

# PSYCHEYE SELF ANALYTIC CONSCIOUSNESS A BASIC INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURE pdf

## 1: A Brief Introduction to C. G. Jung and Analytical Psychology

*Psycheye: Self Analytic Consciousness - A Basic Introduction to the Natural Self-Analytic Images of Co of Consciousness [Akhter Ahsen] on www.enganchecubano.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. Introduction to Eidetics, the natural self-analytic images of consciousness.*

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all philosophy—as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing the discipline. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions. Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own. Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean. The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling conditions—conditions of the possibility—of intentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience, on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience. The Discipline of Phenomenology The discipline of phenomenology is defined by its domain of study, its methods, and its main results. Phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as experienced from the first-person point of view, along with relevant conditions of experience. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, the way it is directed through its content or meaning toward a certain object in the world. We all experience various types of experience including perception, imagination, thought, emotion, desire, volition, and action. Thus, the domain of phenomenology is the range of experiences including these types among others. Experience includes not only relatively passive experience as in vision or hearing, but also active experience as in walking or

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hammering a nail or kicking a ball. The range will be specific to each species of being that enjoys consciousness; our focus is on our own, human, experience. Not all conscious beings will, or will be able to, practice phenomenology, as we do. Conscious experiences have a unique feature: Other things in the world we may observe and engage. But we do not experience them, in the sense of living through or performing them. This experiential or first-person feature—“that of being experienced”—is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious experience: How shall we study conscious experience? We reflect on various types of experiences just as we experience them. That is to say, we proceed from the first-person point of view. However, we do not normally characterize an experience at the time we are performing it. In many cases we do not have that capability: Rather, we acquire a background of having lived through a given type of experience, and we look to our familiarity with that type of experience: The practice of phenomenology assumes such familiarity with the type of experiences to be characterized. Importantly, also, it is types of experience that phenomenology pursues, rather than a particular fleeting experience—“unless its type is what interests us. Classical phenomenologists practiced some three distinguishable methods. Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty spoke of pure description of lived experience. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially social and linguistic context. In the end, all the classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience, factoring out notable features for further elaboration. These traditional methods have been ramified in recent decades, expanding the methods available to phenomenology. What makes an experience conscious is a certain awareness one has of the experience while living through or performing it. Does this awareness-of-experience consist in a kind of inner observation of the experience, as if one were doing two things at once? Recent theorists have proposed both. Or is it a different form of inherent structure? Sartre took this line, drawing on Brentano and Husserl. These issues are beyond the scope of this article, but notice that these results of phenomenological analysis shape the characterization of the domain of study and the methodology appropriate to the domain. For awareness-of-experience is a defining trait of conscious experience, the trait that gives experience a first-person, lived character. It is that lived character of experience that allows a first-person perspective on the object of study, namely, experience, and that perspective is characteristic of the methodology of phenomenology. Conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but experience shades off into less overtly conscious phenomena. As Husserl and others stressed, we are only vaguely aware of things in the margin or periphery of attention, and we are only implicitly aware of the wider horizon of things in the world around us. Moreover, as Heidegger stressed, in practical activities like walking along, or hammering a nail, or speaking our native tongue, we are not explicitly conscious of our habitual patterns of action. Furthermore, as psychoanalysts have stressed, much of our intentional mental activity is not conscious at all, but may become conscious in the process of therapy or interrogation, as we come to realize how we feel or think about something. We should allow, then, that the domain of phenomenology—“our own experience”—spreads out from conscious experience into semi-conscious and even unconscious mental activity, along with relevant background conditions implicitly invoked in our experience. These issues are subject to debate; the point here is to open the door to the question of where to draw the boundary of the domain of phenomenology. To begin an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider some typical experiences one might have in everyday life, characterized in the first person: I see that fishing boat off the coast as dusk descends over the Pacific. I hear that helicopter whirring overhead as it approaches the hospital. I am thinking that phenomenology differs from psychology. I wish that warm rain from Mexico were falling like last week. I imagine a fearsome creature like that in my nightmare. I intend to finish my writing by noon. I walk carefully around the broken glass on the sidewalk. I stroke a backhand cross-court with that certain underspin. I am searching for the words to make my point in conversation. Here are rudimentary characterizations of some familiar types of experience. Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating in everyday English the structure of the type of experience so described. The verb indicates the type of intentional activity described: Of central importance is the way that objects of awareness are presented or intended in our experiences, especially, the

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way we see or conceive or think about objects. In effect, the object-phrase expresses the noema of the act described, that is, to the extent that language has appropriate expressive power. The overall form of the given sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality in the experience: Rich phenomenological description or interpretation, as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty et al. But such simple descriptions bring out the basic form of intentionality. As we interpret the phenomenological description further, we may assess the relevance of the context of experience. And we may turn to wider conditions of the possibility of that type of experience. In this way, in the practice of phenomenology, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze structures of experiences in ways that answer to our own experience. In such interpretive-descriptive analyses of experience, we immediately observe that we are analyzing familiar forms of consciousness, conscious experience of or about this or that. Intentionality is thus the salient structure of our experience, and much of phenomenology proceeds as the study of different aspects of intentionality. Thus, we explore structures of the stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily action. Furthermore, as we reflect on how these phenomena work, we turn to the analysis of relevant conditions that enable our experiences to occur as they do, and to represent or intend as they do. Phenomenology then leads into analyses of conditions of the possibility of intentionality, conditions involving motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often language, with its special place in human affairs. The science of phenomena as distinct from being ontology. That division of any science which describes and classifies its phenomena. From the Greek phainomenon, appearance. In physics and philosophy of science, the term is used in the second sense, albeit only occasionally. In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: Yet the discipline of phenomenology did not blossom until the 20th century and remains poorly understood in many circles of contemporary philosophy. What is that discipline? How did philosophy move from a root concept of phenomena to the discipline of phenomenology? Immanuel Kant used the term occasionally in various writings, as did Johann Gottlieb Fichte. From there Edmund Husserl took up the term for his new science of consciousness, and the rest is history. Suppose we say phenomenology studies phenomena:

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## 2: Summary and Analysis

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History of the issue Questions about the nature of conscious awareness have likely been asked for as long as there have been humans. Neolithic burial practices appear to express spiritual beliefs and provide early evidence for at least minimally reflective thought about the nature of human consciousness Pearson , Clark and Riel-Salvatore Preliterate cultures have similarly been found invariably to embrace some form of spiritual or at least animist view that indicates a degree of reflection about the nature of conscious awareness. Nonetheless, some have argued that consciousness as we know it today is a relatively recent historical development that arose sometime after the Homeric era Jaynes According to this view, earlier humans including those who fought the Trojan War did not experience themselves as unified internal subjects of their thoughts and actions, at least not in the ways we do today. Though the ancients had much to say about mental matters, it is less clear whether they had any specific concepts or concerns for what we now think of as consciousness. The Hamlet who walked the stage in already saw his world and self with profoundly modern eyes. By the beginning of the early modern era in the seventeenth century, consciousness had come full center in thinking about the mind. Indeed from the mid through the late 19th century, consciousness was widely regarded as essential or definitive of the mental. Later, toward the end of the 17th century, John Locke offered a similar if slightly more qualified claim in *An Essay on Human Understanding* , I do not say there is no soul in man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep. But I do say he can not think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but our thoughts, and to them it is and to them it always will be necessary. Locke explicitly forswore making any hypothesis about the substantial basis of consciousness and its relation to matter, but he clearly regarded it as essential to thought as well as to personal identity. Leibniz was the first to distinguish explicitly between perception and apperception, i. In the *Monadology* he also offered his famous analogy of the mill to express his belief that consciousness could not arise from mere matter. He asked his reader to imagine someone walking through an expanded brain as one would walk through a mill and observing all its mechanical operations, which for Leibniz exhausted its physical nature. Nowhere, he asserts, would such an observer see any conscious thoughts. Associationist psychology, whether pursued by Locke or later in the eighteenth century by David Hume or in the nineteenth by James Mill , aimed to discover the principles by which conscious thoughts or ideas interacted or affected each other. The purely associationist approach was critiqued in the late eighteenth century by Immanuel Kant , who argued that an adequate account of experience and phenomenal consciousness required a far richer structure of mental and intentional organization. Phenomenal consciousness according to Kant could not be a mere succession of associated ideas, but at a minimum had to be the experience of a conscious self situated in an objective world structured with respect to space, time and causality. Within the Anglo-American world, associationist approaches continued to be influential in both philosophy and psychology well into the twentieth century, while in the German and European sphere there was a greater interest in the larger structure of experience that led in part to the study of phenomenology through the work of Edmund Husserl , , Martin Heidegger , Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others who expanded the study of consciousness into the realm of the social, the bodily and the interpersonal. At the outset of modern scientific psychology in the mid-nineteenth century, the mind was still largely equated with consciousness, and introspective methods dominated the field as in the work of Wilhelm Wundt , Hermann von Helmholtz , William James and Alfred Titchener However, the relation of consciousness to brain remained very much a mystery as expressed in T. In the s, the grip of behaviorism weakened with the rise of cognitive psychology and its emphasis on information processing and the modeling of internal mental

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processes Neisser , Gardiner However, despite the renewed emphasis on explaining cognitive capacities such as memory, perception and language comprehension, consciousness remained a largely neglected topic for several further decades. In the 80s and 90s there was a major resurgence of scientific and philosophical research into the nature and basis of consciousness Baars , Dennett , Penrose , , Crick , Lycan , , Chalmers It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world Armstrong Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or bees? One might further require that the organism actually be exercising such a capacity rather than merely having the ability or disposition to do so. Thus one might count it as conscious only if it were awake and normally alert. In that sense organisms would not count as conscious when asleep or in any of the deeper levels of coma. Again boundaries may be blurry, and intermediate cases may be involved. For example, is one conscious in the relevant sense when dreaming, hypnotized or in a fugue state? A third and yet more demanding sense might define conscious creatures as those that are not only aware but also aware that they are aware, thus treating creature consciousness as a form of self-consciousness Carruthers The self-awareness requirement might get interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would qualify as conscious in the relevant sense will vary accordingly. If it is taken to involve explicit conceptual self-awareness, many non-human animals and even young children might fail to qualify, but if only more rudimentary implicit forms of self-awareness are required then a wide range of nonlinguistic creatures might count as self-conscious. What it is like. Subject of conscious states. A fifth alternative would be to define the notion of a conscious organism in terms of conscious states. That is, one might first define what makes a mental state a conscious mental state, and then define being a conscious creature in terms of having such states. In addition to describing creatures as conscious in these various senses, there are also related senses in which creatures are described as being conscious of various things. The distinction is sometimes marked as that between transitive and intransitive notions of consciousness, with the former involving some object at which consciousness is directed Rosenthal There are at least six major options. States one is aware of. On one common reading, a conscious mental state is simply a mental state one is aware of being in Rosenthal , Conscious states in this sense involve a form of meta-mentality or meta-intentionality in so far as they require mental states that are themselves about mental states. To have a conscious desire for a cup of coffee is to have such a desire and also to be simultaneously and directly aware that one has such a desire. Unconscious thoughts and desires in this sense are simply those we have without being aware of having them, whether our lack of self-knowledge results from simple inattention or more deeply psychoanalytic causes. States might also be regarded as conscious in a seemingly quite different and more qualitative sense. See the entry on qualia. There is considerable disagreement about the nature of such qualia Churchland , Shoemaker , Clark , Chalmers and even about their existence. Traditionally qualia have been regarded as intrinsic, private, ineffable monadic features of experience, but current theories of qualia often reject at least some of those commitments Dennett Such qualia are sometimes referred to as phenomenal properties and the associated sort of consciousness as phenomenal consciousness, but the latter term is perhaps more properly applied to the overall structure of experience and involves far more than sensory qualia. The phenomenal structure of consciousness also encompasses much of the spatial, temporal and conceptual organization of our experience of the world and of ourselves as agents in it. States might be conscious in a seemingly quite different access sense, which has more to do with intra-mental relations. In so far as the information in that state is richly and flexibly available to its containing organism, then it counts as a conscious state in the relevant respect, whether or not it has any qualitative or phenomenal feel in the Nagel sense. Although these six notions of what makes a state conscious can be independently specified, they are obviously not without potential links, nor do they exhaust the realm of possible options. Drawing connections, one might argue that states appear in the stream of consciousness only in so far as we are aware of them, and thus forge a bond between the first meta-mental notion of a conscious state and the stream or narrative concept. Or one might connect the access with the qualitative or

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phenomenal notions of a conscious state by trying to show that states that represent in those ways make their contents widely available in the respect required by the access notion. Aiming to go beyond the six options, one might distinguish conscious from nonconscious states by appeal to aspects of their intra-mental dynamics and interactions other than mere access relations; e. Alternatively, one might try to define conscious states in terms of conscious creatures. Distinctions can be drawn between creature and state consciousness as well as among the varieties of each. One can refer specifically to phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, reflexive or meta-mental consciousness, and narrative consciousness among other varieties. How much this commits one to the ontological status of consciousness per se will depend on how much of a Platonist one is about universals in general. See the entry on the medieval problem of universals. Though it is not the norm, one could nonetheless take a more robustly realist view of consciousness as a component of reality. That is one could think of consciousness as more on a par with electromagnetic fields than with life. Since the demise of vitalism, we do not think of life per se as something distinct from living things. There are living things including organisms, states, properties and parts of organisms, communities and evolutionary lineages of organisms, but life is not itself a further thing, an additional component of reality, some vital force that gets added into living things. Electromagnetic fields by contrast are regarded as real and independent parts of our physical world. Even though one may sometimes be able to specify the values of such a field by appeal to the behavior of particles in it, the fields themselves are regarded as concrete constituents of reality and not merely as abstractions or sets of relations among particles. Though such strongly realist views are not very common at present, they should be included within the logical space of options. However, this may be less of an embarrassment than an embarrassment of riches. Consciousness is a complex feature of the world, and understanding it will require a diversity of conceptual tools for dealing with its many differing aspects. Conceptual plurality is thus just what one would hope for. However, one should not assume that conceptual plurality implies referential divergence. Our multiple concepts of consciousness may in fact pick out varying aspects of a single unified underlying mental phenomenon. Whether and to what extent they do so remains an open question.

**Problems of Consciousness** The task of understanding consciousness is an equally diverse project. Not only do many different aspects of mind count as conscious in some sense, each is also open to various respects in which it might be explained or modeled. Understanding consciousness involves a multiplicity not only of explananda but also of questions that they pose and the sorts of answers they require. At the risk of oversimplifying, the relevant questions can be gathered under three crude rubrics as the What, How, and Why questions: What are its principal features? And by what means can they be best discovered, described and modeled? How does consciousness of the relevant sort come to exist? Is it a primitive aspect of reality, and if not how does or could consciousness in the relevant respect arise from or be caused by nonconscious entities or processes? Why does consciousness of the relevant sort exist? Does it have a function, and if so what is it? Does it act causally and if so with what sorts of effects? Does it make a difference to the operation of systems in which it is present, and if so why and how? The three questions focus respectively on describing the features of consciousness, explaining its underlying basis or cause, and explicating its role or value. The divisions among the three are of course somewhat artificial, and in practice the answers one gives to each will depend in part on what one says about the others. One can not, for example, adequately answer the what question and describe the main features of consciousness without addressing the why issue of its functional role within systems whose operations it affects. Nor could one explain how the relevant sort of consciousness might arise from nonconscious processes unless one had a clear account of just what features had to be caused or realized to count as producing it. Those caveats notwithstanding, the three-way division of questions provides a useful structure for articulating the overall explanatory project and for assessing the adequacy of particular theories or models of consciousness. What are the features of consciousness? The What question asks us to describe and model the principal features of consciousness, but just which features are relevant will vary with the sort of consciousness we aim to capture.

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## 3: The Concept of Consciousness - Bibliography - PhilPapers

*Psycheye: Self Analytic Consciousness - A Basic Introduction to the Natural Self-Analytic Images of Co of Consciousness by Ahsen, Akhter. Brandon House. Used - Good.*

Retail Price to Students: How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness wars. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this heated debate as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, while offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain. Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly reveals how contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology have failed to explain how and why mental events emerge from physiological occurrences in the brain. He proposes instead that conscious experience must be understood in an entirely new light--as an irreducible entity similar to such physical properties as time, mass, and space that exists at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its parts. And after suggesting some intriguing possibilities about the structure and laws of conscious experience, he details how his unique reinterpretation of the mind could be the focus of a new science. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the notion that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by silicon chips that precisely duplicate their functions--as the neurons are replaced, will consciousness gradually fade away? All of us have pondered the nature and meaning of consciousness. Engaging and penetrating, *The Conscious Mind* adds a fresh new perspective to the subject that is sure to spark debate about our understanding of the mind for years to come. Reviews About the Author s David J. Chalmers is a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Reviews "Certainly one of the best discussions of consciousness in existence. Offers an outstandingly competent survey of the field. What is the nature of subjective experience? Why do we have vividly felt experiences of the world? Why is there someone home inside our heads?"

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## 4: Freudian Theory and Consciousness: A Conceptual Analysis\*\*

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Furthermore, the study of the self extends far beyond the topics that explicitly reference the term. Social comparison theory, for example, comprises studies on how people define their characteristics by assessing where they stand relative to others. And of course, the study of the self extends beyond psychology: The major topics related to self-functioning that social and personality psychologists address concern the ways in which people understand and define their characteristics self-knowledge, how people use task and social feedback to monitor their goal progress self-regulation, the influence of personal standards, expectations, and values on perception of others self in social judgment, and how people maintain desired self-images. The self has been studied as an individual difference variable primarily by personality theorists, as a determinant of social perception, attribution, and judgment, and as an essential element in social relations. A major theme has been the interplay between motivational and nonmotivational factors in self-evaluation. Most current perspectives on the self include the motives that can potentially bias the way information regarding the self is obtained, processed, and recalled, as well as the ordinary cognitive processes that underlie self-functions. This integration has broadened theoretical explanations involving the self and bodes well for the future vigor of this research area.

**General Overviews** Although a great deal of research on the psychology of self will be surveyed throughout this bibliographic guide, presenting an exhaustive review of the available work is beyond the scope of the current article. Discussion on the nature of selfhood dates back to pre-scientific philosophy Descartes; first published, a testament not only to the theoretical intrigue of the self as a construct of study but also to the difficulty if not impossibility of paying homage to every scholastic endeavor that has valuably contributed to our current understanding of self and identity. Thus before exploring the specific facets of selfhood as outlined in the following sections, it would be useful to direct the reader to more thoroughly comprehensive works that delve into the psychology of self at a deeper level. Leary and Tangney offers perhaps the most authoritative compilation of contemporary scholarship on selfhood on the market, while Baumeister provides a collection of some of the most influential empirical works both historical and contemporary to advance the scientific study of self. Baumeister is a chapter in the *Handbook of Social Psychology* that offers a systematic, comprehensive survey of historical and contemporary research on the self, and Fiske emphasizes the inherently social nature of the many manifestations of selfhood. Finally, Kruglanski, et al. In *The handbook of social psychology*. Discusses relevant research as it relates to one of three major experiences of selfhood: *The self in social psychology*: Organized into ten thematic sections: Excellent resource for advanced undergraduate and graduate students. A textbook mutually suitable for upper-level undergraduate courses as well as advanced scholars seeking a broad overview of the relevant subfields in the psychology of self. Surveys both contemporary and historical views on the study of selfhood. *Meditations on first philosophy*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: A classic precursor to the scientific study of self-knowledge wherein Descartes distinguishes between the inner, immaterial substance of mind that ascertains the proceedings of the outer, material body. *Social to the core*. A core motives approach to social psychology. Readable for an advanced undergraduate audience and useful as a summarizing work for the graduate level and beyond. *The self and social identity [Special Issue]*. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* *Handbook of self and identity*. Chapters written by the foremost experts in the field offer an up-to-date, detailed exploration of the self from multiple levels of analysis e. Contributions from authoritative scholars in the area are arranged to investigate selfhood from four perspectives: A valuable resource for the graduate level and beyond. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login. [How to Subscribe Oxford Bibliographies Online](#) is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative [click here](#).

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## 5: Psychology of the Self - Psychology - Oxford Bibliographies

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ISBN

Wundt[ edit ] It has often been claimed that Wilhelm Wundt , the father of modern psychology, was the first to adopt introspection to experimental psychology [1] though the methodological idea had been presented long before, as by 18th century German philosopher-psychologists such as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten or Johann Nicolaus Tetens. Building upon the pre-existing use of introspection in physiology, Wundt believed the method of introspection was the ability to observe an experience, not just the logical reflection or speculations which some others interpreted his meaning to be. Such exact purism was typical of Wundt and he instructed all introspection observations be performed under these same instructions "1 the Observer must, if possible, be in a position to determine beforehand the entrance of the process to be observed. In particular, historians of psychology tend to argue 1 that introspection once was the dominant method of psychological inquiry, 2 that behaviorism, and in particular John B. Watson , is responsible for discrediting introspection as a valid method, and 3 that scientific psychology completely abandoned introspection as a result of those critiques. Introspection is still widely used in psychology, but under different names, such as self-report surveys, interviews and fMRIs. For example, in the " think aloud protocol ", investigators cue participants to speak their thoughts aloud in order to study an active thought process without forcing an individual to comment on the process itself. Immanuel Kant added that, if they are understood too narrowly, introspective experiments are impossible. Introspection delivers, at best, hints about what goes on in the mind; it does not suffice to justify knowledge claims about the mind. Recent psychological research on cognition and attribution has asked people to report on their mental processes, for instance to say why they made a particular choice or how they arrived at a judgment. In some situations, these reports are clearly confabulated. One of the central implications of dissociations between consciousness and meta-consciousness is that individuals, presumably including researchers, can misrepresent their experiences to themselves. However, when we consider research on the topic, this conclusion seems less self-evident. In short, empirical studies suggest that people can fail to appraise adequately i. Another question in regards to the veracious accountability of introspection is if researchers lack the confidence in their own introspections and those of their participants, then how can it gain legitimacy? Three strategies are accountable: For example, people generally see themselves as less conformist than others, and this seems to be because they do not introspect any urge to conform. They made audio recordings of subjects who had been told to say whatever came into their heads as they answered a question about their own bias. When subjects were explicitly told to avoid relying on introspection, their assessments of their own bias became more realistic. Noetic understanding can not be achieved by rational or discursive thought i. Devout Jains often do Pratikraman at least twice a day. Especially, Swami Chinmayananda emphasised the role of introspection in five stages, outlined in his book "Self Unfoldment. Bickham, thought plays a critical role in both scene and sequel.

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## 6: The Function of Consciousness - Bibliography - PhilPapers

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Last Updated on Sunday, 27 October After completing his medical studies, Jung obtained a position at the Burghoelzli Hospital in Zurich, Switzerland. There he worked with patients suffering from schizophrenia, while also conducting word association research. Freud invited Jung to Vienna, and they began a professional relationship. Freud soon began to favor Jung as his successor in the new and growing psychoanalytic movement. Jung and Freud held in common an understanding of the profound role of the unconscious. Their understanding of the nature of the unconscious, however, began to diverge. Jung likewise felt betrayed, believing that Freud, because of his inflexibility, had failed to support this extension of their mutual work. In the years from to , when Jung was largely ostracized by the psychoanalytic community, he embarked upon a deep, extensive, and potentially dangerous process of self-analysis that he called a "confrontation with the unconscious" Jung, , chap. Jung emerged from this personal journey with the structures in place for his theories on archetypes, complexes, the collective unconscious, and the individuation process. These theories, along with his understanding of the symbolism found in dreams and in other creative processes, formed the basis of his clinical approach, which he called analytical psychology. Throughout his long life, Jung continued to develop and broaden his theoretical framework, drawing both on his clinical practice and his study of such wide-ranging subjects as alchemy, Eastern religions, astrology, mythology, and fairy tales. Jungian Theory Jungian theory is very much experience driven. It is an approach which keeps one foot in the world of outer events and the other on the inner realm of fantasies, dreams, and symbols. Jung himself largely moved from human observation to theory. He constructed his concepts on the evidence derived from his clinical observations and personal experience, including an extended period of deep and intense self-analysis see Jung, Jung drew upon an enormous variety of mythical and anthropological material to amplify and illuminate rather than to prove his theory. Only then could the mass of imagery and data from many sources be organized. The organization itself then helps to understand one aspect or other of human behavior. Thus the process is circular: This is, of course, also true for the various neo-Freudian usages of this terminology. In the Freudian conceptualization, ego refers to a psychic structure which mediates between society superego and instinctual drives id. For Jung the ego can be understood in a much more dynamic, relative, and fragile way as a complex, a feeling-toned group of representations of oneself that has both conscious and unconscious aspects and is at the same time personal and collective. Simply put, too simply perhaps, the ego is how one sees oneself, along with the conscious and unconscious feelings that accompany that view Hopcke, , p. The ego, as one complex see below among many, is not seen by Jungians as the goal of psychological development. The Self can be understood as the central organizing principle of the psyche, that fundamental and essential aspect of human personality which gives cohesion, meaning, direction, and purpose to the whole psyche. Resting for the most part close to the surface of the unconscious are those personal attributes and elements of experience which have been excluded from the ego, usually because of parental and societal disapproval. These elements are known as the shadow, and they tend to be projected on less favored individuals and groups. While in general these qualities are negative ones, the shadow may also contain positive aspects which the individual has been unable to own. It reveals certain selected aspects of the individual and hides others. A well-developed individual may have several personae appropriate to business and social situations. The concept of the archetypes is perhaps the most distinctive of the Jungian concepts Jung, b, It is a concept which Jungians understand as a given in human experience but which often baffles those from other psychoanalytic schools. He observed that many of these symbols had appeared again and again throughout history in mythology, religion, fairy tales, alchemical texts, and other forms of creative

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expression. Jung became convinced that the source of this symbolic material was what he identified as the collective unconscious, a pool of experience accessible to all humans through history which lies below the personal unconscious. The archetypes were, for Jung, "typical modes of expression" arising from this collective layer. The archetypes are neither images nor ideas but, rather, fundamental psychic patterns common to all humans into which personal experiences are organized. He termed these clusters "feeling-toned complexes" Jung, , par. Feeling-toned complexes are the basic structural units of the psyche. Jung saw complexes as "the living units of the psyche" a, p. They are like real personalities in that they contain images, feelings, and qualities, and if they engulf the ego, they determine behavior as well Sandner and Beebe, , p. Reality sees to it that the peaceful cycle of egocentric ideas is constantly interrupted by ideas with a strong feeling-tone, that is, by affects. A situation threatening danger pushes aside the tranquil play of ideas and puts in their place a complex of other ideas with a very strong feeling-tone. The new complex then crowds everything else into the background. For the time being it is the most distinct because it totally inhibits all other ideas; it permits only those egocentric ideas to exist which fit its situation, and under certain conditions it can suppress to the point of complete momentary unconsciousness all ideas that run counter to it, however strong they may be. It now possesses the strongest attention-tone Jung, , p. A number of authors have attempted to classify Jungians by school especially see Samuels, , an attempt which seems only partially successful in capturing the great diversity found among Jungians, precisely because the theory is experience driven. Joseph Henderson notes that. This is to be expected since individuation. Although there are differing emphases and styles in Jungian psychotherapy, there are fundamental goals which almost all Jungians hold in common. Murray Stein summarizes these as follows: This transformation of the personality requires coming to terms with the unconscious, its specific structures and their dynamic relations to consciousness as these become available during the course of analysis. Transformation also depends upon the significant modification of the unconscious structures that shape and control ego-consciousness at the beginning of analysis, a change that takes place through the constellation of archetypal structures and dynamics in the interactive field between analyst and analysand , p. Jungian theory understands the psyche as containing a drive toward balance and wholeness, differentiating and incorporating the various elements of the personal unconscious and establishing access to the collective unconscious. Jung called this the process of individuation. Eventually the unconscious will begin to provide not only descriptions of the existing impasse but also positive suggestions for possibilities of development which could reconcile the opposing positions, showing us what avenues of development are available to us, what paths are required of us or closed to us, according to the inherent plan of the Self , p. Karen Signell speaks of the therapeutic process, from a Jungian perspective, as respect[ing] the. Reflections on the history and practice of Jungian analysis. Chicago and La Salle, IL: A guided tour of The Collected Works of C. Princeton University Press, 20 vols. The psychology of dementia praecox. In The psychogenesis of mental disease, Collected works 3. Transformations and symbols of libido, Collected works supplementary vol. On the psychology of the unconscious. In Two essays on analytical psychology, Collected works 7. On the problem of psychogenesis in mental disease. Archetypes of the collective unconscious. In The archetypes and the collective unconscious, Collected works 9, I. The concept of the collective unconscious. Psychology and alchemy, Collected works The psychology of the transference. In The Practice of Psychotherapy, Collected works In Aion, Collected works 9, II. Jung and the post-Jungians. London and New York: The aims and goal of Jungian analysis.

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## 7: Philosophy of self - Wikipedia

*Psycheye: A Basic Introduction to the Natural Self Analytic Images of Consciousness Eidetics (Hardback) Akhter Ahsen (author).*

Avinash De Sousa, Carmel, 18, St. Road, Santacruz west , Mumbai - , India Email: This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. Abstract This paper aims at taking a fresh look at Freudian psychoanalytical theory from a modern perspective. Freudian psychology is a science based on the unconscious id and the conscious ego. Various aspects of Freudian thinking are examined from a modern perspective and the relevance of the psychoanalytical theory of consciousness is projected. Do psychoanalysis and the unconsciousness have something to teach us about consciousness? Approaching Freud from a historical, psychoanalytical, anthropological and sociological perspective, we need to look at how Freudian theory may contribute to a better understanding of consciousness. We also need to look at psychoanalytical psychotherapy and its contribution to a better understanding of body-mind dualism and consciousness as a whole. Ego psychology is considered in the present day context and it is synthesized with various psychological studies to give us a better understanding of consciousness. He gave us a new and powerful way to think about and investigate human thought, action and interaction. He often made sense of the ranges that were neglected or misunderstood. Although one might wish to reject or argue with some Freudian interpretations and theories, his writings and insights are too compelling to simply turn away. There is still much to be learned from Freud Neu, Much to be learned in relation to issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, moral and social theory. The special characteristics of unconscious states including their relations to states described by modern psychology and the relevance of the Freudian unconsciousness to questions concerning the divided or multiple self is equally important. Is the Freudian unconscious relevant in the light of modern day consciousness? Psychoanalysis regarded everything mental being in the first place unconscious, and thus for them, consciousness might be present or absent. This of course provoked a denial from philosophers for whom consciousness and mental were identical and they could never conceive of an absurdity such as an unconscious mental state. Reasons for believing in the existence of the unconsciousness are of course empirical, but the question as to what most fundamentally distinguishes the Freudian unconscious is a conceptual one. It is very important that one understands the nature of the unconsciousness in broad holistic terms rather than the fine details that Freud gave, and also one must follow the coherence of such a concept to understand our present day understanding of consciousness Freud, ; Ricoeur, The qualified specialization of consciousness that can be located in ordinary thought about the mind provides a source of motivation that is free from conceptual confusion. The analysis of what it is to be in consciousness has a further importance for the concept of unconscious mentality. If one assumes that all mental states are conscious alone, we will take a highly sceptical stand on Freudian theory and the topographical model of the mind proposed by him Laplanche and Pontalis, For example, mental states like beliefs and values do not exist solely by virtue of the consciousness in them. It would now be helpful to spell out more precisely various conceptions of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconsciousness in terms of successive degrees of independence from the concept of consciousness. Unconsciousness may be entirely composed of ideas that were previously conscious and have been repressed. This would meet the Lockenian condition on mentality, that is, there can be nothing in the mind that has not been previously in awareness Ricoeur, Unconsciousness may be perceived as entirely composed of, or at least as including some ideas that were not originally conscious but that could become conscious Sears, The last of these conceptions matches the unconsciousness as described in the writings of Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion Bion, ; Dryden, , but it is also most probably attributable to Freud. A different question now needs to be addressed. It has been supposed that positive reason to believe in the existence of unconsciousness may come, and does in fact come from the notion that unconsciousness is necessary as data of consciousness have very large number of gaps in them Freud, Consciousness is

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characterized by a special kind of unity, on account of which it does not tolerate gaps of any kind. These gaps are as such fully psychological in nature and they occur at points where we would ordinarily expect an intentional psychological explanation to be available and in this way, they stand apart from other merely nominal gaps in ordinary psychological explanation for example, the impossibility of explaining how it is that one ordinarily remembers something. Freud in his topographical model never looked at the mind to be built up of a number of agencies or systems, but rather these were terms used in a very special way, and it is a further puzzle as to what precisely Freud wanted them to signify. Freud, Consciousness and unconsciousness are not inimical properties and they are not intrinsically antagonistic to each other. Conflict between them is not regarding their status but because of the particular character of the contents of unconsciousness and their consequent connection with repression. Wollheim, Many questions remain unanswered, but it is fitting to conclude that consciousness and unconsciousness are both a set of states with representational content distinguished by special features which need not be regarded as propositional attitudes, characteristically endowed with phenomenology but attributed in a spirit of pure plain psychological realism. Archard, Relationships Between Freudian Theory and Cognitive Psychology with Reference to Consciousness. Though over a century has elapsed since Freud first proposed his theory, there has been very little comparison between Freudian theory and its links to nonpsychoanalytic academic psychology. The choice of cognitive psychology in this discussion stems from the fact that cognitive theory and cognitive psychology have a basis in almost all facets of modern psychology. Though cognitive psychology has explained many areas unknown to us 50 years earlier, one must admit that no other theorist ever constructed a conceptual and metatheoretical framework like Freud did, in order to understand psychological questions. The evidence available in his time suggested that some mental states might exist outside ones awareness. Thus, Freud had to reject the principle that all mental states are conscious ontological, but he retained the principle that all conscious states are accessible to awareness epistemological. The demotion of consciousness to a purely epistemological role leads to serious failure, both by Freud and other theorists. In the transformation of psychology from a science of consciousness to a science of mental representations, there has been a gain in theoretical power, but there has been a loss of something of great value. Psychologists may in fact be avoiding the problem that made the mental realm so puzzling in the first place, the problem of consciousness, and thereby ignoring the mystery that is at the heart of the nature of meaning and mind. Grunbaum, ; Holt, ; Roth, Terms such as awareness, reflective awareness, phenomenal awareness and phenomenal representation have all been used to refer to the same thing. Awareness has been used to refer to what we mean when we are at the moment conscious of something but also refers to the latent knowledge of something. The term conscious, unless burdened with additional meaning, may serve to mean what is immediately, subjectively and introspectively given in experience. We may be thus conscious of a rational abstract idea, an obsessional preoccupation or even a hallucination. We are conscious in psychosis, dissociative states, in intoxication and so forth. But each of these represents a quite different mental organisation of experiences, obeying different principles of organisation and existing on different levels of categorization and abstraction. Kihlstrom, We shall now take a look at the confusion, both terminological and conceptual, that dogged Freudian thought as well as contemporary cognitive psychology. Freud always struggled with what has been called an adjectival and substantive use of the term conscious. It simply means that the term conscious idea denotes an idea that is directly, subjectively given and capable of being introspected, although it need not be. The experience can be conscious in a variety of different states, i. It is better to refer to the above states as psychological states rather than different states of consciousness. The experience of consciousness may be different in each state but consciousness as a subjective, introspective given, is indivisible no matter what the state of consciousness. But the principles of organisation, levels of categorization and abstraction affecting or producing the experience may be different. Cognitive psychology has not been immune to confusing and ambiguous uses of the term conscious and consciousness. If consciousness can occur in a variety of psychological states regardless of the principles of organisation, what purpose does being conscious serve and what shall then be the special conditions needed for consciousness to

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occur? What is the role that consciousness must play in our lives, apart from the operation of the different principles of organisation and levels of abstraction? Freud gave consciousness the quality and capacity to transform experienced activity into unconscious states, similar to how different forms of energy are interchanged in physics. It could also play a part in inhibiting and restricting certain thoughts from becoming conscious. It also served the purpose of transforming quantities of unconscious excitation into qualitative experiences of pleasure and displeasure Freud, ; Hartmann, Open in a separate window Flowchart of the paper Whether psychoanalytic and cognitive science views of the consciousness are fraternal or identical twins, we do not know, but they were certainly reared apart from one another. The psychoanalytic twin was raised in the consulting room, exposed to primal scenes, intrapsychic conflict and the risky improvisations of clinical work, whereas the cognitive twin was raised in the scientific laboratory where calm and order prevailed. There is no doubt that the cognitive and psychoanalytic views are different and come out of different traditions Shervin and Dickman, Cognitive science focusses on motive, affect and conflict, whereas psychoanalysis focusses on conflict and underlying psychological processes. There are in fact convergences between these two radically different views but from a holistic perspective. They follow a similarity in the nature of the problems they address, though at first look they seem to be far apart. The newer developments in the field of cognitive science dealing with levels of categorisation and organisation will be of immense value in studying the hierarchical relationship between unconscious and conscious experiences. The chasm between the consulting room and scientific laboratory may soon narrow. We are now at a stage where we must broaden and deepen the scientific investigation of consciousness and conscious states in a way never done before. We need to apply our imagination and good will while being open minded and flexible at the same time. Take home message Freudian theory needs to be given a fresh look. Though considered outdated by some, it has a lot to offer to modern theories of consciousness. Insights from Freudian theory are relevant to modern day concepts of consciousness in cognitive neuroscience. Consciousness and unconsciousness are both independent and interdependent phenomena and their study will yield a different perspective on the evolution of conscious phenomena. Footnotes None declared Declaration This is to state that this is my original, unpublished work and has not been submitted for publication elsewhere. Brain, Mind and Consciousness: An International, Interdisciplinary Perspective A. Does Freudian theory play a role in explaining our modern day concept of consciousness? Do parts of Freudian theory have resemblance with modern day cognitive psychology and its theories? Should qualitative research on Freudian concepts be carried out in the light of modern theories of consciousness? Should modern methods of neuroimaging and neuroscience in the light of new data be used to validate Freudian models of conscious phenomena?

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## 8: Introspection - Wikipedia

*Nature is divided into an introduction and eight chapters. In the Introduction, Emerson laments the current tendency to accept the knowledge and traditions of the past instead of experiencing God and nature directly, in the present.*

I am grateful to the Chairman of the British Committee of the summer-school, Dr Nicholas Bunnin, for extending me the invitation. This provided me with a valuable opportunity to develop, and commit to paper, my ideas on the inter-relationships between language, thought, and consciousness. I am also grateful to our Chinese hosts from the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for making the experience such a pleasant and intellectually fruitful one. I hope that, partly as a result of my efforts, those who attended the summer-school went away fired with enthusiasm for philosophical studies of the nature of human cognition. Since then I have received help, of various sorts, from a great many people. I also benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee for Cambridge University Press, and from discussions with colleagues and students at seminars in Manchester, MIT, Oxford, Sheffield, and Cambridge. The main character and direction of my project are described in some detail in the Introduction and the opening chapter, and so do not need to be reiterated here. But I should like to say something very briefly about the way in which I understand the nature and methods of philosophy. Besides having some intrinsic interest, these remarks may help to orient the reader with respect to the arguments that follow. It is often commented that there are two very different species of philosophy widely practised within the English-speaking world. I ignore the small minority who attempt to do philosophy in Continental mode – they will not, in any case, be reading this. One of these conceives of philosophy as broadly continuous with science, takes the goal of philosophy to be truth about a wide variety of subject-matters, and is prepared to make use of a posteriori inferences to the best explanation in pursuit of this goal. In contrast, the other species of philosophy sees itself as sharply distinct from science, takes the distinctive goal of philosophy to be conceptual truth, and insists that the methods of philosophy must be a priori conceptual analysis or argument. Let us label these the substantive and the analytical conceptions of philosophy respectively. Analytical philosophy is more common in Britain, stemming partly from the influence of Wittgenstein, who believed that the sole business of the philosopher is to gain a clear view of the inter-relations amongst our concepts. It might then seem that the kernel of the disagreement between the two conceptions concerns the legitimacy of a category of analytic truth. For substantive philosophy, in denying that there is any such category, must deny that there is any sharp distinction between philosophical and scientific truth. Whereas analytical philosophy, in accepting that category, can insist that the class of analytic truths constitutes the proper domain of the philosopher as opposed to the scientist. This way of viewing the disagreement between the two conceptions is mistaken, however, as I shall now try to explain. The crucial point is that there is nothing to force a philosopher who accepts the existence of concepts and conceptual connections to believe that philosophy should be concerned only with such connections. Someone can accept the category of analytic truth, and so find a place for a priori conceptual analysis and discovery within philosophy, while maintaining that philosophers can also be concerned with substantive issues of fact, and can legitimately employ a posteriori inferences to the best explanation in attempting to resolve those issues. Indeed, I hold just such a combination of views myself. As will be seen in Chapter 4, I believe that the reasons for rejecting the existence of concepts and conceptual truths are not very powerful. But I also believe that philosophy can, and should, be substantive. I think we can distinguish between two distinct strands within analytical philosophy, corresponding to two distinct sources of motivation. Let me take each of these sources of motivation in turn. In the beginning, of course, philosophy was simply the pursuit of knowledge, and no distinction was drawn between philosophy and science. But with the passage of time the various special sciences – physics, chemistry, biology, and, now, psychology – grew up and became independent of their parent, leaving the subject-matter remaining to philosophy correspondingly diminished. This naturally gave rise to an anxiety, in the minds of some, that the domain of

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philosophy might one day shrink to zero, as science progressed still further. And it then seemed imperative to define a subject-matter proper to philosophy that would be forever safe from the encroachment of science. This was to be the domain of analytic as opposed to synthetic truth. But in fact this anxiety was misplaced. For it should have been plain that there will always be substantive questions for philosophers to answer that are not scientific ones. This must be so, if only because those questions are about science, such as the question whether science is successful in obtaining real knowledge for us. Moreover there are, arguably, many domains of belief which are not, and do not purport to be, scientific, but which nevertheless give rise to philosophical problems. These include ethics, aesthetics, common-sense physics, and many others. One such body of beliefs, in my view, is that of common-sense beliefs about the mind so called folk-psychology, as will be seen in the chapters that follow. And it should always have been obvious that the question of the relationship between these beliefs and those of science cannot itself be a scientific one. The line of thought goes something like this. We begin with the idea that the business of philosophy is to obtain for us genuine knowledge or perhaps, on some conceptions of knowledge, to obtain the knowledge that we have such knowledge – see my a, ch. We then add to this a foundationalist conception of the architecture of knowledge, according to which all knowledge must be grounded in beliefs that are certainly true by means of principles of inference that are also certain. And then it follows that only deduction can be legitimate in primary philosophy. If other methods of inference – including inference to the best explanation – are to be employed at all, then they must first be vindicated by means of deductive argument from premises that are certainly true. But the mistake in this argument, in my view, lies in the foundationalist premiss. Rather, the best account of the architecture of our knowledge is coherentist. According to this view, a belief comes to be justified by forming part of an explanatory network of such beliefs, which collectively provide the simplest, most coherent, explanation for the course of our experience. From such a perspective, inference to the best explanation can play just as fundamental a role in the construction of appropriately coherent sets of belief as does deduction. There is then no reason why philosophers should not, at least tentatively, avail themselves of such modes of inference in advance of attempting to vindicate them. Indeed, there is some reason to think, contrariwise, that even deduction must rely, tacitly, upon an inference to the best explanation – if only on an inference from the fact that an argument seems valid to us to the conclusion that it is so – in which case there is no philosophy which can be done without employing explanatory inferences. In the chapters that follow, then, I shall be concerned with questions that are substantive as well as with those that are more narrowly analytic. Indeed, many of these questions might equally be raised, from a somewhat different perspective, by scientific psychologists. There is a good reason for this. For example, Einstein engaged in extensive reflection on the nature of space and time, in the period when he was developing the theory of relativity, which might have seemed familiar to Locke, or to Leibniz, or to Kant. Arguably, psychology is in just such a state of revolution and self-analysis. For the basic nature and direction of psychological enquiry are currently topics of intense psychological debate; and one of the strands in this debate is – or should be – the role to be accorded to natural language in our best model of human cognition. Moreover, since the resolution of this latter issue is currently empirically undetermined as I shall argue in Chapter 2, it is crucial to stake out and explore the implications of the different frameworks within which more detailed investigations may take place. That is what I have tried to do in this book, in connection with the presently-unfashionable hypothesis that much of human thought is conducted in natural language. So my hope is that the ideas defended here will be of interest to psychologists and other cognitive scientists, just as much as to philosophers. But this must be for them to judge. I shall be arguing for a version of the latter thesis. My view is that much of human conscious thinking is, necessarily given the way in which human cognition is structured, conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. I do not, however, make any claim to have demonstrated the truth of this view beyond all reasonable doubt. For the arguments that I provide in its support are broadly empirical ones, involving inferences to the best explanation of a range of phenomena. They are therefore vulnerable to counter-attack from those who can provide further recalcitrant data, and may reasonably be rejected by anyone who can

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provide a better explanation of the phenomena in question. What I do hope that I have shown, however, is that the case for the independence of thought from language is by no means as clear-cut as many philosophers and cognitive scientists have assumed. And I therefore hope to have provided encouragement for further work to be conducted in the alternative, language-involving, paradigm. If thought is independent of such language, then language itself becomes only a medium for the communication of thoughts. I shall refer to this theory of the role and significance of natural language as the communicative conception of language. According to the communicative conception, the function and purpose of natural language is to facilitate communication and not except indirectly, by enabling the acquisition of new beliefs to facilitate thinking. Language will still have to be represented and processed within the cognition of each individual, of course. The communicative conception of language has been widely endorsed in the history of philosophy, by figures such as John Locke , Bertrand Russell , Paul Grice and and David Lewis It is also the standard model for those now working in cognitive science, who view language as an isolable, and largely isolated, module of the mind, which is both innately structured and specialised for the interpretation and construction of natural language sentences. If, on the other hand, natural language is constitutively involved in our conscious thinkings as I shall argue , then language is itself the primary medium of such thought, and much such thinking is essentially linguistic. I shall refer to this as the cognitive conception of language, since it accords a central place to natural language within our cognition. On this account we often think in language, and the trains of reasoning which lead up to many of our decisions and actions will consist in sequences of natural language sentences. Language thus has an intra-personal cognitive function, as well as having its obvious inter-personal uses. Here the picture of communication through language is quite different. When a speaker utters a sentence, on this view, their utterance expresses a thought by constituting it, not by encoding or signalling it. A hearer who is a competent user of the same language will then understand that utterance in virtue of it constitutively expressing, for them, the very same or a sufficiently similar thought. The cognitive conception of language has been endorsed by such disparate figures as Ludwig Wittgenstein and , Lev Vygotsky , Benjamin Lee Whorf , Daniel Dennett , and also sometimes Noam Chomsky – at least, that is how I interpret Chapter 2 of that work; but Chomsky has since disavowed any such view in personal correspondence. My own diagnosis of what has happened in the cognitive sciences in recent decades is this. Researchers have become increasingly convinced, by neuropsychological and other evidence, that the mind is more or less modular in structure, built up out of isolable, and largely isolated, components see Fodor, , Sachs, , and Shallice, They have also become convinced that the structure and contents of the mind are substantially innate see Fodor, and , and Carey, , and that language is one such isolable and largely innate module see Fodor, , and Chomsky, There has then been, amongst cognitive scientists, a near-universal reaction against the cognitive conception of language, by running it together with the Whorfian hypothesis. Most researchers have assumed, without argument, that if they were to accept any form of cognitive conception of language, then that would commit them to Whorfian linguistic relativism and radical empiricism, and would hence be inconsistent with their well-founded beliefs in modularity and nativism see Pinker, It is important to see, however, that someone endorsing the cognitive conception of language does not have to regard language and the mind as cultural constructs, either socially determined or culturally relative. A large part of my task is to show that there is a position intermediate between the communicative conception of language on the one hand, and Whorfian relativism the Standard Social Science Model on the other, which deserves the attention of philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. More than this, of course, I hope to convince the reader that this combination of views is not only possible, but plausible. In fact the issues before us are ones which have profound methodological implications for both philosophy and psychology, as we shall see in more detail in section 1. If thought is independent of language, then the philosophy of language has no right to claim the sort of foundational position within philosophy as a whole which it has been accorded through much of the twentieth century. On the contrary, it should be the philosophy of mind – more narrowly, the philosophy of thought – which is more basic. It will also follow that the study of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the acquisition and use of natural language should be

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accorded no more central position within psychology than the study of any other mental faculty, such as vision or memory. If thought requires or involves natural language, on the other hand, then many philosophical questions will be expressed most appropriately in linguistic mode, and it will follow that psychologists engaged in the study of natural language are examining one of the basic mechanisms of human cognition. It should hardly need saying, therefore, that our main question is an important one. Much of this book has the form of an extended debate with Jerry Fodor. While I share many of my premises with him, as will be seen from the latter half of Chapter 1, I disagree in my conclusions, particularly in relation to the role of natural language in cognition. Their further elaboration and critique is then distributed over many of the remaining chapters. Plainly, the issues before us are ones that must straddle both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. For one part of what is in question is the best account that can be given of the nature of thought, another being the best account that can be given of the character and semantics of natural language.

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## 9: LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

*The analysis of what it is to be in consciousness has a further importance for the concept of unconscious mentality. If one assumes that all mental states are conscious alone, we will take a highly sceptical stand on Freudian theory and the topographical model of the mind proposed by him (Laplanche and Pontalis, ).*

In writing *Nature*, Emerson drew upon material from his journals, sermons, and lectures. A new edition also published by Munroe, with Emerson paying the printing costs, his usual arrangement with Munroe appeared in December of 1849. This second edition was printed from the plates of the collection *Nature; Addresses, and Lectures*, published by Munroe in September 1849. The second edition of this collection was published in Boston in 1850 by Phillips, Sampson, under the title *Miscellanies; Embracing Nature, Addresses, and Lectures*. *Nature* was published in London in 1850 in *Nature, An Essay. And Lectures on the Times*, by H. A. German. A German edition was issued in 1851. Emerson prefaced the prose text of the first edition of *Nature* with a passage from the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus. The second edition included instead a poem by Emerson himself. Both present themes that are developed in the essay. The passage from Plotinus suggests the primacy of spirit and of human understanding over nature. *Nature* is divided into an introduction and eight chapters. In the Introduction, Emerson laments the current tendency to accept the knowledge and traditions of the past instead of experiencing God and nature directly, in the present. He asserts that all our questions about the order of the universe "about the relationships between God, man, and nature" may be answered by our experience of life and by the world around us. Each individual is a manifestation of creation and as such holds the key to unlocking the mysteries of the universe. Nature, too, is both an expression of the divine and a means of understanding it. Emerson identifies nature and spirit as the components of the universe. He defines nature the "NOT ME" as everything separate from the inner individual "nature, art, other men, our own bodies. In common usage, nature refers to the material world unchanged by man. Art is nature in combination with the will of man. Emerson explains that he will use the word "nature" in both its common and its philosophical meanings in the essay. At the beginning of Chapter I, Emerson describes true solitude as going out into nature and leaving behind all preoccupying activities as well as society. When a man gazes at the stars, he becomes aware of his own separateness from the material world. The stars were made to allow him to perceive the "perpetual presence of the sublime. They never lose their power to move us. We retain our original sense of wonder even when viewing familiar aspects of nature anew. Emerson discusses the poetical approach to nature "the perception of the encompassing whole made up of many individual components. Our delight in the landscape, which is made up of many particular forms, provides an example of this integrated vision. Unlike children, most adults have lost the ability to see the world in this way. In order to experience awe in the presence of nature, we need to approach it with a balance between our inner and our outer senses. Nature so approached is a part of man, and even when bleak and stormy is capable of elevating his mood. All aspects of nature correspond to some state of mind. Nature offers perpetual youth and joy, and counteracts whatever misfortune befalls an individual. The visionary man may lose himself in it, may become a receptive "transparent eyeball" through which the "Universal Being" transmits itself into his consciousness and makes him sense his oneness with God. In nature, which is also a part of God, man finds qualities parallel to his own. There is a special relationship, a sympathy, between man and nature. But by itself, nature does not provide the pleasure that comes of perceiving this relationship. The way we react to nature depends upon our state of mind in approaching it. In the next four chapters "Commodity," "Beauty," "Language," and "Discipline" Emerson discusses the ways in which man employs nature ultimately to achieve insight into the workings of the universe. In Chapter II, "Commodity," he treats the most basic uses of nature "for heat, food, water, shelter, and transportation. Although he ranks these as low uses, and states that they are the only applications that most men have for nature, they are perfect and appropriate in their own way. Moreover, man harnesses nature through the practical arts, thereby enhancing its usefulness through his own wit. Emerson quickly

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finishes with nature as a commodity, stating that "A man is fed, not that he may be fed, but that he may work," and turns to higher uses. The two together offer a unified vision of many separate objects as a pleasing whole — "a well-colored and shaded globe," a landscape "round and symmetrical. Emerson presents three properties of natural beauty. First, nature restores and gives simple pleasure to a man. It reinvigorates the overworked, and imparts a sense of well-being and of communion with the universe. Nature pleases even in its harsher moments. The same landscape viewed in different weather and seasons is seen as if for the first time. But we cannot capture natural beauty if we too actively and consciously seek it. We must rather submit ourselves to it, allowing it to react to us spontaneously, as we go about our lives. Secondly, nature works together with the spiritual element in man to enhance the nobility of virtuous and heroic human actions. There is a particular affinity between the processes of nature and the capabilities of man. Thirdly, Emerson points out the capacity of natural beauty to stimulate the human intellect, which uses nature to grasp the divine order of the universe. The love of beauty constitutes taste; its creative expression, art. Man apprehends wholeness in the multiplicity of natural forms and conveys these forms in their totality. The poet, painter, sculptor, musician, and architect are all inspired by natural beauty and offer a unified vision in their work. Art thus represents nature as distilled by man. Beauty, like truth and goodness, is an expression of God. But natural beauty is an ultimate only inasmuch as it works as a catalyst upon the inner processes of man. He first states that words represent particular facts in nature, which exists in part to give us language to express ourselves. He suggests that all words, even those conveying intellectual and moral meaning, can be etymologically traced back to roots originally attached to material objects or their qualities. Although this theory would not be supported by the modern study of linguistics, Emerson was not alone among his contemporaries in subscribing to it. Over time, we have lost a sense of the particular connection of the first language to the natural world, but children and primitive people retain it to some extent. Not only are words symbolic, Emerson continues, but the natural objects that they represent are symbolic of particular spiritual states. Human intellectual processes are, of necessity, expressed through language, which in its primal form was integrally connected to nature. Emerson asserts that there is universal understanding of the relationship between natural imagery and human thought. An all-encompassing universal soul underlies individual life. In language, God is, in a very real sense, accessible to all men. In his unique capacity to perceive the connectedness of everything in the universe, man enjoys a central position. Man cannot be understood without nature, nor nature without man. In its origin, language was pure poetry, and clearly conveyed the relationship between material symbol and spiritual meaning. Emerson states that the same symbols form the original elements of all languages. And the moving power of idiomatic language and of the strong speech of simple men reminds us of the first dependence of language upon nature. But because we have lost the sense of its origins, language has been corrupted. The man who speaks with passion or in images — like the poet or orator who maintains a vital connection with nature — expresses the workings of God. Finally, Emerson develops the idea that the whole of nature — not just its particulate verbal expressions — symbolizes spiritual reality and offers insight into the universal. He writes of all nature as a metaphor for the human mind, and asserts that there is a one-to-one correspondence between moral and material laws. All men have access to understanding this correspondence and, consequently, to comprehending the laws of the universe. Emerson employs the image of the circle — much-used in Nature — in stating that the visible world is the "terminus or circumference of the invisible world. Man may grasp the underlying meaning of the physical world by living harmoniously with nature, and by loving truth and virtue. Emerson concludes "Language" by stating that we understand the full meaning of nature by degrees. Nature as a discipline — a means of arriving at comprehension — forms the subject of Chapter V, "Discipline. The ultimate result of such lessons is common sense. Emerson offers property and debt as materially based examples that teach necessary lessons through the understanding, and space and time as demonstrations of particularity and individuality, through which "we may know that things are not huddled and lumped, but sundered and individual. The wise man recognizes the innate properties of objects and men, and the differences, gradations, and similarities among the manifold natural expressions. The practical arts and

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sciences make use of this wisdom. But as man progressively grasps the basic physical laws, he comes closer to understanding the laws of creation, and limiting concepts such as space and time lose their significance in his vision of the larger picture. Emerson emphasizes the place of human will "the expression of human power" in harnessing nature. Nature is made to serve man. We take what is useful from it in forming a sense of the universe, giving greater or lesser weight to particular aspects to suit our purposes, even framing nature according to our own image of it. Emerson goes on to discuss how intuitive reason provides insight into the ethical and spiritual meanings behind nature. Moreover, the uses of particular facets of nature as described in "Commodity" do not exhaust the lessons these aspects can teach; men may progress to perception of their higher meaning as well. Emerson depicts moral law as lying at the center of the circle of nature and radiating to the circumference. Each object is a microcosm of the universe. Through analogies and resemblances between various expressions of nature, we perceive "its source in Universal Spirit. Emerson builds upon his circle imagery to suggest the all-encompassing quality of universal truth and the way it may be approached through all of its particulars. Unity is even more apparent in action than in thought, which is expressed only imperfectly through language. Action, on the other hand, as "the perfection and publication of thought," expresses thought more directly.

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