

1: virtuous - Dictionary Definition : [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*We become virtuous by making the right choices until it becomes second nature to us -- until it is the core of our character. The Nichomachean Ethics The virtuous person, according to Aristotle, is a person who develops and excellently exercises his or her distinctive essence or function.*

Today as we see women of all ages following dubious role models, we are refreshed to find a timeless example of virtue, responsibility and good sense. Here, in this lovely picture of womanhood, is a woman who embodies the qualities which every believing woman should strive for in her personal life and appearance, in her family life, and in her daily duties. The woman described in Proverbs 31 is so exemplary and so virtuous, and so diligent to perform all her duties that women today, who have a heart to please God, may find it difficult or even discouraging to try to follow her example. They might think, "How could I ever measure up to such a godly woman? When I think of how I have carried out my responsibilities as a wife or as a mother or even as an unmarried woman, compared to this person described in Proverbs 31, I am of all women most miserable! In 1 Peter 2: We all fall far short. We have not attained to His level of perfection, and yet we "follow after" and "press toward the mark" Phil. There are other stellar examples of godly persons in the Scriptures, whose lives often put us to shame; yet it is our joyful privilege to imitate them and follow their example. Think of men such as Joseph and Daniel and Paul as a converted man. Most Bible characters had their flaws, and certainly these men did as well, and yet nothing negative is said about these three in the Bible. They are wonderful role models for believers. In and of ourselves we will surely fail in our quest for godly living. We will come to the end of ourselves and recognize our own bankruptcy. With Paul we will cry out, "I know that in me that is, in my flesh dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not" Rom. God, by His grace and by the power of His Spirit can enable us to live lives that are pleasing to the One who died and rose again for us. May we reckon ourselves to be dead indeed unto sin Rom. We cannot, but God can! The God who indwells us can enable us. When we do fail to measure up to the kind of person God wants us to be, we can still rejoice that we have an Advocate with the Father a Helper in court! Each verse begins with a different letter of the Hebrew alphabet in proper order. The same alphabetical pattern is found in some of the Psalms and may have been used as an aid in memorizing Scripture. The most well-known alphabetical Psalm is Psalm where there are 22 alphabetical sections of eight verses each. In the Hebrew text of Proverbs 31, each verse is also clearly divided into two parts for example, in verse Part 1: Who can find a virtuous woman? For her price is far above rubies. This same two-part format is found in all of these verses. The only exception might be verse 15 which seems to be divided into three parts. The first part of verse 10 literally reads, "Who can find a woman of strength? Here it refers to strength of character, that is, moral strength and firmness. Moses was to find "able men" lit. In light of this verse we can say that a virtuous man is one who fears God, loves truth and hates sin. Moses was to look for and find such men, and the implication is that such men were not easy to find. The expression is also used in 1 Kings 1: In this latter passage v. Thus a virtuous man is a man of great moral strength, in whom wickedness is not found. He is a godly, God-fearing man. So also, the virtuous woman is a God-fearing woman--compare Proverbs The Old Testament uses this expression of a virtuous woman in two other places. Everyone in the city knew that she was a virtuous woman! When a woman has strength of character fears God, loves truth, hates sin, then others will take note and recognize this. It will be very obvious because it is so unusual. People are usually so morally weak and so anemic in character, that when a man or woman of strength shows up it is quite evident to all. She is far more valuable and worth far more than rubies. The Hebrew term for "rubies" may not refer to rubies, but may refer to pink pearls or red coral. A pink pearl which was found in a mollusk in the Red Sea was considered of great value to the ancients. It is difficult to know exactly which stone or pearl this Hebrew word referred to, but its usage in the Old Testament tells us two things for sure: Who can find a virtuous woman a woman of strength? She is like a rare gem. Precious stones are precious and costly because they are so rare. If you could go out along the roadside and collect hundreds of rubies anytime you wanted to, then they would not be worth much. It is the rare, hard to find gems that are worth so much. Also, for some

reason God made most common stones unattractive; yet He made most rare stones very beautiful and brilliant and lustrous. The virtuous woman is a beautiful woman, not necessarily outwardly, but certainly inwardly see Prov. She is not only a rare gem but a beautiful gem. A godly woman is rare and very hard to find. The same thing could be said about the godly man. There are hardly any such creatures around, and the few that do exist will eventually die out! May God in His infinite grace and mercy be pleased to raise up godly men and women in these difficult and trying days. First he should trust God to find her for him. Second, he must realize that a virtuous woman is not going to want just any man. She is going to want to find a virtuous man a man of strength, a man valiant for the truth, a godly servant of Christ. So if you want to have any chance of finding such a gem, you must be a gem yourself. Exercise yourself unto godliness. Learn the fear of the Lord. Dare to be different. Dare to go against the flow of the world, and to be transformed by the renewing of your mind Rom. Be the kind of a man that would attract the interest of the godly woman! So in this opening verse we have learned that the godly woman is very hard to find. She is more valuable than a rare gem. She has an inner beauty and a strength of character and a moral firmness that is lacking in the vast majority of women, even believing women. Sadly, this cannot be said of most husbands today. They cannot trust their wives and often their wives cannot trust them. Being able to fully trust your marriage partner is one of the fundamental foundations of a strong God-honoring marriage. Martin Luther said of his wife, "The greatest gift of God is a pious amiable spouse, who fears God, loves his house, and with whom one can live in perfect confidence" [quoted in Proverbs, by Charles Bridges, p. The term "husband" is the common word for husband in the Old Testament. It also means "lord" or "owner. The first reason is found in the second part of verse 11 "so that he shall have no need of spoil" and the second reason is found in verse 12 "she shall do him good and not evil". See the discussion that follows. So that he shall have no need of spoil "No need" is the very same expression found in Psalm Both here and in Psalm If I have a godly wife, I shall not be in need of spoil. The word "spoil" means "plunder, booty, spoil. Here in Proverbs She is not a financial liability as the verses following will amply illustrate. She manages the home so well and she is so industrious and productive that her efforts result in great gain and even profit. Sadly today some wives are so slothful and careless that they cause the family to suffer great financial loss. They go on shopping sprees or incur immense credit card debt or waste countless hours each week engaged in unproductive activities television, etc. How can her husband safely trust in her? After she has finished destroying the family budget, he has great need of gain considering all that she has lost! Of course, the problem of wasteful spending and unproductive activities is not limited to women only. Men are at fault as well. Of course, the man must find the right kind of wife. Some men find "a crown to their head" while others find "rottenness to their bones" Prov. One of the reasons Proverbs God knows who my life partner should be. The verb "will do" is of interest. It is not the common Hebrew verb for "do. At times it even approaches the meaning of "to reward, to pay back.

### 2: SparkNotes: Aristotle (≈ B.C.): Nicomachean Ethics: Books I to IV, page 2

*A virtuous person who does not exercise virtue is like an athlete who sits on the sideline and watches. Aristotle has a proactive conception of the good life: happiness waits only for those who go out and seize it.*

The virtuous person not only knows what the good thing to do is, she is also emotionally attached to it. In addition, these two excellences, or virtues, are intimately connected, so that the one cannot be had without the other Nicomachean Ethics 6. Some scholars stress the intellectual virtue pertaining to action, viz. She argues that the virtues of character have been poorly understood and that "the parts of his [ethical] theory examined here that have been maligned and neglected may be the most interesting and valuable of all" Short of explicitly downplaying the importance of intellectual virtues, she claims that excellence of character is the ethically important virtue for Aristotle. The book is divided into two parts. She singles out the doctrine of the mean as the key to that understanding. A virtue of character is an action-guiding disposition to hit the mean between two extreme emotions within a certain field. Courage, for instance, is the disposition to hit the mean between cowardice and rashness in the field of danger. The mean is determined not by the extremes alone, but by these in relation to the demands of the particular situation, including facts about the agent herself. She also defends Aristotle against misgivings about the virtues of character by showing these to be based on uncharitable readings, or on straightforward misinterpretations. She argues against the idea that virtues of character amount to moderation Kant , and the suggestion that they are remedies for natural deficiencies in human nature Philippa Foot, Christine Korsgaard. Moreover, it is through the doctrine of the mean that the contribution of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom is best appreciated, for it takes a reasoned view of the situation to hit the mean. The doctrine of the mean also provides a criterion for distinguishing between real virtues and mere emotions or natural temperament. These include the nature of moral dilemmas, virtuous motivation, how to understand the so-called practical syllogism, what the virtuous agent needs to know, and what kind of political arrangement best nurtures the development of virtuous persons. So in less than pages, Gottlieb takes on an array of difficult, and much disputed, issues in the Nicomachen Ethics. It is a bold enterprise she undertakes. She intends the study not only for Aristotle scholars, but aims at a broader audience interested in ethical theory, particularly virtue ethics. The purpose is to show that on a sound reading of Aristotle, his account of the virtues of character makes an important contribution to the contemporary ethical debate. At its best, scholarship manages both things in a single study. The comparisons would have required a more thorough treatment to be fruitful. Perhaps the scope of difficult issues is too wide to be manageable. By and large, however, it is a fairly conventional interpretation she puts forward. The phenomenon to be articulated is that some people tend to have a good judgement, and to get it right even in demanding, complex situations. Indeed, explaining what the virtues of character are, and in what way they help the agent hit the mean, by appealing to how the virtuous person would react has an air of circularity. My concern here is not the vexed question of the place of contemplation in the happy life. For even the picture of practical wisdom remains incomplete. Far from being merely instrumental, the exercises of intellectual virtues, practical wisdom included, are just as ethically significant in their own right as the virtues of character, being part and parcel of the happy human life. So when Gottlieb claims in chapter 7 that virtuous actions can be chosen for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of happiness, one wonders what notion of happiness she is operating with. Since they are constituents of the happy life, there is no difference between choosing virtuous actions for their own sake and choosing them for the sake of happiness. It is true that virtuous action is motivated both by the non-rational part of the soul and by the reason-possessing part. I now turn to some more specific issues. In chapter 5, Gottlieb discusses the claim that the virtues of character form a unity such that one cannot be had without all the rest. For instance, in order to exhibit the virtue of generosity, it is not enough to give the right amount to the right person at the right time for the right reasons. The resources shared must also have been acquired in accordance with other virtues such as justice. So the fully virtuous person must integrate the different virtues into a whole. Equipped with this disposition, the agent can assess the particular situation against the demands of the different virtues so as to form a balanced decision what to do. In addition to the

role played by practical wisdom in deliberating to such decisions, Gottlieb pinpoints its role in the genetic process of turning the natural temperaments into fully blown prohairesis virtues, i. It is in this reasoning process that the different virtues are integrated into a unity. I sympathise with this suggestion as far as the development of the virtuous character goes. But does it have any immediate bearing on the claim that having one virtue of character requires having all the rest? We are left guessing how turning even one natural temperament into a virtue of character requires the rest of them. The issue, it should be pointed out, is not the requirement on the practically wise person to have all the virtues of character integrated into a harmonious whole -- a fairly trivial point at that. Instead, the claim at issue is that a person cannot develop, and possess, a single virtue of character without developing all of them. What is needed is an account of what the alleged mutual dependence of all the virtues of character really amounts to. For instance, even if it seems reasonable to say that on some occasions the response of the virtue of courage must be checked against the demands of the virtue of temperance, why should possession of courage require possession of all other virtues of character? Is it a claim about how psychological faculties work, or a conceptual claim, or a claim about the ethical reality such that all the virtues of character have a bearing on each and every action? Forced to choose between two repugnant alternatives, choosing the less bad action does not jeopardise the character of the agent, although she might still feel regret for the action. The suggestion is sound as far as it goes. But Gottlieb then goes on to undermine the problem at hand. For according to her, "Aristotelian practical reasoning is more complicated than the version of single competing options given by those who propose the modern analysis of modern dilemmas" The idea is that the flexibility provided by the fact that the mean is relative to the particular circumstances makes the dilemma conception of moral challenges simple-minded. When the total situation is appreciated, more than the two repugnant alternatives of the dilemma will emerge. It cannot be the metaethical interest in moral dilemmas, the purpose of which is to investigate the theoretical framework of moral philosophy. Is it the assumption that there are real life moral dilemmas? It is of course true that when a moral dilemma is insufficiently specified, one might wonder whether there is a way of disarming the dilemma by considering the situation more carefully. But are there any reasons to believe this always to be the case? In chapter 8, Gottlieb makes her main effort to clarify the intimate connection between the virtues of character and practical wisdom. This effort involves her in a revisionist, and unorthodox, account of the practical syllogism in Aristotle. The idea is that the first part in both the major and the minor premises refers to the character of the agent, and that it plays an explanatory role similar to that of the middle term in a scientific syllogism. Gottlieb conceives of the practical syllogism not merely as an explanatory schema, but takes it to express a mental act on the part of the agent. She gives the following example Temperate human beings should avoid sweets. I should avoid this. So the virtue of temperance is supposed to explain the outcome, which is the act of avoiding the sweet. Gottlieb also suggests that the first part of the minor premise expresses self-knowledge, and is dependent on one of the nameless virtues of character, viz. So the claim that practical wisdom is dependent on the virtues of character is explained by this twofold dependence of the practical syllogism on the possession of virtues of character. To begin with, on her account the practical syllogism is not a general schema for explaining actions, but is confined to virtuous actions exclusively. Furthermore, if the first term in the premises gives the reason for the action, then the reason to avoid sweets is the concern to be temperate, rather than the concern for health. The weak-willed person, for instance, would have no reason to abide by the command of the major premise. It is obscure what weakness of will would amount to on this construal of the practical syllogism. Moreover, the exegetic support for her construal is weak. The appeal to the *De anima* is questionable. That, however, seems to be a cognitive disposition. The virtues of character do not, at least not generally, have an impact on the content of the syllogisms, although they have an important role in explaining whether or not the action results. I should stress that I question neither the importance of the virtues of character, nor the intimate relationship between them and the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. By and large, she assigns to practical wisdom the instrumental role of weighing the demands of the different virtues of character in relation to the particular situation. For practical wisdom has an end, viz. Now, this feature certainly complicates the relation between the virtues of character and the intellectual virtues, most notably practical wisdom, but this complication should be addressed, not circumvented. Four of the ten

chapters 2, 3, 5 and 8 derive from previously published articles, but not much is gained by bringing them together with one another and the rest of the chapters. Perhaps it would have been more prudent to go for separate publication of some of the new material, particularly chapters 6 and 7. For the latter view, see, e.g. Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason", in A. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* Oxford, 2008, which covers much of the same ground.

## 3: Virtue - Wikipedia

*The virtuous person does not have to "stop and think" whether to do the right thing eclectic an \_\_\_\_\_ catalog of virtues like Franklin's is one that has no single source or set of reasons behind it.*

The virtues are things like courage, honesty, generosity, and they are opposed to the vices, things like cowardice, dishonesty, and miserliness everything I say here about the virtues also goes for the vices. The virtues are of enduring interest to everybody because they are the most sophisticated and developed evaluative framework available before you take your first class in moral philosophy. And even moral philosophers make extensive reference to the virtues to explain their theories, even theories that try to replace the virtues as the way we explain the praiseworthiness or not of acts— for instance, someone like Peter Singer makes frequent appeals to something being considerate or callous even when explaining the highly revisionist theory of utilitarianism. So, the virtues are a sophisticated and shared framework that it seems we learn how the use as we learn a language and are socialised in a culture. Philosophers have two different approaches they can take to the virtues-terms as they exist in our everyday moral discourse. A recent example is the consequentialist Julia Driver who explains virtues as dispositions to behave in ways that are likely to bring about the best consequences. Similarly, a deontologist like Kant and much of the tradition after him has a developed virtue theory that tries to explain our use of the virtues with reference to what the basic duties are meant to be. What are the virtues? The virtues are complexes of behaviour and responses that are recognisably excellent. We use virtue-terms in two respects: These uses are intimately related, but not the same thing. We can describe someone as doing something virtuous without wanting to claim that they have virtuous characters e. The same goes for the vices. Note that this is very much like the way we use psychological categories: To use dispositional terms, the virtues are multi-track; to use functional terms, the virtues are multiply realisable. Both are part of fully-realised virtue. Aristotle makes the distinction between acting according to virtue having the same behaviour as a virtuous person and acting from virtue behaving the way virtuous people do from the reasons that virtuous people have. We can conceive of this difference by way of considering someone playing a good move in chess either because a grandmaster has told them to do so playing according to good chess sense or instead because they themselves see why it is a good move and do it under their own self-control playing from good chess sense. What the standard is meant to be by which this recognition happens I discuss below. How can the virtues be primary? The original model of how virtues are the basic building-blocks of morality is provided by Aristotle. Aristotle invites us to take a very big-picture look at human life with reference to what types of action is especially good for beings like us to engage in. The most important difference is that while most people these days thinks of happiness as a mental state that you can flit in or out of moment-to-moment, like a light being flicked on or off, whereas eudaimonia is instead meant to be a stable disposition that is an enduring feature of an individual. Think of eudaimonia the way you would of trying to change an empty patch of land into a garden: This kind of condition of enduring happiness and contentment is what the ancient Greeks thought was the thing most people wanted from their lives, and Aristotle set out to give an explanation of what it is. Eudaimonia is meant to be a stable disposition of an agent, the kind of thing that the agent is makes a difference to what kind of stable dispositions they can have and is worthwhile for them to have. He points out how very often we evaluate something with reference to the type of thing it usually does: Furthermore, the things we are rational about are the things that bring about the kind of things that are the most worthwhile for the kind of beings we are. So, on the Aristotelean account, there are some distinctively human ends that we pursue just as cutting things is an end for a knife, and musical expression of the flute-player. Whatever else we may be and ends we may have, all of us are also humans and also have the human ends: Our own development is among the distinctively human ends somebody may try to achieve, and there are standards about what count as doing well or not at an end. For instance, humans are endowed with certain social capacities, and one of the distinctive goods for humans is to participate in a well-ordered social life--have good relationships with your friends and family, with your intimates, and so on. To succeed at this means, among other things, cultivating the social capacities in yourself that make these good relationships

possible. In short, the virtuous life is the life of activity in accordance with practical reasoning, and that the virtuous life is a happy life thinking of happiness as eudaimonia. The life of practical reasoning is the one where you are best able to do the things that are suited for a being of your type to do, and reach the ends of the activities distinctive of the type of being you are. Reaching the ends of the activities a being like you are going to naturally do is going to be both the appropriate kind of value for you to pursue, and the most reliable source of pleasure. This is why Aristotle claims that being virtuous is the most reliable way for us to live happy and contented lives: And this is the claim that neo-Aristotelean virtue ethicists have tried to make compelling to in the contemporary world as well. On Virtue Ethics, by Rosalind Hursthouse. Intelligent Virtue by Julia Annas. Natural Goodness by Philippa Foot. The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Points for discussion Is the most plausible account of the virtues one that has them be primary? Perhaps the best way to understand Aristotle is to see how the virtues can be built onto a theory of what makes human lives genuinely worthwhile. On this reading, once we see what stable disposition is best for people to have, and we have a way of describing that disposition without the virtues, we can then explain the virtues using that theory of well-being. But this would make the virtues derivative. Do the virtues need to be defined in terms of well-being? This is in contrast with most contemporary theories that have moral reasons to do things separate from non-moral reasons. If not, why should we divorce the moral reasons from non-moral reasons?

## 4: virtuous deed - definition - English

*Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism).*

Definition[ edit ] The Definitions , a dictionary of Greek philosophical terms attributed to Plato himself but believed by modern scholars to have been written by his immediate followers in the Academy , provides the following definition of the word eudaimonia: Verbally there is a very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is [eudaimonia], and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what [eudaimonia] is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing like pleasure, wealth or honour [a17] [5] So, as Aristotle points out, saying that eudaimon life is a life which is objectively desirable, and means living well, is not saying very much. The really difficult question is to specify just what sort of activities enable one to live well. Aristotle presents various popular conceptions of the best life for human beings. The candidates that he mentions are a 1 life of pleasure, 2 a life of political activity and 3 a philosophical life. One important move in Greek philosophy to answer the question of how to achieve eudaimonia is to bring in another important concept in ancient philosophy, "arete" " virtue ". Aristotle says that the eudaimon life is one of "virtuous activity in accordance with reason" [b22â€”a20]. And even Epicurus who argues that the eudaimon life is the life of pleasure maintains that the life of pleasure coincides with the life of virtue. However, they disagree on the way in which this is so. One problem with this is that we are inclined to understand virtue in a moral sense, which is not always what the ancients had in mind. Doing anything well requires virtue, and each characteristic activity such as carpentry, flute playing, etc. The alternative translation "excellence" or "a desirable quality" might be helpful in conveying this general meaning of the term. The moral virtues are simply a subset of the general sense in which a human being is capable of functioning well or excellently. A literal view of eudaimonia means achieving a state of being similar to benevolent deity, or being protected and looked after by a benevolent deity. Despite this etymology, however, discussions of eudaimonia in ancient Greek ethics are often conducted independently of any super-natural significance. It is significant that synonyms for eudaimonia are living well and doing well. One important difference is that happiness often connotes being or tending to be in a certain pleasant state of mind. For example, when we say that someone is "a very happy person", we usually mean that they seem subjectively contented with the way things are going in their life. We mean to imply that they feel good about the way things are going for them. Eudaimonia depends on all the things that would make us happy if we knew of their existence, but quite independently of whether we do know about them. Ascribing eudaimonia to a person, then, may include ascribing such things as being virtuous, being loved and having good friends. This implies that a person who has evil sons and daughters will not be judged to be eudaimonic even if he or she does not know that they are evil and feels pleased and contented with the way they have turned out happy. Conversely, being loved by your children would not count towards your happiness if you did not know that they loved you and perhaps thought that they did not , but it would count towards your eudaimonia. So eudaimonia corresponds to the idea of having an objectively good or desirable life, to some extent independently of whether one knows that certain things exist or not. It includes conscious experiences of well being, success, and failure, but also a whole lot more. Nicomachean Ethics, book 1. Because of this discrepancy between the meaning of eudaimonia and happiness, some alternative translations have been proposed. Ross suggests "well-being" and John Cooper proposes "flourishing". These translations may avoid some of the misleading associations carried by "happiness" although each tends to raise some problems of its own. In some modern texts therefore, the other alternative is to leave the term in an English form of the original Greek, as "eudaimonia". This division will be employed here in dividing up the positions of Socrates and Plato on eudaimonia. As with all other ancient ethical thinkers, Socrates thought that all human beings wanted eudaimonia more than anything else. However, Socrates adopted a quite radical form of eudaimonism see

above: Socrates is convinced that virtues such as self-control, courage, justice, piety, wisdom and related qualities of mind and soul are absolutely crucial if a person is to lead a good and happy eudaimon life. Virtues guarantee a happy life eudaimonia. For example, in the Meno, with respect to wisdom, he says: In the Apology, Socrates clearly presents his disagreement with those who think that the eudaimon life is the life of honour or pleasure, when he chastises the Athenians for caring more for riches and honour than the state of their souls. Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth or the best possible state of your soul [29e]. Virtues are states of the soul. When a soul has been properly cared for and perfected it possesses the virtues. Moreover, according to Socrates, this state of the soul, moral virtue, is the most important good. The health of the soul is incomparably more important for eudaimonia than e. Someone with a virtuous soul is better off than someone who is wealthy and honoured but whose soul is corrupted by unjust actions. This view is confirmed in the Crito, where Socrates gets Crito to agree that the perfection of the soul, virtue, is the most important good: And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to the body? It is much more valuableâ€¦? Much moreâ€¦! 47eâ€”48a Here Socrates argues that life is not worth living if the soul is ruined by wrongdoing. A person who is not virtuous cannot be happy, and a person with virtue cannot fail to be happy. We shall see later on that Stoic ethics takes its cue from this Socratic insight. The basic argument presented by Thrasymachus and Callicles is that justice being just hinders or prevents the achievement of eudaimonia because conventional morality requires that we control ourselves and hence live with un-satiated desires. According to the myth, Gyges becomes king of Lydia when he stumbles upon a magical ring, which, when he turns it a particular way, makes him invisible, so that he can satisfy any desire he wishes without fear of punishment. When he discovers the power of the ring he kills the king, marries his wife and takes over the throne. But if eudaimonia is to be achieved through the satisfaction of desire, whereas being just or acting justly requires suppression of desire, then it is not in the interests of the strong man to act according to the dictates of conventional morality. This general line of argument reoccurs much later in the philosophy of Nietzsche. Throughout the rest of the Republic, Plato aims to refute this claim by showing that the virtue of justice is necessary for eudaimonia. According to Aristotle, eudaimonia actually requires activity, action, so that it is not sufficient for a person to possess a squandered ability or disposition. Eudaimonia requires not only good character but rational activity. Aristotle clearly maintains that to live in accordance with reason means achieving excellence thereby. Moreover, he claims this excellence cannot be isolated and so competencies are also required appropriate to related functions. For example, if being a truly outstanding scientist requires impressive math skills, one might say "doing mathematics well is necessary to be a first rate scientist". From this it follows that eudaimonia, living well, consists in activities exercising the rational part of the psyche in accordance with the virtues or excellency of reason [b22â€”a20]. Which is to say, to be fully engaged in the intellectually stimulating and fulfilling work at which one achieves well-earned success. The rest of the Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to filling out the claim that the best life for a human being is the life of excellence in accordance with reason. Since reason for Aristotle is not only theoretical but practical as well, he spends quite a bit of time discussing excellence of character, which enables a person to exercise his practical reason i. So, a person who is hideously ugly or has "lost children or good friends through death" b5â€”6, or who is isolated, is unlikely to be eudaimon. Epicurus[ edit ] Epicurus identified eudaimonia with the life of pleasure. His view proved very influential on the founders and best proponents of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad. An object, experience or state of affairs is intrinsically valuable if it is good simply because of what it is. Intrinsic value is to be contrasted with instrumental value. An object, experience or state of affairs is instrumentally valuable if it serves as a means to what is intrinsically valuable. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose a person spends their days and nights in an office, working at not entirely pleasant activities for the purpose of receiving money. Someone asks them "why do you want the money? Epicurus identifies the good life with the life of pleasure. He understands eudaimonia as a more or

less continuous experience of pleasure and, also, freedom from pain and distress. But it is important to notice that Epicurus does not advocate that one pursue any and every pleasure. Rather, he recommends a policy whereby pleasures are maximized "in the long run". In other words, Epicurus claims that some pleasures are not worth having because they lead to greater pains, and some pains are worthwhile when they lead to greater pleasures. The best strategy for attaining a maximal amount of pleasure overall is not to seek instant gratification but to work out a sensible long term policy. He believes that we do and ought to seek virtue because virtue brings pleasure. This thesis—"the eudaimon life is the pleasurable life"—is not a tautology as "eudaimonia is the good life" would be: Aristotle maintains that eudaimonia is what everyone wants and Epicurus would agree. He also thinks that eudaimonia is best achieved by a life of virtuous activity in accordance with reason. The virtuous person takes pleasure in doing the right thing as a result of a proper training of moral and intellectual character See e. However, Aristotle does not think that virtuous activity is pursued for the sake of pleasure. Pleasure is a byproduct of virtuous action: Aristotle does not think that we literally aim for eudaimonia. Virtue is the largest constituent in a eudaimon life. By contrast, Epicurus holds that virtue is the means to achieve happiness. His theory is eudaimonist in that he holds that virtue is indispensable to happiness; but virtue is not a constituent of a eudaimon life, and being virtuous is not external goods aside identical with being eudaimon. Rather, according to Epicurus, virtue is only instrumentally related to happiness. So whereas Aristotle would not say that one ought to aim for virtue in order to attain pleasure, Epicurus would endorse this claim. The Stoics[ edit ] Zeno thought happiness was a "good flow of life. According to the Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. We saw earlier that the conventional Greek concept of arete is not quite the same as that denoted by virtue, which has Christian connotations of charity, patience, and uprightness, since arete includes many non-moral virtues such as physical strength and beauty. However, the Stoic concept of arete is much nearer to the Christian conception of virtue, which refers to the moral virtues.

### 5: Virtuous Synonyms, Virtuous Antonyms | [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*Here the gods of the dead performed the "weighing of the heart" ceremony to judge whether the person's earthly deeds were virtuous. LDS Be virtuous in thought and in deed.*

While ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato , Aristotle , and their descendants opined that justice cannot be defined and that it was a divine mystery, Valluvar positively suggested that a divine origin is not required to define the concept of justice. In the words of V. Nedunchezhiyan , justice according to Valluvar "dwells in the minds of those who have knowledge of the standard of right and wrong; so too deceit dwells in the minds which breed fraud. Men should seek the sovereign good that Descartes, following Zeno , identifies with virtue, as this produces a solid blessedness or pleasure. The only aspect that makes a human truly virtuous is to behave in accordance with moral principles. Kant presents an example for more clarification; suppose that you come across a needy person in the street; if your sympathy leads you to help that person, your response does not illustrate your virtue. In this example, since you do not afford helping all needy ones, you have behaved unjustly, and it is out of the domain of principles and true virtue. Kant applies the approach of four temperaments to distinguish truly virtuous people. According to Kant, among all people with diverse temperaments, a person with melancholy frame of mind is the most virtuous whose thoughts, words and deeds are one of principles. Nietzsche promotes the virtues of those he calls "higher men", people like Goethe and Beethoven. According to Nietzsche these higher types are solitary, pursue a "unifying project", revere themselves and are healthy and life-affirming. Finally, a Higher type affirms life because he is willing to accept the eternal return of his life and affirm this forever and unconditionally. In the last section of Beyond Good and Evil , Nietzsche outlines his thoughts on the noble virtues and places solitude as one of the highest virtues: And to keep control over your four virtues: He had a checklist in a notebook to measure each day how he lived up to his virtues. Eat not to Dullness. Drink not to Elevation. Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself. Let all your Things have their Places. Let each Part of your Business have its Time. Resolve to perform what you ought. Perform without fail what you resolve. Make no Expense but to do good to others or yourself; i. Be always employed in something useful. Cut off all unnecessary Actions. Use no hurtful Deceit. Think innocently and justly; and, if you speak, speak accordingly. Wrong none, by doing Injuries or omitting the Benefits that are your Duty. Forbear resenting Injuries so much as you think they deserve. Tolerate no Uncleanliness in Body, Clothes or Habitation. Be not disturbed at Trifles, or at Accidents common or unavoidable. Imitate Jesus and Socrates. Contemporary views[ edit ] Virtues as emotions[ edit ] Marc Jackson in his book Emotion and Psyche puts forward a new development of the virtues. He identifies the virtues as what he calls the good emotions "The first group consisting of love , kindness , joy , faith , awe and pity is good" [40] These virtues differ from older accounts of the virtues because they are not character traits expressed by action, but emotions that are to be felt and developed by feeling not acting. In Objectivism[ edit ] Ayn Rand held that her morality, the morality of reason , contained a single axiom: All values and virtues proceed from these. To live, man must hold three fundamental values that one develops and achieves in life: Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem. The first three represent the three primary virtues that correspond to the three fundamental values, whereas the final four are derived from the virtue of rationality. She claims that virtue is not an end in itself, that virtue is not its own reward nor sacrificial fodder for the reward of evil, that life is the reward of virtue and happiness is the goal and the reward of life. Man has a single basic choice: Moral perfection is an unbreached rationality, not the degree of your intelligence but the full and relentless use of your mind, not the extent of your knowledge but the acceptance of reason as an absolute. List of virtues The opposite of a virtue is a vice. Vice is a habitual, repeated practice of wrongdoing. One way of organizing the vices is as the corruption of the virtues. As Aristotle noted, however, the virtues can have several opposites. Virtues can be considered the mean between two extremes, as the Latin maxim dictates in medio stat virtus - in the centre lies virtue. For instance, both cowardice and rashness are opposites of courage; contrary to prudence are both over-caution and insufficient caution; the opposites of pride a virtue are undue humility and excessive vanity. A more "modern" virtue, tolerance , can be considered the mean between the two extremes

of narrow-mindedness on the one hand and over-acceptance on the other. Vices can therefore be identified as the opposites of virtues - but with the caveat that each virtue could have many different opposites, all distinct from each other.

## 6: The Virtuous Woman - Proverbs

*Most virtue ethics theories take their inspiration from Aristotle who declared that a virtuous person is someone who has ideal character traits. These traits derive from natural internal tendencies, but need to be nurtured; however, once established, they will become stable.*

It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late s. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live. Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed Slote ; Swanton , a. See Annas for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three. We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplors dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased as appropriate when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal Athanassoulis Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise. If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not. The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular putative examples of virtues to give these truisms up. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to

be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion? The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the related modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom. One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not? The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice. These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

**Forms of Virtue Ethics** While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a eudaimonist virtue ethics, b agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c target-centered virtue ethics, and d Platonistic virtue ethics. A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about barring advanced cases of self-deception. Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive. Kraut Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon, but a wasted life. But although all standard versions of virtue ethics

insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril. It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia, the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents. Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents. However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics see Slote. At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else such as eudaimonia or states of affairs which is taken to be more fundamental. Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them in at least some respects and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars. This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking or disliking to exemplars. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton, by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve. A complete account of virtue will map out 1 its field, 2 its mode of responsiveness, 3 its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4 its target. Different virtues are concerned with different fields. Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. Courage aims to control fear and handle

danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them. A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way. Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose.

### 7: Virtue Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*The virtuous person is the ethical person. At the heart of the virtue approach to ethics is the idea of "community". A person's character traits are not developed in isolation, but within and by the communities to which he or she belongs, including family, church, school, and other private and public associations.*

At the beginning of Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that there are two different kinds of human excellences, excellences of thought and excellences of character. When we speak of a moral virtue or an excellence of character, the emphasis is not on mere distinctiveness or individuality, but on the combination of qualities that make an individual the sort of ethically admirable person he is. If someone lacks virtue, she may have any of several moral vices, or she may be characterized by a condition somewhere in between virtue and vice, such as continence or incontinence. Although these ancient moralists differed on some issues about virtue, it makes sense to begin with some points of similarity. These points of similarity will show why the Greek moralists thought it was important to discuss character. They often begin by having Socrates ask his interlocutors to explain what a particular virtue is. In reply, the interlocutors usually offer behavioral accounts of the virtues. In the *Charmides*, Charmides suggests that temperance consists in acting quietly. In the *Republic*, Cephalus suggests that justice consists in giving back what one has borrowed. In each of these cases, Plato has Socrates reply in the same way. In the *Republic* Socrates explains that giving back what one has borrowed cannot be what justice is, for there are cases where giving back what one has borrowed would be foolish, and the just person recognizes that it is foolish. If the person from whom you have borrowed a sword goes mad, it would be foolish for you to return the sword, for you are then putting yourself and others in danger. The implication is that the just person can recognize when it is reasonable to return what he has borrowed. Similarly, as Socrates explains in the *Laches*, standing firm in battle cannot be courage, for sometimes standing firm in battle is simply a foolish endurance that puts oneself and others at needless risk. The trouble one encounters in trying to give a purely behavioral account of virtue explains why the Greek moralists turn to character to explain what virtue is. It may be true that most of us can recognize that it would be foolish to risk our lives and the lives of others to secure a trivial benefit, and that most of us can see that it is unjust to harm others to secure power and wealth for our own comfort. But the Greek moralists think it takes someone of good moral character to determine with regularity and reliability what actions are appropriate and reasonable in fearful situations and that it takes someone of good moral character to determine with regularity and reliability how and when to secure goods and resources for himself and others. Living well or happiness is our ultimate end in that a conception of happiness serves to organize our various subordinate ends, by indicating the relative importance of our ends and by indicating how they should fit together into some rational overall scheme. When we are living well, our life is worthy of imitation and admiration. For, according to the Greek moralists, that we are happy says something about us and about what we have achieved, not simply about the fortunate circumstances in which we find ourselves. Whatever happiness is, it must take account of the fact that a happy life is one lived by rational agents who act and who are not simply victims of their circumstances. The Greek moralists conclude that a happy life must give a prominent place to the exercise of virtue, for virtuous traits of character are stable and enduring and are not products of fortune, but of learning or cultivation. Moreover, virtuous traits of character are excellences of the human being in that they are the best exercise of reason, which is the activity characteristic of human beings. In this way, the Greek philosophers claim, virtuous activity completes or perfects human life. As explained in Section 2. Bravery requires more than standing up against threats to oneself and others. This led the Greek moralists to conclude that virtuous traits of character have two aspects: The Greek philosophers disagree mostly about what b involves. In particular, they differ about the role played in virtuous traits of character by cognitive states e. Socrates and the Stoics argued that only cognitive states were necessary for virtue, whereas Plato and Aristotle argued that both cognitive and affective states were necessary. On this view later revived by Epicurus, â€” BCE , having a virtuous character is purely a matter of being knowledgeable of what brings us more pleasure rather than less. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates recognizes that most people object to this view.

Someone may be overcome by anger, fear, lust, and other desires, and act against what he believes will bring him more pleasure rather than less. He can, in other words, be incontinent or weak-willed. Socrates replies that such cases should be understood differently. When, for example, a cowardly person flees from battle rather than endanger his life, even though he may seem to be pursuing the more pleasant action, he is really just ignorant of the greater pleasure to be achieved by entering battle and acting bravely. In other words, incontinence is not possible, according to Socrates. Both Plato and Aristotle argue that virtuous character requires a distinctive combination of cognitive and affective elements. In the Republic, Plato divides the soul into three parts and gives to each a different kind of desire: rational, appetitive, or spirited. As types of non-rational desire, appetitive and spirited desires can conflict with our rational desires about what contributes to our overall good, and they will sometimes move us to act in ways we recognize to be against our greater good. When that happens, we are incontinent. To be virtuous, then, we must both understand what contributes to our overall good and have our spirited and appetitive desires educated properly, so that they agree with the guidance provided by the rational part of the soul. A potentially virtuous person learns when young to love and take pleasure in virtuous actions, but must wait until late in life to develop the understanding that explains why what he loves is good. Once he has learned what the good is, his informed love of the good explains why he acts as he does and why his actions are virtuous. Of all the Greek moralists, Aristotle provides the most psychologically insightful account of virtuous character. Excellence [of character], then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect. Rather it is the settled condition we are in when we are well off in relation to feelings and actions. We are well off in relation to our feelings and actions when we are in a mean or intermediate state in regard to them. If, on the other hand, we have a vicious character, we are badly off in relation to feelings and actions, and we fail to hit the mean in regard to them. Virtue as a mean state Aristotle emphasizes that the mean state is not an arithmetic mean, but one relative to the situation. The different particular virtues provide illustrations of what Aristotle means. Each virtue is set over or concerned with specific feelings or actions. The virtue of mildness or good temper, for example, is concerned with anger. Aristotle thinks that a mild person ought to be angry about some things. It would also be inappropriate to take offense and get angry if there is nothing worth getting angry about. That response would indicate the morally excessive character of the irascible person. Sometimes intense anger is appropriate; at other times calm detachment is. Aristotle seems to think that, at bottom, any non-virtuous person is plagued by inner doubt or conflict, even if on the surface she appears to be as psychologically unified as virtuous people. Aristotle seems to have this point in mind when he says of vicious people in Nicomachean Ethics IX. Virtuous persons, on the other hand, enjoy who they are and take pleasure in acting virtuously. Like the morally vicious person, the continent and incontinent persons are internally conflicted, but they are more aware of their inner turmoil than the morally vicious person. Continence is essentially a kind of self-mastery: The incontinent person also in some way knows what she should do, but she fails to do it because of recalcitrant feelings. Recall that Socrates had explained apparently incontinent behavior as the result of ignorance of what leads to the good. Since, he thought, everyone desires the good and aims at it in his actions, no one would intentionally choose a course of action believed to yield less good overall. Moral education and the human function Because Aristotle thinks that virtue is a unified, unconflicted state where emotional responses and rational assessments speak with the same voice, he, like Plato, thinks that the education of our emotional responses is crucial for the development of virtuous character. If our emotional responses are educated properly, we will learn to take pleasure or pain in the right things. Virtue is the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function well. His function his *ergon* or characteristic activity, Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics I. According to Aristotle, human beings can reason in ways that non-human animals cannot. They can deliberate about what to do, about what kind of lives to live, about what sort of persons to be. They can look for reasons to act or live one way rather than another. In other words, they can engage in practical reasoning. They can also think about the nature of the world and why it seems to behave as it does. They can consider scientific and metaphysical truths about the universe. There is no agreement among scholars as to whether,

and how, these types of reasoning can be distinguished. How do one realize these powers fully? Not by becoming adept at every kind of activity in which deliberating and judging on the basis of reason is called for. For then one would have to master every kind of cultural, scientific, and philosophical activity. When that happens, his exercise of these abilities is a continuing source of self-esteem and enjoyment. He comes to like his life and himself and is now a genuine self-lover. In *Nicomachean Ethics IX*. Morally defective types love themselves in the sense that they love material goods and advantages. They desire to secure these things even at the expense of other people, and so they act in ways that are morally vicious. Genuine self-lovers, on the other hand, love most the exercise of their developed human activity, which is rational activity. When they enjoy and recognize the value of developing their rational powers, they can use this recognition to guide their decisions and to determine which actions are appropriate in which circumstances. Moreover, because they now take pleasure in the right things they enjoy most figuring things out rather than the accumulation of wealth or power, they will avoid many of the actions, and will be unattracted to many of the pleasures, associated with the common vices. In other words, they will act as a virtuous person would. The need for relationships and community According to Aristotle, the full realization of our rational powers is not something we can achieve or maintain on our own. It is hard, he says in *Nicomachean Ethics IX*. To realize our powers fully we need at least a group of companions who share our interests and with whom we can cooperate to achieve our mutually recognized goals. In this kind of cooperative activity, we are parts of a larger enterprise, so that when others act, it is as though we are acting, too. Examples listed by Aristotle include sailors on a ship, soldiers on an expedition, members of families, business relationships, religious associations, citizens of a political community, and colleagues engaged in contemplative activity. As Aristotle explains in *Rhetoric II*. Although we may have initiated activity for self-interested reasons, the psychological result is that we come to like our cooperative partners and to develop a concern for their good for their own sakes. This change, Aristotle indicates, is caused to occur in us. It is not chosen. Once bonds of friendship are formed, it is natural for us to exhibit the social virtues Aristotle describes in *Nicomachean Ethics IV*.

### 8: Moral Character (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Virtuous is "good" with a halo. If you call someone virtuous, you are saying that person is living according to high moral principles.*  
*www.enganchecubano.come virtuous is who you want leading your Girl Scout troop.*

Changing Modern Moral Philosophy a. Anscombe In Elisabeth Anscombe published a paper titled "Modern Moral Philosophy" that changed the way we think about normative theories. A law conception of ethics deals exclusively with obligation and duty. Among the theories she criticized for their reliance on universally applicable principles were J. This approach to ethics relies on universal principles and results in a rigid moral code. Further, these rigid rules are based on a notion of obligation that is meaningless in modern, secular society because they make no sense without assuming the existence of a lawgiver an assumption we no longer make. In its place, Anscombe called for a return to a different way of doing philosophy. Taking her inspiration from Aristotle, she called for a return to concepts such as character, virtue and flourishing. She also emphasized the importance of the emotions and understanding moral psychology. The resulting body of theories and ideas has come to be known as virtue ethics. Before we go on to consider this in detail, we need to take a brief look at two other philosophers, Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre, whose call for theories of virtue was also instrumental in changing our understanding of moral philosophy. Williams criticized how moral philosophy had developed. He drew a distinction between morality and ethics. Morality is characterized mainly by the work of Kant and notions such as duty and obligation. Crucially associated with the notion of obligation is the notion of blame. Blame is appropriate because we are obliged to behave in a certain way and if we are capable of conforming our conduct and fail to, we have violated our duty. Williams was also concerned that such a conception for morality rejects the possibility of luck. If morality is about what we are obliged to do, then there is no room for what is outside of our control. But sometimes attainment of the good life is dependant on things outside of our control. In response, Williams takes a wider concept, ethics, and rejects the narrow and restricting concept of morality. Ethics encompasses many emotions that are rejected by morality as irrelevant. Ethical concerns are wider, encompassing friends, family and society and make room for ideals such as social justice. This view of ethics is compatible with the Ancient Greek interpretation of the good life as found in Aristotle and Plato. MacIntyre Finally, the ideas of Alasdair MacIntyre acted as a stimulus for the increased interest in virtue. However, he also attempts to give an account of virtue. MacIntyre looks at a large number of historical accounts of virtue that differ in their lists of the virtues and have incompatible theories of the virtues. He concludes that these differences are attributable to different practices that generate different conceptions of the virtues. Each account of virtue requires a prior account of social and moral features in order to be understood. Thus, in order to understand Homeric virtue you need to look its social role in Greek society. Virtues, then, are exercised within practices that are coherent, social forms of activity and seek to realize goods internal to the activity. The virtues enable us to achieve these goods. That end is the virtue of integrity or constancy. These three writers have all, in their own way, argued for a radical change in the way we think about morality. Whether they call for a change of emphasis from obligation, a return to a broad understanding of ethics, or a unifying tradition of practices that generate virtues, their dissatisfaction with the state of modern moral philosophy lay the foundation for change. A Rival for Deontology and Utilitarianism There are a number of different accounts of virtue ethics. It is an emerging concept and was initially defined by what it is not rather than what it is. The next section examines claims virtue ethicists initially made that set the theory up as a rival to deontology and consequentialism. How Should One Live? Moral theories are concerned with right and wrong behavior. This subject area of philosophy is unavoidably tied up with practical concerns about the right behavior. However, virtue ethics changes the kind of question we ask about ethics. Where deontology and consequentialism concern themselves with the right action, virtue ethics is concerned with the good life and what kinds of persons we should be. What kind of person should I be? Instead of asking what is the right action here and now, virtue ethics asks what kind of person should one be in order to get it right all the time. Whereas deontology and consequentialism are based on rules that try to give us the right action, virtue ethics makes central use of the concept of character. The

answer to "How should one live? Character and Virtue Modern virtue ethics takes its inspiration from the Aristotelian understanding of character and virtue. Aristotelian character is, importantly, about a state of being. For example, the virtue of kindness involves the right sort of emotions and inner states with respect to our feelings towards others. Character is also about doing. Aristotelian theory is a theory of action, since having the virtuous inner dispositions will also involve being moved to act in accordance with them. Realizing that kindness is the appropriate response to a situation and feeling appropriately kindly disposed will also lead to a corresponding attempt to act kindly. Another distinguishing feature of virtue ethics is that character traits are stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions. If an agent possesses the character trait of kindness, we would expect him or her to act kindly in all sorts of situations, towards all kinds of people, and over a long period of time, even when it is difficult to do so. A person with a certain character can be relied upon to act consistently over a time. It is important to recognize that moral character develops over a long period of time. People are born with all sorts of natural tendencies. Some of these natural tendencies will be positive, such as a placid and friendly nature, and some will be negative, such as an irascible and jealous nature. These natural tendencies can be encouraged and developed or discouraged and thwarted by the influences one is exposed to when growing up. Our natural tendencies, the raw material we are born with, are shaped and developed through a long and gradual process of education and habituation. Moral education and development is a major part of virtue ethics. Moral development, at least in its early stages, relies on the availability of good role models. The virtuous agent acts as a role model and the student of virtue emulates his or her example. Initially this is a process of habituating oneself in right action. Aristotle advises us to perform just acts because this way we become just. The student of virtue must develop the right habits, so that he tends to perform virtuous acts. Virtue is not itself a habit. Habituation is merely an aid to the development of virtue, but true virtue requires choice, understanding, and knowledge. Virtue is chosen knowingly for its own sake. The development of moral character may take a whole lifetime. But once it is firmly established, one will act consistently, predictably and appropriately in a variety of situations. As discussed above, virtue is a settled disposition. It is also a purposive disposition. A virtuous actor chooses virtuous action knowingly and for its own sake. It is not enough to act kindly by accident, unthinkingly, or because everyone else is doing so; you must act kindly because you recognize that this is the right way to behave. Note here that although habituation is a tool for character development it is not equivalent to virtue; virtue requires conscious choice and affirmation. Virtue "lies in a mean" because the right response to each situation is neither too much nor too little. Virtue is the appropriate response to different situations and different agents. The virtues are associated with feelings. The virtue lies in a mean because it involves displaying the mean amount of emotion, where mean stands for appropriate. This does not imply that the right amount is a modest amount. Sometimes quite a lot may be the appropriate amount of emotion to display, as in the case of righteous indignation. The mean amount is neither too much nor too little and is sensitive to the requirements of the person and the situation. Finally, virtue is determined by the right reason. Virtue requires the right desire and the right reason. To act from the wrong reason is to act viciously. On the other hand, the agent can try to act from the right reason, but fail because he or she has the wrong desire. The virtuous agent acts effortlessly, perceives the right reason, has the harmonious right desire, and has an inner state of virtue that flows smoothly into action. The virtuous agent can act as an exemplar of virtue to others. It is important to recognize that this is a perfunctory account of ideas that are developed in great detail in Aristotle. Modern virtue ethicists have developed their theories around a central role for character and virtue and claim that this gives them a unique understanding of morality. The emphasis on character development and the role of the emotions allows virtue ethics to have a plausible account of moral psychology which is lacking in deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics can avoid the problematic concepts of duty and obligation in favor of the rich concept of virtue. Judgments of virtue are judgments of a whole life rather than of one isolated action. Virtue ethicists have challenged consequentialist and deontological theories because they fail to accommodate this insight. Both deontological and consequentialist type of theories rely on one rule or principle that is expected to apply to all situations. Because their principles are inflexible, they cannot accommodate the complexity of all the moral situations that we are likely to encounter. We are constantly faced with moral problems. Should I tell my friend the truth

about her lying boyfriend?

### 9: What are Virtues? - Virtues for Life

*Veritas, being the mother of Virtus, was considered the root of all virtue; a person living an honest life was bound to be virtuous. Virtus - "manliness" - valor, excellence, courage, character, and worth.*

Living a Virtuous Life FR. Paul in his Letter to the Philippians captured the idea of virtue and the living of a virtuous life: With this in mind, the classic definition of virtue is a habit or firm disposition which inclines a person to do good and avoid evil. Characterized by stability, a virtuous person not only strives to be a good person, but also seeks what is good and chooses to act in a good way. Aristotle defined virtue as "that which makes both a person and what he does good. Joseph Pieper, one of the great Thomist theologians and an expert on virtue, provided this explanation: The doctrine of virtue is one form of the doctrine of obligation, but one by nature free of regimentation and restriction" The Four Cardinal Virtues. On one hand, an individual can acquire human virtues through his own effort under the guidance of reason. Through education, by deliberately choosing to do what is good, and through perseverance, a person acquires and strengthens virtue. On the other hand, with the help of divine grace from God, the individual finds greater strength and facility to practice these virtues. Through these grace-assisted virtues, which we would now call moral virtues, he gains self-mastery of his weakened nature due to original sin. In sum, these virtues help to forge that Christian character and to motivate a person to become God-like, in the best sense of the term. There are four primary moral virtues, which are called the cardinal virtues: The word cardinal derives from the Latin *cardo*, meaning "hinge. The Book of Wisdom of the Old Testament states, "For [Wisdom] teaches temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful for men than these" 8: Prudence, the "mother" of all of the virtues, is the virtue by which a person recognizes his moral duty and the good means to accomplish it. Actually, prudence is part of the definition of goodness. A person can be prudent and good only simultaneously. No other virtue can contradict what is prudent. Therefore, what is prudent is substantially what is good, and prudence is the measure of justice, temperance, and fortitude. A prudent person looks at the concrete reality of a situation with a clear, honest objectivity; references and applies the moral truths e. Moreover, prudence also seeks to accomplish the action in a good way "€" doing what is good in a good way. One cannot do what is good if one does not know the principles of truth and goodness. To prudently examine a situation and then to determine a course of action, one must keep in mind three aspects of prudence: *Memoria* simply means having a "true-to-being" memory which contains real things and events as they really are now and were in the past. Everyone must learn from his past experiences. Remembering what is to be done or avoided from past experiences helps to alert us to the occasions and causes of sin, to prevent us from making the same mistakes twice, and to inspire us to do what is good. *Docilitas* means that a person must have docility, an open-mindedness, which makes the person receptive to the advice and counsel of other people. A person should always seek and heed the wise counsel of those who are older, more experienced and more knowledgeable. Finally, the exercise of prudence involves *solertia*, which is sagacity. Here a person has a clear vision of the situation at hand, foresees the goal and consequences of an action, considers the special circumstances involved, and overcomes the temptation of injustice, cowardice, or intemperance. With *solertia*, a person acts in a timely manner but with due reflection and consideration to decide what is good and how to do the good. Perhaps the last vice is most prevalent today: The prudent person seeks to always do what is good in the eyes of God so as one day to be joined to His everlasting goodness in Heaven. After all, Jesus asked, "What profit would a man show if he were to gain the whole world and destroy himself in the process? Thomas Aquinas defined justice as "a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due with constant and perpetual will. We have the duty to pray, to worship, to obey the God who has shown such great love to each one of us and whom we must love above all things. In justice to God, we uphold vows taken to Him and make sacrifices for the sake of His love, such as accepting martyrdom rather than abandoning the faith. The second duty in justice is toward our neighbor. A person must not only refrain from doing evil toward his neighbor, but also do what is good toward his neighbor. As such, a person must respect the rights of each person and establish relationships which promote equity among all people and build up the common good. The virtue of

justice has three dimensions: Commutative or reciprocal justice governs relationships between individuals. Strictly speaking, here is contract justice. Looking at the broader spectrum of justice, distributive justice orders the relationship of the community as a whole to its individual members. In justice, the whole community must promote the common good for each person, not just the majority. Therefore, those entrusted with the care of the common good must make sure individual members are given what is their due. For example, in justice, the government must insure that each person has proper food, clothing, shelter, medical care and educational opportunities which are basic goods for the dignity of each person. Here one recognizes the duty of the whole community to care especially for those members who are most vulnerable – the unborn, the old, the sick, and the disabled. Every person has the duty to uphold and obey the just laws that insure the common good. For instance, every citizen has a duty to support the common good through the defense of the country or through the payment of taxes too bad, but true. Virtues that derive from justice include piety here the proper reverence and service to our parents, country, and others in legitimate authority, obedience, gratitude, veracity, affability the proper friendliness and civility among all and equity. Next, the virtue of fortitude enables a person to stand firm against and endure the hardships of life and to remain steadfast in pursuing what is good. However, genuine fortitude is always exercised in accord with reason, assesses the true nature and value of things. To have fortitude does not mean that a person is immune from fear. Instead, a person with fortitude recognizes fear, but does not allow fear to prevent him from doing what is good or, worse, to do what is evil. Think then of how important fortitude is to withstand peer pressure. Fortitude strengthens a person to conquer the fear of death or persecution and even to make the ultimate sacrifice of martyrdom. Virtues stemming from fortitude include magnanimity, which inclines a person to perform great works in every virtue; munificence, which inclines a person to perform great physical works; patience, which inclines a person to endure present evils; and perseverance, which inclines a person to continue steadfastly in the pursuit of virtue. Vices contrary to fortitude include timidity, recklessness, presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity, inconstancy and pertinacity. Finally, the virtue of temperance enables a person to keep his passions and emotions under the control of reason. The exercise of temperance includes two essential parts: The sense of shame causes a person to fear feeling the disgrace, confusion or embarrassment from being intemperate in action. The sense of honor causes a person to want to feel the dignity, esteem or love for practicing temperance. On one hand, the sense of shame prevents a person from acting intemperately and, thereby sinfully; while on the other hand, the sense of honor, inspires a person to act temperately and, thereby, meritoriously. In all, temperance in action is self-preservation, whereas intemperance in action is self-degradation and self-destruction. Virtues aligned with temperance include abstinence, sobriety, chastity, purity, continence, humility, gentleness, clemency, modesty and lack of greed. On the contrary, vices opposed to temperance include gluttony, drunkenness, unchastity, impurity, incontinence, pride, wrath and greed. However, as the old saying goes, "Easier said than done. Therefore, we need the abundant graces our Lord offers through prayer, the frequent reception of the sacraments and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Looking to the example of the saints and invoking their prayers also strengthen our resolution for holiness. This article is reprinted with permission from Arlington Catholic Herald.

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