

## 1: Book In Nature S Interests PDF Download - [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

1. *Introduction: Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and Practice*, by Thomas Heyd Part I. *Nature and Autonomy of Nature: Are They Real?* 2. *Toward a Progressive Naturalism*, by Val Plumwood 3. *Is Nature Autonomous?*, by Keekok Lee Part II. *Autonomous Nature and Human Interests: Are They Compatible?* 4. *The Liberation of Humanity and Nature*, by Eric Katz 5.

Includes bibliographical references and index. *Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Nature and Autonomy of Nature: Autonomous Nature and Human Interests: Management, Restoration, and the Autonomy of Nature: Managing a Needy Nature?* My colleague and friend, Antony Berger, a geologist interested in the reception of drastic natural events, such as occur during rapid climate change, had asked me to join him in organizing a multidisciplinary meeting to discuss the ethics of natural environmental change. Although rather skeptical about the sense of holding nature responsible, I was intrigued by the question whether nonhuman nature in its totality, or any part of it, may be said to act at all. If it reasonably could be said that it acts, even if only in an attenuated way, it would open up the space to ask whether this entailed moral responsibilities for human beings toward nature and perhaps for nature toward human beings. *Ethics and Natural Environmental Change*. According to this plan, after meeting at the University of Newfoundland in St. A call for papers succeeded in complementing my selection of outstanding papers from the conference with essays from some of the most important environmental philosophers who have dealt with the topic. The result of the combination of these papers is this collection of wonderful essays. Finally, Columbia University Press urged me to obtain one further essay that could function as a concluding, critical commentary on all those collected. I am very pleased that Bill Jordan, a noted theorist and practitioner of restoration, accepted the invitation and hence provided an appropriate closure for the book. I would like to acknowledge the help of many friends in getting the original conference organized. Andrew Light and Eric Katz were of extraordinary help in getting the manuscript published. My greatest gratitude goes to the contributors to the volume for their creative work and their willingness to go through the long editing process with me. I have come to know them as intimate mates on this journey toward a better understanding of our place in relation to the rest of nature. Thanks and good wishes to all. This book is intended as an exploration of the idea that this rethinking calls for the recognition of the autonomy of nature, understood both in epistemological and ethical terms. After this, I introduce the papers featured in this book.

*A Place and Its Circumstances* The town where I grew up is located on a hill by the sea in a broad alluvial plain crossed by a small river known in ancient times for its health-bringing waters. Interrupted by deep canyons, this northern mountain connects with an even higher, extended range of sierras all along the western side of the plain. Though only a few long day walks away, these western ranges are so high that in former times packed snow would survive in caves until summer. Enterprising country folk would load up portions of the resulting ice in late spring to supply the towns on the plain with the means to refrigerate their foods. If it were not for the two openings to the sea and the narrow strip of desertic, hilly land that can be traversed toward the southwest permitting access further along the coast, this plain would be quite isolated from the rest of the world. Nearly the entirety of the plain is dotted with rounded, pine-clad hillocks. The older towns sit on craggy outcrops, traditionally watchful for slaving pirate ships out for booty. Despite the dangers that the area had to face in the past, the plain exudes a sense of well-being and safety. What is most interesting from the point of view of environmental philosophy is that the natural and the artifactual merge and coexist throughout this area at uncounted places. Irrigated citrus orchards may suddenly give way to a hill covered with wild pine trees and dryland herbs, such as rosemary, basil, and thyme. On the other side of the hill, however, there may be an olive tree grove, itself perhaps bordered by the wild canyons of one of the mountains that enclose the area. The seashore along the bay is covered with rounded boulders, which have come rolling down the river valley throughout thousands of years. Over the last forty years, however, this whole area has undergone an increasingly radical transformation. Where the plain meets the sea along its southern edge, a city of skyscrapers has been built for sun-hungry northern Europeans. My hometown has started to spread along the seashore. Houses are even being built on the steep slopes of the two mountains that

border the bay. Presently, new possibilities of growth are being considered by developers and city councils. A new, fast highway has been built into the western mountain ranges, making urbanization of their base an immediate, concrete possibility. Much debated but likely to be approved, a plan has been unveiled to transform the lower part of the river valley, remaining wetlands, stands of oleander, and orange groves included, into a huge new, high-price residential area, complete with pools, leisure parks, and golf courses. These projects have roused the ire of many locals and new residents alike. One type of objection is expressed in terms of the aesthetic value represented by certain landscape features for the tourism industry. Higher population density brought about through the urbanization of the lower river valley without correspondingly greater services, such as new networks of roads, would worsen living conditions. If the infrastructure were increased to the new levels required, this would mean more roads, more parking lots, more suburban malls, more water damming projects. As noted by various environmental philosophers, such as David W. Similarly, once the new infrastructure is built, it is likely that, over time, the inhabitants of the area would adjust their aesthetic valuations in such a way that they would come to consider the added roads, parking lots, malls, and dams as relatively unobtrusive to their appreciation of the overall aesthetic qualities present in the area. Traditional-societal values also are subject to change for various reasons. For example, once a society undergoes cognitive colonization through global mass media, its values change. Much progress has been made in clarifying how the logic of arguments appealing to the intrinsic worth of some entity is or is claimed to work. Notably, the issue revolves around the objectivity of values in the sense that something simply has a certain value just as it may have a certain other quality, such as a color. The metaphysics of intrinsic values is much debated, of course, for the same reason that attributions of color are problematic once we assume that those attributions depend on a certain kind of perceiver. Without attempting to settle this question here, we may nonetheless speak about the activity of valuing some entity a certain way. My suggestion is that valuing a being for itself requires recognition of it as autonomous. Less pompously, recognizing some being as autonomous means realizing both that this entity can maintain its organization at least for a time in the presence of diverse external forces and, consequently, that it may exert a systematic force on its environment, at least passively, insofar as it seeks to maintain its integrity. Of course, recognizing some entity as autonomous does not mean that one is supposing it to be fully independent of all other beings, since human beings human selves can be recognized as autonomous even if highly dependent on many other people, culture, genetic makeup, and so on. In fact, self-maintenance may only be possible for a being while in relation with certain other beings or in determinate circumstances. We may have reasons for excluding from our moral community certain entities even if deemed autonomous, such as bacteria harmful to human beings or dangerous psychopaths. In other words, what I propose is that, when we say that we value some being for itself, we are saying that we minimally recognize it as counting in a manner similar to ourselves, namely for its self, thereby implying that there may be legitimate, morally relevant limits to our own acting. Arguments based on traditional-societal and religious values similarly are dependent on historical developments of society and religious institutions that have nothing to do with nature as such. Arguments based on the intrinsic value of nature, in contrast, appeal to features that belong to the thing itself and as such, in principle, should enjoy stability as long as their object does. As noted, if, when speaking of the intrinsic value of nature, we limit ourselves to that which we are valuing in nature for itself, then it seems that we are reintroducing a dependency on the one making the arguments. Insofar as arguments based on the intrinsic value of nature rely on the recognition of its autonomy, those arguments are dependent on the capacity of individuals to recognize it. I think that this dependency on a subject must be granted but does not make the arguments any less legitimate. The dependency in question goes little beyond the necessity, in the presentation of arguments, for there to be someone with a point of view. The objectivity of such arguments is dependent on their openness to intersubjective exploration. Recognizing the autonomy of nature requires applying this minimal personal capacity of openness to other selves to the realm of nature. Consequently, since arguments based on intrinsic value are based on the constitutive capacity of selves to function as such, they should be relatively protected from the vagaries to which arguments based on self-interest, aesthetics, and traditional-societal and religious value systems are subject. So, if valuing an entity for itself means recognizing its autonomy, then it becomes

imperative to develop ways of knowing adequate to this task. Natural science has an important role here since it likely is the most sophisticated way of knowing the natural environment available to us. This is the case, for instance, even when the value of the integrity of the rainforest is praised, since its integrity is often only valued, for example, because of its function as a repository of future pharmaceutical information. This situation implies that we need to be clear on which ways of knowing nature do not instrumentalize it and thereby obscure its self-maintaining character. This primarily is a task for environmental education. As noted, I interpret the recognition of autonomy in an entity as minimally indicating unity and the maintenance of unity, the possession of which, I suggest, invites but does not necessitate our moral consideration based on a recognition of an important similarity having a kind of self with ourselves. I suppose that moral consideration of nature follows from the recognition of its autonomy as sketched here in combination with a generalization from existing commitments to moral consideration of human selves. It remains a matter of great urgency to determine what the moral consideration of nature, once we recognize its autonomy, should mean in practice.

The Papers This book is divided into three parts. In order to discuss the autonomy of nature meaningfully, it is necessary to be clear on two basic points. First, does it make sense to speak of nature at this juncture in the discussion carried on in environmental philosophy and environmental studies? And, second, if it does make sense to speak of nature, is it reasonable to speak of nature as autonomous? The book ends with a review of the discussion of what autonomy does and should mean in the context of human transformation, and restoration, of nonhuman nature. I proceed, next, with more detailed discussions of each of the papers of the volume. It is pointed out, for example, that nature often has been appealed to in order to justify, without further argument, the sociopolitical status quo. William Chaloupka and R. McGreggor Cawley, for instance, argue that what is contested in debates concerning the protection of nature is rooted in other, social and political, contexts. Callicott asks, for instance, whether an area should be open to hikers and river rafters even if such visitations endanger local biodiversity. Consequently, this volume begins by addressing the question whether it still makes sense at this juncture to work with such terms. She claims that the nature-skeptical arguments, which take as their point of departure the claim that nature is a mere social construct, are subject to substantial critiques and that, despite the highly problematic ways in which the notion of nature has been utilized in the past, it is possible to conceive of a progressive or liberatory naturalism. On independent grounds from those presented by Plumwood, Keekok Lee, in the next chapter, also argues against the view that skepticism regarding the reality of nature necessarily follows from social constructionist theses. The diverse authors assembled in this volume have a variety of ways of understanding the autonomy of nature but, generally speaking, agree on the idea that it is constituted by a sort of independence, self-rule, unimpeded development on its own, and similar notions. An underlying assumption, which even if not usually made explicit seems quite reasonable, is that, if some being as such is ascribed positive value, this is *prima facie* grounds for respecting it. This conclusion seems to be correct even if there may be countervailing conditions that might narrow down the cases in which moral respect is appropriate. So, if we have other important values that might be put in jeopardy by respecting the free development of a certain being, then it becomes a matter of judgment whether its autonomy is reason enough to grant it respect after all. Similarly, even if we have reason to attribute autonomy to a certain species of bacterium, rodent, or fungus, we may still have good reasons stemming from other values, such as concern for human health not to promote its development, at least within close human proximity. Katz claims that we need not be concerned if we lack a metaphysics of nature since we do know, from our interactions with human beings, what it is to dominate and what it is to liberate a being. Ned Hettinger faces the problem of human cohabitation with, and use of, nature head on. First, Throop and Vickers make a case for considering ecosystems as capable of autonomy. Human communities, in fact, are taken to be essential parts of these landscapes since the activities of human beings, insofar as they are sustainable, make characteristic contributions to the functioning of such areas. Hence respecting the autonomy of ecosystems constituted by agricultural areas means not dramatically altering their existing nature.

### 2: Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature - Thomas Heyd - Bok () | Bokus

*The authors begin by exploring what is meant by "nature," in what sense it can be seen as autonomous, and what respect for the autonomy of nature might entail. They examine the conflicts that arise between the satisfaction of human needs (food, shelter, etc.) and the natural world.*

Forthcoming in Thomas Heyd, ed. When considerably modified by humans, nature loses much of its value and even its essential character. A strong conceptual separation exists between humans and nature. Respect for nature most importantly involves preservation of wilderness areas, free from significant human influence. But as important as they are, these preservationist ideas--left by themselves and unsupplemented--have a dark side. Most troubling is that such views of the human relation to nature make it difficult to envision a positive role for humans in nature. As the antithesis of nature, humans necessarily degrade and destroy nature. But an adequate environmental philosophy must explain how humans could be something other than an ugly scar or nasty stain on the natural world. Purely preservationist views also fail to provide guidance for how humans should treat the nature with which we must interact. At best, pure preservationists tell us to minimize our use of such lands and entities. At worst, preservationists see such lands and the animals and plants on them as human artifacts totally lacking natural value. Unsupplemented preservationist views fail to account for how respect for nature can go hand in hand with the human use of nature. Preservationist intuitions need to be joined with the idea of respecting the autonomy of nature. A healthy respect for the wildness of the nature that is significantly uninfluenced by humans combined with a respect for the autonomy of the nature with which humans are involved provides a far more adequate and comprehensive ethic of respect for nature than does either ethic alone. Problems for Pure Preservationism Numerous environmental philosophers, including some of the most influential, accept some version of these preservationist ideas and are vulnerable to the criticisms just mentioned. This is unfortunate, for an ethic of how humans should treat the nature with which they live and work is of crucial importance and a central if too often forgotten task of a philosophical account of the human relation to nature. While a duty of noninterference in wild nature is a crucially important one, suggesting that any human modification of--or involvement with--nature of any sort violates a prima facie duty to nature makes a positive conception of the human relationship with nature difficult to conceive. But humans, like other species, must influence the natural world. Human survival, much less human flourishing, requires this. For Katz, even well-intentioned human involvement with nature--such as restoration of degraded nature--is oppressive. For Katz, then, the human stain on nature is so toxic that once soiled, it has been spoiled forever; nature will never return. In a powerful response to J. This borders on the claim that only pristine wilderness is real nature. Such a view leaves no place for humans in nature. Although in various places Rolston suggests humans might add to natural value, the dominant story is that human interaction with nature is a loss for nature. To flourish, human civilization must trade in natural values in the pursuit of cultural ones Rolston, While there is much truth in this perspective, it is important to allow for types of human flourishing that need not compromise natural value. Leaving much of nature on earth alone is an absolutely central part of any adequate environmental ethic. But this is not all that is needed, and an environmental ethic that suggests nature necessarily loses or ceases to be nature in any significant interchange with humans is an ethic that makes the human presence on earth a tragedy for earthen nature. For humans to have something other than a purely negative and harmful role with respect to nature, we must distinguish between human involvement with nature and human domination of nature. Modification and alteration of nature must be distinguished from mastery and control of nature. If we define human alteration of nature as ipso facto degradation, humans who want to be respectful of nature will not be allowed to interact with it at all. Activities such as birdwatching from a distance would seem the extent of allowable interaction. Relatedly, we need to explain how certain types of human uses of nature need not be abusive and how humans can use nature as a means, without necessarily using it as a mere means. If our use of other humans need not be devoid of respect for them, one would expect that our use of nature need not be devoid of respect and concern for its flourishing. A symbiotic, mutually-beneficial relationship with nature is the ideal. Autonomy is a form of independence that is distinct

from absolute independence i. Respecting the autonomy of others does not mean avoiding interaction with or influence on them. What respect for autonomy requires is that one not dominate or control the other. Jack Turner puts a related point this way: Nature is clearly not autonomous in some senses in which persons are autonomous. With the possible exception of psychologically sophisticated animals, natural entities or systems do not survey the range of possible alternatives and intentionally choose a plan of action. Nor is the activity of natural entities autonomous in a sense that would justify us holding them morally accountable for their behavior. Nonetheless, the behavior of natural entities can be plausibly described as autonomous in a number of respects. Call this the autonomy of nature in relation with humanity. This is a purely negative sense of autonomy and it consists in the lack of a certain type of human influence over nature. Autonomy in this sense is a relational property between natural entities and humans. To say nature is autonomous in relation to humanity is to say that nature carries on independently of human control or domination. Humans dominate nature when they exercise mastery over it by exerting the supreme determining or guiding influence. Humans can respect the autonomy of nature in this sense whether the natural entity is goal-directed e. A natural arch about to collapse because of anthropogenic acid rain has had its autonomy undermined as much as has a drive-through sequoia whose life cycle has been cut in half by the tunnel, even though the former is not a self-organizing or teleological being. In both cases, humans dominate these natural entities by exerting the preponderance of influence over their fates. Similarly, keeping an arch from falling due to wind and water erosion by using metal cables and bolts puts humans in control of the fate of the arch and fails to respect its autonomy from humanity. All natural entities and processes have headings or trajectories in the minimal sense that they have beginnings, endings, and patterns of change. For example, human mimicking of the natural fire regime in a fire-adapted forest is significant human involvement in a natural system, which nevertheless does not constitute domination or mastery over it in part because the overall trajectory of the system is not altered. It is sometimes suggested that if humans are necessary conditions for the existence of an entity, then it is ontologically dependent on them and thus lacks autonomy in relation to humanity Katz , Lee Domesticated animals and plants would not exist but for humans and thus, the argument goes, are dominated and controlled by humans. In so far as this is a critique of contemporary agriculture, it is much too broad. According to this account, all agriculture, whether it be small-scale organic farming or industrial-chemical agriculture, is disrespectful of nature. On the account given here, humans dominate a natural entity when they exert the preponderance of influence over it. Many species on the planet--including those existing in wilderness areas--have human forbearance a necessary condition for their existence. But this is not to dominate them. Thus that humans are necessary conditions for the existence of some aspect of nature is not necessarily to dominate or show a lack of respect for their autonomy in relation to humanity. There are other conceptions of respecting the autonomy of nature that, unlike autonomy in relation to humanity, suggest that we can and should respect natural entities and systems because they possess specific properties or capacities. Respect for the autonomy of nature might mean respect for self-organizing, autopoietic systems in nature, or it might mean respect for natural entities and systems that are powerful, active, resistant, or resilient to human-induced changes. A wild river actively and powerfully resists human attempts to change its course or flow. Rainy eastern North America is much more resilient in the face of human impacts than is the dry west, and a granite mesa is more resistant to the mountain biker than the fragile desert that lies around it. One virtue of respecting the autonomy of nature in relation to humanity is that it does not discriminate in these ways between natural entities. Consider that although spouses exert a high degree of influence over each other, they typically do not dominate each other. That same amount of influence exerted over an acquaintance would likely be considered domination. We are less likely to judge that a high degree of influence of one over another is domination when there is significant influence in return. In human affairs, it is a sign of a healthy relationship when two people exert significant nondominating influence over each other. Such influence is a similar sign of health when present in the human relationship with nature. Contrast human interaction with rural landscapes and with wilderness areas. Many preservationists would argue that humans significantly dominate rural lands, while wilderness has autonomy from humanity. This need not be the case, given the above account of autonomy. While it is obviously true that wilderness is less influenced by people than are rural lands, it does not follow

from this that wilderness is more autonomous. Instead of letting the banker, boss, or stock market determine their lives, they let the seasons, temperature, and presence or absence of predators or pests determine their lives. Rural nature can preserve its autonomy in relationship with humanity even when significantly influenced by humans because it can significantly influence us in return. It is true that a farmer might have machinery, chemicals, irrigation systems, greenhouses, insurance, and so on, so that she is hardly more influenced by nature than is an urban dweller. But some farmers put their livelihoods in the hands of nature. They depend on the rain coming, instead of irrigating with fossil water. They depend on insect predators in the hedgerows, instead of chemical pesticides. They depend on the hawks to keep the field mice down. They depend on horses to plough and manure the fields. By leaving themselves open to significant influence from natural entities and systems, their relation with nature is likely to be a nondominating one. One implication of this account is that if we want to respect the autonomy of nature, it helps to not protect ourselves too much from it. When humans accommodate themselves to natural processes and entities, rather than reworking or eliminating those processes or entities, they show a respect for the autonomy of the nature with which they live. The only guidance pure preservationists offer for our treatment of the nature we use is to minimize our involvement with that nature or use it as efficiently as possible. But then our advice to the farmer, the forester, and rural homebuilder is to do as little farming, forestry, or home building as possible. If respect for nature means leaving nature alone, then using nature involves disrespecting it and at best we can minimize our disrespect by using it as little as possible. In contrast, if respect for nature can mean respecting its autonomy in relationship with humanity, then it is possible to use nature while respecting it. Use of nature that does not compromise its autonomy can be respectful use. Not only does a pure preservationist ethic give no real guidance for our treatment of less than fully wild nature but it tends to disparage the value of that type of nature. The lack of respect for less than fully wild nature is an increasingly frequent target for critics of the pure wilderness preservation ethic. Val Plumwood puts the criticism this way: By making respect for the autonomy of nature in relation to humanity a central focus of an environmental ethic, we can avoid viewing non-wilderness lands and humanly influenced species as inferior, degraded versions of wild nature. Rural lands and domesticated animals and plants--though more greatly influenced by humans--can be just as autonomous as wild nature. We can respect them by influencing them in a way that does not dominate them and letting them influence our lives in return.

### 3: Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and Practice - PDF Free Download

*In focusing on the recognition and meaning of nature's autonomy and linking issues of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and policy, the essays provide a variety of new perspectives on human relationships to nature.*

### 4: Contributors : Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature Theory and Practice

*Nature-inspired-autonomy describes the value attached to wild nature emerging from dissatisfaction with the imposed values of society, and the resulting desire for some degree of autonomy.*

### 5: Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature

*Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.*

### 6: Respecting Nature's Autonomy in Relationship with Humanity

*The essays in the book's final section turn to management and restoration practices, investigating whether they promote the autonomy of nature or represent further attempts to dominate the natural world.*

*Multinational risk assessment and management Mein kampf ford edition Indian english poetry books Career-long professional growth. Cognitive functions of the cerebellum The Artful Christmas Special orthopedic injection therapy : contraindications, information List of afghanistan ministries The Rover Boys on a Hunt Spell of the Holy Land. Create compelling spectacles law 38. States and capitals of india and their chief ministers The Slave in the Swamp Samuel Beadle family Dante and the City Schools make a difference Nutrient dense foods list Precession of the Equinox 73 Symbolism and modern literature Chartreuse of Padula Monster slumber party Complete creative Oriental cooking 3. The image of the Buddha The siege and capture of Fort Loyall Zagat Survey 2006/07 New Jersey Shore Restaurants Pocket Guide (Zagat Survey) Lewis, L. A. The meerschaum pipe. Tourney and Joust (A Wayland Sentinel Book) Strategic management and business policy 15th ed Prayers that avail much book Urban problems related to energy Word after word after word How to Flunk Out of a Community College Standard gibbs energy table Jesus Loves Me! (Baby Flap Book) Become a 911 Dispatcher The service of the Knights Templar, &c. Time dependent pharmacokinetics introduction classification The Quistclose Trust Memories of Summer A season of goodwill*