

1: Benghazi Probe Finds Marines' Response Was Slowed by Uniform Changes | www.enganchecubano.com

This relative military stasis, in technology, at least, has a range of causes: the end of the Cold War, bureaucratic changes, political cultures, scientific limits, cost inflation, a focus on new.

After all, much of the historiography of the last hundred years has given World War I a very bad reputation. Both the popular and the scholarly images of that war paint the picture of a four-year long blood bath - a senseless war of attrition conducted by incompetent generals, without a trace of strategic thought or tactical innovation. Thus, it has become accepted wisdom that World War I has nothing to teach the student of modern war, especially in comparison to World War II, with its fast-moving armored and airborne divisions that are the basic models of military forces today. The reality is something quite different. The scholarship over the last thirty years has shown that the period from through introduced the biggest changes in warfighting tactics and technologies in all human history. With a few significant exceptions, almost everything about how large-scale combat operations are conducted today traces its origins to World War I. If an infantry battalion commander of August were to jump ahead a scant four years to August, he would be totally bewildered by what he saw happening on the battlefield around him. Almost nothing that he knew in about how to fight a battle would be of much use in. On the other hand, if a battalion commander from were to jump forward to a World War II battlefield of or, he would be able to understand the broad outlines of what was happening. To be sure, some military technologies would have advanced considerably in the more than twenty years, but they nonetheless would be recognizable. The battlefield problems prior to bore very little relation to those of. Those of World War II were essentially the same as those of - and those of remain quite similar. By, however, the tactical and technical solutions to the problems of the modern battlefield were starting to emerge. World War I ended in exhaustion before the new concepts could be developed fully, but the firm foundations were there for the mobile tactics and operations of World War II, and ever since. Quite often it is a revolution, a transformation, a complete metamorphosis. A paradigm shift does not just happen by itself: The introduction of gunpowder about the 15th century was the cause of one such paradigm shift that completely altered the way wars were fought. Paradigm shifts tend to be far and few between. During the period to, however, three separate but related warfighting paradigm shifts came to a head almost simultaneously, rendering most pre standard military wisdom completely obsolete, almost overnight. Nor did the new realities automatically point the way to new tactics, techniques, and procedures. They had to be developed slowly and painfully, by trial and error, costing in the process the lives of hundreds of thousands of troops on all sides. Such was the daunting challenge faced by the World War I battlefield commanders at all levels. The first of these paradigm shifts was the transition from human and animal muscle power to machine power as the primary motive force in war. The horse had dominated the battlefield for thousands of years, providing speed and mobility to the cavalry and draft power for transport and logistics. And although horses played a major role throughout World War I, their days were clearly numbered by. The transition to mechanical motive power did not occur all at once, of course, but it reached full maturity during World War I. The transition started with the invention of the steam engine and railroads during the 19th century, but it went into high gear with the development of the internal combustion engine at the end of the century. By the military technologies based on the internal combustion engine were starting to mature with the introduction of the tank and heavier-than-air combat aircraft. Up to that point battles had been fought on two-dimensional planes, although any piece of high ground on that plane gave an advantage to the side holding it. Now, aircraft made the sky itself the new high ground, and it was no longer sufficient to dominate the horizontal space within the range of your weapons. You also had to control the sky above you, or you would be vulnerable to deadly attack from the air. The problem of control of the air also extended to the battle at sea, but there the introduction of the submarine extended the battle space below the surface as well as above it. The combination of submarines and naval aircraft quickly made the heavy-gun ship-of-the-line "the battleship" obsolete. Throughout history most battles were fought and decided at the line of contact. Now, with the advent of aircraft, long-range artillery, fire-control technologies to engage accurately targets far beyond the line of sight of the gun crews, and

target-acquisition technologies capable of accurately locating deep targets, it became possible to attack an enemy force deep in its vulnerable rear areas, rather than just along the hardened defenses of its front line. Now, the combat problem became one of striking at the enemy simultaneously along his front and deep in his rear, while defending simultaneously along your own front and the vulnerable and critical installations in your own rear. And they all had to be coordinated and synchronized. Modern communication technologies played a major role in making all that possible, but rapid communications and mobility also speeded-up the process, cutting down the reaction times and the time available for the decision cycles. If warfare before was like a standard chess game, warfare since World War I has been like a multi-level chess game where each player moves ten, fifteen, or even twenty pieces at the same time. The first wave ushered in breech-loading, rifled weapons of increased firing speed and accuracy. The second wave brought smokeless powder, repeating rifles, machine guns, rapid-firing artillery, and the internal combustion engine. All of these changes came together during World War I to create a technological perfect storm. The new technologies, which dramatically increased the tempo and lethality of combat operations, also made coordination between the various arms infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc. All sides in had difficulties coping with and integrating the new technologies, but especially the Germans. Despite their impressive tactical and organizational innovations later during World War I, the German army remained handicapped by an institutional bias against many of the technical possibilities, and pursued instead largely tactical solutions to most of the problems of the modern battlefield. Writing immediately after the war, even a talented tactician like Lieutenant General William Balck still defended the old dogmas when he noted: The moral forces in the breast of the commander and in the soul of the entire people are the qualities which have finally turned the scales in war. The report of one of the post-war study commissions established by General Hans von Seeckt criticized the German General Staff for having too many tacticians but not enough technicians. The Germans sorely lacked weapons specialists who really understood both the tactical effects and the limitations of current technology. The Germans, of course, were not completely hostile to the new military technologies. In some areas, they were significantly ahead of the Allies. Most of those areas fell into the realm of firepower—field artillery, heavy artillery, mortars, machine guns. The mobility area was where they seem to have had the greatest shortcomings, which is somewhat ironic considering their exploitation of the railroad during the later 19th century. During the years between the two world wars the various armies of the world adopted modern technologies at varying rates. Despite their embrace of the tank, the German army overall was still heavily dependent on horses right through, as was the Soviet army. Firepower produces the kinetic energy effect that destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses an objective. Maneuver is movement throughout the battle space to gain positional advantage. The two complement each other. The side with greater positional advantage can position its firepower to better effect; and the side with superior firepower can better support its maneuver element. Over the course of military history, these two elements have been locked in a cyclical struggle for dominance. Rarely has one gained dominance over the other, or held it for very long. But in the seventy or so years before the start of World War I, firepower technology had advanced much farther and faster than mobility technology. Bolt-action rifles, machine guns, and rapid-firing artillery had increased drastically the rates of fire, but battlefield mobility still plodded along at the speed of a man or a horse. That would begin to change by, with the emergence of combat aircraft, the tank, and the increased use of motor vehicles. By, the balance between fire and maneuver was almost restored, which largely explains why World War II did not bog down in trench warfare. But, for most of World War I, maneuver in the face of such overwhelming firepower became almost suicidal. The result was trench warfare. Neither side anticipated or planned for anything like the long and drawn-out static warfare that actually developed, but many military thinkers did recognize the basic problems of modern warfare. In his five-volume book published in, the Polish civilian banker Jan Bloch argued that modern weaponry made offensive maneuver all but impossible. There was no common consensus for a solution to the problem of fire and maneuver. Many planners, likewise, recognized that any war on the Continent would be a long one, rather than the short and decisive war everyone hoped for. That problem was compounded by the firepower-maneuver disconnect. The Wars of German Unification ended in, and from then until there had been no major wars in western or central Europe. During that same period, the vast technological

improvements in weapons resulted in greatly increased range, accuracy, volume of fire, and lethality that placed the soldier in the open at a distinct disadvantage to the soldier fighting from a protected position. During the early battles of August and September, there was a great deal of attempted maneuver. But, as both sides groped across the battlefield searching open flanks that did not exist, firepower took its grim toll. The troops themselves soon realized the near impossibility of survival on the surface of the earth. Soldiers on all sides hated and still hate the spade, but the overwhelming volumes of firepower forced them to dig. As the war continued, these defenses became more elaborate and semi-permanent. The Eastern Front never quite solidified into the static and rigid network of trenches and fortifications so typical of the Western Front. While the problem on the Western Front was too many forces in too little space, the problem on the Eastern Front was just the opposite. Many professional soldiers clung to the belief that aggressive spirit was the only way the attacker could overcome modern firepower. The cult of the offensive became a substitute for any coherent system of tactical doctrine. The military tacticians of the period, therefore, concentrated on ways to restore the old paradigm, failing to understand that the central paradigm of war itself had shifted. War was no longer a contest between two opposing forces of blood, muscle, and bayonets, but now a struggle between two armies consisting of machines. The most important human roles in warfare were now the operation and direction of those machines. Gone forever were the days when massed infantry alone, attacking with bayonets could win battles. The greatly improved range, accuracy, and rates of fire of artillery created serious challenges for coordinating its fires with the infantry on the battlefield. Indirect fire techniques, which allowed guns to engage targets far beyond the line of sight of their crews, combined with the still primitive communications systems, made close support of the infantry very difficult the farther the attack advanced from the line of departure. Radio was still in its infancy. The telephone worked well enough in defensive situations, but during an attack, messengers were the only way to send and receive requests for fire support and corrections. That sometimes took hours, assuming the messengers survived to get through. One solution to the problem was to advance the artillery fire on a pre-set schedule, controlled by phase lines on the map. That technique evolved into the creeping barrage, with the attacking infantry trained to follow closely behind the moving wall of their own artillery fire. Infantry commanders were ordered to keep their lead troops as close as possible to the advancing barrage, even though they almost certainly sustained casualties from friendly fire in the process. The underlying assumption was that the closer the infantry hugged to the back of the barrage, the less time the defending enemy would have to recover and react when the leading attack wave reached the objective. Creeping barrages, phase lines, and rigid firing schedules, however, completely subordinated the infantry advance to the artillery plan. But, the communications systems of the period were inadequate for greater centralization of control, resulting in slower response times. Thus, front line infantry commanders had no alternative but to ignore terrain in their planning, and they had less and less control of their immediate tactical situations.

2: Arms Race - HISTORY

It finds that the environment is a period of relative military stasis, of slow technological development, and of little novelty in broader issues. If anything, it is a return to an older period, of the time before the Cold War, before the fear of nuclear war dominated all other thinking in the field.

Visit Website A close examination of the historical evidence reveals a different picture. Political purposes almost always drive and govern arms races. It is common for a major race to be initiated by a state interested in changing the political status quo. In some cases, the response of states content with the status quo is swift and resolute, but in other cases it is constrained by domestic political or economic considerations or diverted by diplomatic calculations. The course of an arms race has frequently exacerbated a sense of rivalry and occasionally even determined the timing of a war; but most often it has ended in a political settlement between rivals or in a decision by one side to moderate its buildup. The first competitive buildup in which contemporaries used the arms race metaphor seems to have been the naval rivalry in the late nineteenth century, in which France and Russia challenged Britain in the context of acute tensions over colonial expansion. The British responded with a determination to remain masters of the seas. The ultimate result was not war, but rather an Anglo-French political settlement in and an Anglo-Russian rapprochement in against the background of a rising German threat. The German challenge to Britain in the early twentieth century involved the most famous naval arms race of all. As the post-Bismarck political leadership decided that Germany must become a world power, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was able to justify building a large German battle fleet. When the British finally responded, the upshot was a competition that fit an action-reaction model more closely than any other arms race. The Germans in the end could not keep up, because of domestic difficulties in raising taxes and pressures to give greater priority to spending on the army. Though the naval arms race did poison Anglo-German relations, it was the actions of the German army, not the German navy, that ultimately produced war in . It was fueled by Japanese efforts to expand their political influence in East Asia and by an American attempt to gain greater political leverage over Britain. This was a race that, for financial reasons, none of the participants wanted to run very far. It ended at the Washington Conference of with the first major arms-limitation treaty ever and a new political settlement for East Asia. In fact, an arms race among European armies had some part in the outbreak of World War I. Similarly, Adolf Hitler was in a rush to attack France in and the Soviet Union in , partly because of the dynamics of an arms race that he had started in the s. Held back by domestic financial constraints, Britain and France had lagged behind. Its naval leaders appreciated that the Japanese navy had gained a lead over the U. Pacific Fleet in every class of warship, but that a massive American naval program begun in would leave them far behind by . Coupled with the effects of an American oil embargo against Japan, this playing out of the dynamics of an arms race helped to prompt an attack on the United States in December see Pearl Harbor , Attack on . But in this case, as in the two European wars, hegemonic political ambitions fueled the conflict. The arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union did not fit an action-reaction model very well. For domestic political and economic reasons, the United States was slow to rearm in the late s even as it perceived hegemonic ambitions on the part of the Soviets. After the United States did greatly increase its nuclear and conventional arms during the Korean War , the Soviet leadership for its own domestic reasons made only a partial response. When from the mids the Soviets undertook the most massive peacetime military buildup in history, the United States chose to disengage somewhat from the race. Not until after did it reassess its posture. The new qualitative improvements embodied in the last American arms spurt of the Cold War made Soviet military leaders nervous and helps explain why they were willing in the mids to accept the new ideas promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev in hopes of raising the technological level of Soviet society. The arms race that had produced the greatest anxiety among contemporaries ended in the most astonishing political settlement of the past century. Edited by Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker.

3: Slowing Military Change

This monograph looks at the development of military technology in recent years. It examines three major platforms: fighter aircraft, tanks, and cruisers, examining the gaps between generations as well as the capability gains of each succeeding type.

Now, his trans son is trying to integrate the armed forces once again. By Kylar Broadus November 15 6: He served overseas in World War II, when our segregated military refused to fully recognize his humanity as an African-American man, even though he was willing to lay down his life for this country. For William and so many people back then, the military was viewed as the only path to obtaining vocational skills or an education. Service was one of the few avenues that black people had to upward mobility, respectability, and a place in the American middle class. That remains true for many people of color to this day. As the oldest son in his family, William was forced to leave school in Fayette, at age 12, to help support his family. When he completed his service, he had hoped to earn at least a high school diploma and be trained as a barber under the GI Bill. But purely because of racial animus, the Army denied his claims for education assistance. This happened even though President Harry Truman integrated the armed forces by executive order in 1948. The pace of change is often slow, even when the orders come from the top “and especially when it comes to dismantling institutional racism. Truman, in fact, faced fierce opposition from military and political leaders at the time he issued the order. Nonetheless, Truman did what he knew was right “for the military as a whole, for national security in the face of a burgeoning Cold War, and for millions of American people of color seeking equal opportunity in the armed forces. Eventually, equality began to manifest. Everyone will tell you that it has immeasurably bolstered the morale of our fighting forces, increased their efficiency and has been successful. But history has also shown me that equality will eventually manifest. Transgender Americans have served honorably and fought courageously on behalf of the American people. One way we do this is by lifting up the voices of the most important people in this fight: We are speaking with active duty trans troops and veterans and publishing their stories to give the public, the courts, and policy makers a full and true picture of the service transgender troops render. The public and the people shaping military policy need to hear directly from trans folk about the contributions we make to our national security, and how this ban affects all of us. In particular, they need to hear from trans people of color. Neither TPOCC or any other organization will use your story for fundraising or any other purpose aside from public education. We can speak to you in confidence and let you determine the level of privacy you wish to have in sharing your story. Your privacy and security is paramount above all, given the current environment. My father was willing to lay down his life for this country and in return was denied the full benefits of his service. That should not happen to any service member or veteran who serves our country honorably “including transgender people who wear the uniform. If you are interested in sharing your story or would like to discuss this project further, please visit <https://>

4: 50 American Patriotic Military Songs - U.S. Military Bands | Songs, Reviews, Credits | AllMusic

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October Pages Brief Synopsis The author looks at the development of military technology in recent years. He examines three major platforms: While development has slowed, at the same time capability increases have also slowed: Only in electronics and computer technology was that shown to be somewhat untrue, but even there military technology has lagged significantly behind commercial advances. This relative military stasis, in technology at least, has a range of causes: The author also looks at the strategic environment to see whether that has evolved rapidly while technology has proven more dormant. Summary This monograph looks at the development of military technology in recent years. It examines three major platforms: While it shows that development has slowed, at the same time capability increases have also slowed: It is thus a period of declining gains. Only in electronics and computer technology was that thesis shown to be somewhat untrue, but even there military technology has lagged significantly behind commercial advances, and thus to call it innovative and rapidly developing is to draw a long bow. This relative military stasis, in technology, at least, has a range of causes: The monograph also looks at the strategic environment to see whether that has evolved rapidly while technology has proven more dormant. While many of the issues that characterize the post-Cold War period were also present during the Cold War; they may be newly important, but they are not necessarily new. Indeed, the contemporary period may be seen as a return to military normalcy after the lengthy anomaly of the Cold War. It is a shift away from state-on-state conflict, away from large scale war, away from a view that sees armies as forces designed solely for decisive, Clausewitzian battles. Yes, there has been change since the end of the Cold War, but it should not be exaggerated; rather than innovation, it might be taken as reaction, and the Cold War should be examined from a new perspective as a period of radical innovation in strategic terms, which would further be reinforced by the rapid technological development that characterized it. This is a long time in military history; 66 years ago, a fighter known as the P was entering service. That is an argument from extremes, but it is still valid nonetheless. Let us use the time that this relative military stasis affords us to examine the strategic environment both more closely and from a greater distance.

5: Zhivan J. Alach (Author of Slowing Military Change)

This monograph revises, reexamines, and reevaluates the contemporary military environment. It finds that the environment is a period of relative military stasis, of slow technological development, and of little novelty in broader issues.

Special operations forces from Jordan and the United States conduct a combined demonstration with commandos from Iraq in Amman, Jordan, on June 20. The facts are sometimes murky, which makes it hard to know the truth. To clear up the confusion, PolitiFact has answers to five common questions about military spending and equipment under the watch of President Barack Obama. Want to know more? Read all of our fact-checks about the military and terrorism. Has the military budget dropped under Obama, and if so, who is to blame? Spending increased in and , but it has fallen every year for four years since then by a cumulative 15 percent. Other ways of looking at the question show declines as well. National security spending made up Over the same period, spending fell from 4. There are two main reasons for the spending drop. The second has to do with a process known as sequestration. Sequestration refers to the framework for automatic, across-the-board cuts to both military and non-military spending that were originally designed to force bipartisan negotiators in Congress to strike a deal in . When negotiations fell apart, the cuts went into effect. The bipartisan nature of the sequestration provision means that both parties merit a share of the blame, experts say. The most recent Obama budget proposed a 7. The spending bill enacted this fall puts the defense budget on a path to start growing in fiscal year , up about 6 percent from the previous year. How much is the Army shrinking? Republican presidential candidate U. Marco Rubio brought up declining military spending while on the campaign trail at the Iowa State Fair, deeming it an example of the government failing on its "most important obligation" of keeping Americans safe. He said, "We have an Army that just cut 40, spots. In , the Army had about , soldiers. Reductions over several years have taken it down to its current size of about , Do we have the smallest Navy since ? A popular talking point about the United States having the "smallest Navy" in almost a century emerged in the presidential campaign and has seen new life this cycle. In , the U. Navy had active ships. The number peaked at a massive 6, ships during World War II. Then the number drifted down during most of the 20th century, with slight upticks during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. However, the ships of were most definitely not the ships of today. The types of ships active in that are also active today -- such as cruisers and destroyers -- are now outfitted with far more advanced technology than they were during World War I. And today, the U. And all are more effective at projecting seapower than their forebears. Stueck, a historian at the University of Georgia, told us in . In March , the Navy, after a formal process completed in to consider its future military needs, set a goal for a fleet of ships. Given the current shipbuilding schedule, that goal would not be met until at the earliest. And that depends on repealing sequestration. Is the United States building new military equipment? Rubio made a less accurate attack when he said the United States "is not building the aircraft, the long-range bombers, the additional aircraft carriers, or the nuclear submarines. The United States is, in fact, building various military equipment, though there is debate among experts as to whether it is happening fast enough. Here is an updated summary of some of what we found: The Navy is building 12 ballistic missile submarines to replace the current force of 14 beginning with the first hull in . In recent years, around 30 have been built a year, and that will ramp up to a year around . In October, the Air Force awarded a contract for the new bomber program , known as a long-range strike bomber. However, the bid is currently under protest by Boeing. The planes are expected to be done by the s. Both Rubio and Donald Trump have portrayed our nuclear weapons as out of date. While the United States has reduced the number of warheads, the government is in the process of extensive nuclear modernization efforts. The United States has been spending billions to improve nuclear equipment, and there are plans to do more. China, for example, is modernizing its arsenal, but its arsenal is also far smaller.

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SLOWING MILITARY CHANGE pdf

He finds that the environment is a period of relative military stasis, of slow technological development, and of little novelty in broader issues. If anything, it is a return to an older period, of the time before the Cold War, before the fear of nuclear war dominated all other thinking in the field.

7: PolitiFact Sheet: Military spending under Obama and Congress | PolitiFact

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8: The Military Has Shown Time and Again It Can Integrate

*Zhivan J. Alach is the author of *Slowing Military Change* (avg rating, 0 ratings, 0 reviews, published).*

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