

1: Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge - James Sherr - Häftad () | Bokus

Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.

National Intelligence Estimate 0 Washington, December 1, Summary of the Estimate 1. The attempt to forecast developments within the USSR and in Soviet power and policy for five years ahead is subject to some very severe limitations. Our estimative reach in many of the detailed matters discussed in the body of this Estimate is frankly acknowledged to fall well short of such a period. In respect of matters where we have actually made five-year estimates the degree of certainty falls off markedly for the later years. In the summary paragraphs which follow we are dealing with the broader trends which will determine the nature and magnitude of the challenge which the USSR will present to US security in the years ahead. These we believe are predictable in the main, although their particular manifestations clearly depend upon unknown and imponderable factors, or even upon purely fortuitous developments. The Present Soviet Outlook 2. One of the principal factors which will shape future developments is the outlook of the Soviet leaders themselves. There are two essential aspects of this. There is no evidence at present to indicate that the Soviets will come to accept a world system which assumes the genuine coexistence of states and ideologies. For so brief a period as five years, Soviet behavior and policy will surely be marked by fundamental hostility toward the West, and especially toward the US as the principal obstacle to the fulfillment of Soviet aims. That it was a Communist rocket which first ventured into space symbolizes for them that they are marching in the vanguard of history. They think they see a response to their doctrines and influence in the revolutionary turmoils of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They expect to associate the peoples emerging from colonialism and backwardness with their own cause, mobilizing them against an ever more constricted world position of the Western states. The relative internal stability of the latter at present they see as only a transient phase. While hostility toward the West and confidence in the eventual outcome of the world struggle will inspire Soviet behavior in the period ahead, we do not believe that the result will be policies of recklessness. The Soviet leaders recognize that Western resources remain great, and that the struggle for Communist power in the uncommitted world will be prolonged. They are particularly conscious of the hazards of nuclear war. Moreover, they have numerous problems of their own within the Communist Bloc which may move them to caution. Their policies will be marked by a persistent activism and opportunism, but also by what they consider to be a due measure of caution. More important, however, than the Soviet outlook and aims, especially since these offer little hope for accommodation and genuine peace, are the strengths and resources which the Soviets will be able to bring to the pursuit of their aims. Perhaps the most firmly based of our estimates are those which relate to the growth of Soviet economic power. The Soviet economy has the resources and plant as well as the planning and directing mechanisms to insure steady fulfillment of most of the goals in industrial expansion which the leadership sets. The industrial targets of the Seven-Year Plan , providing for 8. We estimate that by total investment will reach about one-third of gross national product GNP , as compared with the present US rate of about one-fifth of GNP. Only in agriculture, which is burdened by a heritage of errors and neglect, will the regime fall well short of its goals, but even here we estimate that output will increase by about 3 to 4 percent per year. GNP is a rough measurement, however. More important in terms of world power competition are the uses to which economic resources are put. The dollar value of Soviet investment in industry in exceeded the highest US figure, achieved in For purposes related to national powerâ€”defense, science, foreign economic and political operationsâ€”the Soviets are increasingly in a position to assign resources freely and without agonizing self-denials. That they are able to provide the resources for national power on a scale equivalent to the US is due to the virtually absolute command which the leadership has over the disposal of resources. The Soviet regime has bought economic growth and military strength at the expense of the living standards of the Soviet people. But its resources are now great enough so that it feels able to provide for improved living standards also. The consumption level remains low but we estimate that per capita increases will occur over the next five years at the respectable rate of four percent annually. The Soviet challenge in the economic field

will be increasingly formidable, not because the USSR has any chance of overtaking the US standard or style of living, but because Soviet resources for the competition in power are already great and will continue to grow rapidly. As indicated, military power has one of the first claims upon Soviet resources. Our estimates on the development of Soviet military power until are far less certain than those on the Soviet economy. This is partly due to unpredictable developments during a period of rapid change in military technology. It is due more to gaps in certain kinds of critical information about Soviet military programs. Although in recent years the Soviets have released fuller economic data than previously, on essential matters in the military field they continue to maintain a policy of extreme secrecy, which they evidently view as a major military asset in itself. The overcoming of an inferiority under which the Soviets have operated throughout the postwar period is already having a profound effect on Soviet attitudes and policy. It inspires the confidence remarked upon above, has emboldened the Soviets to challenge the West on a vital issue like Berlin, and has led them to engage the West in other areas around the world formerly conceded to be beyond the reach of Soviet power. The Soviet leaders will not be content with the gains in military power they have made. They will seek, by intensive research and development through the years ahead, as well as by equipping their forces with advanced weapons as these become available, to acquire an advantage over the West. If they succeed, they will press their advantage ruthlessly, though still within what they would consider to be the limits of tolerable risk to their own rule and system. It seems quite clear that in their present view both sides are deterred from the deliberate initiation of general war as a rational course of action. Moreover, with the weapons systems now on hand or likely to be available during the next few years, the Soviets probably do not count on acquiring an advantage so decisive as to permit them to launch general war under conditions which would not gravely menace their regime. Nevertheless, they are building their nuclear striking power with vigor, and we believe that they will build a substantial missile force. What we can learn of Soviet ideas suggests that their long-range striking capability is thought of primarily in terms of deterrence, and of employment for a heavy blow should the Soviets finally conclude that deterrence had failed, rather than in terms of the deliberate initiation of general war. In order to deal more effectively with the continuing bomber threat the Soviets are incorporating a large number of surface-to-air missiles into their air defense. They are now also doing large-scale research and development on antimissile systems in the hope of obtaining an advantage in this critical aspect of the future weapons balance. By the period they will probably begin to deploy such a system, though its effectiveness is uncertain. Soviet research and development effort will probably also focus on the new threat presented by Polaris. Partly as a result of the increased security the Soviets feel they have gained from their development of a variety of offensive and defensive missiles, they have announced a major personnel reduction in their forces, from about 3. Barring a serious deterioration in the international situation, we believe the cut will be substantially carried out. We believe that tactical aviation has already been cut by one-half and naval aviation by two-thirds, the latter primarily through elimination of the fighter arm. However, the main weight of the cut will fall on the very large ground forces. Even with the reduction, the Soviets will still have substantial field ground forces: The submarine force will become even more than it is today the primary component of the Soviet Navy, and will include nuclear and missile-carrying types suitable for strategic attack. In sum, the USSR will continue to develop formidable military strength despite the personnel reduction. The Soviet military posture is designed primarily, we believe, to deter general war but also to fight such a war if necessary. Soviet capabilities for limited war in areas close to Bloc borders are obviously great, but for conflict in more distant areas they are comparatively slight. We do not believe that the USSR intends as a matter of policy to conduct limited war at remote ranges. However, we do not exclude that, with their current tendency to political involvement in remoter areas, the Soviets may seek to develop a greater capacity for intervening militarily, even if only to establish a military presence, in such areas. A really effective ability to do this would presumably depend heavily upon acquisition of base rights and facilities under friendly political arrangements. The Soviets obviously understand that science has become one of the key fronts in the world struggle, not only because of its relations to military capability but also because it is a major element in great power prestige. The scale of their effort, thanks to the heavy investment they made in training scientists in past years, is probably now roughly on a par with that of the US, at least in some fields of the basic sciences

and in critical areas related to weapons technology. Presumably the scope of Soviet scientific activity will broaden as needs in these first priority areas are met. The quality of Soviet scientific work in many fields is now such that achievements conferring great prestige are as likely to occur in the USSR as in any other country. It is in estimating the political aspect of future developments within the Soviet Bloc that the greatest imponderables intrude. The political system within the USSR itself is stable, and it will almost certainly retain its totalitarian features. If there is change in the Soviet political system it will come from the higher levels of the party and government. In the relatively small group which constitutes the real governing class there are some signs of a desire for more regular participation in policy making, and for more reliance in policy execution on professional expertise instead of party agitational methods. While Khrushchev has avoided or been obliged to avoid the arbitrariness of Stalin, among those who surround him there are probably some who would like to move still further away from the domination of one man in the system. His successor at the head of the Soviet Government and party may be more restricted in the personal power he wields, but in any totalitarian system political developments are likely to depend heavily on the qualities and style which individual personalities bring to the exercise of great and arbitrary power. In the area of political developments within the Communist Bloc it is the evolution of relations among the Bloc states which raises the greatest uncertainties at present. In general, the states of Eastern Europe have gained in economic strength and political stability in recent years, despite the continuing alienation and resentment of large parts of their populations. There seems little doubt that, with the more flexible and indirect methods of control the USSR has been employing since , it will be able to maintain a generally effective hegemony. However, China has raised a fundamental challenge to Soviet leadership of the Bloc. We believe that there is a trend away from monolithic unity, and that in the long run, if China is to remain within the Bloc, a looser relationship is bound to develop. The future course of Sino-Soviet relations will obviously have profound consequences for the nature of the challenge which communism poses for the Free World. The [Page 7] West may be faced either with new dangers or new opportunities, or both. The general Soviet strategy for carrying on the world struggle in the present phase rests on two propositions. The first is that general nuclear war must be avoided because the costs in physical damage and social disintegration would be intolerable. Political struggle takes the form of a constant agitation designed to capture and organize in broad mass movements the sentiments which focus on the great issues of the current period—peace, disarmament, anticolonialism, social justice, economic development. By manipulating these issues and by dramatizing the growth of Soviet power, the Soviets are also trying to align the governments of the under-developed and uncommitted states with the Bloc, and against the West. The Soviet leaders hope that the result will be a progressive isolation and loss of influence for the Western powers, divisions among them, and a decline in their ability to deal effectively with threats to their interests. This is not a strategy which aims immediately at the revolutionary seizure of power by Communist parties and the setting up of Communist regimes. The Soviets know that there are few countries where the Communists are strong enough to undertake such action, and where they themselves could count upon being able to deter intervention by non-Communist forces. The Soviets naturally expect that conditions will thereby be created which are favorable to the growth of Communist movements and which will sooner or later permit the latter to acquire state power peacefully, or by revolutionary action if necessary. Even though overt seizure of power is not now the main aim of the Soviet strategy, over a five-year period situations might arise where the gains from such action would seem important enough to the Soviets so that they would be willing to depart from their present general line. The general line of Soviet policy estimated in the two preceding paragraphs falls within a range which excludes, on the one hand, the deliberate assumption of serious risks of general war, and on the other, abandonment of active struggle against the West. Within these limits we believe that the Soviet leaders will display both militancy and conciliation, at various times and in various proportions as seems to them most profitable. However, the Chinese challenge to Soviet authority involves basic questions of foreign policy, and brings severe pressure to bear on Soviet policy decisions. In trying to adjust to Chinese pressures, the Soviets may go farther in the direction of militancy and risk-taking than they otherwise would. On the other hand, if the Soviets should conclude that the Chinese were pushing them towards unacceptable dangers, they might move as a matter of temporary expediency toward a greater degree of stabilization in their

relations with the West than they would otherwise consider, though without altering their long-term aim of establishing Communism throughout the world. As a general rule, we believe that the Soviets would consider that the initiation of limited war with Soviet or even Bloc forces entailed unacceptably high risks and political liabilities. However, it cannot be excluded that situations will appear in which they would conclude that some prize was great enough, and the military and political risks acceptable enough, to justify resort to such action.

2: - Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge by James Sherr

The greater part of this book dwells on the nature of Soviet power (military capabilities, economic resources, subordinate empire) and on the continuity of political aims and institutions. The treatment is coolly analytical, relatively hard-line, mindful of the Soviet stress on competition for power.

Wages were much higher in the Donbas than in the Kursk region, and Sergei Khrushchev generally left his family in Kalinovka, returning there when he had enough money. According to Khrushchev in his memoirs, Shevchenko was a freethinker who upset the villagers by not attending church, and when her brother visited, he gave the boy books which had been banned by the Imperial Government. Upon completing that apprenticeship, the teenage Khrushchev was hired by a factory. He was employed by a workshop that serviced ten mines, and he was involved in several strikes that demanded higher pay, better working conditions, and an end to the war. In 1918, they had a daughter, Yulia, and in 1919, a son, Leonid. In late 1919 or early 1920 he was mobilized into the Red Army as a political commissar. With the only way into the churchyard through the church, he had the coffin lifted and passed over the fence into the burial ground, shocking the village. He helped restart the machines key parts and papers had been removed by the pre-Soviet mineowners and he wore his old mine outfit for inspection tours. However, he refused the offer, seeking to be assigned to the newly established technical college tekhnikum in Yuzovka, though his superiors were reluctant to let him go. As he had only four years of formal schooling, he applied to the training program rabfak attached to the tekhnikum that was designed to bring undereducated students to high-school level, a prerequisite for entry into the tekhnikum. He briefly joined supporters of Leon Trotsky against those of Joseph Stalin over the question of party democracy. Soon after the abortive marriage, Khrushchev met Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk, a well-educated Party organizer and daughter of well-to-do Ukrainian peasants. They had three children together: In mid-1921, Khrushchev was appointed Party secretary of the Petrovo-Marinsky raikom, or district, near Stalino. Khrushchev is left behind Yagoda. Khrushchev met Lazar Kaganovich as early as 1922. In 1923, Kaganovich became Party head in Ukraine [30] and Khrushchev, falling under his patronage, [31] was rapidly promoted. He was appointed second in command of the Stalino party apparatus in late 1923. Khrushchev never completed his studies there, but his career in the Party flourished. In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that Alliluyeva spoke well of him to her husband. Faced with an already-announced opening date of 7 November 1925, Khrushchev took considerable risks in the construction and spent much of his time down in the tunnels. When the inevitable accidents did occur, they were depicted as heroic sacrifices in a great cause. The Metro did not open until 1 May 1926, but Khrushchev received the Order of Lenin for his role in its construction. The two increasingly built a good relationship. Central to this campaign were the Moscow Trials, a series of show trials of the purged top leaders of the party and the military. In 1927, as the trials proceeded, Khrushchev expressed his vehement support: Everyone who rejoices in the successes achieved in our country, the victories of our party led by the great Stalin, will find only one word suitable for the mercenary, fascist dogs of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang. That word is execution. Of the arrestees, according to Khrushchev, 8, deserved execution. The dictator took the confession in his stride, and, after initially advising Khrushchev to keep it quiet, suggested that Khrushchev tell his tale to the Moscow party conference. Khrushchev did so, to applause, and was immediately reelected to his post. Stalin told Khrushchev of the accusation personally, looking him in the eye and awaiting his response. Khrushchev speculated in his memoirs that had Stalin doubted his reaction, he would have been categorized as an enemy of the people then and there. The high ranks of the Party were not immune; the Central Committee of Ukraine was so devastated that it could not convene a quorum. Almost all government officials and Red Army commanders were replaced. But we must not allow a single honest Bolshevik to be harmed. We must conduct a struggle against slanderers. A large number of ethnic Ukrainians lived in the invaded area, much of which today forms the western portion of Ukraine. Many inhabitants therefore initially welcomed the invasion, though they hoped that they would eventually become independent. Through a combination of propaganda, deception as to what was being voted for, and outright fraud, the Soviets ensured that their new territories would elect assemblies which would unanimously petition for union

with the USSR. Stalin used Khrushchev to keep commanders on a tight leash, while the commanders sought to have him influence Stalin. Handicapped by orders from Stalin that under no circumstances should the city be abandoned, the Red Army was soon encircled by the Germans. According to Marshal Georgi Zhukov, writing some years after Khrushchev fired and disgraced him in 1959, Khrushchev persuaded Stalin not to evacuate troops from Kiev. But let me return to the enemy breakthrough in the Kiev area, the encirclement of our group, and the destruction of the 37th Army. Later, the Fifth Army also perished. All of this was senseless, and from the military point of view, a display of ignorance, incompetence, and illiteracy. There you have the result of not taking a step backward. And yet it was possible to allow this not to happen. The Germans, however, had deduced that the Soviets were likely to attack at Kharkov, and set a trap. Beginning on 12 May, the Soviet offensive initially appeared successful, but within five days the Germans had driven deep into the Soviet flanks, and the Red Army troops were in danger of being cut off. Stalin refused to halt the offensive, and the Red Army divisions were soon encircled by the Germans. While Stalin hinted at arresting and executing Khrushchev, he allowed the commissar to return to the front by sending him to Stalingrad. He proposed a counterattack, only to find that Zhukov and other generals had already planned Operation Uranus, a plan to break out from Soviet positions and encircle and destroy the Germans; it was being kept secret. Before Uranus was launched, Khrushchev spent much time checking on troop readiness and morale, interrogating Nazi prisoners, and recruiting some for propaganda purposes. One theory has Leonid surviving the crash and collaborating with the Germans, and when he was recaptured by the Soviets, Stalin ordering him shot despite Nikita Khrushchev pleading for his life. Khrushchev biographer Taubman speculates that this omission was most likely to avoid the possibility of being seen as complicit in the death of the son of a Politburo member. He was attached to Soviet troops at the Battle of Kursk, in July, which turned back the last major German offensive on Soviet soil. He was appointed Premier of the Ukrainian SSR in addition to his earlier party post, one of the rare instances in which the Ukrainian party and civil leader posts were held by one person. However, Tompson points to the fact that the few mentions of Khrushchev in military memoirs published during the Brezhnev era were generally favorable, at a time when it was "barely possible to mention Khrushchev in print in any context". Even though millions of Ukrainians had been taken to Germany as workers or prisoners of war, there was insufficient housing for those who remained. He made a short visit to his birthplace of Kalinovka, finding a starving population, with only a third of the men who had joined the Red Army having returned. Khrushchev did what he could to assist his hometown. Khrushchev viewed this policy as very effective, and recommended its adoption elsewhere to Stalin. While Khrushchev hoped to accomplish this by, lack of resources and armed resistance by partisans slowed the process. The inevitable starvation was largely confined to remote rural regions, and was little noticed outside the USSR. When letters to Stalin had no effect, Khrushchev flew to Moscow and made his case in person. Stalin finally gave Ukraine limited food aid, and money to set up free soup kitchens. Once Khrushchev was able to get out of bed, he and his family took their first vacation since before the war, to a beachfront resort in Latvia. These sometimes backfired, however: He completed only one such town before his December return to Moscow; he dedicated it to Stalin as a 70th birthday present. I recall warmly the years I spent there. This was a period full of responsibilities, but pleasant because it brought satisfaction. But far be it from me to inflate my significance. The entire Ukrainian people was exerting great efforts

3: Nikita Khrushchev - Wikipedia

Contents List of Abbreviations Notes on the Contributors Acknowledgements Foreword Malcolm Mackintosh PART I THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE 1 First Principles.

4: Soviet Military Power: Books | eBay

Representing the culmination of an RUSI main theme study, "Soviet Power and Prospects", this volume is based on the Institute's proposition that military power exerts a profound influence on the course of world politics and that such power

SOVIET POWER, THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE pdf

cannot be divorced from its social and political context.

5: The continuing Soviet collapse

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

6: Soviet Union - Wikipedia

Comment: A copy that has been read, but remains in clean condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine may show signs of wear. Pages can include limited notes and highlighting, and the copy can include previous owner inscriptions.

7: "The political response of Soviet Republican leaders to the challenge o" by Peter A. Lambert

St. Martin's Press. Used - Good. Ships from Reno, NV. Former Library book. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside. % Money Back Guarantee.

Topics in polynomials Juan Bautista De Anza Chapter 4 does morality depend on religion Parkett collaborations editions since 1984 The night of a thousand suicides Moonlit upper deckerina Maddie on TV (First Novel Series) Change in the retail environment Part 2 : The wi-fi journey in perspective. Hello, Mallory (The Baby-Sitters Club #14) Jvc kd r728bt manual A month after date Representational cortex in musicians C. Pantev . [et al.] A Guide to College Programs in Culinary Arts, Hospitality, and Tourism (Guide to College Programs in Culi Our Roots Are Deep With Passion Council Of Justice The story of a brief marriage The Americans and the British. Works of John Webster Functions and programs of the state 6 Role of pili in Haemophilus influenzae adherence, colonization Army postal service calendar 2016 Pain and pain relief Federal Theatre Project Front Door Trim Rebuild Setting Boundaries With Youth Early Canal pioneers The Shadow Cabinet in British politics Summer at The Cedars Lets laugh together Add books to kindle fire Geographic visualization concepts tools and applications Shifts in economic geography and their causes Anthony J. Venables. Commentary Douglas A. Irwin. General d Short-term financial management Great toe-to-thumb microvascular transplantation after traumatic amputation Gregory M. Buncke, Harry J. B Sidney sheldon best novels Edmund W. Gordon James Pellegrino and Susan R. Goldman Radiowave propagation and smart antennas for wireless communications Building the Railways of the Raj, 1850-1900 Pamilia The fish finder