

## 1: Thailand Islamic Insurgency

*The South Thailand insurgency (Thai: Pemberontakan di Selatan Thailand) is an ongoing conflict centered in southern Thailand.*

Pemberontakan di Selatan Thailand is an ongoing conflict centered in southern Thailand. It originated in [10] as an ethnic and religious separatist insurgency in the historical Malay Patani Region , made up of the three southernmost provinces of Thailand and parts of a fourth, but has become more complex and increasingly violent since . Although low-level separatist violence had occurred in the region for decades, the campaign escalated after , with a recrudescence in , and has occasionally spilled over into other provinces. On 19 September , a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup. However, these groups have been largely sidelined by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional -Koordinasi BRN-C , the group currently spearheading the insurgency. It sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other insurgent groups. The BRN-C has as its immediate aim to make southern Thailand ungovernable and it has largely been successful. In General Pallop Pinmanee claimed that there were only hardcore jihadists. Other estimates say there as many as 15, armed insurgents. Around some Thai analysts believed that foreign Islamic terrorist groups were infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict. Over 6, people died and almost 12, were injured between and in a formerly ethnic separatist insurgency, which has currently been taken over by hard-line jihadis and pitted them against both the Thai-speaking Buddhist minority and local Muslims who have a moderate approach or who support the Thai government. Historical background Despite the ethnic affinity of the people of the Patani region with their Malay neighbours to the south, the old Patani Kingdom was led by sultans who historically preferred to pay tribute to the distant Siamese kings in Bangkok. For many centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas , ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgement of Siamese suzerainty , leaving the Patani rulers largely alone. Until well into the 20th century, the government in Bangkok had interfered little locally, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local Islamic laws regarding issues on inheritance and family. However, by Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Patani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand. Its "Mandate 3" was directly aimed at the Patani people. Traditional Muslim courts that formerly handled civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok. This forced assimilation process and the perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society were irritants to the ethnic Malay Patani. Sulong was released from jail in , then disappeared under mysterious circumstances in . Inspired by ideologies such as Nasserism , in the s a Patani nationalist movement began to grow, leading to the south Thailand insurgency. The emphasis was laid in pursuing an armed struggle towards an independent state where Patani people could live with dignity without having alien cultural values imposed on them. Despite some differences in ideology they shared broadly separatist aims, but all justified the use of violence to reach their goals, setting a pattern of attacking police and military posts, as well as schools and Thai government offices. The effectiveness of these groups was marred, however, by infighting and lack of unity among them. The violence expands and intensifies A resurgence in violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began after . This new development disoriented and confused the Thai authorities, who kept groping in the dark as the identity of the new insurgents in the conflict remained a mystery. Thailand held relatively free elections in February , but no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. In July the same year, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee admitted, "The attacks look like they are well-organised, but we do not know what group of people is behind them. Other tactics used to gain publicity from shock and horror are slashing to death Buddhist monks, bombing temples, beheadings , intimidating pork vendors and their customers, as well

as arson attacks on schools, killing the teachers “mostly female” and burning their bodies. Mostly led by Salafist hardliners, they have extreme and transnational religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of a constructive cultural or nationalistic Patani identity. Salafi jihadist groups are hostile to the cultural heritage and practices of traditional Malay Muslims, accusing them of being un-Islamic. Instead their immediate aim is to make the Patani region ungovernable. Many local policemen are allegedly involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. Often the army responds to the attacks with heavy-handed raids to search Muslim villages, which only results in reprisals. Insurgents routinely provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace. Main incidents after the insurgency upsurge Attacks after concentrated on installations of the police and military. Schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region have been subject to arson and bombing as well. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 incidents related to the insurgency in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat by the end of . When the insurgents make a show of strength “generally at least every few months” they have eschewed large-scale attacks, preferring well-coordinated pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces. Martial law was instituted in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in January . Violence, however, has escalated. Many young militants received training and indoctrination from Islamic teachers, some of which took place within Islamic educational institutions. By the late s, Muslims were holding unprecedented senior posts in Thai politics. For example, Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, a Malay Muslim from Yala, served as chairman of parliament from to under the Democrats and later as interior minister during the first Thaksin government. Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies in the border provinces, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom. The Thaksin regime, however, began to dismantle the southern administration organisation, replacing it with a notoriously corrupt police force which immediately began widespread crackdowns. Consultation with local community leaders was also abolished. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during and . Muslim politicians and leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, thus eroding their political legitimacy and support. This cost them dearly. In the general election, all but one of the eleven incumbent Muslim MPs who stood for election were voted out of office. Between and , the average per capita income of Pattani grew from 9, baht to 57, baht, while that of Yala and Narathiwat increased from 14, baht and 10, baht to 52, baht and 38, baht, respectively. Impressive as these gains are, the border provinces did have the lowest average income among all the southern provinces. Also, the national average is well below the estimated average needed to be considered an acceptable minimum wage by international organisations for Southeast Asia. Household income improved from to by . For comparison, income growth for all of Thailand in the same period was just 9. By , the three provinces had , people living below the poverty line, compared to , in . Government schools are taught only in Thai and the secular educational system is being undermined by the destruction of schools and the murders of teachers by the insurgent groups. Jobs in the Thai public sector are difficult to obtain for those Muslims who never fully accepted the Thai language or the Thai education system. Insurgent attacks on economic targets further reduce employment opportunities for both Muslims and Buddhists in the provinces. PULO, the doyen of the Patani insurgent groups and formerly the most respected secessionist movement in the region, has been largely inactive in recent years. It was revived after and its leaders are mainly Salafi religious teachers who have rejected the Pan-Arab socialist ideology of the early BRN, engaging in political activism by recruiting followers in mosques and indoctrinating at Islamic schools. This group has the vision of becoming a mass movement, aiming towards having , members in its area of operation. The BRN-C has no constructive cultural or nationalistic goals; instead its immediate aim is to make southern Thailand ungovernable. It has been largely successful at spreading and maintaining an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty through well-trained secret militant units that engage in assassinations and calculated destruction. It is composed of young, mostly Salafi, militants who routinely flee to Malaysia after carrying out violent attacks, including bombings, arson, and murders in Yala, Pattani, or Narathiwat Province. Its priority was freeing Pattani from Thai rule by all

means, including armed struggle. Salafism has heavily eroded Patani cultural identity and current insurgent groups have extreme religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of Patani nationalism. The agreement included a section in which they agreed to form a unified military force, the Patani Liberation Army PLA. After a tense seven-hour stand-off, Pallop ordered an all-out assault on the mosque. All of the gunmen were killed. He later insisted, "I had no choice. I was afraid that as time passed the crowd would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them". A government investigative commission found that the security forces had over-reacted. The Asian Centre for Human Rights questioned the independence and impartiality of the investigative commission. On 3 May during a senate hearing, Senator Kraissak Choonhavan noted that most of those killed at Krue Se Mosque had been shot in the head and there were signs that ropes had been tied around their wrists, suggesting they had been executed after being captured. Six local men were arrested for having supplied weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organised to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used tear gas and water cannons on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to the Ingkayutthaboriharn army camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination five hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had died of suffocation. Thaksin, however, gave the army his full support. Those responsible for the ill-treatment and death of the detainees received the most minor of non-custodial punishments. As police and the army stormed the building, militants holed up inside opened fire, killing Sgt Maj Pongsathorn Niraphai of the Bannang Sata police station and Sergeant Major 3rd Class Sangsun Kalong, 39, a soldier. The incident, which also wounded 12 people was considered as one of the worst attacks in 5 years. In May, Wan Kadir Che Man, exiled leader of Bersatu and for years one of the key symbolic figures in the guerrilla movement, stated that he would be willing to negotiate with the government to end the southern violence. He also hinted that Bersatu would be willing to soften its previous demands for an independent state. However, the government response was severely criticised as being "knee-jerk" and "just looking to score cheap political points. He claimed that he would take a "new and effective" approach to a crisis and that "The Army is informed [of who the insurgents are] and will carry out their duties. The identity of the insurgents was not revealed. Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat unrest in the far south. A fierce critic of the Thaksin -government, Anand frequently criticised the handling of southern unrest, and in particular the State of Emergency Decree. He has been quoted to have said, "The authorities have worked inefficiently. They have arrested innocent people instead of the real culprits, leading to mistrust among locals. So, giving them broader power may lead to increased violence and eventually a real crisis". The country is Thai and the language is Thai

### 2: Project MUSE - Thailand's Southern Insurgency

*Southern Insurgents. 2 likes. A Small Riding Group looking for Prospects to earn a part in a brotherhood. Obey the rules, earn the respect and give the.*

Recent violence has created new uncertainties about whether the peace talks will lead to progress. But a series of bombings and arsons hit several south-central Thai beach resorts, including in the town of Hua Hin, just kilometers south of Bangkok. Four people died and more than 30 were injured in the August 12 attacks. Until the August 12 bombings, it appeared most insurgent groups wanted to negotiate. Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan told local media the government would not make any peace deals as long as violence persisted. The insurgency in the largely Muslim-populated region, in its 12th year, had claimed over 6, lives, defying official efforts to end the bloodshed. The insurgency seeks greater regional autonomy from the Thai state, which the central government has consistently rejected. The most frequent targets of insurgent attacks are ethnic Thai Buddhists and ethnic Malay Muslims in the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala. Brutal attacks on teachers and state officials by insurgents have led to accusations of extra judicial killings by authorities, perpetuating a cycle of violence. The military leaders also hoped to restart peace talks with insurgents. Civilian organizations would come under the military command. Peace talks under the former civilian government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, collapsed in and there was no fresh date set for them to recommence. The remaining Muslims were Pakistani immigrants in the urban centers, ethnic Thai in the rural areas of the Center, and a few Chinese Muslims in the far north. Education and maintenance of their own cultural traditions were vital interests of these groups. Except in the small circle of theologically trained believers, the Islamic faith in Thailand, like Buddhism, had become integrated with many beliefs and practices not integral to Islam. It would be difficult to draw a line between animistic practices indigenous to Malay culture that were used to drive off evil spirits and local Islamic ceremonies because each contained aspects of the other. In the mids, the country had more than 2, mosques in 38 Thai provinces, with the largest number in Narathiwat Province. All but a very small number of the mosques were associated with the Sunni branch of Islam. The remainder were of the Shia branch. Each mosque had an imam prayer leader , a muezzin who issued the call to prayer , and perhaps other functionaries. Following World War II, local Malaysian communists, nearly all Chinese, launched a long, bitter insurgency, prompting the imposition of a state of emergency in , which was eventually lifted in . Small bands of guerrillas remained in bases along the rugged border with southern Thailand, occasionally entering northern Malaysia. These guerrillas finally signed a peace accord with the Malaysian Government in December . In the past, the Muslim separatist groups in southern Thailand, as well as the Communist Party of Thailand, dabbled in drug trafficking to raise funds to support their political and operational objectives. As of there was little if any data linking indigenous terrorists to drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. The Communist Party had not been a viable organization in Thailand for years, and the Muslim separatist movement had fractured into a number of organizations known more for their banditry than their political activities. Drug trafficking did not, therefore, contribute to any significant terrorism on the part of these organizations. In fact, there were no credible reports of any terrorist groups either being based in or conducting terrorist activity within the Kingdom of Thailand. The 4-province area in the southern-most part of Thailand, which was populated mainly by Muslim Thais, had not been completely pacified. There were still some small groups of Islamic radical, which sometimes resorted to violent tactics in order to make their presence felt, were still posing problems to public safety in the south. The crack down following the 11 September attacks in the United States on terrorist organizations with connections to international terrorist groups like Al-Queda, was seen as having the potential to spill over into this sensitive area. The possibility of local Islamic radical groups in the south giving sanctuary or staging location for future attack to fellow neighboring or international factions could be totally discounted. It had been a concern among Thai and friendly countries. Authorities had known for quite some time that many Muslim Thai activists went overseas to Islamic schools, where they came under influence of hard-line teachers. Some were reported to have joined the jihad against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Thailand as extremists. There

were also some Tamil Tigers in the Phuket area of southern Thailand reportedly involved in heroin smuggling. In addition, they were believed to have purchased weapons for transport to Sri Lanka to support their separatist activities there. The drug proceeds could have been used to purchase any weapons actually acquired. There were 5 main Islamic insurgent groups that had appeared throughout the 20th century that contributed to the attacks in Thailand. The original BRN was established in as a leftist organization advocating Islamic socialism, but later split in the s into 3 politically more moderate factions: BRN-Coordinated maintained a number of underground cells, which were known as Runda Kumpulan Kecil, or "small patrol groups. This group was considered the first organized armed resistance group. It was reorganized in , but traced its origin to a local revolt which took place in in Narathiwat province. It was quite active in the s and early s, but had become defunct. In the early s, it operated mainly from exile in Syria, where Tengku Bira lived, and Sweden, where its foreign affairs department was located. The group split for a while into "old" and "new" factions, but was believed to have been reunited. Exiles in Sweden maintained a number of websites that carried news from the region as well as political statements. It was, however, uncertain how much remained of the KMM following a massive crackdown by Malaysian authorities in . The last main insurgent group was called the United Front for the Independence of Patani. This group was more commonly known as "Bersatu", which meant "united" in the Malay language. It was formed in from 4 smaller groups: Bersatu was believed to be defunct or to have been replaced by a less formal arrangement between currently active groups. Pemuda meant "youth" in Malay and had been adopted as the name of a youth movement closely associated with BRN-Coordinate. However, Pemuda members rarely, if ever, had access to firearms, but rather assisted the BRN-Coordinate with logistical support and intelligence gathering, and occasionally sprayed separatist slogans on walls or took part in arson attacks. Other, smaller groups also existed, but it was difficult to ascertain whether the abundance of insurgent organizations reflected actual factionalism and divergent agendas or just a division of labor in the struggle for a common goal. Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. During , authorities responded with military force and legal action to separatist activity in the south. Authorities claimed that he was responsible for 90 percent of the terrorist activities in Narathiwat, a southern Thai province. The case was still pending before the court at the end of . Authorities suspected Muslim separatists conducted several small-scale attacks on public schools, a government-run clinic, and a police station in the south. In , the Thai government officially recognized attacks in Thailand as terrorist acts performed by the various insurgent groups that were in the country. Massive killings occurred throughout the mid to late s and as of , nearly 4, people had been killed due to insurgent violence.

### 3: Explainer: Thailand's deadly southern insurgency - CNN

*"Southern Insurgency is the first book to theorize and examine the present and future shape of global class struggles. Analytically brilliant and empirically sound, it is a must-read for all who wish to grasp and understand the emerging working class in India, China, and South Africa.*

Email In this undated family photo, Sapae-ing Basor, the spiritual leader of many Muslims in insurgency-torn southern Thailand, poses for a photo. Sapae-ing Basor, died at 81 in self-imposed exile in Malaysia Jan. But when the spiritual leader of many Muslims in insurgency-torn southern Thailand died at 81 in self-imposed exile in Malaysia Jan. Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha expressed his condolences. Several separatist groups are active in the three provinces closest to the Malaysian border, and Sapae-ing was associated with the most powerful, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional or BRN. Malay Muslims who make up the majority in of the three provinces have resented what they see as an imposition of Buddhist culture for decades. After a nationalist military junta seized power in , Thailand passed the "National Culture Act" to press a uniform culture on the country. Lessons taught in local Jawi script were switched to Thai, and Muslim courts were replaced by civil courts, sparking resistance. Sapae-ing was educated in local Islamic schools before departing for Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to study Islamic law in After his return, he swiftly established himself as a charismatic theologian with a potent authority. He became headmaster at Thamma Witthaya, a prominent Islamic school. He "was not only leader of his family, but was also the leader of a family of tens of thousands," the school said in a statement. Violence waned in the s, as Thailand allowed limited cultural rights. In the early s, attacks escalated dramatically, led by the BRN. Sapae-ing was senior in the BRN but his official role in the organization is unclear. Don Pathan, a southern Thailand security analyst, said that although was little proof Sapae-ing was involved organizing day-to-day fighting, he served as a "one-man religious police. Sapae-ing urged southerners to hold fast to their Malay Muslim identity and values while decrying the Thai government as a corrupting influence. An army roundup on a single October day left 85 protesters dead; seven were shot to death and the rest suffocated in overcrowded trucks taking them away to be detained. Police suspected Thamma Witthaya to be a "hotbed of recruitment for the militants. Don said that although Sapae-ing said little publicly after leaving Thailand, he remained an influential figure in the south. Jaded, he balked but eventually sent representatives calling for greater autonomy instead of outright independence, a reconciliatory step that took insurgents by surprise. But he refused to meet Thai officials and talks went nowhere. His death comes as new rounds of peace talks are underway. But the BRN has opted out and few think things will change. Just wait and see.

## 4: South Thailand insurgency

*Southern insurgents have attacked the house of a policeman in Pattani's Nong Chik district with assault rifles and a molotov cocktails late last night. Police say it's lucky that no one was injured in the attack.*

However, mid-way through the 12th year of this struggle, recent incidents suggest growing restlessness on the part of the Muslim Malay rebels after a historically unprecedented lull in the violence since August. On June 3, four soldiers died in two separate attacks, including an ambush. Some two weeks earlier, insurgents set off a wave of nearly 20 bombs that injured. A month earlier, in mid-May, a car bomb exploded in an underground parking lot of an upscale mall on the resort island of Samui, in the first out-of-area operation by insurgents since December; luckily only seven were wounded. Neither is it without human tragedy, with the body count now estimated to have hit 6. Fears that the insurgency may be swept up in the wave of extremism sweeping through the Islamic world remain overblown, however. The roots of the violence in Southern Thailand are ethno-political in nature rather than primarily sectarian. Despite the arrests of over Malaysians for supporting the Islamic State, and the estimated Southeast Asians who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the fight, there is no evidence of any support or recruitment in southern Thailand. This article examines the roots of the conflict, before explaining the recent flare up of violence.

**Background** The insurgency in southern Thailand has been intractable since violence erupted in. Four elected governments and two military-installed regimes have come no closer to resolving the conflict and it remains the single most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia, with nearly 6,000 dead and 11,000 wounded. Violence peaked in mid-2008, when nearly three people a day were being killed. The insurgents overplayed their hand, however, and the RTA was goaded into action. Today, more than 60,000 security forces are deployed in the south, an area roughly the size of Connecticut. Violence declined in 2009, but stabilized between 2009 and 2011, averaging 86 casualties per month. Between June 2011 and May 2012, the average number of casualties fell to 51 per month. The average number of people killed has fallen from 31 per month in 2008 to 17 since the coup. The reduction in violence has been a source of pride and accomplishment for the junta that has been grasping at any accomplishment to legitimize its rule. Insurgents interviewed by the author in October 2011 and February 2012 acknowledged the changing environment. They cited as causes both fierce flooding in December 2011 and January 2012, but also that arrests were taking a toll on the movement. They also reported a palpable fear of the security forces, which even under democratic leadership had operated with near total impunity in the south under the Emergency Decree. Government promises to end the insurgency by also have created a sense that the junta was willing to give the security forces more scope to control the insurgency. Poorly trained rangers and Ministry of Interior troops are ill equipped to take on kinetic operations. Rebels Return Casualties, which hit a low of 24 in December 2011, have stormed back. March, April, and May showed consecutive increases in violence with casualties jumping from just 27 in February to 80 in May, well above the average since January and February saw 12 shootings combined; the three months following averaged. IED attacks also moved higher than long-term averages. In May, 33 IEDs exploded while another 17 were defused before they detonated, for a total of 50 bombs; the average since January is. The May attacks may also mark a shift in tactics. This is both because the security forces, who were at greatest risk in such attacks, are widely seen as legitimate targets, and because the urban areas in the south are so heavily defended with checkpoints and monitored with near ubiquitous CCTVs[5] that launching attacks in cities is much riskier. The additional difficulties posed by staging attacks in built-up areas, as well as the potential for collateral damage among the Muslim community, indicates that the insurgents may have additional goals beyond discrediting the government. When insurgents do stage major bombings in cities, it has usually also been intended to communicate messages about the campaign and to win further support. For example, on February 20, 2012, insurgents detonated a car bomb in Narathiwat. The target and timing were very specific: The bomb exploded in the middle of the day when bar traffic was minimal, rather than at night when the casualties would have been far higher. While 17 people were wounded and more than 40 buildings were damaged, the insurgents clearly intended to minimize the loss of life and signal their military capabilities.

**A Focused Strategy** The attack on Narathiwat, though, was atypical and for the most part, the militants instead concentrate on

retaliatory attacks with a far more focused use of violence than in the past. But when we hit, we hit hard. It was thought to be a revenge attack for a February 3 extra-judicial killing of a suspected insurgent who had recently been acquitted. Starting in February, the insurgents had entered into peace talks with the democratically-elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra. The rebels appeared to be negotiating in good faith, though at times they seemed amateurish, for example, by making post-facto demands. In reality, the talks had stalled long before because of Thai army opposition to any concessions that the government might make and increased targeting of the insurgents by security forces. In the year since the coup, the junta has seemed insincere about its desire to negotiate with several calls for talks to resume failing to result in any advances. For example, the team that approached Malaysia for assistance in bringing the insurgents to the table is headed by Gen. Aksara Kerdphol, a confidante of Gen. Prayut and anathema to at least one of the rebel groups. Few concessions are being considered by the Thai government. The insurgents meanwhile are trying to show that they can still attack at will. Recent targeting suggests that the insurgents are trying to force the military government back to the table. In March and April, security forces made up 26 and 27 percent of the total casualties respectively, but that jumped to 54 percent in May. At the same time, the rebels are increasing their attacks in the heavily defended cities. The targeting of security forces continued in early June, with four soldiers gunned down in an ambush, and eight wounded by a car bomb as their truck passed by. In , there were none, and six in Another gruesome tactic, beheading, has not been used by the rebels since March Thai leaders seem convinced that with the decline of violence following the coup, they could enter into peace talks from a position of strength, perhaps with only nominal concessions. It is evident that they were taking a tactical pause, and are now seeking to again show the government that the only path to ending the insurgency is through a negotiated political solution. That fear remains overblown. Other than a handful of training manuals downloaded from the Internet, there have been few proven links to any international movement, including Jemaah Islamiyah or the Islamic State. The roots of this fight are cultural and sociological, and are very much rooted in religion and language. Thai officials are frustrated that the year project to assimilate the Malays has failed, unlike every other minority group. Thai authorities have expressed concern about the influence of the Islamic State, including after recent arrests in Malaysia, but the concerns are driven more by ignorance than reality. Although the Salafi presence in southern Thailand is growing, they are at odds with the Malay nationalists, and in many ways share many of the same prejudices toward them as demonstrated by the institutions of the Thai state. A great concern to Thai security forces is that young university students are starting to be drawn to Islamic State propaganda. Some insurgents seem to share this perspective. The Koh Samui bombing is thought to be the work of Ubaidillah Rommuhli. Rommuhli was responsible for the March bombing of the Lee Gardens Hotel in the commercial center of Hat Yai that wounded more than The operation was not sanctioned by the insurgent leadership. Indeed, one insurgent told me that most of the leadership had determined that such attacks would only be authorized as a last resort, as they would be too counter-productive. But more hard-line commanders may be insisting that similar types of operations are necessary to take the insurgency to the next level or force the Thai side to talks. Yet it is doubtful that hard-line militants such as Rommuhli will be able to win support because the risks are so much greater, and such tactics would run counter to what to date has been a very conservative and cautious insurgency. Also, the insurgency has limited resources and areas to operate from, and it is fighting a large and well-funded state security apparatus. Conclusion With violence largely contained to the three southernmost provinces, and only one Westerner killed since , the insurgency remains a low priority for both the military government in Bangkok and the international community, despite the violence ongoing in the heart of Southeast Asia. Yet the Thai government has neither the capabilities to defeat the insurgency nor the political will to end it. The insurgents have limited resources and are operating in a very hostile environment. As such, the violence will likely remain subdued. To many in the insurgency, this is an adequate and appropriate level needed to force concessions. Of course, frustrations are building among some insurgents given there is little expectation the government will give any ground despite new murmurs about peace talks and there are signs that some rebels may change tactics, and start targeting tourists on a more regular basis. There are few internal checks on cells pursuing more aggressive tactics and despite the inherent risks in such a strategy, some insurgents may believe

they are worth it given that the smoldering low intensity struggle of the past decade has raised awareness of Malay demands, but has not achieved them. He has a forthcoming monograph on the Thai insurgency due for publication by the National Defense University Press. The numbers are conservative; not every incident is reported in the press and there is little follow up; many wounded later die.

**5: Thailand: Insurgents Bomb Southern Mall | Human Rights Watch**

*The insurgency in southern Thailand has been intractable since violence erupted in four elected governments and two military-installed regimes have come no closer to resolving the conflict and it remains the single most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia, with nearly 6,000 dead and 11,000 wounded.*

Malaysia portal Historical background Despite the ethnic affinity of the people of the Patani region with their Malay neighbours to the south, the old Patani Kingdom was led by sultans who historically preferred to pay tribute to the distant Siamese kings in Bangkok. For many centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgement of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Patani rulers largely alone. Until well into the 20th century, the government in Bangkok had interfered little locally, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local Islamic laws regarding issues on inheritance and family. However, by Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Patani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand. Its "Mandate 3" was directly aimed at the Patani people. Traditional Muslim courts that formerly handled civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok. This forced assimilation process and the perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society were irritants to the ethnic Malay Patani. Sulong was released from jail in 1960, then disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1962. Inspired by ideologies such as Nasserism, in the 1960s a Patani nationalist movement began to grow, leading to the south Thailand insurgency. The emphasis was laid in pursuing an armed struggle towards an independent state where Patani people could live with dignity without having alien cultural values imposed on them. Despite some differences in ideology they shared broadly separatist aims, but all justified the use of violence to reach their goals, setting a pattern of attacking police and military posts, as well as schools and Thai government offices. The effectiveness of these groups was marred, however, by infighting and lack of unity among them. The violence expands and intensifies. A resurgence in violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began after 1975. This new development disoriented and confused the Thai authorities, who kept groping in the dark as the identity of the new insurgents in the conflict remained a mystery. Thailand held relatively free elections in February 1976, but no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. In July the same year, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee admitted, "The attacks look like they are well-organized, but we do not know what group of people is behind them. Other tactics used to gain publicity from shock and horror are slashing to death Buddhist monks, bombing temples, beheadings, intimidating pork vendors and their customers, as well as arson attacks on schools, killing the teachers and burning their bodies. Mostly led by Salafist hardliners, they have extreme and transnational religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of a constructive cultural or nationalistic Patani identity. Salafi jihadist groups are hostile to the cultural heritage and practices of traditional Malay Muslims, accusing them of being un-Islamic. Instead their immediate aim is to make the Patani region ungovernable. Many local policemen are allegedly involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. Often the army responds to the attacks with heavy-handed raids to search Muslim villages, which only results in reprisals. Insurgents routinely provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace. Main incidents after the insurgency upsurge Attacks after concentrated on installations of the police and military. Schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region have been subject to arson and bombing as well. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 incidents related to the insurgency in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat by the end of 1976. When the insurgents make a show of strength—generally at least every few months—they have eschewed large-scale attacks, preferring well-coordinated pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces.

Violence, however, has escalated. Martial law was instituted in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in January. Many young militants received training and indoctrination from Islamic teachers, some of which took place within Islamic educational institutions. Many see the southern Thai violence as a form of Islamist militancy and Islamic separatism, testifying to the strength of Malay Muslim beliefs and the determination of local people to resist the Buddhist Thai state on religious grounds. By the late s, Muslims were holding unprecedented senior posts in Thai politics. For example, Wan Muhamad Noor Matha , a Malay Muslim from Yala, served as chairman of parliament from to under the Democrats and later as interior minister during the first Thaksin government. Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies in the border provinces, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom. The Thaksin regime, however, began to dismantle the southern administration organisation, replacing it with a notoriously corrupt police force which immediately began widespread crackdowns. Consultation with local community leaders was also abolished. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during and Muslim politicians and leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, thus eroding their political legitimacy and support. This cost them dearly. In the general election, all but one of the eleven incumbent Muslim MPs who stood for election were voted out of office. Between and , the average per capita income of Pattani grew from 9, baht to 57, baht , while that of Yala and Narathiwat increased from 14, baht and 10, baht to 52, baht and 38, baht, respectively. Impressive as these gains are, the border provinces did have the lowest average income among all the southern provinces. Also, the national average is well below the estimated average needed to be considered an acceptable minimum wage by international organisations for Southeast Asia. Household income improved from to by . For comparison, income growth for all of Thailand in the same period was just 9. By , the three provinces had , people living below the poverty line, compared to , in . Government schools are taught only in Thai and the secular educational system is being undermined by the destruction of schools and the murders of teachers by the insurgent groups. Jobs in the Thai public sector are difficult to obtain for those Muslims who never fully accepted the Thai language or the Thai education system. Insurgent attacks on economic targets further reduce employment opportunities for both Muslims and Buddhists in the provinces. Public opinion Some locals in the area support some kind of independence from Thailand; others clearly do not. PULO , the doyen of the Patani insurgent groups and formerly the most respected secessionist movement in the region, has been largely inactive in recent years. It was revived after and its leaders are mainly Salafi religious teachers who have rejected the Pan-Arab socialist ideology of the early BRN, engaging in political activism by recruiting followers in mosques and indoctrinating at Islamic schools. This group has the vision of becoming a mass movement, aiming towards having , members in its area of operation. The BRN-C has no constructive cultural or nationalistic goals; instead its immediate aim is to make southern Thailand ungovernable. It has been largely successful at spreading and maintaining an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty through well-trained secret militant units that engage in assassinations and calculated destruction. It is composed of young, mostly Salafi, militants who routinely flee to Malaysia after carrying out violent attacks, including bombings, arson , and murders in Yala , Pattani , or Narathiwat Province. Its priority was freeing Pattani from Thai rule by all means, including armed struggle. Salafism has heavily eroded Patani cultural identity and current insurgent groups have extreme religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate , to the detriment of Patani nationalism. The agreement included a section in which they agreed to form a unified military force, the Patani Liberation Army PLA. After a tense seven-hour stand-off, Pallop ordered an all-out assault on the mosque. All of the gunmen were killed. He later insisted, "I had no choice. I was afraid that as time passed the crowd would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them. A government investigative commission found that the security forces had over-reacted. The Asian Centre for Human Rights questioned the independence and impartiality of the investigative commission. On 3 May during a senate hearing, Senator Kraisaak Choonhavan noted that most of those killed at Krue Se Mosque had been shot in the head and there were signs that ropes had been tied around their wrists, suggesting they had been executed after being captured. Six local men were arrested for having supplied weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organised to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used tear gas and

water cannons on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to the Ingkayutthaboriharn army camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination five hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had died of suffocation. Thaksin, however, gave the army his full support. Those responsible for the ill-treatment and death of the detainees received the most minor of non-custodial punishments. In May, Wan Kadir Che Man, exiled leader of Bersatu and for years one of the key symbolic figures in the guerrilla movement, stated that he would be willing to negotiate with the government to end the southern violence. He also hinted that Bersatu would be willing to soften its previous demands for an independent state. However, the government response was severely criticised as being "knee-jerk" and "just looking to score cheap political points. He claimed that he would take a "new and effective" approach to a crisis and that "The Army is informed [of who the insurgents are] and will carry out their duties. The identity of the insurgents was not revealed. Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat unrest in the far south. A fierce critic of the Thaksin -government, Anand frequently criticised the handling of southern unrest, and in particular the State of Emergency Decree. He has been quoted to have said, "The authorities have worked inefficiently. They have arrested innocent people instead of the real culprits, leading to mistrust among locals. So, giving them broader power may lead to increased violence and eventually a real crisis. However, the recommendations were vigorously opposed by Prem Tinsulanonda.

### 6: Thai Police: Drug Traffickers have Links with Southern Insurgents

*Separatist insurgents have used landmines to maim rubber plantation workers and seriously disrupt the daily life of people in Thailand's southern border provinces.*

### 7: Thailand: Insurgents Use Landmines in South | Human Rights Watch

*Southern Insurgency: The Coming of the Global Working Class (Wildcat) [Immanuel Ness] on [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com) \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. Even as labor in the developed world seems to be in retreat, industrial struggle continues elsewhere—and with particular force in the Global South.*

### 8: Pattani policeman's house attacked by southern insurgents | The Thaiger

*Many fantasy stories from the Conan the Barbarian series, to the Cthulhu Mythos, to Doctor Strange comics involve sorcerers and cults drawing dark forbidden powers by invoking powerful creatures from outside our dimension.*

### 9: South Thailand insurgency | Revolv

*Insurgents detonate two bombs at Big C shopping mall, the largest shopping mall in Thailand's southern border provinces on May 9, At least 61 people were injured.*

*High Fall (Kiernan O'Shaughnessy Mystery) Seneca Caverns in Bellevue Social differentiation of English in Cameroon Meteorology today 9th edition 4J3. The accumulator bottle 86 The land in between: constructing nature, wilderness, and agriculture The Origami Master Otot Ha-Shamayim: Samuel Ibn Tibbons Hebrew Version of Aristotles Meteorology Sac and Fox Nation. The market state : arming terror Understanding regulation Multiplication of distributions Mary Engelbreits Sweetie Pie Beyond medical care Conspiracy and death of Lin Biao Fandango Involvement Rohde schwarze tutorial A history of the concept and nosology of epilepsy Peter Wolf Current perspectives in dysphasia Power and sample size determination U2022duration of the disorder at least three months. Mystery of Lady Bountiful A plea for Africa The annals and The histories Fundamental laws of electrical engineering Factoring and the lending bank Statistics in economics Modern Jewish attitudes to the concept of myth Wout Jac. van Bekkum On the defects of perception, reasoning, and spatial orientation ability in linguistically handicapped ch AAA Spiral Ireland, 4th Edition (Aaa Spiral Guides) V. 5. By-ways of Europe. Hannah Thurston. Software quality lessons from medical device failure data In-cell polymerase chain reaction: strategy and diagnostic applications T. Vauvert Hviid The wit and wisdom of Yogi Berra The collected stories of Evan S. Connell. Bringing in talent competence aggregators Prepositional phrase list a-z An artists journey down the Thames All this and more The explorers journey : a report from the frontier David G. Campbell*