

## 1: Social Epistemology - Oxford Scholarship

*Social Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Science, Technology, and Society, Information Systems About I am a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Community Information Systems (also known as Community Informatics) at Zefat Academic College.*

Background In the long history of philosophy there have been comparatively few signs of social epistemology until recently. Treatments of such topics that would nowadays be subsumed under this heading have occurred in various periods think of discussions of testimony by Hume and Reid , but they were never assembled into a single unified package. In the second half of the 20th century, however, philosophers and theorists of assorted stripes launched a variety of debunking movements aimed at traditional epistemology. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a convergence of such thinkers who attacked the notion of truth and objectivity, a constellation that gained powerful influence in the academic community. Many of them challenged the intelligibility of the truth concept, or challenged the feasibility of truth acquisition. In the social studies of science practitioners such as Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar [1] rejected the ideas of truth or fact as traditionally understood. Discourse being a social phenomenon, what they were saying, in effect, is that facts were to be eliminated in favor of social phenomena. Although few practicing philosophers of the period endorsed these ideas, at least one influential philosopher, Richard Rorty , seemed to be a camp follower. Sharply departing from these debunking themes, contemporary social epistemology is substantially continuous with classical epistemology. It sees no need to reject or distance itself from the epistemological projects of the past. Even social practices, after all, can be—and often are—aimed at finding the truth. Such social practices have a hit-or-miss record; but the same could be said of individual practices. At any rate, epistemologists can engage in their traditional enterprise of appraising alternative methods in terms of their capacities or propensities to achieve this kind of goal. Such epistemology can survive, and even thrive, with an expanded conception of how the truth-goal and the justification and rationality goals can be served, namely, with the help of well-designed social and interpersonal practices and institutions. Initial moves toward a positive form of social epistemology as opposed to a debunking form were begun in the 1980s, largely in response to the debunkers. Alvin Goldman offered promissory notes In the same issue Steve Fuller pursued a line more akin to the debunkers, and elaborated his position the following year with a monograph Fuller That same year Fuller launched a journal entitled *Social Epistemology*, which became a prime venue for science studies work. This path, however, does not express what most philosophers now pursue under the heading of social epistemology. The decade of the 1990s and its run-up saw the publication of several monographs and chapter-length treatments of various branches of social epistemology, followed by a wide-angle depiction of the field as a whole. Kitcher highlighted diversity within scientific communities as an important tool in the pursuit of truth. Alvin Goldman published a series of papers applying social epistemology to a number of topics, including argumentation Goldman , freedom of speech Goldman and Cox , legal procedure Talbott and Goldman , and scientific inquiry Goldman and Shaked His book *Knowledge in a Social World* showed how classical epistemology, with its focus on the values truth possession and error avoidance, could be applied to the social domain without abandoning its traditional rigor. Among the domains covered were testimony, argumentation, the Internet, science, law, and democracy. The years since have witnessed a surge of activity in social epistemology. This surge was encouraged by the launch of the journal *Episteme*, which is heavily dedicated to work in the field. *Giving Shape to the Field: A Taxonomy of Social Epistemology* Traditional epistemology focuses on individual agents and their doxastic states or attitudes. Doxastic attitudes are a sub-species of propositional attitudes, ones that make categorical or graded judgments concerning the truth or falsity of their propositional contents. A doxastic attitude is right or wrong—accurate or inaccurate—as a function of the genuine truth-value of its propositional content. In addition to assessing beliefs as accurate or inaccurate, token attitudes e. Given that justification evaluation is the paradigm of individual epistemology, what is or are the paradigm task s for social epistemology? A great deal of evidence that epistemic agents possess, of course, does not involve others at all. Her next-door neighbor might relate the incident to her when she comes home. Here we can introduce a first branch of social

epistemology: The first branch of social epistemology, so characterized, subsumes two of the most intensively debated topics in the field: A the problem of testimony-based justification, and B the problem of peer disagreement. These topics will be addressed in due course. Obviously, what makes the first branch of social epistemology social is not the character of the doxastic agents who are studied. Rather, it is the social character of the evidence relative to the agent. The second branch of social epistemology, by contrast, is social in an altogether different way. It is social because the doxastic agent is a social, or collective, entity. This branch of social epistemology starts by assuming that there are group entities that possess doxastic attitudes analogous to those possessed by individual humans. That there are such agents is a question of ontology or perhaps philosophy of mind. It is undeniable, however, that we often acknowledge such group subjects in everyday thought and speech. If we are philosophically content with this practice, then the adoption of such doxastic attitudes by various groups gives rise to epistemological questions. Under what conditions are these entities justified in adopting a specified doxastic attitude, or making such a judgment? Here, then, is a core problem for the second branch of social epistemology: Assessing the epistemic quality of group doxastic attitudes whatever their provenance may be. A third branch of social epistemology has a wider assortment of manifestations. Within this branch the locus of activity ranges from social systems to social practices, institutions, or patterns of interaction. For example, a social system might formally select a pattern of rewards or punishments to motivate its actors or agents to engage in certain activities rather than others. Science as a social institution, for example, has adopted a reward system that confers honors, prizes, or credit to scientists and mathematicians who make important discoveries or prove major theorems. How often does a given trial system generate accurate judgments? How does it or would it, if adopted compare with alternative systems? Turning to science, how well does a given reward system function to motivate scientists to engage in fruitful inquiry that ultimately produces new knowledge? Instead of deliberately adopted institutional arrangements, the same questions can be asked about alternative patterns of social interaction, which can also generate truth-linked consequences. Different patterns of communication, for example, and different choices of participants in a collective activity can vary in their degree of epistemic success. What are the best kinds of systems or practices? Some authors contend that diversity trumps expertise when it comes to group problem-solving. With these questions in mind, we can formulate the third branch of social epistemology as follows: Assessing the epistemic consequences of adopting certain institutional arrangements or systemic relations as opposed to alternatives. Under the aegis of this third branch of social epistemology, philosophers and other professionals can weigh the epistemic value of choosing one kind of institution or system rather than others. In the real world, of course, epistemic properties of an institution or system may not be the paramount properties to consider; they are certainly not the only ones of interest. Standard examples of such sources in traditional individual epistemology are perception, introspection, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and so forth. When turning to social epistemology, we quickly encounter an ostensibly new kind of source, viz. Knowledge or justification can be acquired, it seems, by hearing what others say or reading what they write and believing it. In the realm of epistemic sources, a distinction can be drawn between basic and non-basic derived sources. Vision is presumably a basic source of justification, but not all sources are basic. If testimony is also a source, is it a basic or non-basic source? David Hume argued for non-basicality. Although we are generally entitled to trust what others tell us, we are so entitled only in virtue of what we have learned from other basic sources. Each of us can remember many occasions on which people told us things that we independently verified by perception and found to be true. This reliable track record from the past—which we remember—warrants us in inferring via induction that testimony is generally reliable. From this we can conclude that any new instance of testimony we encounter is also likely to be true, assuming we have no defeaters. As James Van Cleve formulates the view, testimony gives us justified belief not because it shines by its own light, but because it has often enough been revealed true by our other lights. However, global reductionism has come under fire. Coady argues that the observational base of ordinary epistemic agents is much too small and limited to allow an induction to the general reliability of testimony. Local reductionism does not require a hearer to be justified in believing that testimony is generally reliable. It only requires a hearer to be justified in believing that the particular speaker whose current testimony is the target is

reliable or reliable”and sincere”about the specific topic she was addressing. This is a much weaker and more easily satisfied requirement than that of global reductionism. Local reductionism may still be too strong, however, but for a different reason. Is a speaker S trustworthy for hearer H only if H has positive evidence or justification for the reliability of this particular speaker S? This is far from clear. I do not normally gather such evidence for a given public address announcer, but surely I am justified in trusting such announcements. Given these problems for both kinds of reductionism, some epistemologists embrace testimonial anti-reductionism Coady ; Burge ; Foley Anti-reductionism holds that testimony is itself a basic source of evidence or justifiedness. No matter how little positive evidence a hearer has about the reliability and sincerity of a given speaker, or of speakers in general, she has default or prima facie warrant in believing what the speaker says. This thesis is endorsed, for example, by Tyler Burge, who writes: Since this negative requirement is extremely weak, many anti-reductionists add an additional requirement, i. However, Jennifer Lackey Suppose Sam sees an alien creature in the woods drop something that seems to be a diary, written in a language that appears to be English. Intuitively, however, this is dubious. Reductionism and anti-reductionism both assume that testimonial beliefs can be justified because testimony provides evidence for the truth of what is asserted. Proponents of the assurance or interpersonal view of testimony Ross ; Hinchman ; Moran ; Faulkner ; Fricker ; Zagzebski reject this assumption. On their view, testimonial beliefs are justified not or not only because testimony is evidence, but because testimony is assurance. More precisely, testimonial justification has its roots in the fact that the speaker takes responsibility for the truth of her assertion Moran or invites the hearer to trust her Hinchman The assurance view is motivated by the following line of argument. If all that matters for testimonial justification is that the speaker be a reliable indicator of the truth, the fact that she is inviting us to trust her should be epistemically superfluous.

2: Philip R. Olson | College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences | Virginia Tech

*Social Epistemology (SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY) [Steve Fuller] on www.enganchecubano.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers.*

SERRC is the digital side of the journal *Social Epistemology*, encouraging dialogue on published articles, reviews and roundtables on new books exploring the social and political dimensions of knowledge from a variety of disciplines and schools of thought. SERRC is also an independent platform for original research, scholarship, commentary, and judgment on issues related to knowledge, culture, and policy. Our digital platform looks well beyond the academic disciplinary boundaries of social epistemology per se, to explore new research and concepts about many aspects of social knowledge production. Check out the full history of our posts with the Blogroll above. A list of our most recent posts is on the right side of the page. All our different long-running and one-off projects can be found through our other menu options above. We are proudly open-access, and encourage innovation in affordable platforms to spread the latest knowledge and research through the public. Our disciplinary backgrounds include philosophy, sociology, history, business administration, literature to science and technology studies, biology and psychology. The online platform is currently maintained and edited by Adam Riggio. Our book review editor is Eric Kerr. Our Aims SERRC is a platform of intellectual exchange concerning themes that are central to social epistemology as an academic discipline and as a trans-disciplinary inquiry into issues of knowledge, society, politics, economics, ecology, and technology. As a digital, open-access platform, SERRC allows for a response to current issues in disciplinary research and in the wider public square that is both thoughtful and fast enough to keep pace with the contemporary world. SERRC forms a complex, interdependent assemblage with the journal *Social Epistemology*, developing new formats for academic and intellectual publications that remix and re-imagine the public value, reception, and purpose of scholarship and research. We open to written contributions such as articles, short essays, book reviews, comments, meta-critiques, and aphorisms, and also encourage visual formats such as films, images, and audio. **Reviewing** We either individually or collectively review contemporary books and classics that are of interest to social epistemology. **Replying** Our online platform serves as a space of engaging with current events and themes that are relevant to social epistemology. As our online platform allows for faster responses than traditional journals, we are particularly interested in promoting shorter contributions. Moreover, the platform seeks to foster a meta-critical discussion of the journal *Social Epistemology* with replies to articles, a look at a particular topic addressed in the journal over time, blog postings on subjects and issues, replies from past authors and critical responses, commentaries and syntheses. In this sense, the platform can also serve as a space for discussion of upcoming journal ideas or themes. A Collective Experiment in the Making Collective work and academic exchange are often presented as ideal scenarios in knowledge work. However, as our own experience has shown us so far, working as a collective is by no means a straightforward and easy process. Being based in different parts of the world—“with many of us never having met in person”—developing a collective dialogue is an even more challenging endeavour. We would like to revisit our process of developing as a collective in a reflexive mode. Taking our own experience as a point of departure, one idea so far was to pay increased attention to the relationship between conditions of work at universities and knowledge work. If you would like to be part of our collective, or if you would like to contribute scholarship, commentary or judgment on issues related to knowledge, culture and policy, please get in touch with Adam Riggio via email , at Facebook, and at ReplyCollective.

**3: Social Epistemology - Bibliography - PhilPapers**

*Social Epistemology as the Goal of All Epistemology* You should now have a rough sense of the conceptual location of social epistemology. who. it would seem that "social epistemology" has become an [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com) theory of knowledge. time. invoked this assumption when he exempted mathematics and the natural sciences from his field of inquiry.

History[ edit ] The consideration of social dimensions of knowledge in relation to philosophy started in B. As the exploration of a dependence on authoritative figures constitutes a part of the study of social epistemology, it confirms the existence of the ideology in minds long before it was given its label. It was not until the s that there was a powerful growth of interest amongst philosophers in topics such as epistemic value of testimony, the nature and function of expertise, proper distribution of cognitive labor and resources among individuals in the communities and the status of group reasoning and knowledge. The rise of social epistemology[ edit ] The term "social epistemology" was firstly used by the library scientists Margaret Egan and Jesse Shera in the s. Steven Shapin also used it in However, it was not until the late s that its current sense began to emerge. In , the philosophical journal *Synthese* published a special issue on social epistemology which included two authors that have since taken the branch of epistemology in two divergent directions: Alvin Goldman and Steve Fuller. A journal of knowledge, culture, and policy in and published his first book, *Social Epistemology*, in Goldman advocates for a type of epistemology which is sometimes called "veritistic epistemology" because of its large emphasis on truth. Goldman looks into one of the two strategies of the socialization of epistemology. This strategy includes the evaluation of social factors that impact knowledge formed on true belief. In contrast, Fuller takes preference for the second strategy that defines knowledge influenced by social factors as collectively accepted belief. The difference between the two can be simplified with exemplars e. As for the "analytic social epistemology", to which Goldman has been a significant contributor, Fuller concludes that it has "failed to make significant progress owing, in part, to a minimal understanding of actual knowledge practices, a minimised role for philosophers in ongoing inquiry, and a focus on maintaining the status quo of epistemology as a field. Both brought historical concerns directly to bear on problems long associated with the philosophy of science. Perhaps the most notable issue here was the nature of truth , which both Kuhn and Foucault described as a relative and contingent notion. On this background, ongoing work in the sociology of scientific knowledge SSK and the history and philosophy of science HPS was able to assert its epistemological consequences, leading most notably to the establishment of the strong programme at the University of Edinburgh. In terms of the two strands of social epistemology, Fuller is more sensitive and receptive to this historical trajectory if not always in agreement than Goldman, whose "veritistic" social epistemology can be reasonably read as a systematic rejection of the more extreme claims associated with Kuhn and Foucault. Social epistemology as a field within analytic philosophy[ edit ] As a field within analytic philosophy , social epistemology foregrounds the social aspects of knowledge creation and dissemination. What precisely these social aspects are, and whether they have beneficial or detrimental effects upon the possibilities to create, acquire and spread knowledge is a subject of continuous debate. Within the field, "the social" is approached in two complementary and not mutually exclusive ways: The inter-individual approach typically focuses on issues such as testimony , epistemic trust as a form of trust placed by one individual in another, epistemic dependence, epistemic authority, etc. The community approach typically focuses on issues such as community standards of justification, community procedures of critique, diversity, epistemic justice, and collective knowledge. While parts of the field engage in abstract, normative considerations of knowledge creation and dissemination, other parts of the field are "naturalized epistemology" in the sense that they draw on empirically gained insights which could mean natural science research from, e. For the notion of "naturalized epistemology" see Willard Van Orman Quine. And while parts of the field are concerned with analytic considerations of rather general character, case-based and domain-specific inquiries in, e. Important academic journals for social epistemology as a field within analytic philosophy are, e. However, major works within this field are also published in journals that predominantly address philosophers of science and psychology or in

interdisciplinary journals which focus on particular domains of inquiry such as, e. Major philosophers who influenced social epistemology[ edit ].

## 4: Links Â« Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective

*SERRC is a platform of intellectual exchange concerning themes that are central to social epistemology as an academic discipline and as a trans-disciplinary inquiry into issues of knowledge, society, politics, economics, ecology, and technology.*

Research Wolfe Chair of Scientific and Technological Literacy Carla Fehr works in the areas of socially relevant philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, and feminist epistemology. Her research examines the social nature of scientific research. Simply put, she argues that diversity promotes excellence. Scientific communities that include members from a diversity of social and material locations, and members who hold different theoretical perspectives, facilitate research that is more creative, more rigorous, and better able to meet the needs of a wide range of publics and policy makers, than homogeneous scientific communities. This means that research communities ought to value diversity not only for ethical and political reasons, but also because it makes our science better. She is also interested in exploring ways to foster this diversity. She conducts research in feminist philosophy of biology, in which she develops critiques of biological accounts of sex differences in human cognition and in the division of labour. Understanding this sex difference research is particularly important because it has frequently been used to justify the relative absence of women in science and technology careers. She works in the epistemology of ignorance, exploring why smart people of goodwill resist acknowledging the how race, gender and other social categories structure both our knowledge producing institutions and the knowledge that we produce in those institutions. This work is highly interdisciplinary, drawing on research in sociology and psychology. These implications range from equitably setting national research priorities, to creating a positive culture in academic professional organizations, to developing and implementing university policies that promote the recruitment and retention of a diverse faculty, to the development of departmental climates in which all faculty members are enabled to do their best work. Fehr frequently consults on climate issues and flexible career policies within the academy. This program is a resource for philosophy departments across the USA and Canada who would like to improve the climate for women philosophers. Examination of these areas sharpens our general understanding of the nature of science. For example, I have argued that the value-free ideal for science is an inadequate ideal, for both epistemic and moral reasons arising from the importance of science for policy-making. Articulating an alternative ideal is a central part of my recent book. Because values are important to the process of science, new roles for the public in that process become apparent. I also work on the moral responsibilities of scientists with respect to their work, how to understand scientific integrity, and how the institutional structures of science help or hinder scientists in doing their work with integrity and responsibility. In addition, I work on how to combine or weigh evidence from multiple disciplinary perspectives, which has implications for scientific reasoning generally. Finally, I have an ongoing interest in the history of philosophy of science, particularly how the discipline of philosophy of science emerged in the mid-century from the logical empiricist movements of the early 20th century, and how that emergence has shaped the field. Science and Technology in Society Teaching Group Interested in how science, technology, and society interact? Find out more information about the Science and Technology in Society Teaching Group professors and the undergraduate courses they teach at the University of Waterloo. Feminism and Science Research Group In the Feminism and Science Research Group we conduct research that is unified by attention to justice and the social nature of scientific, technological and medical research. We are interested in research policy, practice, education and implementation.

## 5: STS Program » About » What is STS?

*The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision sets an agenda for exploring the future of what we - human beings reimagining our selves and our society - want, need and ought to know. The book examines, concretely, practically and speculatively, key ideas such as the public conduct of.*

Info Martin Kusch Social epistemology is the philosophical study of the relevance of communities to knowledge. Social epistemology can be done descriptively or normatively. It is part of the descriptive project, for instance, to clarify whether a social isolate like Robinson Crusoe could have knowledge. It is central to the normative project to define how groups should be organised for them to produce knowledge most reliably and effectively. Most social epistemologists recognise that social epistemology is closely related to the sociology of knowledge. But different authors conceive differently of this relation. Some suggest that the sociology of knowledge is a purely descriptive and empirical enterprise, whereas social epistemology is purely conceptual, and, at least in part, a normative endeavour. Other social epistemologists see the two fields as inseparable. One can conceive of social epistemology more broadly and more narrowly. In the latter case one counts as social epistemologists only those authors who apply the label to themselves. In the former case one includes among social epistemologists all those writers that fall under the above definition. On this view, most feminist epistemologists, many philosophers of science, and many historical figures like Hume! I shall concentrate here mostly on self-proclaimed social epistemologists. Social epistemology is a relatively recent addition to philosophy. It is an exciting field for many reasons. Its problems and theories are still fresh and in rapid movement. A solid contribution to this field has a good chance of shaping its future. It is also an interdisciplinary project. Social epistemologists routinely use the results of psychologists, sociologists, economists, and historians. The best starting point is: To date the most interesting work in social epistemology has been done on the role of trust and testimony in knowledge. A Philosophical Study, Oxford: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: The two most important and direct contributions to social epistemology by the sociology of knowledge are: Good starting points for feminist social epistemology are: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Essays on Gendered Locations, London: The most prolific writer on social epistemology " and the editor of the journal by that name " is S. His views are not, however, representative of the field. I find some of his writings a bit obscure. University of Minnesota Press, Alvin Goldman has been a key writer in epistemology for a long time. His forthcoming book on social epistemology will undoubtedly be the focal point of debates around social epistemology for some time: Important work on the concept of collective belief has been done by M. Some important related contributions from other fields are: An excellent review of this latter field is Zagzebski ; Kvanvig emphasises the social aspects of cognitive virtues.

## 6: The Future of Social Epistemology | Rowman & Littlefield International

*Social epistemology refers to a broad set of approaches that can be taken in the study of knowledge that construes human knowledge as a collective achievement. Another way of characterizing social epistemology is as the evaluation of the social dimensions of knowledge or information.*

## 7: Social epistemology | Research guide | HPS

*Post-Kuhnian sociology of science (a tradition often called "social studies of science" or "science and technology studies") departs largely from the concerns and convictions of traditional epistemology and philosophy of science by rejecting the classical epistemological notions of objective truth, justification and knowledge, and/or by.*

## 8: Social Epistemology & Technology | Frank Scalabrino - [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*Social Epistemology and Technology provides insights into such questions relating to public self-awareness regarding*

*www.enganchecubano.com* concerns addressed in this book apply to a large and diverse audience including, but not limited to, those interested in social epistemology, technology, cultural studies, trans-humanism, augmented subjectivity.

### 9: Science, Technology, and Society < Brown University

*Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy* is a bimonthly peer-reviewed academic journal. *www.enganchecubano.com* was established in and is published by Routledge in collaboration with the Society for Social Studies of Science and the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology.

*Barlow, R. H. The tomb of the god. Lifeskills For Basic Workplace Communication Skills Mastery Workbook Combing Floridas Shores Ragged Lady, Part 2 Markets and networks : pure paradigm and effect Poems for All Occasions Adf developer guide 11.1.1.6 The National Road and the difficult path to sustainable national investment Changes in You for Girls 2nd grade fraction worksheets Third semester: learning about how to work in-between: legal and illegal realms Sparrowhawk Companion 1983-84 miscellaneous tax bills, III, S. 562 and S. 1161 Mountain Bike! San Francisco and the Bay Area Using frameworks in historical research Joy Buck An international affair Bmc remedy developer studio guide Smart insurance reform School management Hay Day country market cookbook The economic recovery program Liquid chromatography Culture of sensibility America : one nation under God Capitalization theory and techniques A historians final mission. Corporate finance 3rd european edition Address to the freemen of Kentucky Physics and the art of dance understanding movement Interpersonal messages 4th devito j 300 070 ciptv1 book Obviation in Romance The scythe hand, or, The homestead Marriage and sacrament Basketball academy business plan German Trade Mark Act and regulation of January 1, 1995 Community development corporations and welfare reform Hypothesis testing II : the two-sample case Forms I advocate for management and resolution of disputes People with epilepsy*