1: The Nationalist Internationale Is Crumbling â€" Foreign Policy

The illusion of difference: realities of ethnicity in Canada and the United States / Jeffrey G. Reitz and Raymond Breton. FC R45 Rethinking the Great White North: race, nature, and the historical geographies of whiteness in Canada / edited by Andrew Baldwin, Laura Cameron, and Audrey Kobayashi.

The land in such a system was of two kinds. One was the large home-farm, cultivated under the immediate direction of the seigneur or his supervisors. Theâ€¦ Origins Manorialism had its origins in the late Roman Empire , when large landowners had to consolidate their hold over both their lands and the labourers who worked them. This was a necessity in the midst of the civil disorders, enfeebled governments, and barbarian invasions that wracked Europe in the 5th and 6th centuries. In such conditions, small farmers and landless labourers exchanged their land or their freedom and pledged their services in return for the protection of powerful landowners who had the military strength to defend them. In this way, the poor, defenseless, and landless were ensured permanent access to plots of land which they could work in return for the rendering of economic services to the lord who held that land. This arrangement developed into the manorial system, which in turn supported the feudal aristocracy of kings, lords, and vassals. Western Europe The typical western European manor in the 13th century consisted partly of the cottages, huts, and barns and gardens of its peasants, which were usually clustered together to form a small village. There might also be a church, a mill, and a wine or oil press in the village. Close by was the fortified dwelling, or manor house , of the lord, which might be inhabited by him or merely by his steward if the lord happened to hold more than one manor. The village was surrounded by arable land that was divided into three large fields that were farmed in rotation, with one allowed to lie fallow each year. There were also usually meadows for supplying hay, pastures for livestock, pools and streams for fishing, and forests and waste lands for wood gathering and foraging. Most of the latter and a portion of the cultivated land were held by the lord as his demesne â€"i. The lord would grant part of his land out to free tenants to hold at a rent or by military or other service. Below the lord and the free tenants came the villeins, serfs, or bondmen, each holding a hut or small dwelling, a fixed number of acre strips, and a share of the meadow and of the profits of the waste. Normally the peasant was unfree; he could not without leave quit the manor and could be reclaimed by process of law if he did. The strict contention of law deprived him of all right to hold property, and in many cases he was subject to certain degrading incidents, such as marchet merchetum , a payment due to the lord upon the marriage of a daughter, which was regarded as a special mark of unfree condition. But there were certain limitations. First, all these incidents of tenure , even marchet, might not affect the personal status of the tenant; he might still be free, though held by an unfree tenure. Second, even if unfree, he was not exposed to the arbitrary will of his lord but was protected by the custom of the manor as interpreted by the manor court. Moreover, he was not a slave , since he could not be bought and sold apart from his holding. The hardship of his condition lay in the services due from him. As a rule, a villein paid for his holding in money, in labour, and in agrarian produce. In money he paid, first, a small fixed rent that was known as rent of assize and, second, dues under various names, partly in lieu of services commuted into money payments and partly for the privileges and profits enjoyed by him on the waste of the manor. In labour he paid more heavily. The most-complicated structure in the system was the manor court, whose business was divided into criminal, manorial , and civil. Its powers under the first head depended on the franchises enjoyed by the lord in the particular manor. For the most part, only petty offenses were triable, such as small thefts, breaches of the assize of bread and ale , assaults, and the like. Except under special conditions, the justice of great offenses remained in the hands of the king or other territorial sovereign. Under the head of manorial business, the court dealt with the choice of the manorial officers and had some power of making regulations for the management of the manor, but its most important function was the recording of the surrenders and admittances of the villein tenants. Finally, the court dealt with all suits as to land within the manor, questions of dower and inheritance , and those few civil suits not connected with land.

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The revival of commerce that began in Europe in the 11th century signaled the decline of the manorial system, which could only survive in a decentralized and localized economy in which peasant subsistence farming was dominant. As a result, lords increasingly allowed their peasants to commute their labour services for money and eventually to purchase their freedom with it as well. Agricultural surpluses could now be sold to the cities and towns, and it was found that free workers who paid rent or received wages farmed more efficiently and produced more profits than enserfed labourers. Owing to these and other economic reasons, the inefficient and coercive manorial system disintegrated in western Europe, gradually evolving into simpler and less-onerous economic arrangements between landlords and rent-paying tenants. Central and eastern Europe Manorialism underwent a somewhat different evolution in central and eastern Europe. These areas had witnessed the decline of manorialism in the 12th and 13th centuries as vast areas of forest and wasteland were colonized by free German and Slavonic peasants. But the numerous wars fought between the Russians, Poles, Prussians, Lithuanians, and others in the 15th and 16th centuries reproduced the political instability and social insecurities that had led to peasant enserfment in western Europe centuries earlier. So by the 16th century manorialism had been re-created on a large scale in eastern Europe, particularly in eastern Germany , Poland , and Russia. These reactionary manorial developments were not reversed in eastern Europe until the 19th century in most cases. Learn More in these related Britannica articles:

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Peri Pamir Introduction The subject of nationalism is extremely complex, not the least because of the many different sources and manifestations of the phenomenon. This paper will deal essentially with certain contemporary forms of nationalism which have emerged or intensified in Europe and the former Soviet Union during the s. In order to place this discussion in perspective, a brief background of the historical experience is provided at the outset as well as a consideration of some of the basic concepts relating to this phenomenon. As the ensuing discussion will show, it is almost impossible to come up with a uniform definition of nationalism. In its historical context, it is an ideological movement aimed at attaining and maintaining the identity, unity through social cohesion and autonomy through national self-determination of a "nation," or a peoples united under a "national" banner Smith, In other words, it is the most potent ideology in nation state building and consolidation. However, as we will seek to illustrate, nationalism, particularly in the contemporary era, has also been a vehicle for disaffected ethnic or cultural communities to voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The sources of discontent may be related to a variety of factors such as denial of cultural identity, political discrimination, repression, or economic deprivation. In these cases, it is a movement of minority groups which springs up in reaction to the policies or performance of the central state. At other times, it is a counter-reaction, either on the part of the political authorities, or of threatened social groups, in response to the political authorities, and therefore embodies different objectives. But in most cases, the central state, whether directly or indirectly, plays a key role in manipulating or being the target of nationalist sentiments. Hence, in this paper, nationalism has a broad meaning ranging from being the defining ideology of political movements seeking some form of autonomy or independent statehood; of groups striving to achieve or to improve their cultural, political, social and economic rights within a given state; of protest movements on the part of communities threatened by either state policies or by other social groups; to the core ideology employed by the state to galvanize public support for its policies or to reaffirm its legitimacy. The typology offered attempts to distinguish between these various contemporary manifestations of nationalist sentiment and discusses their impact on democracy as a means of distinguishing between the progressive and reactionary forms of nationalism. Historical and Conceptual Background The historical paradoxes of nationalism To understand the contemporary forms of nationalism, it is useful to keep in mind the paradoxical goals which this ideology has served in the historical process of nation state building. Eighteenth and nineteenth century European nationalism was a unifying force which brought together people of diverse backgrounds at the price of subordinating their ethnic identities to the larger territorial unit dominated by the secular state. The background to this evolution went back to the emergence of the secular state following the decline of the feudal and the rise of the industrial system, when effective power shifted from the unity of Church and State to that of Nation and State. Consequently, ethnic loyalties, which sometimes transcended the boundaries of these states, were seen to be subversive and every attempt was made to suppress them. The dominant ideology became that of nationalism, which idealized the secular state and deprecated the maintenance of any linguistic, religious or other sentiments that might conflict with loyalty to it. Nationalism became synonymous with patriotism Richmond, A similar trend followed the creation of nation states after the collapse of the multinational Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires in the aftermath of World War I. In the Balkans, in particular, nation states were created often with little or no regard for the rights and aspirations of the substantial ethnic groups trapped within their borders. The principle of state sovereignty, which evolved from the legitimization of national self determination made these new nation states as unsympathetic to demands for self determination from dissatisfied groups within their jurisdiction as were the Romanov,

Habsburg and Ottoman rulers to the national claims that were advanced against their rule in the 19th century. The aftermath of the decolonization process and the creation of nation states in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific after followed a similar pattern. Those states which achieved their independence through the principle of self determination held the view that a broader definition of the concept could become counterproductive. Hence the paradoxical qualities of nationalism in its modern historical expression reside in the fact that it has served several conflicting purposes. It has acted as the principal ideology which enabled nations to seek self determination and political statehood. It also provided the subsequently created states with the ideological justification for holding "the nation" together. And third, it has enabled dissatisfied minority or ethnic groups within the nation states to challenge state authority by questioning its claim to legitimacy which, in a democratic system, formally rests on the doctrine of self determination and popular sovereignty. Hence, nationalism, in this sense, has ironically contributed to the formation, and survival as well as to the dismemberment of nation states. The relationship between each of these concepts as they relate to nationalism are discussed below. Self determination, national sovereignty and international responsibility The concept of self determination, as articulated in the Charter of the United Nations Art. Consequently, the principle of territorial integrity and respect for existing frontiers or the preservation of the unitary state as a major factor of international stability predominated over the right to self determination where this implied the dismemberment of existing states and secession. However, advances in the field of democracy and fundamental freedoms over the last decades, accompanied by the growing consensus that the use of force is neither desirable nor effective in stifling aspirations for self determination, have led to situations where conflicts between the concept of self determination and the unitary state have become increasingly more difficult to resolve. The experience of the Kurds, the Slovenes, the Croats and the Bosnians has demonstrated that separatist pressures can no longer be regarded as strictly internal affairs, especially since the resistance to their struggle has had the effect of invalidating the fundamental assumption linking territorial inviolability - and, implicitly, the denial of self determination - to international peace and stability. Consequently, the human rights performance of a state, including its treatment of its minorities, is steadily becoming a matter of legitimate international concern. Embodied in this attitude is the developing consensus, strengthened since the Gulf war experience, that state sovereignty can no longer provide governments immunity in cases of violations of human rights, particularly in its repression of its minorities. Another related issue is the changed world environment since the end of the cold war in Europe. Whereas before the cause of ethnic minorities was often exploited by the superpowers or their allies as a way of obtaining geopolitical leverage e. While this may be the case, there is also much confusion as to who has right to self determination, where the limits of national sovereignty and unity lie, and whether and when the territorial integrity of nation states should remain unconditionally unchallenged. What are the main overriding criteria for self determination and independent statehood? Are there any legal distinctions between the rights of those minorities which belong to a group which already has a state e. Does the right to self determination include the right to secession and independent statehood? When should the international community recognize the rights of a peoples to decide on its own international status, and when should the territorial unity of the nation state be protected as reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act? Nations and nation states It would appear then that the drive for self determination, which has acted as the principal inspiration for many modern day nationalist movements, challenges the legitimacy of the state by placing in question its claim to represent the popular will of the nation. We will now turn to the dynamic between the nation and the state as a means of understanding the basis for what is broadly known as ethno-nationalism. Part of the confusion concerning the nature of the relationship between nation and state arises from the different sometimes overlapping meanings ascribed to the former concept depending on the particular context, which are briefly enumerated below: Given these definitions, a "nation or multi-national nation state" can connote: The nationalist belief, as expressed by Guiseppe Mazzini in the 19th century, maintained that every nation each particular ethno-linguistic group had the right to form its own state, and that there should be only one state for each nation. This claim has been historically impractical since, by current accounting, there exist

practically no ethno-linguistically homogeneous nations. The territorial distribution of the human race is older than the idea of ethnic-linguistic nation-states and therefore does not correspond to it. Development in the modern world economy, because it generates vast population movements, constantly undermines ethnic-linguistic homogeneity. Multi-ethnicity and plurilinguality are quite unavoidable, except temporarily by mass exclusion, forcible assimilation, mass expulsion or genocide - in short, by coercion Hobsbawm, In reality, therefore, the definitions are not so clear cut as states are generally multinational and hence, rarely homogeneous and nations are quite often polyethnic. Nationalism in the Contemporary Era A number of contemporary developments, one pertaining to the European continent and the former Soviet Union, the other occurring on a world scale but affecting Europe closely, provide some basis for our understanding of the resurgence of nationalism in modern times. Expressing itself in the form of nationalist or self determination movements, notably in the Balkans and in several republics of the former Soviet Union, these groups have been seeking protection of minority rights, territorial autonomy or sovereign statehood. It is interesting to note that both trends have had the effect of challenging state sovereignty, though the tendency towards fragmentation - or the weakening or collapse of central political authority - has also delivered a direct blow to the concept of the territorial integrity of the nation state. The other development has its origins in the increase in international migration as a result of global economic and political developments. Over the last decade or so, Europe has become a main destination for people fleeing economic and political distress, traditionally from the South but increasingly from Eastern Europe. This development, in turn, has created fertile ground for the emergence of xenophobic right-wing groups in Western Europe which are exploiting economic discontent to justify hostility to "outsiders" perceived as competing for limited resources. As we will see later, the xenophobic reaction is not confined to Western Europe, but has come to the fore as a platform of protest in the economically unstable former socialist societies as well. Contemporary forms of nationalism: Because of the diversity of the conditions, it is manifested in many different forms which makes it difficult to draw clear distinctions between them. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, the following analysis will concentrate on three broad - and sometimes overlapping - contemporary varieties, namely, state nationalism, ethno-nationalism and, finally, what we call "protest" nationalism, encompassing both right-wing nationalist movements in Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism. Given the background of the preceding section, which has sought to establish the relationship between certain key concepts, we will try to show that in each case nationalism is a reaction to something which is directly or indirectly related to the policy or the performance of the state. State nationalism In a practice widely resorted to by governments, state nationalism embraces the nation as a whole, thus transcending ethnic distinctions. It is the creation of mass public sentiment in favor of the state and is used by the latter to mobilize popular support for its policies most prominently in wartime or to reaffirm its legitimacy. State nationalism can be expressed in a multitude of ways. Most prominently, it is an instrument wielded in the process of nation state building where the state is created and sustained around the concept and the glorification of the nation e. It can also allude to state manipulation of nationalist ideology to promote unity against external opposition e. Externally, it can refer to policies aimed at extending the territory of the state into areas which the state claims as belonging to its nation e. Internally, one could describe as nationalist actions taken by the state against specific groups or individuals amounting to a denial of cultural pluralism and justified on grounds of the anti- or un-national "unpatriotic" character of those groups or individuals e. Ethnicity and Ethno-nationalism 6 Although no common definition of ethnicity exists, it is generally described as the awareness on the part of a particular community of having a separate identity on the basis of common history, race, language, religion, culture and territory. Where that community constitutes a minority, which is often the case, ethnicity is also used synonymously with minority or identity groups, which is sometimes also loosely extended to migrant or refugee communities. Most ethnic groups are oriented towards recognition and expression of their cultural identity and the protection of their rights as a group to share in the benefits of the state in which they live. An increasing number, however, are seeking various forms of political recognition or autonomy. Irrespective of

the regions involved, the complaints appear to be the same: Broadly speaking, therefore, ethnicity becomes a form of nationalism when it assumes a political and often territorial dimension that challenges the status quo, and, in some cases, the legitimacy and stability of the state in question by becoming a catalyst for intra- or inter-state conflict. Some would argue that the most dynamic ingredient of nationalism is ethnicity; indeed, that nationalism is in essence the political expression of ethnicity. It is clear that ethnic divisions have existed since time immemorial. Conflicts or tensions have been present even when apparently latent and grievances nursed for generations. What concerns us here are the factors which have given rise to contemporary ethno-nationalism, some of which are enumerated below. At the national level, the resurgence of ethno-nationalism can be sought in the failure or inability of the modern nation state to serve the national community and to meet the needs of its minority populations in terms of an equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. Economic deprivation and disparity, as witnessed in numerous cases, has often acted as a powerful catalyst igniting the flame of nationalist revolt and in crystallizing a sense of ethnic identity. Not only does the denial of cultural and political rights and the lack of active power-sharing for minority groups through constitutional arrangements fail to close the poverty gap, but this failure combines, in some cases, with frustration over the slow development of democratic forms of government - a combination that helps to explain some of the political bases for ethnic resurgence. Furthermore, the tendency of the modern nation state to resort to political discrimination, repressive action e. Such actions invariably result in strengthening aspirations for separate ethno-national identity. A related consequence of state policies also resulting in ethno-nationalism happens when migrant communities fleeing ethnic, political and economic victimization settle in the more industrialized societies and create new hybrid cultural identities distinct from the society in which they have settled. The growing hostility to their presence frequently expressed through racist rejection is leading these groups to declare their specificity and to rally around different forms of cultural or political expression. Though most Muslims in Western Europe numbering over 8 million say they want to integrate, it can be argued that it is the enmity and coldness of the native European populations which push them to assert their identity through religious and cultural differences. In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the principal stimulus for ethnic revival springs from the multinational and multiethnic composition of most of the societies in the region. Such reactions have invariably sprung from or led to repressive government policies, thereby periodically creating serious tensions between the states or communities concerned. In addition, almost all the countries harbor revisionist claims against one another. However, although such tensions have occasionally strained inter-state relations since World War II, they have never jeopardized national and regional stability to the extent witnessed since the collapse of the socialist state system, the war in Bosnia being its most tragic illustration. The situation in the former Soviet Union is analogous, demonstrated most dramatically by the liberation struggle of the Chechen people and the inter-ethnic conflicts within the Transcausian republics. Several reasons are ascribed to this development, some of which are outlined below. The "deep freeze" effect: Others claim that it is the disintegration of central power and not the strength of national feeling that has forced certain republics, such as Khazakstan and Macedonia which did not previously dream of separation, to assert their independence as a means of self-preservation Hobsbawm, Or, stated differently, nationalism, in this case, becomes a means of filling the political void left by the rapid breakdown of central political authority, or of retrospectively celebrating new-found statehood. The seeming inability of the nation state to satisfy the demands of ethno-cultural minorities and the lack of an accepted international premise for the recognition of self determination as in the case of Chechenya no doubt constitute additional reasons for the eruption of ethnic tensions in the region.

Brought about by the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of the threats to national security, this is an ongoing process. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe differ in terms of size, economic capability, geostrategic situation and the nature of their relationships with the European Union and NATO. However, notwithstanding the corresponding differences in size and composition of their armed forces, the path of military reform has followed a remarkably similar pattern everywhere. The first stage was characterised by a loss of rationale and ideology, and by massive force reductions brought on by the change in geostrategic, economic and political circumstances. This was attended by a loss of Communist Party and governmental control mechanisms that were not replaced by any corresponding mechanisms for democratic control. New governments everywhere lacked military expertise and had no adequate civilian mechanisms either to make military policy or to direct the course of military affairs and the development of their armed forces. Where mechanisms existed, they were crude and amounted to little more than establishing ever-lower financial ceilings for defence expenditure. In many countries, internal power struggles resulted in authority over the armed forces either being split between many ministries and agencies, including some which would not normally have expected to have responsibility over troops, or being moved from one branch of the executive to another, such as from the government to the president, or vice versa. In some countries, politicians sought to use the military directly in power struggles. This further reduced the degree of real political control over the armed forces. This was influenced by a combination of motives in which vested interests undoubtedly played a part. But sincere conviction, based on patriotism and a strong belief in the validity of the former system, reinforced by the lack of competence and expertise of new civilian governments, was the driving factor. The effects were quickly felt. Trying to maintain a massive but obsolete structure at a time of rapid social change and economic decline proved disastrous. As Central and Eastern European countries moved painfully towards a real cash economy, resources for the military began to dry up. In most countries, this was not immediately obvious because the military establishment had traditionally been able to draw on resources in kind rather than in cash and had its own means of generating income and consumable resources. Exploiting these assets allowed the core of the military to survive, despite the lack of government funding. After more than four, and in some cases seven, decades of a command economy, all Central and Eastern European countries lacked appropriately trained accountants and effective accounting procedures. Moreover, neither police nor judiciary were equipped to monitor and control financial irregularities. This was particularly the case in defence establishments, where the need for military secrecy further impeded transparency. As a result, the defence sector in Central and Eastern Europe was slow to set up proper budgetary systems and, as a result, corruption became endemic in some instances. The uncontrollable sale or distribution of military material, the lack of guidelines on officers using their positions and forces under their command for personal purposes, the hiring out of soldiers by officers, straightforward theft and other corrupt practices - all highly destructive of military discipline - proliferated. This led to a rapid decline in training standards and then in living standards, both for conscripts and for those officers and senior non-commissioned officers who lacked the rank or position to control marketable resources, or - the majority - who were simply honest. In the third stage, the procurement system broke down. Defence industries, deprived of a tied domestic market, generally tried to avoid restructuring and reorientation, taking refuge in the fiction that arms sales abroad would save them. In the event, as a result of corruption, an unwillingness to reform and a lack of expertise in market-economic realities, Central and Eastern European defence industries missed what might have been a window of opportunity in the early s to seize a share of the world market. With this export opening lost and with domestic demand collapsed, defence industries looked to governments to bail them out. Defence factories soaked up

massive state subsidies but used the money to keep large numbers of idle workers on subsistence pay, rather than to restructure the industry. In the long term, no country can maintain the quality and cost benefits that make for attractive exports without the security of a good home market. The ability to draw on vast reserves of fundamental, scientific research as well as existing military research and development has enabled the industries to survive in their obsolete form and avoid painful reform. But these reserves are now running out and defence industries in Central and Eastern Europe that have not yet restructured face near-total collapse. Reform today will be far more difficult and painful than had it been undertaken ten years ago. The impact of this myriad of problems was in almost all countries first felt among conscripts, whose training and living standards disintegrated. The failure of the military establishment in some countries to change with society meant that the young were no longer willing to serve and the breakdown of the established system meant that they could no longer be compelled to do so. The system of universal conscription decayed rapidly and, with it, any pre-service military training in schools and universities. Henceforth, only a fraction of the eligible age groups would serve in the military. Legal exemption, the ineffectiveness of the draft and bribery would ensure that the better-off and better-educated would never have to serve in the ranks. With the disintegration of national service, the concept of a "socialist nation-in-arms" died. Moreover, it could not be restored because the social basis it sprang from and depended on had gone forever. In retrospect, this seems obvious. But, at the time, in the early to mid s, it was not appreciated by decision-makers brought up in a very different system, so the decline continued. Meanwhile, standards of entry to officer training colleges dropped. Moreover, many cadets, having received a good technical education, decided not to enter the army and left on or just before graduation. This completed the self-destruction of the old system. The armed forces of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, working to a common Soviet model, had relied on young officers to conduct all the junior command and training tasks at unit level that in most Western armies are carried out in depots or by regular professional long-service non-commissioned officers. The lack of young officers meant that the steady downward spiral of training accelerated. A vicious circle had become established. Equipment broke down and was not replaced. Poor treatment of soldiers increased. The gap between the command and the soldier grew. Recruitment of young officers became more difficult. Morale fell and, with it, public respect. The result was declining competence, accompanied by a steady command and administrative drain, as officers left their posts at all levels and the force structure crumbled. When this process was also accompanied by military action, such as affected the Russian Army in the first Chechen War, the results of the decay were instantly visible. As armies shrank, their officer corps became grossly top-heavy and this itself created an obstacle to reform. But attempts to reduce drastically the officer ranks were also harmful. The sight of the government discharging unwanted senior officers without thanks, without proper pensions or social security and with little chance of taking up a new career led those who were not qualified for other employment to do all in their power to stay in the armed forces. It also demoralised younger officers and put many young men off the idea of a military career. Reforms are being spurred by the realisation that, were they to be postponed, the process would be even more difficult in the future The deterioration of the armed forces did not take place at the same speed everywhere and the pace differed even within the armed forces of the same country. In general, problems have been worse in Russia and some new countries of the former Soviet Union than in most of Central Europe. But many experiences are common to most countries. Successive ministers and chiefs of defence attempted to rationalise their shrinking armies and succeeded to differing degrees. In units and formations with exceptional commanders, competence and combat capabilities were retained. By concentrating efforts and resources on a small number of units â€" regiments, squadrons or ships â€" some of these have been maintained at a reasonable standard of military readiness. But, in the main, the decline was not halted. As a result, during the s, none of the armed forces of countries in the former Soviet Union or its former Central and Eastern European allies managed to reconstruct an effective and sustainable military system on modern lines. Indeed, a point was reached in most Central and Eastern European countries where the situation got so dire that the armed forces became desperate. Their plight was obvious and the only way they could see to pursue reform was to

seek more money from the state. A thorough military reform programme is expensive. However, experience in Central and Eastern Europe has shown that, when money was made available to defence establishments in advance of reforms, it tended to be spent not on reform but on keeping the old system on life support. Cosmetic improvements were made, but the essential, fundamental reform was actually put off and the situation got worse. Indeed, reform became more difficult because the money stiffened resistance. In some countries keen to get into NATO, the military command has on occasion proposed the procurement of unnecessary and often unaffordable equipment arguing that: Moreover, Western arms manufacturers often peddled the same line. In other countries, governments sometimes used NATO "demands" as the excuse for pushing for defence reform because they lacked the self-confidence to tackle this issue on their own authority. Both approaches have damaged civil-military relationships and eroded public confidence. The maintenance of a perception of a military threat from NATO has been used to justify the preservation of much of the old military infrastructure. This has in turn distracted attention and siphoned off money from real defence reform. The final element in the "NATO factor" has been the readiness of Central and Eastern European governments and militaries alike to look to the West for models of military organisation and reform. All NATO members have different military systems, while Central and Eastern European countries have widely differing requirements for defence reform or for building forces anew. Central and Eastern European countries have therefore found it exceptionally difficult to evaluate successful models, to work out which elements are relevant for their own development and to find reliable, unbiased advice. Governments and armies have gone from the one extreme of rejecting any Western influence to the other of rushing to embrace Western ideas, such as professionalisation, without any real understanding of what it involves â€" or costs. Many efforts to reform from below failed. At one stage, advocates of reform hoped that young officers would be able to rejuvenate the system and bring in new ideas from the bottom up. Indeed, this approach did have some temporary successes. However, in the end, there were too few energetic, young officers to create sufficient momentum for reform. They failed, either because they could not overcome the inertia of the mid-level structures or because they were undermined by superiors who viewed them as a threat. The story is similar with officers sent for training and education abroad, most frequently to Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. These individuals were expected to return home and infuse their military systems with new ideas. In practice, however, this proved a false hope as, all too often, the military establishment closed ranks to protect itself. In some Central European countries, even as late as , every single officer who had been sent abroad on training courses was on return, either dismissed, demoted or sent to serve in a dead-end post in some military backwater. In another country, although all senior officers had received training abroad, their lead was ignored by the mass of colonels beneath them, who obstructed the implementation of the orders from on high. But democratic control can also fail if colonels do not obey the generals. A further common failing has been the inability of defence ministries in Central and Eastern Europe to implement an effective budgetary and planning system. This is extremely difficult because it requires converting the mentality of the military collective. Militaries have traditionally wished to retain the existing system, while modernising weapons and improving conditions for soldiers. As a result, they have pushed for the resources for such a vision, refusing to accept that economic realities make excessive defence spending unjustifiable and that social and economic changes necessitate reform. Western armies, by contrast, approach the issue of defence planning from the budget, working out what that pot of money will buy and prioritising on the basis of current threat assessments. Linked to this common failing is the almost total absence of an honest and open system for evaluating the abilities and qualifications of officers.

4: Yugoslavia's Germans: Roots and Realities - Ambassador Géza Jeszenszky

Chapter Settlement, Depression and Alienation: An Episode From Early Prairie History (IN: Roots and Realities. Among Eastern and Central Europeans, ed. by Martin L Kovacs).

Hyman Of all Jewish immigrants to the United States from to , forty-four percent were women, far more than for other immigrants groups arriving during the heyday of mass immigration. The more than two million Jews from the Russian Empire, Romania, and Austria-Hungary who entered the United States in the years to —when the American government imposed a restrictive quota system—came to stay. Only 7 percent chose to return to Europe, as opposed to about 30 percent of all immigrants. Jewish immigrants intended to raise American families. Ashkenazi European Jewish culture and American values as conveyed by social reformers as well as by advertising, and the economic realities of urban capitalist America, all influenced the position of women in immigrant Jewish society in America. Jewish immigrant women shared many of the attributes of immigrant women in general, but also displayed ethnic characteristics. Immigrant Jews, both female and male, arrived in America with considerable experience of urban life in a capitalist economy. In the Pale as a whole, Jews constituted thirty-eight percent of those living in cities or towns, though only 12 percent of the total population. Women worked alongside men, supporting their families primarily through petty commerce, selling all kinds of produce in the marketplace, and also through artisan trades such as shoemaking and tailoring. In the small number of traditional families where husbands devoted themselves to studying Torah , women bore the major responsibility as breadwinners for their families. Others took advantage of their commercial background in the market towns and cities of Eastern Europe to become peddlers, hoping that their entrepreneurial skills would lead to prosperity. Although immigrant Jewish males arrived in the United States with less cash than the average immigrant, they inserted themselves into the economy largely as skilled workers and peddlers, while most newcomers began their working lives in America as unskilled laborers. Jews engaged in chain migration, in which one member of an extended family secured a place in the new country and then bought a ticket for siblings so that they could settle in America. Oftentimes, married men set out in advance to prepare the way economically and planned for their wives and children to join them once they were settled. Sometimes the delay in reuniting the family stretched into years, compelling women to raise their children alone and to take on the full responsibility of arranging a transoceanic voyage. The outbreak of World War I, for example, left Rachel Burstein with her three children in the Ukrainian town of Kamen-Kashirski while her husband labored in America, having returned there from a prolonged visit with his family that began in Only after six and a half years of separation did Rachel and her children succeed in reaching Ellis Island, where they were quarantined for two weeks, before coming to their final destination of Chelsea, Massachusetts. Hershl, now Harry, Burstein made no effort to meet them at Ellis Island or at the train station in Boston. Once settled in America, women and men worked together to sustain their families. Because Jewish men were more successful than other immigrants in earning enough to support their households, albeit with the help of their teenage children, fewer married immigrant Jewish women worked outside the home than all other married American women, immigrant or native. They did so by working at home, taking in piecework and especially cooking and cleaning for boarders. In fact, more immigrant Jewish households had boarders than any other immigrant group. A governmental study found that in New York City, for example, fifty-six percent of Russian Jewish households included boarders, as compared with seventeen percent of Italian households. Mothers ran back and forth between their customers in the store and the food cooking in their ovens, balancing their conflicting responsibilities. In most official documents, these women appear simply as housewives, but their labor was crucial to the family economy. Almost all the women worked, of course, but their work patterns depended on their domestic obligations. Married women had full responsibility for managing the household, and the obligations of mothers were particularly heavy. Some energetic immigrant Jewish women contributed to the family economy by becoming entrepreneurs. Female pushcart peddlers were

a familiar sight in immigrant neighborhoods. One immigrant woman in New York City, for example, put her skills at bargaining and cooking to work in running a restaurant, whose profits were invested in real estate. She soon persuaded him to hire as her partner her cousin Nathan, who later became her husband. Sarah made the decisions about hiring and firing workers. She convinced Nathan to become a foreman, in charge of eighty-six machines. That business sustained the family while the children were growing up. Although she clearly had more business sense than her husband, she was content to recede into the background once she had laid the foundation for a family enterprise. No such reluctance to take center stage characterized Anna Levin, who immigrated to Columbus, Ohio, in She began by selling fish in a garage. Within a decade, her store, which now also sold poultry, fruits, and vegetables, was so successful that her husband gave up his carpentry work to join her in the business. With fewer grandmothers and aunts available than was the case in the home country, and with mandated public education that kept older children at school, child care was burdensome. Keeping a crowded tenement flat clean and orderly in a grimy industrial city required much scrubbing. Laundry for the family had to be managed in cramped indoor conditions in cold-water flats. Limited family budgets forced housewives to spend hours circulating among stores and pushcarts looking for the best bargain. Literature written by the children of immigrant women praised their self-sacrifice as well as their capacity to cope with economic hardships, sometimes sentimentalizing the mothers in the process of acknowledging the difficulties of their lives. The critic Alfred Kazin typifies this view of the immigrant Jewish mother: The kitchen gave a special character to our lives: All my memories of that kitchen are dominated by the nearness of my mother sitting all day long at her sewing machine. Because the wage scale and division of labor were determined by gender, immigrant daughters earned less than their brothers. Working full-time in garment shops, they earned no more than sixty percent of the average male wage. They worked in crowded and unsanitary conditions in both small workshops and larger factories. Their hopes for improving their economic circumstances lay in making an advantageous match, while their working brothers aspired to save enough to become petty entrepreneurs. Moreover, immigrant sons occupied a privileged place in the labor market in comparison with their sisters. In New York in , for example, forty-seven percent of immigrant Jewish daughters were employed as semiskilled and unskilled laborers; only twenty-two percent of their brothers fell into those ranks. Conversely, more than forty-five percent of immigrant sons held white-collar positions, while less than twenty-seven percent of their sisters did. The roles and expectations of daughters within the family also differed substantially from those of their brothers. The gendered expectations regarding work and the lower salaries that women earned made mothers particularly vulnerable when no male breadwinner could be counted upon. Women were more likely to be poor than were men. Widows with small children and few kin in America found it impossible to earn enough to feed and house their children. The personal and cultural divide between husbands and wives who had immigrated to America at different times occasionally became too wide to bridge. Jewish philanthropic associations in the early s spent about fifteen percent of their budgets assisting the families of deserted wives, and still more on the families of widows. Jewish communal leaders responded to these social problems not only through direct provision of charity, but also by establishing the National Desertion Bureau to locate recalcitrant husbands and orphanages to house poor children. No more than ten percent of residents of orphanages in the immigrant period were actually orphaned of both parents; rather their surviving parent was unable to care for them. The case of the family of Rose Schneiderman , the labor leader, was typical. Despite the differential they experienced in wages and social mobility because they were female, young immigrant women reveled in the freedom that wage-earning work conferred. Although immigrant daughters were expected to hand over most of their wages to their parents, and to accept this obligation to their families, they also developed a sense of autonomy, as they decided what small portion of their wages to keep back for their own needs. Like other urban working-class girls, they took advantage of the leisure-time activities that the city made available: Their sense of autonomy, reinforced by their participation in the labor force, extended to courtship and marriage. The custom of chaperonage disappeared in America, perhaps because the parents of young immigrants often remained behind in Europe, and young immigrant men and

women considered it their right to choose their own spouses. The years spent at work between the end of formal schooling and marriage contributed to the Americanization, and particularly the politicization, of immigrant daughters. Young Jewish women preferred to work in larger factories, where they came in contact with a more varied work force than in smaller shops and where they experienced a female community of their peers. Most importantly, they participated in the labor movement that became a powerful force within immigrant Jewish communities. In fact, their activity helped to shape the nascent Jewish labor movement, as young women activists, demonstrating in picket lines, repeatedly confronted the authorities. Young immigrant women and immigrant daughters were reared with the sense that the world of politics was not reserved for men alone. Although the public religious sphere of the Jewish community had been closed to women in Eastern Europe, they participated in the public secular sphere of economic and political life. Radical socialist movements like the Bund were not as egalitarian as their rhetoric suggested, but they did recruit women as members. Unlike the women of some ethnic groups who were closely supervised by their men folk, immigrant Jewish women attended lectures and political meetings alone and often discussed the issues of the day. Gentile observers commented that Jewish working women were not concerned simply with their own tasks or skills. With confidence in their right to act politically, they demonstrated a great interest in labor conditions in general and in the left-wing political movements that addressed working-class problems. The immigrant Jewish community, particularly through the Yiddish press, validated their political involvement, providing support for female-led kosher meat boycotts and rent strikes as well as for woman suffrage. Although the male Jewish leaders in the nascent garment industry unions, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, did not accept women as their peers and discriminated against those who sought leadership roles, women in fact galvanized the Jewish labor movement. In the years immediately before World War I, the union movement achieved the stability that had eluded it until then, largely due to women worker militancy. Women took their place on the picket lines and suffered arrest along with their male colleagues. Female activists such as Rose Schneiderman, Pauline Newman , Fannia Cohn, and Clara Lemlich Shavelson , along with others, devoted themselves to the cause of improving the economic conditions and the status of workers. Jewish women probably contributed more than a quarter of the total increase in female members of all labor unions in the United States in the s. The political interest and sophistication of young immigrant Jewish working women continued even when they quit the garment workshops upon marriage. Within immigrant Jewish communities, older women with families engaged in political activity on the local level. From the s through the s, they spoke out and demonstrated on issues that directly affected their roles as domestic managers. When Margaret Sanger opened a birth control clinic in the heavily immigrant Jewish neighborhood of Brownsville, Brooklyn, Jewish housewives thronged to it, even though dispensing birth control information was then illegal. They organized boycotts in response to rising meat prices and conducted rent strikes to protest evictions and poor building maintenance. When New York state held elections on female suffrage in and , they canvassed their neighbors, going from house to house to persuade male voters of their moral claim to enfranchisement. Because they had fewer institutional affiliations than men, women often have been omitted from scholarly examination of the Jewish community. Yet women found in their neighborhoods, in the streets and stoops where they spent their days, a sense of community that nourished their political activity. Although immigrant Jews kept their children in school longer than other ethnic groups, they invested more heavily in the education of their sons than their daughters. But it also frustrated the dreams of many immigrant girls who had defined the freedom of America as the opportunity of studying as long as they liked. As immigrant Jewish families prospered, they kept children of both sexes in school. The youngest in the family usually had the best chance of getting an education, irrespective of gender. Even for the children of the most successful immigrants, however, social mobility was gendered. Sons went to college to become doctors or lawyers, while daughters attended normal school to become teachers. Of course, most immigrant sons did not even graduate from high school in the years before World War I; they became businessmen. Most immigrant daughters entered the world of white-collar work as saleswomen or commercial employees.

of heart among Europeans. Instead, closer 4 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 5.

Prehistory[edit] The prehistory of the European peoples can be traced by the examination of archaeological sites, linguistic studies and by the examination of the DNA of the people who live in Europe or from ancient DNA. The research continues and so theories rise and fall. Although it is possible to track migrations of people across Europe using founder analysis of DNA, most information on these movements comes from archaeology. Rather, the settlement process was complex and "likely to have occurred in multiple sic waves from the east and to have been subsequently obscured by millennia of recurrent gene flow". His cluster did not contribute anything or very substantially to the genetic makeup of modern europeans. Neanderthals inhabited much of Europe and western Asia from as far back as , years ago. They existed in Europe as late as 30, years ago. They were eventually replaced by anatomically modern humans AMH; sometimes known as Cro-Magnons , who began to appear in Europe circa 40, years ago. Given that the two hominid species likely coexisted in Europe, anthropologists have long wondered whether the two interacted. There has also been speculation about the inheritance of specific genes from Neanderthals. For example, one MAPT locus 17q Since the H2 lineage seems restricted to European populations, several authors had argued for inheritance from Neanderthals beginning in Green University of California, Santa Cruz , and David Reich Harvard Medical School , comparing the genetic material from the bones of three Neanderthals with that from five modern humans, did show a relationship between Neanderthals and modern people outside Africa. It is thought that modern humans began to inhabit Europe during the Upper Paleolithic about 40, years ago. Some evidence shows the spread of the Aurignacian culture. They have been found in some very old human remains in Europe. However, other haplogroup are far more common among living European males. While it is now concentrated in Europe, it probably arose in a male from the Middle East or Caucasus , or their near descendants, c. At about this time, an Upper Palaeolithic culture also appeared, known as the Gravettian. This suggested that haplogroup IJ colonists formed the first wave and haplogroup R1 arrived much later. Martin Richards et al. HV split into Pre-V around 26, years old and the larger branch H, both of which spread over Europe, possibly via Gravettian contacts. Ornella Semino postulates that these differences "may be due in part to the apparent more recent molecular age of Y chromosomes relative to other loci, suggesting more rapid replacement of previous Y chromosomes. Gender-based differential migratory demographic behaviors will also influence the observed patterns of mtDNA and Y variation". According to the classical model, people took refuge in climatic sanctuaries or refugia as follows: Its frequency drops rapidly in central Europe, suggesting that the survivors bearing I2 lineages expanded predominantly through south-eastern and central-eastern Europe. Semino, Passarino and Pericic place the origins of haplogroup R1a within the Ukrainian ice-age refuge. The lineages involved include much of the most common haplogroup, H, as well as much of K, T, W, and X. Mesolithic Europe , Western Hunter-Gatherer , and Caucasian Hunter-Gatherer Mesolithic post-LGM populations had diverged significantly due to their relative isolation over several millennia, due to the harsh selection pressures during the LGM, and due to the founder effects caused by the rapid expansion from LGM refugia in the beginning Mesolithic. However, the lineage of Mesolithic hunter-gatherers of Western Europe WHG does not survive as a majority contribution in any modern population. Neolithic Europe , Neolithic Revolution , Early European Farmers , and Holocene A big cline in genetic variation that has long been recognised in Europe seems to show important dispersals from the direction of the Middle East. This has often been linked to the spread of farming technology during the Neolithic, which has been argued to be one of the most important periods in determining modern European genetic diversity. There were several phases of this period: In a late European Mesolithic prelude to the Neolithic, it appears that Near Eastern peoples from areas that already had farming, and who also had

sea-faring technology, had a transient presence in Greece, for example at Franchthi Cave. A later stage of the Neolithic, the so-called Pottery Neolithic , saw an introduction of pottery into the Levant, Balkans and Southern Italy it had been present in the area of modern Sudan for some time before it is found in the Eastern Mediterranean but it is thought to have developed independently and this may have also been a period of cultural transfer from the Levant into the Balkans. Secondarily, population geneticists have tried to clarify whether any genetic signatures of Near Eastern origin correspond to the expansion routes postulated by the archaeological evidence. J, T1 and U3 in that order of importance. These were predominantly found in the southern Balkans, southern Italy and parts of Iberia. Concerning timing the distribution and diversity of V13 however, Battaglia et al. They propose that the first major dispersal of E-V13 from the Balkans may have been in the direction of the Adriatic Sea with the Neolithic Impressed Ware culture often referred to as Impressa or Cardial. In contrast to Battaglia, Cruciani et al. The authors proposed that the V13 mutation first appeared in western Asia, where it is found in low but significant frequencies, whence it entered the Balkans sometime after 11 kYa. It later experienced a rapid dispersal which he dated to c. More recently, Lacan et al. The other specimens tested from the same site were in haplogroup G2a , which has been found in Neolithic contexts throughout Europe. The authors therefore proposed that, whether or not the modern distribution of E-V13 of today is a result of more recent events, E-V13 was already in Europe within the Neolithic, carried by early farmers from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Western Mediterranean, much earlier than the Bronze age. This supports the proposals of Battaglia et al. After an initial focus upon E1b1b as a Neolithic marker, a more recent study in January , looked at Y haplogroup R1b1b, which is much more common in Western Europe. We looked at how the lineage is distributed, how diverse it is in different parts of Europe, and how old it is. Dr Patricia Balaresque added: In contrast, most maternal genetic lineages seem to descend from hunter-gatherers. To us, this suggests a reproductive advantage for farming males over indigenous hunter-gatherer males during the switch from hunting and gathering, to farming". Bronze Age Europe The Bronze Age saw the development of long-distance trading networks , particularly along the Atlantic Coast and in the Danube valley. There was migration from Norway to Orkney and Shetland in this period and to a lesser extent to mainland Scotland and Ireland. There was also migration from Germany to eastern England. Another theory about the origin of the Indo-European language centres around a hypothetical Proto-Indo-European people, who traced in the Kurgan hypothesis , to north of the Black and Caspian Seas at about BC. The most common North European subclade N1c1 is estimated to be around 8, years old. There is evidence of human settlement in Finland dating back to BCE, linked with Kunda culture and its putative ancestor Swiderian culture , but the latter is thought to have European origin. The geographical spread of haplogroup N in Europe is well aligned with the Pitâ€"Comb Ware culture , whose emergence is commonly dated c. Mitochondrial DNA studies of Sami people , Haplogroup U5 are consistent with multiple migrations to Scandinavia from Volga - Ural region, starting 6, to 7, years before present. They analysed genomes from two hunter-gatherers from Georgia which were 13, and 9, years old, and found that these Caucasus hunter-gatherers were probably the source of the farmer-like DNA in the Yamna. Consistent with this, the earliest known individual with the derived allele is a ANE individual from the Late Upper Paleolithic Afontova Gora archaeological complex.

REGNUM EDINBURGH CENTENARY SERIES Volume 34 Mission in Central and Eastern Europe: Realities, Perspectives, Trends REGNUM EDINBURGH CENTENARY SERIES The centenary of the World Missionary Conference of , held in Edinburgh, was a suggestive moment for many people seeking direction for Christian mission in the 21st century.

Several different constituencies within world Christianity held significant events around From , an international group worked collaboratively to develop an intercontinental and multi- denominational project, known as Edinburgh , based at New College, University of Edinburgh. This initiative brought together representatives of twenty different global Christian bodies, representing all major Christian denominations and confessions, and many different strands of mission and church life, to mark the centenary. These inspired the idea of a new round of collaborative reflection on Christian mission â€" but now focused on nine themes identified as being key to mission in the 21st century. It was overseen by the Study Process Monitoring Group: These publications reflect the ethos of Edinburgh and will make a significant contribution to ongoing studies in mission. It should be clear that material published in this series will inevitably reflect a diverse range of views and positions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electric, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying. Anderson University of Birmingham, UK. Titus Re-Imagining Theological Education: Trusting in the Triune God and with a renewed sense of urgency, we are called to incarnate and proclaim the good news of salvation, of forgiveness of sin, of life in abundance, and of liberation for all poor and oppressed. We are challenged to witness and evangelism in such a way that we are a living demonstration of the love, righteousness and justice that God intends for the whole world. Our approach is marked with bold confidence in the gospel message; it builds friendship, seeks reconciliation and practises hospitality. Knowing the Holy Spirit who blows over the world at will, reconnecting creation and bringing authentic life, we are called to become communities of compassion and healing, where young people are actively participating in mission, and women and men share power and responsibilities fairly, where there is a new zeal for justice, peace and the protection of the environment, and renewed liturgy reflecting the beauties of the Creator and creation. Disturbed by the asymmetries and imbalances of power that divide and trouble us in church and world, we are called to repentance, to critical reflection on systems of power, and to accountable use of power structures. We are called to find practical ways to live as members of One Body in full awareness that God resists the proud, Christ welcomes and empowers the poor and afflicted, and the power of the Holy Spirit is manifested in our vulnerability. Affirming the importance of the biblical foundations of our missional engagement and valuing the witness of the Apostles and martyrs, we are called to rejoice in the expressions of the gospel in many nations all over the world. Recognising the need to shape a new generation of leaders with authenticity for mission in a world of diversities in the twenty-first century, we are called to work together in new forms of theological education. Hearing the call of Jesus to make disciples of all people â€" poor, wealthy, marginalised, ignored, powerful, living with disability, young, and old â€" we are called as communities of faith to mission from everywhere to everywhere. In joy we hear the call to receive from one another in our witness by word and action, in streets, fields, offices, homes, and schools, offering reconciliation, showing love, demonstrating grace and speaking out truth. Recalling Christ, the host at the banquet, and committed to that unity for which he lived and prayed, we are called to ongoing co-operation, to deal with controversial issues and to work towards a common vision. We are challenged to welcome one another in our diversity, affirm our membership through baptism in the One Body of Christ, and recognise our need for mutuality, partnership, collaboration and networking in mission, so that the world might believe. Themes Explored The conference was shaped around the following nine study themes: Foundations for mission 2. Christian mission among other faiths 3. Mission and

post-modernities 4. Mission and power 5. Forms of missionary engagement 6. Theological education and formation 7. Christian communities in contemporary contexts 8. Mission and unity â€" ecclesiology and mission 9. Mission spirituality and authentic discipleship Preface xi The Regnum Edinburgh Centenary Series to Date Against this background a series of books was commissioned, with the intention of making a significant contribution to ongoing studies of mission. This series currently includes: Mission Then and Now, David A. Kerr and Kenneth R. Edinburgh Volume II: The Church Going Local: Evangelical and Frontier Mission: Perspectives on the Global Progress of the Gospel, A. Scott Moreau and Beth Snodderly eds. Interfaith Relations after One Hundred Years: Witnessing to Christ in a Pluralistic Age: Mission and Post Modernities, Rolv Olsen ed. A Learning Missional Church: Global Anglican Perspectives, Cathy Ross ed. Orthodox Perspectives on Mission, Petros Vassiliadis ed. Mission At and From the Margins: Theology, Mission and Child: It highlights the challenges and opportunities facing Christian mission in post- Communist Central and Eastern Europe, thereby setting a clear agenda for missiologists in that context. At the same time, it invites and enables missiologists from other parts of the globe to enter into meaningful dialogue with them, to explore the similarities between their respective contexts, and to learn from the creative initiatives being undertaken there. I wish to commend the editors and contributors for four specific features of the volume. Firstly, for the underlying theological method that gives it coherence. The sub-title Realities, Perspectives, Trends outlines the key dimensions of contextual theologising: Due to the wide range of themes, not all the contributions emphasise these three these dimensions equally, but the overall effect of the volume is to expose the reader to the energy and passion evident in contextual missiological reflection in the region. Secondly, I wish to commend the editors for the broad inclusiveness of their project. The confessional and geographical spread of the more than thirty participants is truly impressive, allowing readers from other parts of the world to appreciate both the richness and the complexity of the church situation in Central and Eastern Europe. In its almost pages, the volume is a veritable mine of information and inspiration. Thirdly, I particularly appreciated the theological depth evident in the contributions. As with other theologies emerging out of places of suffering and deprivation on earth, recovering from legacies of sustained totalitarian rule and state propaganda, these contributions do not exude cheap triumphalism or superficial optimism; instead, a humble, grateful and grounded hope permeates the volume. Fourthly, the detailed case studies from numerous countries provide an insightful picture of the historical backgrounds and the contours of the present challenges facing churches in their witness and service in Central and Eastern Europe. The volume avoided the temptation of trading in vague and nice-sounding generalities or abstract theological ideas. I sincerely hope, with the editors, that this volume will be used widely and productively as a textbook in theological education across Central and Eastern Europe and further afield , so that it may stimulate ongoing reflection and action for the coming of the Reign of God. The contributors have rendered a sterling service to worldwide missiological literature by producing this book. The remark in the Editorial Introduction that the demise of Communism brought not only religious freedom but also political instability, nationalism, ethnic prejudice, bureaucratic tyranny, and a litany of other woes, reminded me of the parable in Matthew May this volume inspire and empower us all to bring the humanising and liberating gospel of Jesus Christ into this broken world so deeply loved by God. It is the place in which Marxist ideology gave birth to the communist hegemony that has affected the European arena for over half a century. It is the place from where there came wars, violence and genocides that have affected countless people in Europe and beyond. It is also a place where the demise of ideologically driven totalitarian regimes in has not only brought the religious freedom many had hoped for, but resulted also in further social and political instability characterized by nationalism, ethnic prejudice, bureaucratic tyranny, economic paralysis, religious fragmentation and increasingly widening economic gaps leading to poverty and despair, work migration and widespread corruption. Nonetheless, Central and Eastern Europe is also a context that presents us with unique opportunities for mission and therefore an interesting field to look at from the perspective of mission studies. It is also a place where Christianity and Islam have co-existed for centuries. And most importantly, it is a unique place, for in spite of oppressive political regimes and a lack of religious

freedom, the historical churches in the region have â€" albeit to various degrees â€" preserved a strong sense of Christian identity, often closely related to national identity, and Evangelical Christianity, in some quarters, has flourished as church membership has grown notably. Moreover, after , the new-found freedom which Eastern Europe experienced, has allowed communities in the region to interact with the previously limitedly accessible western world, which, in connection with the noted growth of the Evangelical communities, has resulted in a number of developments we consider as missiologically significant: In addition to these, we ought to point out other changes, gradually taking root in the region, all of which are reflected in one way or another in the papers included in this volume: Realities, Perspectives, Trends, attempts to accomplish a threefold aim: The book brings together over forty significant contributions from theologians, missiologists and practitioners from Central and Eastern Europe, coming from thirteen different countries, and representing different Christian traditions and confessions. Contributions therefore reflect the various forms of Christianity and the geographical regions under scrutiny. Part One The volume is structured in three parts. The first section begins with a general overview on mission understanding and practice in Central and Eastern Europe before and after in three chapters. In the second chapter, looking more specifically at the numerous mission Introduction 3 initiatives, Anne-Marie Kool explores carefully the question of what has been achieved in 25 years of East European mission. She identifies four distinct periods in mission, which moved from underground mission, to euphoria, to disillusionment, to an innovative new paradigm. Similarly, through an interview analysis about the mission of the church in the same period, Alex Vlasin reveals a slow but steady shift in various initiatives in missions and calls for further co-operation and partnerships. Chapters Four and Five in the first section bring the Bible to the fore as the foundation for, and the message of, mission. Ciprian Terinte examines the kerygmatic speeches found in the book of Acts, pinpointing the major Christological ideas available in the apostolic preaching recorded in this New Testament writing. The hope is that the apostolic example will help the reader formulate a relevant, theologically sound, evangelistic discourse for Central and Eastern Europe. The last chapter in the first section introduces the imperative of ecumenism for mission in the context of a diverse European Christianity. In an increasingly secularized Europe, argues Ovidiu Druhora, an authentic Christian witness can only be manifested through a radically new, effective and action-oriented ecumenical dialogue, and through a rediscovery of the Spirit of life. Part Two In the second part of the book, which is also the largest, the readers will discover a richness of case studies of ongoing missiological endeavours and concrete manifestations of the embodiment of the gospel in various and specific contexts in Central and Eastern Europe. This part provides a unique insight into the complex experiences and situations of Christian churches and their roots, taking into account denominational variations and different missiological emphases. The second part of the volume continues with a study by Anton Rus that introduces the reader to the Greek-Catholic Church in Romania and presents the fundamentals of mission from the perspective of this unique Byzantine church. Following this prelude, the section focuses on Roman Catholic expressions of Christianity and perspectives on mission. Given this expertise, his is the only study in the volume that gives a comprehensive perspective on the encounter between Christianity and Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He argues that, in order for Christian churches and communities to pursue their missional calling in the Czech context, they ought to take specific contextual identifiers seriously, as many aspects of such identifiers â€" post-rationalistic, post-ideological, post-optimistic, post-traditional, post-individualistic and post-materialistic â€" have significant potential for establishing and pursuing authentic and relevant Christian presence, witness and mission. The next five studies focus on the Romanian context from an evangelical perspective. Only in this way, he argues, can the churches formulate a missionary task that will make Christian communities relevant as social and cultural witnesses today. The study covers the period , a time during which membership in this local Pentecostal community more than tripled in number, thus making this denomination one of the largest Pentecostal churches in Europe. The authors hope to raise awareness regarding the urgency of such missiological endeavours in this part of the world. Along similar lines, the study by Bill Prevette and Corneliu Constantineanu that concludes this section on mission in the Romanian context from an evangelical

perspective, addresses the issue of children at risk in Romania. The authors offer a historical analysis, pinpointing the factors that caused the serious child crisis in this country, and argue for serious biblical, theological and missiological reflection, leading to engagement on behalf of these children in need. Two articles that bring to fore the Hungarian context come next.

7: Genetic history of Europe - Wikipedia

We seek to provide an analysis of of Central-Eastern European responses to the 'refugee crisis' which exposes the historical, economic and political roots of nationalism and xenophobia in ways which neither justify these phenomena nor explains them using Cold War stereotypes of 'Eastern' Europeans as inherently backwards.

Toggle display of website navigation Argument: Argument The Nationalist Internationale Is Crumbling Steve Bannon is trying to sell Trumpism to Eastern Europeansâ€"but shared ideologies die hard when they run into economic and military realities. July 20, , 7: He received a warmer welcome the following day after traversing visa-free borders to star at an alt-right activist bonanza hosted by the Hungarian government in Budapest. The viciously xenophobic Czech President Milos Zeman and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the eccentric conservative who rules Poland from behind the scenes, also attract admiring glances from far-right activists across Europe and the United States. Yet beneath the biblical bluster, both Bannon and Trump appear blind to the concrete national interests of Eastern European leaders. The move toward the right in Central Europe is largely driven by political opportunism, which taps into frustrations that 14 years after joining the EU, the quality of life there is yet to equal that in Western Europe. The mood in the White House is useful ideological support. But Bannon does it from a blinkered Washington perspective. There was little Central European context in his speeches and no evidence of the close attention that Bannon claims the U. The rest of the region is also careful to avoid offending Beijing as it chases Chinese investment. When the Czech culture minister privately met the Dalai Lama in , Zeman forced the then-prime minister into co-signing a groveling letter of apology. In Prague, Bannon also offered an economic epiphany. Bannon and Trump may have correctly identified the populist ideological urges in the region, but they flunked Economics by failing to understand how economic realities determine political priorities for these small European nations. Slovakia has the most to fear, with cars accounting for 60 percent of its exports to the United States. On top of the vehicles produced by the Volkswagen, PSA Peugeot Citroen, Kia, and Jaguar Land Rover plants on Slovakian soil, the country plays a large role in the supply chain of numerous German brands being built across the region. If he follows through, tariffs would put 40, jobs at risk in Poland, and 25, each in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis, a billionaire businessman often compared to Trump, rarely misses an opportunity to blow the immigration dog-whistle. Unlike his Hungarian counterpart, Babis did not pop in to greet the U. Neither is his government prepared to hand U. With those few words, Trump collapsed the mechanics of an alliance that more than any other body draws Eastern Europe westward. The tension in capitals such as Warsaw and Vilnius is palpable, and Trump is rapidly turning from hero to villain for his ideological brethren. The divergence between nationalist ideology and concrete national interests has left Central European officials unimpressed with the efforts of the U. But only so far in the face of such concrete realities.

8: Czech Genetics - DNA of the Czech Republic's Slavic people

Argument The Nationalist Internationale Is Crumbling Steve Bannon is trying to sell Trumpism to Eastern Europeans—but shared ideologies die hard when they run into economic and military realities.

Search Share The creators of the Corded Ware culture, named after this intricate pottery, may have spoken an Indo-European language derived from one spoken by herders from the East. Ever since the midth century, scholars have noted such similarities among the so-called Indo-European languages, which span the world and number more than if dialects are included. Researchers agree that they can probably all be traced back to one ancestral language, called Proto-Indo-European PIE. But for nearly 20 years, scholars have debated vehemently when and where PIE arose. Two long-awaited studies, one described online this week in a preprint and another scheduled for publication later this month, have now used different methods to support one leading hypothesis: One study points out that these steppe land herders have left their genetic mark on most Europeans living today. A rival hypothesis—that early farmers living in Anatolia modern Turkey about years ago were the original PIE speakers—is not ruled out by the new analyses, most agree. Then in , archaeologist Colin Renfrew of the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom proposed that PIE spread with farming from its origins in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East, moving west into Europe and east further into Asia; over time the languages continued to spread and diversify into the many Indo-European languages we know today. Traditional linguists, meanwhile, painstakingly reconstructed PIE by extrapolating back from modern languages and ancient writings. Listen to a short fable spoken in PIE here. In , evolutionary biologists Russell Gray and Quentin Atkinson of the University of Auckland in New Zealand used computational methods from evolutionary biology to track words as they changed over time, and concluded that the Anatolian hypothesis was right. Fans of the steppe hypothesis are now hailing a genetics study that used ancient DNA from 69 Europeans who lived between and years ago to genetically track ancient population movements. Beginning about years ago, these steppe people herded cattle and other animals, buried their dead in earthen mounds called kurgans, and may have created some of the first wheeled vehicles. Archaeologists had noted similarities among these cultures, especially in their emphasis on cattle herding. The team focused on sections of DNA that they suspected would provide markers for past population movements and identified nearly , DNA positions across the genome in each individual. They used new techniques to zero in on the key positions in the nuclear DNA, allowing them to analyze twice as many ancient nuclear DNA samples from Europe and Asia as previously reported in the entire literature. That suggests a massive migration of Yamnaya people from their steppe homeland into central Europe about years ago, one that could have spread an early form of the Indo-European language, the team concludes. Thus the paper for the first time links two far-flung material cultures to specific genetic signatures and to each other—and suggests, the team says, that they spoke a form of Indo-European. A team led by University of California, Berkeley, linguists Andrew Garrett and Will Chang employed the language database and evolutionary methods previously used by Gray to create a family tree of the Indo-European languages from their first origins in PIE. For example, they assumed that Latin was directly ancestral to Romance languages such as Spanish, French, and Italian—something that many but not all linguists agree on—and that Vedic Sanskrit was directly ancestral to the Indo-Aryan languages spoken on the Indian subcontinent. Garrett, Chang, and their colleagues found that the origins of PIE were about years ago, consistent with the steppe hypothesis but not the Anatolian, because the farming migration out of the Middle East was years ago. But many supporters of the Anatolian hypothesis remain staunchly unconvinced. Even small differences in the true ancestral language, Heggarty insists, could throw off the timing estimates. As for the Reich paper, many archaeologists and linguists praise the data on ancient migrations. But they challenge what they see as its speculative link to language.

9: Difference between Eastern and Western Religion | Eastern vs Western Religion

Key Difference - Western vs Eastern Europe. The continent of Europe can be divided into two regions as the western and eastern Europe. Between these two regions, a myriad of differences can be viewed regarding the geographical location, culture, economy, etc.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Elena Marushiakova, Vesselin Popov eds. Roma series Hristo Kyuchukov and Ian Hancock, eds. ISBN The book under review focuses on selected aspects of Roma culture in Eastern Europe, addressed in general terms in historical and contemporary context. It sets out to examine widely existing stereotypes on the specificity and uniqueness of Roma culture, which often form the basis of political approaches to Roma issues. The book consists of a preface, an introduction, and seven chapters, each focusing on a key issue or chosen aspect of Roma culture, followed by a conclusion. Although the term Roma is ubiquitous, it is not without its difficulties. Since the term is considered politically correct, it is used as an umbrella term for many groups without clearly formulated criteria. Next, they turn to explanations of the different socio-historical contexts and perceptions of the Roma in the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, which trigger misunderstandings in definition and terminology. In Eastern Europe the Roma define themselves on the basis of a common origin as a distinctive ethnic community, and so do the surrounding populations. According to the Roma and to the local population in Eastern Europe the criterion of who the Roma are and who they are not is clear: Marushiakova and Popov underline the significance of the primordialistic factor, referring to the primacy of origin in the process of ethno-national state creation in Eastern Europe since the nineteenth century. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Roma of Eastern Europe should attempt to build their ethnic identity according to models that differ from the general one. The editors carefully contextualise the Roma community, offering a detailed explanation of the social history of Eastern Europe. The first chapter of the book focuses on the culture of the Roma pp. Marushiakova and Popov consider the culture of the Roma as ethnic, and examine certain stereotypes about Roma culture in political and academic discourses, such as nomadism. The authors stress that the specificities of Roma culture can be examined only through a detailed comparison with other ethnic cultures in the countries and regions where the Roma live. Drawing on three decades of fieldwork in numerous communities the authors expand the themes addressed in the Introduction, adding a detailed discussion of the concept of Romanipe. In the second chapter, Hristo Kyuchukov deals with problems of codification of the Romani language pp. He presents a table with words from Hindi which are preserved in different Roma dialects, noting that many have changed their meaning in You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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