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Political perspectives will tend to influence that type and amount or social policy that will be allowed at a certain time. EX: When the main political perspective in a nation is conservative many social welfare programs will be cut.

Measured by the size of territory it once controlled, its wealth in terms of cash on hand and access to modern military material, and in its shocking brutality, the Islamic State has broken new ground as a terrorist organization. However, the Islamic State is not simply a terrorist organization, but is also a well-equipped insurgent army, and a quasi-state that seized andâ€"with qualified successâ€"operated the bureaucratic institutions of the territories it captured. The Islamic State is often contrasted with its ideological predecessor and operational competitor, al-Qaeda. Highlighting how these organizations differ is helpful in developing effective means of confronting them. Through this comparative analysis, we argue that understanding the Islamic State, not simply as a terrorist organization but also as a social movement, allows us to contextualize its violence within patterns evinced by other violent social movements. This approach will also allow us to better understand how the Islamic State might eventually end. Political Violence; Social Movements; Terrorism; Counter-terrorism Introduction By employing a comparative approach to studying the Islamic State and applying social movement and revolution theory, we argue that the Islamic State is more than a transnational terrorist organization. In the case of the Shining Path, we have the benefit of following the life of the organization from birth to eventual death though it lives on in residual organizations, which is also instructive. Collective political action is the product of shared discontent in a society. Political violence is possible when that discontent is focused on the activity or the inaction of a constituted political system. Thus, collective political violence is a function of shared discontent in a society, and the degree to which that discontent is blamed on the established political system. It begins with a brief analysis of the Islamic State in the context of the case study, without an extensive history of the organization, which has been treated thoroughly in recent scholarship. The Islamic State Rather than attempt to re-do the extensive scholarly work done on the history, ideology and tactics employed by the Islamic State, in this section we move directly to comparing and contrasting the Shining Path with the Islamic State. First, both organizations claimed localized objectives as well as universal ideological goals. The Islamic State and the Shining Path represent violent political movements claiming both particularistic and universal goals. The historical antecedents of what we now call the Islamic State rose out of the political marginalization of Iraqi Sunnis following the coalition invasion of Iraq in While particularistic political goals prompted its rise and motivated many Iraqis who joined its ranks, under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq adopted its universalistic goals surrounding the establishment of a new caliphate. The Islamic State expects to extend its political dominion outward, obliterating current national frontiers as it does, demanding universal obedience: Void is the legitimacy of all emirates, groups, administrations, and organizations to which his [i. Global Terrorism Database Second, as with the Shining Path, the Islamic State demands violent action to achieve its goals, violence is both instrumental, and symbolic, having its own intrinsic valueâ€"violence is a means to an end and an end in itself. Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet peace be upon him was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the creation. He was ordered with war until Allah is worshipped alone. He himself left to fight and took part in dozens of battles. He never for a day grew tired of war. Abu Naji Bakr argues in the Management of Savagery that violence is useful in forcing non-participants to action: Similarly, the Shining Path believed in the transformative nature of violence to produce revolution;[10] violence is also an essential element of the Jihadi Salafism of the Islamic State which eschews negotiation and compromise. Terror groups that rely on dramatic surges of violence against civilian targets almost never get their way, and end up becoming pariahs. Finally, the Islamic State claims to represent an ideological purity and to stand for correction of past errors, or a repentance, as did the Shining Path. The Islamic State embraces Wahhabi-Salafism, which focuses on the elimination of idolatry shirk and affirms the oneness tawhid of God. Under Zarqawi, this pursuit of religious purity led him to seek a sectarian civil war in Iraq, beginning in The Fourth Sword Between and Peru was governed by a military junta. The military government had been

markedly leftist, endorsed by Fidel Castro, and militarily supported by the Soviet Union. The Shining Pathâ€"here referred to as SL. The Senderoistas cast themselves as the initiators of a new revolution that would, inevitably, engulf the entire world, and permanently reset the path of history. The SL was a particularly rigid, uncompromising organization, one focused on ideological purity repudiating the United States, the Soviet Union, as well as Communist China under Deng Xiaoping. Above all, SL had an unwavering commitment to violent revolution. This is of transcendental importance. This we shall do, this is the rebirth. Comrades, we are reborn! As many theorists have noted, violence has little appeal in systems marked by even a small amount of democracy, as was the case in Peru in Why did the SL enter its armed struggle in , pursue it so vigorously as to murder tens of thousands of Peruvians, and at one point claim the allegiance of several thousand fighters, extending control through much of the countryside of the center and south of Peru? Marks , however, takes a distinctly different approach. Others argue that ideological commitment is necessary, but not sufficient. First, though the Peruvian government failed initially to fully appreciate the threat posed by SL, suffered from widespread corruption, and failed to understand counter-insurgency doctrine, eventually, the Peruvian government managed to score some significant intelligence victories. Immediately after Guzman was captured, the number of terrorist attacks by SL dropped; before his capture SL averaged over acts of terror per quarter, after his capture, they averaged just ten see Figure 2. Additionally, the lethality and complexity of these acts were also reduced. Guzman explicitly organized the SL as a military organization, distributing to subordinate cadres documents that detailed its military doctrine, situated in Marxist-Lenininst-Maoist thought. Politics concentrated on the war, but did not become subordinate to the military organization charged with waging war. As such, the SL required a safe base of support beyond the reach of government forces, the ability to maneuver unhindered, and reliable resupply of fighters and material. Relentless, oppressive government action denied SL the ability to act as a guerilla army, though it did little to address the underlying conditions that engendered support for SL at its outset, which helps explain the arrival of successor organizations that bear some of the ideological commitments of SL. It has systematically lambasted and even assassinated, not just government officials and peasant villagers in the highlands, but even members of Marxist and social democratic political parties. They had shown virtually no concern about the attitude of other Peruvians concerning the future of the nation. The final demise of SL, as the Communist terror organization it was in the s and early 90s, has been variously set as early as September when Guzman was captured [37], or the year , by the CVR, or at the end of the Fujimori era in , after the disgraced president resigned and fled to Japan. The fervor and certitude of the Peruvian Communists who were utterly convinced of their future success at pulling down the current global political-economic-cultural system has long since faded. Their source of inspiration and central personality, Guzman himself, called for the end of violence as early as , and one of the remaining members of the original leadership arrested in admitted defeat and the end of armed struggle. How does Peru in compare to Iraq in ? Peru in saw significant institutional change: Similarly, the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in ended the thirty-year dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and introduced political reforms. The invasion meant revolutionary change was now possible; mobilization and agitation among contentious groups divided along communal lines precipitated an escalating spiral of action and counter-action. The availability of violence as an acceptable tool of political action meant that once political space opened and allowed expression of contested political objectives, the move toward violence was just as likely as other forms of political action. That discontent was blamed on the established political system, which, through the mobilization led by Guzman, resulted in collective violent political action. Similarly, Sunnis in Iraq had, under Saddam Hussein enjoyed disproportionate political power. These two decisions of the U. How Might the Islamic State End? When the Islamic State is defeated on the battlefield and its territorial control severely contracted or eliminated, it will likely persist as a traditional terrorist threat even if that defeat is accompanied by the collapse of its central leadership structure. The process of their inevitable defeat is already in progress. Significant portions of the territory they rapidly seized in have been re-taken. Indeed IS leadership seems resigned to losing their so-called caliphate, and have begun to spin that possibility in the best possible way. In this section we contemplate how the Islamic State may end, given what we have learned from our comparative analysis. First, we argue that the Islamic State has some unique characteristics

when compared to SL that make it particularly dangerous, even if severely disabled. Finally, the underlying social and political conditions that gave rise to the Islamic State are particularly intractable, and may have been significantly exacerbated since it came into existence. The ideology of the Islamic State contains some deeply held convictions that set it apart from SL as well as many other terrorists. First, the Islamic State leadership is convinced that we are living in the End of Times and plans to play a central role in ushering in the coming apocalypse. These differences make the Islamic State particularly dangerous: Even severely degraded and deprived of all of its territory and much of its other resources, followers of the Islamic State can carry on these elements of its violent ideology. We would argue that he does not have the charismatic leader role that Guzman had for the Senderoistas. Jenna Jordan found that religious organizations are resilient even when their leaders are killed or captured. Secondly, the case of Guzman and the SL could present an interesting lesson: The logistics of such an undertaking would be problematic at best, even after locating and capturing him. For example, any trial that would be held in United States, Iraq or Syria would immediately be denounced as illegitimate. Finally, even after the Islamic State is militarily defeated, with its leadership dead or in prison, and all its territories reclaimed, the social and political circumstances that gave rise to it both in Iraq after and its resurgence in Syria, and then again in Iraq in are likely to persist, and may even have been exacerbated. The inequality experienced by rural Peruvians contributed to the popularity of the SL. Conclusion Although the so-called Islamic State represents a significant challenge to the peace and security of the Middle East, and manages to project its terrorist violence to the Western world as well as Russia, one cannot conclude that it is wholly unique and unprecedented, or that the challenge it presents is insurmountable. We have assessed, through a comparative analysis of the Sendero Luminoso, that the Islamic State can be understood as a political movement borne of specific social-political conditions, with clear ideological objectives. As such, the historical trajectory of other comparable movements can be instructive for explaining how the Islamic State may have risen, earned sympathy with a constituency, and could eventually wither away. Yet the present challenge is not unique. In , George Kennan under the pseudonym X analyzing the Soviet system noted: Arguably, it may not be possible to deter an organization like the Islamic State the same way that the Soviet Union and Stalin, a realist with an instinct for institutional survival, was deterred. Swagger, grand gestures, fruitless engagements were contra-indicated. Instead, persistent containment, through positive example, negative consequences for bad behavior, and above all, unified action and harmony, were what he advised. Political competition is natural in liberal democratic societies, but the current level of discord and disunity in the United States and Europe must comfort Islamic State ideologues in Raqqa, Mosul and elsewhere. The important question is how well the threat that IS poses can be managed and reduced in the interim. Open warfare may achieve one goal: Michael Stohl is the Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies and a professor of communication, political science, and global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Princeton University Press, pp. Routledge, Chapter 1; Gurr, The full conference paper on which this article is based also made a comparison with al-Shabaab, but for considerations of length was removed for this publication; the full conference paper not peer reviewed , is available at the TRENDS Research and Analysis website. University of North Carolina Press, pp.

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On the other hand, I would like to show how, within an East European context, the feminist approach that wants to be useful for a concrete analysis and inspire substantial actions cannot avoid the questions of the relationship between the social and political as argued by Hannah Arendt.

Ethnicity and Politics in Contextualising Far Right and Islamist Extremism by Tahir Abbas Abstract This article critically reviews contemporary understandings of the drivers, objectives, and the social and political distinctions of far right and Islamist extremism as reciprocal and correlative threats. While social structure and identity politics are important themes in the social science literature on the radicalisation of far right and Islamist extremist individuals and groups, there remain significant knowledge and policy gaps. Based on a discourse analysis of two related concepts, this article seeks to explain the nature of similarities and differences. As exclusivist and self-reinforcing narratives, the actions and perspectives of one group embolden the other. Policymakers need to understand far right and Islamist extremism as phenomena with shared local driving forces and impacts. This approach would also avoid duplication of effort, as well as misrecognition and insensitivity, in counterterrorism efforts. It also generates valuable political inroads into grounded notions of social cohesion. Far right, Islamist extremism, politics, radicalisation, identity, spatiality Introduction In late July , an year old German-born man fatally shot nine young people in a fast-food restaurant and a shopping mall in Munich. He was a child of Iranian parents who had sought refuge in Germany in the early s. As news first came in, the immediate response was to suggest that this incident was an example of an Islamic State-inspired or -instigated act of terrorism. Indeed, after a spate of attacks in Brussels, France and Germany during , the Sonboly attack appeared to be another instance of radical Islamism leading to violent extremism. There was, however, a twist to this story. It transcended his co-ethnic cultural, immigrant and minority background of friends and relations. The stark reality was that Sonboly did not feel comfortable in his own skin: What was peculiar about the Sonboly episode were the twin issues of radicalisation and far right extremism in an individual who was born into a Shia Muslim household but subsequently rejected his past. It confirmed how identity formation and self-realisation journeys of a few young people exist within various instances of conflict. It leads some to radicalisation and ultimately violence. This event was a reminder that similar issues at the margins of society affect a variety of young people challenged by their local and global identities. It is now increasingly apparent that an anti-Muslim outlook plays a part in radicalising far right extremists. These sentiments have also become a defining feature of current forms of Islamophobia [6], much of which also demonstrates a correlation with rising populism and nationalism. Breivik was also hostile to broadly conceived notions such as Marxism and liberalism. This article establishes two principles. First, in thinking through radicalisation, it is important to situate the debate within the wider economic, political and cultural contexts of post-industrial urban centres. Second, conceptualisation of these extremisms suggests how identities conflict due to the simultaneous moving terrains of localisation and globalisation. This article is an attempt to explore the theoretical and conceptual nature of the symbiosis that defines and characterises far right and Islamist extremism. It synthesises current knowledge on the similarities and differences between these two extremisms arising from disjuncture between social structure and identity, the knowledge gaps raised in existing research, and the ramifications for policy and practice in this area. The conclusions discuss the repercussions of these growing extremisms and the implications raised for further research in this area. Structural and Cultural Context Understanding radicalisation is all about appreciating context and perspective. In some respects, radicalisation refers to pathways. In others, it relates to outcomes. Furthermore, radicalisation does not always equate with terrorism. For some, violence is the main concern. For others, an ideology that may or may not lead to violence is the primary focus. All definitions, nevertheless, recognise the notion as a highly individualised and largely unpredictable process. That far right and Islamophobic attacks result in Islamist-inspired terrorism is now a given. It reflects a shift within broader right-wing extremism, with many groups and individuals â€" including Breivik â€" condemning Nazism, fascism and anti-Semitism but defining their cause as a defence against the perceived threat from Islam. However, there is relative

underreporting and under-analysis of the threat from right-wing extremism in North America and in Europe. Saleem had been walking home from his local mosque in the late hours of 29 April In June and July , Lapshyn attempted to bomb three mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton during Friday afternoon prayers, the busiest time of the week. Western European societies and economies have transformed profoundly since the deregulation of the financial sector and the dominance of privatisation of public utilities and economic neoliberalism that began in the s. Here, residential concentration emerges largely through a lack of choice, not through choice. Simultaneously, the spatial concentration of deprived marginalised majorities is also an opportunity to protect group norms and values associated with the group identity, which, in the light of present politics, perceives a threat from the dominant or subordinated other. This discourse, though, is harmful for many minorities who are on the receiving end of frequent vilification, alienation and discrimination. Developments to such thinking would help to explore the synergies between arguably two parallel and similar radicalisation and violent extremism outcomes. This was compared to 4. That is, over 90 per cent of all attacks were carried out by non-Muslims. It reveals a distinct layer of conflict, locking both groups in intense struggle for the least in society. Although both groups have made various political impacts, their electoral successes, however, haven been until recently negligible [24]. This was the case until the Brexit vote in the UK, which was, in part, motivated by negative discourses on immigration, refugees and questions of national political identity. In both cases, apprehensions arise over multiculturalism, dislocation and identity conflict. A lack of hope leads to psychological conundrums, leaving countless young men vulnerable, exposed and then pliable to external influences. With limited educational and employment opportunities due to entrenched patterns of discrimination and disadvantage, the uncertain futures facing various young men in inner city areas, minority and majority, create challenges with limited opportunities. Part of the reason for the radicalisation of both European-born Muslims and far right youth is an aspect of their coming to terms with hegemonic masculinity in the context of intergenerational disconnect, combined with economic insecurity. Britain First, the English Defence League and what were organisations such as Al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK consisted of young men with limited education, employment or social status. These men are outraged and simultaneously embittered by the spiritual or material challenges of their existence. Many of the recruits to Islamic State heralding from the inner cities of Western Europe display similar anxieties and aspirations. Disconnect is also highly relevant in the context of minority communities with particular cultural characteristics. Research has shown that the existence of patriarchy among Pakistani and Turkish fathers acts as a form of dominance over the family. These behaviours derive from an Islamic as well as cultural reading of the role of the male head of household. In wider society, however, these same fathers experience racialisation and subjugation in the work place, while suffering wider labour market penalisation of the group as a whole. Therefore, it appears there are internal issues within homes reinforced by patriarchal practices, but this is in the context of a situation where Muslim minorities face ethnic and religious penalties in the labour market, further affecting income levels [29], status and a sense of persecution felt by Muslim men. In these situations, these Muslim minority masculinities are multiple and situational. The local, regional and transnational interconnects the space in which these masculinities are constructed and deconstructed. It is viewed by some as an attempt to delegitimise criticism of politics and policy while maintaining the status quo concerning foreign policy, and ignores the complete absence of domestic policies to help integrate ethnic minorities. A broad sense of alienation transpires among a wide range of communities due to the political, religious and cultural transformations of the social milieu that has occurred in light of wider developments to thinking and practice on localisation and globalisation. In the midst of material challenges facing young men and women in Western European and North American societies, particular concerns arise over hypermasculinity and hypersexuality an over-concentration on sexual activity. It creates fear, anger and anguish, rather than a smooth transition from youth to adulthood. In quite considerable ways, hypermasculinity diminishes the confidence of young people in Britain. The consequences are that young people become encouraged to prove themselves- to seek recognition, to become somebodyâ€"by using all mean necessary. Disconnected Tribalisms A crisis of masculinity and femininity is at the centre of many of the predicaments facing marginalised communities. It is created by a lack of social mobility, persistent unemployment, growing anomie and political

disenfranchisement, fuelling a national identity crisis. The effects are anger, fear, loathing, intimidation and violence. In reality, when trying to understand radicalisation among young Islamists and far right extremists, one needs to look at the role of the individual, social structure and the question of anomie. Islamist radicals are anti-globalisation, while far right extremists are anti-localisation but both are pro-totalitarian. These groups wish to instil a sense of purist identity politics and both have a utopian vision of society. In the case of far right groups, much of their motivation stems from a counter-jihadist discourse. Here, radical Islamists also experience status inconsistency. Both groups are the structural and cultural outsiders of society and directly opposed to each other. As new tribalisms emerge, radicalised groups situate a core narrative at the heart of their newfound tribalisitic radicalisation. Measures targeting such acts of crime must recognise the multi-layered nature of the processes involved in radicalisation, and hence introduce more joined-up policy thinking at a much earlier stage of the process. It is thus vital to understand the intersecting paths towards radicalisation affecting Islamists and far-right extremists in order to achieve the necessary impact on research, policy and practice. The need to appreciate the dynamics of radicalisation as embedded in social processes at the structural level, where concerns over identity, belonging and self-realisation, remains fundamental. The recent murder of MP Jo Cox in June brought to the surface major concerns regarding far-right extremism in Britain today. Media and political discourses tend to focus on Islamic political extremism, with little attention given to far-right violence. These acts are no aberration either. Rather, various reporting necessarily suggests that far right extremism has become a considerable worry, and in recent periods there are more examples of violence and terrorism at the behest of these groups than that of Muslims in Western Europe. Why is it that we hear so little about it? In addition, why do principal actors regard it differently from that of Islamic political radicalism? First, when far-right extremism does occur, it is invariably underreported or misreported. When it comes to young Muslims involved in acts of serious violence, there are unconscious associations made with Jihadism, Islamic radicalism or even the Islamic State. Indeed, there is a particular reporting bias of such crimes inherent in the media, and it has a long history. It confirms the bias against far right extremism while maintaining an overt focus on Islamist radicalisation. As social divisions widen, these groups remain angry, voiceless and underrepresented. For far right groups, they vehemently hold onto a sense of identity presented to them as potentially at risk due to the emergence of other groups in society seemingly taking away or diluting the purity of this identity. Such representations are ideological, selective and political. After which multiculturalism was seen in wholly negative terms. After its collapse and replacement by neoliberal globalisation, many of these Muslim communities were confined in the inner city areas to which they first migrated. In the s and s, in locations such as Birmingham, parts of the North and areas in Greater London, diverse groups lived cheek by jowl with indigenous Britons and in relatively peaceful harmony. The response was political then and it is political now.

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