

### 1: The Indian Ocean Rim: Southern Africa and Regional Cooperation, 1st Edition (Hardback) - Routledge

*Formed in , the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) came into being thanks to a joint initiative of South Africa, India, Australia and Mauritius.*

**Key Points** The origins of IOR-ARC were tenuous, given there was no shared cultural, historical identity or established economic interaction among its founding members to consolidate the organisation. The IOR-ARC has suffered from a lack of leadership, but now that India is, and Australia soon will be, in the driving seat, both countries have shown renewed interest in the organisation. Regional arrangements need to have major powers willing to invest in material terms but also to provide an ideational impetus. The rhetoric in India, for instance, about maritime security, maritime interests and influence in the Indian Ocean region has significantly changed. The IOR-ARC could benefit from the fact that it cannot be depicted as a monolithic unit, nor can it be perceived as a bloc of revisionist powers. The focus has been on enhancing economic co-operation and improving governance on issues of common concern within the region. Projecting an ambitious vision, the aim was to enhance economic co-operation by stimulating intra-regional trade and investment, synergising competitive advantages in commodities, manufacturing and services, collection, classification and distribution of data and information, establishing a network among Indian Ocean Region IOR countries and promoting standardisation and harmonisation in data, statistics and procedures. Furthermore, the sheer diversity in geography, culture and economic development made it appear an unrealistic and unwieldy entity. India and Australia are back in the leading seats as Chair and Vice-Chair respectively and, from a number of quarters, both from within and external to the Indian Ocean Region, there appears to be renewed interest in its potential. Each in turn had strategic incentives for doing so. During the mids, this entailed an emphasis on improving relations in the near neighbourhood. This coincided with a new assertiveness on the part of South Africa. Breaking free from the constraints imposed during apartheid, South Africa sought to cast its influence beyond the immediate region. It was cemented during the subsequent presidential visit of Nelson Mandela to India in January Business and civil society networks have been set up but over time faded away or collapsed, generating, in the process, a number of parallel organisations, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group, the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum and the Working Group on Trade and Investment. Perhaps most damage to the fledging organisation was receding interest among the major players. Meanwhile, other trans-regional aspirations had caught the imagination of policy-makers. Over the last few years, a number of developments have, on the one hand, dramatically highlighted security concerns in the region and, at the same time, signalled a shift in strategic thinking. Together, these have revived a conviction in the idea that greater economic interaction will benefit the region as a whole. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and along the coasts of Somalia and Kenya, but also out at open sea, has highlighted the vital importance of protecting the sea-lanes of communication. This has led to unprecedented levels of co-operation among naval forces within the region, as well as with extra-regional blue-water navies. At the same time, territorial disputes over strategic and resource-rich islands such as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea , have strained the current balance of power. In the meantime, two major, energy-hungry powers, India and China, are jostling for access to oil and maritime reserves. In other words, the indicators and symptoms of a power shift are evident, both in the vacuum that has emerged as governance is strained, and in the fissures and fault lines emerging between status quo and revisionist actors. There are three major features to consider: Maritime security has, in recent years, received a great deal of media and government attention, especially following the audacious terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were orchestrated from the sea. At the same time, however, India is anxious to pre-empt any accusations or suspicions of maritime power projection. Analysed by specialists, the documents have been described as being primarily informative and educational, rather than pinpointing or framing tactical or operational plans. Such an approach has been adjusted to the exigencies of power. These include vital energy concerns. Estimates, based on current growth levels, project that India will soon have an 85 per cent dependence on foreign oil imports. Hence, it will have a crucial stake in projected pipeline projects and on-going deep-sea oil drilling and gas wells within the Indian Ocean region. As a result, it follows that this

will require the nation to maintain military capabilities, not only for deterrence purposes, but also in case the state is required to adopt a more assertive position. Furthermore, the remittances from an Indian overseas community that numbers more than 3. While previous governmental representatives have judiciously attended the regular meetings, their speeches have been highly procedural and technical, providing a dry depiction of unimpressive achievements and lukewarm proposals for the future. The speech made by the Minister of External Affairs, S. Krishna, which inaugurated the most recent meeting in November, is substantively very different. The IOR-ARC is a unique conglomeration of members, brought together in a forum that is not confined to an agenda focussed on defence, trade or environmental concerns. The association also has five dialogue partners – Egypt, Japan, China, Britain and France and two observers: The expansiveness of the themes that are addressed may certainly indicate a weakness of the organisation but this could also turn out to be its strength, for it cannot be identified as a militarised bloc of monolithic interests. While, on paper, the concrete results so far have been thin, India in particular has demonstrated its interest in providing leadership, as well as revealing a willingness to invest resources. This coincides with a number of indications that India is seeking to enhance its standing and influence in the region as a whole. Nor does it feature in major foreign policy speeches by representatives of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Her PhD in political science from Heidelberg University was on the subject of policymaking and institution building during the transition period after independence under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

### 2: IORA priorities - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

*The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), formerly known as the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative and Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), is an international organisation consisting of coastal states bordering the Indian Ocean.*

Addressing future maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean will require much greater focus on cooperation with regional coast guards. The ocean faces a host of security challenges, mostly involving non-state actors, including piracy; illegal fishing; the smuggling of drugs, people and arms; humanitarian and disaster relief; and search and rescue. But most Indian Ocean states lack sufficient capabilities to properly address maritime security problems in their own waters, let alone assist elsewhere. A lack of enforcement capabilities in one state is a problem for everyone. The collapse of the Somali government led to a piracy problem that affected countries all over the world. The failure to address illegal fishing, for example, can allow for the growth of transnational criminal networks that are also likely to be involved in other activities such as the smuggling of people, drugs and arms. In other words, it is not possible to clearly separate maritime security threats simply by nature or by location. Search and rescue needed in the Indo-Pacific. Although navies have traditionally been the first port of call in the maritime realm, coast guards are likely to take an ever more prominent role in the future. Navies can have an important role in addressing transnational maritime security issues, but it is not the role that they were primarily built for. Their principal mission is to defend their homelands against state-based threats, not be an ocean-going police force. The use of navies can be very costly. The international efforts to counter Somali-based pirates, for example, led to the deployment of many expensive high-end naval vessels to counter what was, essentially, just a policing problem that was mostly solved through the deployment of armed guards. There can also be real political costs in relying too much on navies. Many countries, especially in the Indian Ocean region, are understandably cautious about seeing navies operating off their coasts. These issues are leading many countries to find other ways of addressing maritime security challenges, largely driven by the best mix in terms of cost and effectiveness. In Australia, we have seen the evolution of the Maritime Border Command MBC as an agency that coordinates white and grey hull assets to address civil maritime security issues. Power plays in Indonesian waters. Every country will have different answers to these problems, but a common theme is that in many cases coast guard agencies will assume greater responsibilities and send their vessels further and further afield. Future anti-piracy efforts might for example include greater use of white hulled vessels with the support of traditional military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ISR and logistics systems. This approach would not only save money but would also reduce the potential for naval rivalry. This trend means that we need to think much more about leveraging capabilities and relationships among coast guard agencies. The Indian and Japanese coast guards have been conducting bilateral exercises off the coast of southern India for more than a decade, indicating the value those countries see in coast guard cooperation. Japan is also expending considerable resources in improving maritime law enforcement capabilities in countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Australia also has experience in capacity building. In 2009, the country gave two surplus patrol boats to Sri Lanka, principally driven by Australian concerns about people smuggling activities originating in Sri Lanka. This cooperation, and the broader security partnership that subsequently developed between the two countries, was successful in stemming people smuggling and various other transnational criminal activities that were emanating from Sri Lanka. This can serve as a model for future bilateral capacity building activities with countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar. A key element of capacity building is facilitating regional cooperation among coast guard agencies. Many maritime security challenges need to be addressed on a multilateral and not just a national basis. But there is currently no mechanism or forum for cooperation among coastguard agencies in the Indian Ocean. This is a big missing link in Indian Ocean security architecture. Although IONS promotes dialogue on a range of maritime security issues, it is almost inevitably navy focused. Coast guard agencies have few opportunities to interact directly. But there is no forum for dialogue among all Indian Ocean coast guards, nor is there one to promote cooperation on Indian Ocean security issues. Australia

and its regional partners should seek to create a mechanism for cooperation and coordination among Indian Ocean coast guards. While ideally this could be pan-Indian Ocean, it may be more fruitful to begin with a subset focused on the eastern Indian Ocean. Key eastern Indian Ocean states, such as India, Indonesia and Australia could establish a minilateral mechanism for cooperation among their coast guard agencies. This could be expanded to include other agencies in the eastern Indian Ocean and even facilitate extra-regional contributions to capacity building within the region. Australia has had a very successful experience in building the MBC to provide maritime security in its own waters. The MBC has made some important steps in regional engagement, but these need to be stepped up to include capacity building and the development of regional cooperation structures with key eastern Indian Ocean states.

### 3: IORA - Indian Ocean Rim Association

*China and India increasingly vie for strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean, an independent Indian think Gulf of Aden have been the most successful manifestation of regional cooperation.*

Maritime security is a major challenge for the poorer coastal and island countries of the Indian Ocean Region. In particular those that have large zones of maritime jurisdiction. It has an area of around 100 million square kilometres. Unlike the Pacific and the Atlantic, it is enclosed on three sides by landmasses. The Indian Ocean region comprises all the littoral and island states of that ocean. Some of these nations also share borders with the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The island states of Madagascar, Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles, for example, have maritime zones of around 1 million square kilometres or more. Some west Indian Ocean states, notably Somalia and Yemen, also have large maritime zones that are fish rich. They are open to illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. But also other forms of maritime crime, including piracy, drug and arms smuggling. Managing maritime security is a challenging endeavour. It requires cooperation between regional countries, and between those with a stake in regional security. Maritime security is no longer the sole prerogative of navies with more non-military agencies now involved. Maritime security is a priority for the Indian Ocean Rim Association, currently the main regional organisation for economic and security cooperation. It recently committed its members to working on increasing cooperation among navies and other maritime security forces in the region. The plan is to do this collaboratively with the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, a voluntary initiative to address shared maritime security challenges and threats. The threats include illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and people, piracy, terrorism, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, and the risks of natural disasters. But there are many challenges with developing effective management in the Indian Ocean region. The diversity of interests among regional countries is a problem. There is no agreement on what encompasses maritime security. African countries in the region are more concerned about local issues of governance, poverty, disease and internal security than the broader strategic issues that concern the wider region. It makes a clear link between maritime security and human security. It does this by drawing attention to threats in the maritime domain. This strategy provides a framework for cooperation but much more still needs to be done. Obstacles to effective cooperation include, lack of capacity and political will, as well as maritime boundary and sovereignty disputes. Much more cooperation needed There is clearly a need for enhanced civil maritime security cooperation. This must include coastguards and equivalent national agencies of regional members. In April, a consensus was recognised, looking at the importance of cooperation between navies, coastguards and other agencies. The aim was to develop cooperation to tackle traditional and non-traditional threats in the region. Many countries in the region have separate navies and coast guards. Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives only have coast guards. Somalia is a region where there is massive illegal, unregulated and underreported fishing. Kenya has rejected its earlier plan for a coast guard. Instead the country chose to boost inter-agency coordination. The South African Navy performs the coast guard function and shows characteristics of a coast guard rather than a navy. France and its Indian Ocean territories, like Reunion and Mayotte, are an interesting case. France uses its navy in coast guard roles along with some other European countries, including Portugal and Spain. A similar principle has been followed by former French and Portuguese colonies in the region, like Madagascar and Timor-Leste. Even former British colonies Kenya and Tanzania display a strong institutional impulse based on the colonial legacy to maintain distinctly military structures. Regional architecture Another hurdle is the lack of effective regional architecture for the task. There is too much focus much on naval cooperation risks, diverting attention from real requirements. These include maritime governance, capacity-building, developing national legislation, development, and poverty alleviation. A regional forum of civil agencies involved in maritime security might help overcome this challenge. The involvement of extra-regional countries in regional arrangements is also a challenge. The major powers of the United States, China and Japan have legitimate interests in regional maritime security. But there are sensitivities as to how involved they should be. Given these challenges, sub-regional cooperation may be more achievable. This may be the most effective way of taking regional maritime security management

forward.

### 4: Maritime Safety and Security – Indian Ocean Rim Association – IORA

*IOR-ARC, a regional cooperation initiative of the Indian Ocean Rim countries, was established in Mauritius in March with the aim of promoting economic and technical cooperation. IOR-ARC is the only pan-Indian ocean grouping.*

Jayewardene Introduction Wherever the intensity of human activity has increased, the emergence of management arrangements has been a prerequisite for rational utilization of such areas and their resources. So, in the international field, whether it be outer space, the polar regions or the deep ocean regions, international cooperative arrangements have evolved to circumscribe the limits of individual action and provide for cooperative use and joint management. Also, in the area of ocean space - the oceans - it may be seen as inevitable that intergovernmental arrangements would eventually develop as a basis for rational management. In such a context, the process of Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation IOMAC may be seen as a pioneering ocean management movement initiated by countries of the region, joined by extra-regional user states. For reasons of comprehensiveness and effectiveness, IOMAC was founded on the concept of integrating relevant management disciplines in mandated fields, as well as integrating relevant national, regional, and global institutional elements in the regional management framework. In furtherance of the primary commitment for the realization of the promised benefits to governments from the new ocean regime, IOMAC has consistently emphasized training as an essential tool in advancing national capabilities in the requisite fields of marine affairs. This would be essential for bringing about a true integration of the ocean sector in national development strategies. Inspired by recognition of the finite character of the adjacent ocean and its resources, African and Asian states united in the context of a characterization of the Indian Ocean as the "village pond" in the largely underdeveloped African-Asian region of the world. In addition to promoting cooperation between Indian Ocean States and entities outside the region, including technologically-advanced States and international organizations, IOMAC since its inception, has opened new vistas on regional cooperation and facilitated the broadening of intra-regional contacts which promote closer cooperation between African and Asian countries on a regular basis. In the future, such contacts could provide the platform on which closer integration of the rim community could be forged. Already, a number of far-reaching management measures for the ocean, such as its Declaration as a Sanctuary for Whales for All Time, Banning of Large-scale Drift Nets, Declaration of a New Era of Indian Ocean Exploration, Initiation of Process Leading to the Establishment of an Indian Ocean Tuna Management framework, or establishment of a regional network of focal points for marine affairs, represent significant progress by IOMAC in bringing about collective ocean management in the region. Institutions for ocean management Intergovernmental institutional arrangements for managing various aspects of ocean activities have evolved from time to time. Conventional regimes have evolved in respect of environmental management of specific sea areas, as in the case of the Baltic Sea Convention or the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean. While the provisions of the first two have attracted considerable international attention since the conclusion of the Convention as in the deliberations in the Preparatory Commission, the last has remained in relative obscurity. In the more traditional areas of marine activity such as the delineation of regimes, jurisdiction, marine research, and resource utilization - areas of immediate practical relevance to developing countries - there has been only limited activity in terms of efforts to realize the benefits of the Convention and to advance requisite national skills. Consequently, there have been no major institutional developments in this area. As noted above, the only directly relevant institutional arrangements envisaged under the Convention - although limited in scope to scientific and technological aspects - have not been utilized in the preparatory and post-Conference processes preceding entry into force. The frequent references in the text of the Convention, especially in the context of regional cooperation, has drawn the interpretation that "an undertaking to cooperate is also an undertaking to act". Pinto More recently, the ongoing international deliberations on the regime of the high seas has manifested a trend towards *res communis* and further development of the thesis on the obligatory character of international cooperation in its use and management. The new management discipline One of the remarkable, but often overlooked, aspects of UNCLOS III was the marshalling of multi-disciplinary expertise through

national delegations for confronting a myriad of assorted problems and issues in areas such as fisheries, oceanography, geology, geography, marine technology, finance, and economics - apart from the central legal discipline. Nevertheless, the process of negotiations - perhaps somewhat clouded by immediate issues of jurisdiction and the politically challenging task of completing part XI - possibly detracted from the Conference reflecting that experience in full. Hence, we have in articles , an acknowledgment of the role of marine science and technology. Even at the end of the Conference, "science and technology" was still seen as the essential discipline as emphasized in the Group of inspired "Resolution on the Development of Marine Scientific and Technological Capabilities" - one of the resolutions appended to the Final Act of the Conference as annex VI. While some grappled with nomenclature such as "oceanology," it was left to developments in the aftermath of the Conference to give recognition to the broader concept of "marine affairs" as the general discipline on which ocean management of the future was to be founded. However, there is no precise content of general acceptability, the scope being determined by a particular mandate. In the case of IOMAC, six main areas of activity have been identified, namely, marine science technology and ocean services; living resources; non-living resources; ocean law policy and management; marine transport and communications, and the marine environment. Many countries were slow to recognize that mere assertion of rights in respect of vast sea areas and offshore resource potential would not endow them with those benefits. The principal challenge then, as it is now, was the effective integration of the marine dimension in national development strategies. In the Indian Ocean there was, initially, a need to assess the state of activities and identify national priorities and requisite measures for advancement in the marine sector. Above all, there was a necessity to determine a suitable forum for such deliberations. Several rounds of initial discussions in the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee AALCC which provided the only appropriate general forum spanning the Indian Ocean - soon revealed the need for a dedicated forum within which Indian Ocean marine affairs could be properly addressed. Create an awareness regarding the Indian Ocean, its resources and potential for the development of the states of the region, and furthering cooperation among them, as well as with other states active in the region, bearing in mind the new ocean regime embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Provide a forum where Indian Ocean states and other interested nations could review the state of the economic uses of the Indian Ocean and its resources and related activities, including those undertaken within the framework of intergovernmental organizations, and identifying fields in which they would benefit from enhanced international cooperation, coordination, and concerted actions. Over 35 States from the Indian Ocean region and outside have participated in IOMAC activities together with 38 international organizations, offices and entities of the United Nations system, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations and entities. As an exercise in the development of international organizations, IOMAC is characterized by a functional approach which preceded the process of formalization culminating in the adoption of the Arusha Agreement on the Organization for Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation of In an era of international endeavour based on a new approach to integrated marine affairs management, this practical approach has helped governments and organizations to participate, experience, and understand the nature and scope of such a framework for cooperation. Eight ratifications would be needed for entry-into-force. The organizational framework for Indian Ocean marine affairs cooperation 1. Principles of cooperation The main task of the First Conference at its Consultative Meeting in July , as preceded by the Preparatory Meeting in June of that year, was to give form and content to the basic concept of cooperation underlying the objectives of association of IOMAC. These principles deal inter alia with integration of the marine sector into national development strategies; rights and needs of the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States; acquisition and dissemination of information; harmonization and strengthening of management arrangements; designation of national focal points; development of maritime transport services; cooperation within international organizations; cooperation at international conferences; operational arrangements; and action to implement. The Second Conference in Arusha in , reviewed the principles, and assigned the matter to the Standing Committee for further consideration. This provides for the following categories: Considerable debate and discussion has taken place with regard to the inclusion of the latter category of Major Maritime Users MMUs. Since the area coming within the purview of the organization includes and extends beyond the limits of

national jurisdiction to encompass the high seas, it is arguable that an effort to move to coastal state management of the ocean as a whole, while excluding other users with legitimate rights therein, would tend to go in the direction of creeping jurisdiction and a revival of mare clausum. At the same time, there is no doubt of some concern that developing country interests would be subjugated in a framework also accommodating developed countries making up the category of MMUs. Sometimes the issue is also cast as a political bogey in the context of intra-regional strategic perceptions. On the other hand, some MMUs have argued that the MMU claim of interests may not only be equal to, but could even surpass that of coastal States in terms of areal extent and intensity of user activities. The concern regarding MMUs would appear to be greatly diminished in the light of the reality of day-to-day intercourse with developed countries, and the growing realization of the need for shedding post-colonial antipathy, interdependence, reduction of international tension, and building mutual confidence through cooperation. In fact, precedents of developed country participation in other regional organizations, and even the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission IOFC , and present discussions on an Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IOTC , would tend to recognize the value of accommodating all principal actors in management. An ancillary issue is the claim of some MMUs for recognition as littoral States on account of territorial possession in the Indian Ocean. In Arusha, the IOMAC II Resolution adopting the constituent Agreement for the Organization "considered that at this stage membership in the Organization should be open only to coastal and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean" and further considered it "desirable that States other than coastal nor hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and particularly such states as are active in the Indian Ocean, should also participate in the activities of the Organization for purposes of ensuring the widest possible international cooperation. It was originally envisaged that the Committee would initially consist of 10 members nominated by the Conference to represent the major geographical areas and principal ocean-related interests that is, landlocked, geographically disadvantaged, mainland coastal, and archipelagic States. The Conference provided that the Committee shall be open-ended and shall meet as often as necessary for the performance of its functions and shall determine procedures, the agenda, and venue of its meeting. The Conference established the Standing Committee with primary responsibility for taking action as may be necessary for policy level guidance on the implementation of the Programme and Plan of Action and furthering cooperation through the framework of IOMAC. Participation in the Standing Committee very soon surpassed the numbers envisaged by the First Conference with 17 participants at the initial meeting in January regarded as the original Members of the Committee , which has progressively increased in participation through 15 in , 21 in , 22 in , 25 in , and 28 in July The Committee meetings in and were equally very well attended. Article 8 of the Arusha Agreement governs the Standing Committee as follows: The Conference shall determine the size and elect members of the Committee, from amongst the Members of the Organization, and shall endeavour to ensure that the major geographical areas and the principal ocean-related interests namely, landlocked, geographically disadvantaged, mainland, coastal and archipelagic shall be represented in the Committee. The Committee which shall be the executive body of the Organization shall: Provide the necessary policy guidance for the implementation of the Programme of Cooperation and Plan of Action of the Organization, and for the furtherance of cooperation through the framework of the Organization. Consider the implementation of decisions taken by the Conference. Supervise the administration and finances of the Organization. Submit to the Conference, for its approval, the budget estimates and accounts of the Organization, together with comments and recommendations. Submit to the Conference, for its approval, proposals for programmes and activities of the Organization. Authorize the Secretary-General to take whatever steps the Committee considers necessary for achieving the objectives of the Organization. Establish its rules of procedure except as otherwise provided in this Agreement. Exercise such other functions as may be referred to it by the Conference. The Committee shall meet in regular session once a year. The Committee shall meet in special session whenever a majority of the members of the Committee request the convening of a special session. A quorum for meetings of the Committee shall be two-thirds of the members of the Committee. The Committee shall elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. Members of the Organization not elected to the Committee may participate at its meetings without a vote. The Committee shall endeavour to reach its decisions by consensus. Where consensus is not possible, decisions of the Committee shall, unless

otherwise provided in this Agreement, be made by a majority of its members present and voting. Representatives of governments not members of the Organization, representatives of the United Nations and the appropriate agencies and bodies of the United Nations, representatives of such other international and national governmental and non governmental organizations as the Committee may deem appropriate, and experts in fields of interest to the Committee may be invited to attend meetings of the Committee as observers. If one-third of the members of the Organization objects to the invitation of an observer to the Committee that observer shall not be invited thereafter. In practice, the meetings of the Committee held on an annual basis, has created a regional forum which brings a growing number of delegates and experts from Asian, Arab and African States together regularly, and has helped create new professional and personal ties within the region. The concurrent meetings of the Technical Cooperation Group TCG , which is becoming more active, has also served to focus greater attention on the meetings and work of the Committee. At the Second Standing Committee Meeting in the Committee approved the provision of an independent and permanent location for the Secretariat in Colombo. For the purpose of formalizing these arrangements and securing the appropriate host facilities, in addition to facilities pledged to the Committee, a host facilities agreement between the Secretariat and the Government of Sri Lanka will give effect to these decisions. Article 9 of the Arusha Agreement provides for the Secretariat composed of the Secretary-General, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization, and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall, as chief administrative officer, be responsible, under the guidance of the Committee, for the administration of the Organization and its programmes. The provisions detail the functions of the Secretary-General and provide, inter alia, that he shall ensure that the Organization shall be an effective and dynamic channel of cooperation in marine affairs in the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, the Secretariat identified and invited such countries to be associated with the Standing Committee at its future meetings with a view to jointly identifying areas of possible cooperation and procedures for interaction. The creation of this Group in has provided a forum for a regular dialogue between Indian Ocean States and participating technologically advanced States interested in the Indian Ocean. Initial participation of these countries essentially as observers, has gradually progressed to a more active level of contact. Network of focal points It is required that participating States of IOMAC should designate and notify other participating States the national entity primarily responsible for coordination of its marine activities and the maintenance of marine affairs cooperation on the regional and global levels through a network of such entities. This process of establishing an international network of focal points within the Indian Ocean and globally has been underway since the completion of the First Conference in Both States and international organizations have responded to the formal communication from the Secretariat requesting the early designation of focal points. The Secretariat maintains regular contact with governments through their respective national focal points. Communications relating to the announcements of IOMAC meetings, workshops, training programmes and other activities, are regular items of such contact. Cooperation with international organization Since the inter-agency consultations in Geneva in May which preceded even the First Conference, the IOMAC process has evolved in very close cooperation with international organizations concerned with marine activities, in particular, the United Nations and other interested organizations.

### 5: Indian-Ocean Rim Association - Wikipedia

*"We must seek cooperation and assistance from all nations to ensure that the Indian Ocean is free from all threats and challenges." "It is the responsibility of all of us as neighbours within the Indian Ocean to take easy steps at our command to ensure safe navigation in the waters within our region," the Defence Secretary said."*

The Modi government is making efforts to ensure a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean Region Beginning in the late s, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked all major powers to withdraw from the Indian Ocean out of concern for great power rivalry. The context which gave rise to the Gandhi approach began to change in the s, as India embarked on a policy of economic globalization and ended its military isolation. The top political leadership still had neither the time nor the inclination to lay out clear goals for the Indian Ocean or the maritime space beyond. China, much like India, had long had a continentalist obsession. As China began to build a blue water navy and put its weight behind its own maritime vision for the Pacific and Indian Oceans, however, Delhi was forced to consider the implications for its own maritime security. It sought to inject renewed dynamism into the moribund Indian Ocean Rim Association that was set up in the s to promote regional cooperation in the littoral. It launched the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium that convenes all the naval chiefs in the littoral for professional exchanges and engagement to promote maritime security. Delhi also initiated a trilateral security arrangement, coordinated at the level of national security advisers, between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives in to expand maritime security cooperation. Yet, as in so many areas, the UPA government did not have the energy to pursue these initiatives with urgency or purpose. Since the terror attack on Mumbai at the end of November , Delhi has been acutely conscious of the potential terrorist attacks coming via the sea. At the same time, Delhi has also been deeply aware of the growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean in global politics. India has long had close security partnerships with both Seychelles and Mauritius; Modi now wants to elevate these. In Seychelles, Modi announced the gift of a second Dornier aircraft for maritime monitoring, signed an agreement for conducting hydrographic surveys, and launched a coastal surveillance radar project. The radar initiative is part of an ambitious project to build a maritime domain awareness network across the Indian Ocean. It calls for the establishment of eight surveillance radars in Mauritius, eight in Seychelles, six in Sri Lanka, and ten in Maldives. These will be linked to over 50 sites on the Indian coast and connected to an integrated analysis center near Delhi. In Mauritius, Modi attended the commissioning of the Indian-made offshore patrol vessel Barracuda, marking his commitment to maritime capacity building in small island republics. He also announced agreements to develop infrastructure for connectivity in the Assumption Island in the Seychelles and Aga Lega in Mauritius. These are likely to strengthen the defense capabilities of the two republics and give India a valuable foothold at critical locations in South Western Indian Ocean. Modi said India will help strengthen regional mechanisms in combatting terrorism and piracy and responding to natural disasters. He expressed the hope that Mauritius, Seychelles and other countries will join the trilateral security initiative it already has with Maldives and Sri Lanka. This sets the stage for very productive multilateral maritime security cooperation in the littoral with India at the core. He also demonstrated considerable sensitivity to climate change concerns in the island nations. While insisting that Indian Ocean states hold the primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in those waters, Modi indirectly referenced the role that the United States plays in the region through dialogue, exercises, economic partnerships, and capacity building efforts. There can be no doubt that Modi has made a decisive break from the ambivalence of the UPA government. This was evinced during the recent visit of U. President Barack Obama, when Modi and Obama announced the renewal of their defense framework agreement and signed a broad framework for expanding cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific. His openness towards the U. In sum, there is no doubt that Modi has embarked on a more ambitious foreign policy in the Indian Ocean. It is confident enough to collaborate with the United States in self-interest and engage China on maritime issues with greater self-assurance.

### 6: The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC) (Hiran W. Jayewardene)

*Unfortunately, there has been limited and slow progress in building a 'strong grouping around the Indian Ocean' in terms of either a collective security mechanism or strengthening regional cooperation.*

The Maritime Crime Programme MPC commenced working with States in the Indian Ocean region as part of its counter-piracy activities and continues to work with those States to combat a range of maritime crime threats. Regional "Piracy Prosecution Model" As piracy off the Horn of Africa reached alarming rates in , a major component of the international response involved the deployment of multilateral naval forces to conduct counter-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean region; securing a safe transit corridor for vessels and responding to piracy attacks or reports of suspicious activity on the high seas. This response was authorised by a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The military response to piracy - which continues today - has proven to be a highly effective intervention. However, an immediate obstacle faced by naval forces during the first interceptions was the lack of any clear mechanism for holding suspected pirates criminally accountable when they were intercepted at sea. Naval forces intercepting suspected pirate groups on the high seas were often forced to let the suspects go without any sanctions, because the appropriate criminal justice mechanisms were not in place to enable prosecution. In cooperation with regional States, military forces and international and regional organisations, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme took a leading role in forging the framework for this model. Under the piracy prosecution model, willing prosecuting States are first required to ensure they have the necessary legislation in place to prosecute piracy domestically. Prosecuting States then formalize transfer agreements with naval forces operating counter-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean region. Under these transfer agreements, when suspected pirates are apprehended at sea, the naval force secures the available evidence and submits a request to the prosecuting State, which may accept the case for prosecution based on its own evaluation of the evidence and other considerations. Upon receiving the suspected pirates in its own jurisdiction, the prosecuting State investigates the case further and proceeds to prosecute the case domestically. The MCP has been heavily involved at all junctures of this process, from assisting States to implement legislation criminalizing piracy through to wide-spread criminal justice assistance and direct support to the trial process. MCP support spans the entire prosecution process, from providing interpretation services at the dock when suspects are handed over to the prosecuting State, through to assisting throughout the trial and facilitating the eventual re-transfer of convicted persons. A key component of the MCP mandate is promoting best practices at every stage of the criminal justice process; ensuring that trials are fair, efficient, and in line with international standards. Likewise, the MCP provides substantial support to corrections facilities in the prosecuting States where suspected or convicted pirates are detained, to ensure that they are detained in safe and humane conditions. Ensuring compliance with international human rights norms and protecting the welfare of both suspected and convicted persons is a cornerstone of the piracy prosecution model. The regional prosecution model has been an innovative criminal justice response to piracy. Although piracy is a crime of "universal jurisdiction", which may be prosecuted by any State, the regional model has seen States in the Indian Ocean region take ownership of a regional security issue that affects them directly. The first States to indicate a willingness to prosecute piracy cases under this model were Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles. Assistance provided to prosecuting States by the MCP has included: Legislative implementation and reform Facilitating the signing of transfer agreements between prosecuting States and naval forces, as well as re-transfer agreements for sentenced prisoners Building, renovating and upgrading police, prison and court facilities Enhancing law enforcement and correctional services at the strategic level Monitoring and enhancing detention facilities The provision of welfare support and interpretation services to piracy suspects detained on remand The placement of in-house police, prosecution and prison mentors into national agencies Provision of vehicles and specialist equipment to law enforcement bodies Wide-ranging training initiatives for lawyers, Judges, Police, Coast Guards and Prison officials While these capacity-building activities have fallen under the mandate of counter-piracy support, the benefits have extended to the entire criminal justice systems of the prosecuting States. In all of its capacity building

activities in the Indian Ocean Region, the MCP places a strong emphasis on sustainability and partnership with national agencies. In addition to broad criminal-justice support to prosecuting States, the MCP also supports the trial process directly, by alleviating the costs of prosecution borne by the prosecuting State. To this end, the MCP provides: Activities beyond counter-piracy support Building upon the strong bonds it has forged with States through the piracy prosecution model, the MCP Indian Ocean programme continues to work with regional States to enhance their capacity to combat a wide range of maritime crimes. This includes tackling the rising problem of drug trafficking at sea throughout the region. Piracy Prosecution Statistics at October

### 7: ~Regional cooperation a must for Indian Ocean stability~™ | Daily News

*The Indian Ocean Rim defines a distinctive area in international politics consisting of coastal states bordering the Indian Ocean. It is a region of a diverse mix in terms of culture, race, religion, economic development and strategic interests.*

### 8: India's master plan for the Indian Ocean | Asia Times

*There is considerable value in looking at the Indian Ocean as a region for future analysis of maritime regimes, and this book proposes that international maritime regimes can expand regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean to create a new geopolitical region.*

### 9: Indian Ocean Division

*For example, cooperation through organisations like the Indian Ocean Commission in the Southwest Indian Ocean, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Union.*

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