

1: Kant and Hume on Morality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

the moral law, all laws are to be determined independently of our desires and inclinations in an effort to ensure universality. 10 This rejection of a subjective standpoint has led most of Kant's critics to.

But the existence of large and heterogeneous societies raises conceptual problems for such a descriptive definition, since there may not be any such society-wide code that is regarded as most important. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that both C. But according to the taxonomy at the heart of this entry, all of these are versions of the descriptive sense, distinguished primarily by the size of the relevant group. Etiquette is sometimes included as a part of morality, applying to norms that are considered less serious than the kinds of norms for behavior that are more central to morality. When etiquette is included as part of morality, morality is almost always being understood in the descriptive sense. One reason for this is that it is clear that the rules of etiquette are relative to a society or group. Law is distinguished from morality by having explicit written rules, penalties, and officials who interpret the laws and apply the penalties. Although there is often considerable overlap in the conduct governed by morality and that governed by law, laws are often evaluated—and changed—on moral grounds. Some theorists, including Ronald Dworkin, have even maintained that the interpretation of law must make use of morality. Although the morality of a group or society may derive from its religion, morality and religion are not the same thing, even in that case. Morality is only a guide to conduct, whereas religion is always more than this. For example, religion includes stories about events in the past, usually about supernatural beings, that are used to explain or justify the behavior that it prohibits or requires. Although there is often a considerable overlap in the conduct prohibited or required by religion and that prohibited or required by morality, religions may prohibit or require more than is prohibited or required by guides to behavior that are explicitly labeled as moral guides, and may allow some behavior that is prohibited by morality. Even when morality is not regarded as the code of conduct that is put forward by a formal religion, it is often thought to require some religious explanation and justification. However, just as with law, some religious practices and precepts are criticized on moral grounds, e. It is also being used in the descriptive sense when it refers to important attitudes of individuals. Just as one can refer to the morality of the Greeks, so one can refer to the morality of a particular person. In the 20th century R. Hare, in his earlier books, regarded moral judgments as those judgments that override all nonmoral judgments and that would be universalized by the person making the judgment. This account of moral judgments naturally leads to a view of morality as being concerned with behavior that a person regards as most important and as a guide to conduct that he wants everyone to adopt. Guides to behavior that are regarded as moralities normally involve avoiding and preventing harm to others Frankena, and perhaps some norm of honesty Strawson. But all of them involve other matters as well. This view of morality as concerning that which is most important to a person or group allows matters related to religious practices and precepts, or matters related to customs and traditions, e. A society might have a moral code according to which practices as necessary for purity or sanctity are more important than practices related to whether other persons are harmed. A society may take as morally most important that certain rituals are performed or that certain sexual practices are prohibited, than that harms are avoided or prevented. Some societies may claim that their morality, which is more concerned with purity and sanctity, is based on the commands of God. Moreover, most normative accounts entail that all moral agents would endorse morality, at least under certain circumstances. And most accounts of moral agency at work in such accounts do not include any negative attitudes toward harmless consensual sexual behavior. Many religions condemn certain harmless consensual sexual behavior as immoral, but other religions, which hold that morality is primarily concerned with avoiding and preventing harm, condemn these attitudes themselves as harmful and immoral. A society might have a morality that takes accepting its traditions and customs, including accepting the authority of certain people and emphasizing loyalty to the group, as more important than avoiding and preventing harm. Such a morality might not count as immoral any behavior that shows loyalty to the preferred group, even if that behavior causes significant harm to innocent people who are not in that group. Acting altruistically, at least with regard to those in the group, might be

nearly equated with acting morally, regardless of its effects on those outside of the group. The familiarity of this kind of morality, which makes in-group loyalty almost equivalent to morality, seems to allow some comparative and evolutionary psychologists, including Frans De Waal , to regard non-human animals to be acting in ways very similar to those that are regarded as moral. It is possible for a society to have a morality that is concerned primarily with minimizing the harms that human beings can suffer. Such a society might claim that their morality is based on some universal features of human nature or of all rational beings. Although all societies include more than just a concern for minimizing harm to some human beings in their moralities, this feature of morality, unlike purity and sanctity, or accepting authority and emphasizing loyalty, is included in everything that is regarded as a morality by any society. Because minimizing harm can conflict with accepting authority and emphasizing loyalty, there can be fundamental disagreements within a society about the morally right way to behave in particular kinds of situations. Some psychologists, such as Haidt, take morality to include concern with, at least, all three of the triad of 1 harm, 2 purity, and 3 loyalty, and hold that different members of a society can and do take different features of morality to be most important. Most societies have moralities that are concerned with, at least, all three members of this triad. Concern with harm appears in the form of enforceable rules against killing, causing pain, mutilating, etc. But beyond a concern with avoiding and preventing such harms to members of certain groups, there may be no common content shared by all moralities in the descriptive sense. Nor may there be any common justification that those who accept morality claim for it; some may appeal to religion, others to tradition, and others to rational human nature. Beyond the concern with harm mentioned above, the only other features that all descriptive moralities have in common is that they are put forward by an individual or a group, usually a society, in which case they provide a guide for the behavior of the people in that group or society. Ethical relativists such as Harman , Westermarck , Prinz , and Wong , deny that there is any universal normative morality and claim that the actual moralities of societies or individuals are the only moralities there are. The harm caused by Christian missionaries who used morality as a basis for trying to change the practices of the societies with which they came in contact may have been one of the reasons why many anthropologists endorsed ethical relativism. As a result, when the guide to conduct put forward by, for example, a religious group conflicts with the guide to conduct put forward by a society, it is not clear whether to say that there are conflicting moralities, conflicting elements within morality, or that the code of the religious group conflicts with morality. Members of the society who are also members of a religious group may regard both guides as elements of morality and differ with respect to which of the conflicting elements of the moral guide they consider most important. There are likely to be significant moral disputes between those who consider different elements to be more important. In small homogeneous societies there may be a guide to behavior that is put forward by the society and that is accepted by almost all members of the society. However, in larger societies people often belong to groups that put forward guides to behavior that conflict with the guide put forward by their society, and members of the society do not always accept the guide put forward by their society. If they accept the conflicting guide of some other group to which they belong often a religious group rather than the guide put forward by their society, in cases of conflict they will regard those who follow the guide put forward by their society as acting immorally. When relativized to an individual in this way, morality has less limitation on content than when it is taken to refer to the code of conduct put forward by a society or group. Still, if the person is rational, this guide will include prohibitions on causing harm. It is not clear whether it refers to 1 a guide to behavior that is put forward by a society, to which that person might or might not belong; 2 a guide that is put forward by a group, to which that person might or might not belong; 3 a guide that someone, perhaps that very person, regards as overriding and wants adopted by everyone else, or 4 a universal guide that all rational persons would put forward for governing the behavior of all moral agents. However, if the individual is referring to his own morality, he is usually using it normatively; that is, he would usually accept the claim that all rational persons, at least under certain conditions, would endorse it. However, Sidgwick regarded moral rules as any rational rules of conduct. Because all moralities in the descriptive sense include a prohibition on harming others, ethical egoism is not a morality in the descriptive sense. Because, as will be explained in the following section, all moralities in the normative sense not only include prohibitions on harming others but also are such

that all rational persons would endorse that morality, ethical egoism is not a morality in the normative sense either. Sidgwick does this, but he is decidedly in the minority in this respect. However, that fact that an individual adopts a moral code of conduct for his own use does not entail that the person requires it to be adopted by anyone else. An individual may adopt for himself a very demanding moral guide that he thinks may be too difficult for most others to follow. He may judge people who do not adopt his code of conduct as not being as morally good as he is, without judging them to be immoral if they do not adopt it. For it may be that the individual would not be willing for others to try to follow that code, because of worries about the bad effects of predictable failures due to partiality or lack of sufficient foresight or intelligence. Many moral skeptics would reject the claim that there are any universal ethical claims, where the ethical is a broader category than the moral. But another interesting class of moral skeptics includes those who think that we should only abandon the narrower category of the moral—partly because of the notion of a code that is central to that category. These moral skeptics hold that we should do our ethical theorizing in terms of the good life, or the virtues. Elizabeth Anscombe gave expression to this kind of view, which also finds echoes in the work of Bernard Williams. On the other hand, some virtue theorists might take perfect rationality to entail virtue, and might understand morality to be something like the code that such a person would implicitly endorse by acting in virtuous ways. In that case, even a virtue theorist might count as a moral realist in the sense above. But this appearance is deceptive. And the act-consequentialist J. Smart is also explicit that he is thinking of ethics as the study of how it is most rational to behave. His embrace of utilitarianism is the result of his belief that maximizing utility is always the rational thing to do. On reflection this is not surprising. What is that to me? Even fewer think this option remains open if we are allowed to add some additional conditions beyond mere rationality: Definitions of morality in the normative sense—and, consequently, moral theories—differ in their accounts of rationality, and in their specifications of the conditions under which all rational persons would necessarily endorse the code of conduct that therefore would count as morality. These definitions and theories also differ in how they understand what it is to endorse a code in the relevant way. Some hold that morality applies only to those rational beings that have certain specific features of human beings: These features might, for example, include fallibility and vulnerability. Other moral theories claim to put forward an account of morality that provides a guide to all rational beings, even if these beings do not have these human characteristics, e. Among such theorists it is also common to hold that morality should never be overridden. That is, it is common to hold that no one should ever violate a moral prohibition or requirement for non-moral reasons. Though common, this view is by no means always taken as definitional. Sidgwick despaired of showing that rationality required us to choose morality over egoism, though he certainly did not think rationality required egoism either. More explicitly, Gert held that though moral behavior is always rationally permissible, it is not always rationally required. Foot seems to have held that any reason—and therefore any rational requirement—to act morally would have to stem from a contingent commitment or an objective interest. And she also seems to have held that sometimes neither of these sorts of reasons might be available. Indeed, it is possible that morality, in the normative sense, has never been put forward by any particular society, by any group at all, or even by any individual. That is, one might claim that the guides to behavior of some societies lack so many of the essential features of morality, in the normative sense, that it is incorrect to say that these societies even have a morality in a descriptive sense. This is an extreme view, however. A more moderate position would hold that all societies have something that can be regarded as their morality, but that many of these moralities—perhaps, indeed, all of them—are defective. That is, a moral realist might hold that although these actual guides to behavior have enough of the features of normative morality to be classified as descriptive moralities, they would not be endorsed in their entirety by all moral agents. Moral realists do not claim that any actual society has or has ever had morality as its actual guide to conduct. In the theological version of natural law theories, such as that put forward by Aquinas, this is because God implanted this knowledge in the reason of all persons. In the secular version of natural law theories, such as that put forward by Hobbes, natural reason is sufficient to allow all rational persons to know what morality prohibits, requires, etc. Natural law theorists also claim that morality applies to all rational persons, not only those now living, but also those who lived in the past. In contrast to natural law theories, other moral theories

do not hold quite so strong a view about the universality of knowledge of morality. Still, many hold that morality is known to all who can legitimately be judged by it.

2: What Is an Organizational Moral Agency? | Your Business

Agent-Centred Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues, Samuel Scheffler, University of California, Berkeley The Authority of the Moral Agent, Conrad D. Johnson, University of Maryland What Our Readers Are Saying.

Moral Philosophy and its Subject Matter Hume and Kant operate with two somewhat different conceptions of morality itself, which helps explain some of the differences between their respective approaches to moral philosophy. The most important difference is that Kant sees law, duty, and obligation as the very heart of morality, while Hume does not. Kant believes that our moral concerns are dominated by the question of what duties are imposed on us by a law that commands with a uniquely moral necessity. Like most eighteenth-century philosophers, he also believes that our moral lives are preoccupied with the question of how to be virtuous over the course of a life, but he defines virtue in terms of the more fundamental concepts of law, obligation, and duty. By contrast, these concepts certainly figure into morality as Hume understands it, but they are far less central. Our moral concerns are dominated by the question of which motives are virtuous, and we answer this question by looking to the responses of our fellow human beings, who “when viewing things properly” approve of those motives and character traits that are useful or immediately agreeable EPM 9. These are the terms that characterize duty and obligation for Hume, rather than the other way around. Two other differences are worth noting for the purposes of this article. First, Kant draws a bright line between moral and non-moral phenomena, such as prudence, politics, or art. For Hume, the line between the moral and non-moral is far blurrier. According to Hume, the strict separation of moral and non-moral virtues marks one way in which modern moral thought is inferior to ancient ethics; he also seems to suspect that it reflects an unhealthy fixation on responsibility and guilt inherited from Christianity Darwall A second important difference is closely related to the first. For Kant the moral is distinguished from the non-moral not only by a special form of obligation but also by its elevation above the rest of life. One of our chief moral concerns is to protect this status, which requires respecting the rational autonomy at its source and avoiding behavior or patterns of thought and desire that dishonor or degrade persons by treating ourselves or others as mere things. We see it also in the priority given to duties to self cf. Hume does not see things this way. For Hume, the domain of morality is not particularly pure, special, or elevated. It sometimes shows us at our most benevolent or most magnanimous, but morality is continuous with the rest of life, including politics and the pursuit of wealth and status in modern commercial society. Moral virtue is undoubtedly pleasing to us, sometimes powerfully so, but it does not command a unique form of respect or reverence. Neither do the rules and ideals of morality, which spring from the same propensities, ideas, and passions that drive the rest of human behavior. Morality has us far more concerned with promoting pleasure and utility. Hume and Kant both believe that philosophy should dig beneath the surface of morality and present a theory of its foundation. Second, it cannot be found in mind-independent facts about the world. Yet they disagree about the rest of the story. Hume locates the foundation of morality in human nature, primarily in our emotional responses to the behavior of our fellow human beings. By contrast, Kant locates the foundation of morality in the rational nature that we share with all possible finite rational beings. According to Kant, the will of a moral agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law is self-legislating and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law is self-constraining or self-motivating. A heteronomous will, on the other hand, is governed by something other than itself, such as an external force or authority. These rival conceptions of morality and its foundation correspond to two very different approaches to moral philosophy. His moral philosophy is part of his larger endeavor to provide a naturalistic explanation of human nature as a whole. Hume often seems more interested in explaining morality as a natural phenomenon than in setting out a normative ethical theory, treating moral action as part of the same physical world in which we explain things in terms of cause and effect EHU 8. On this view, everything we do is open to empirical investigation and explanation. In fact, Hume often compares humans with other animals, tracing the bases of human morality to features of the mind that human beings and other animals have in common T 2. His detailed treatment of virtue and moral judgment draws heavily on observations and ideas about human nature. But Kant makes explicit that morality

must be based on a supreme moral principle, which can only be discovered a priori, through a method of pure moral philosophy G 4: We could never discover a principle that commands all rational beings with such absolute authority through a method of empirical moral philosophy. An empirical approach, he argues, can tell us how people do act, but it cannot tell us how we ought to act. Moreover, we must keep the pure and empirical parts of moral philosophy clearly distinguished, since if we do not we could find ourselves confusing conditional truths, such as what is prudentially good for certain individuals or species, with unconditional truths about fundamental moral requirements G 4: Once one has in hand the supreme principle of morality, however, one requires an understanding of human beings in order to apply it to them MM 6: One can say little about what the supreme moral principle requires as duties human agents have to themselves and to one another without knowing such things as the sorts of ends people may be inclined to adopt and the conditions under which human agency will characteristically thrive or wither. Early in his career Kant endorsed an idiosyncratic form of sentimentalism. But he often indicated that he saw Hutcheson as more significant to ethics than Hume. He seems to have associated Hutcheson more with the positive insights about the role of sensibility in ethics, whereas he seems to have associated Hume more with skepticism about practical reason Kuehn In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, which often reads like the work of a mid-eighteenth century British thinker, Kant notes and analyzes the various feelings of pleasure or displeasure, and attraction and aversion, people feel to different traits and temperaments in themselves and others and to different types of literature, objects in nature, kinds of relationships, and other things. His statements about the foundation of morality and its principles convey a commitment to some form of sentimentalism, however idiosyncratic. He claims, for example, that the principles of morality are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance. Kant expresses a similar line of thought in another work from the period, *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, where he distinguishes between the faculty for representing truth and the faculty for experiencing the good, identifying the latter with feeling. For example, in the announcement of his lectures for the winter semester of 1786, he explains one difference between ethics and metaphysics by remarking that the distinction between good and evil in actions, and the judgment of moral rightness, can be known, easily and accurately, by the human heart through what is called sentiment, and that without elaborate necessity of proofs. If Kant was genuinely trying out a version of sentimentalism in the 1780s, this phase did not last long, nor was it a simple adoption of the theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, or Hume. Morality imposes unconditional requirements, and he became increasingly convinced that sentimentalism could not explain or justify such requirements. In a number of works, Kant creates taxonomies of misguided, heteronomous ethical theories based on material determining grounds—in contrast to his theory of autonomy, in which the moral motive constitutes an objective, formal determining ground see Wood b [Other Internet Resources]; Irwin Kant distinguishes among these theories based on their accounts of the basis of moral obligation or the fundamental moral principle G 4: Such theories may assume either subjective empirical or objective rational determining grounds for the moral principle; and within each of these categories, there are theories that assume these determining grounds are external, and others that assume they are internal. Objective, internal grounds include perfection e. Objective, external grounds include the will of God e. Subjective, external grounds include education e. Subjective, internal grounds can include physical feeling, such as self-love e. Thus, Kant locates moral sense theories among those theories that assume a subjective, empirical, internal determining ground of moral feeling as the principle of morality cf. From the *Groundwork* on, Kant registers a number of complaints against sentimentalism, all of which cluster around what he takes to be the core insight into its inadequacy. No empirical principles can ground moral laws, because moral laws bind all rational beings universally, necessarily, and unconditionally; empirical principles are contingent in various ways, for example, on aspects of human nature G 4: Variance in moral feelings makes them an inadequate standard of good and evil G 4: Moral feelings cannot be the source of the supreme moral principle, because the supreme moral principle holds for all rational beings, whereas feelings differ from person to person M If duty were grounded in feeling, it would seem that morality would bind some people e. Even if people were in complete agreement

regarding their moral feelings, the universality of these feelings would be a contingent matter, and thus an inadequate ground for the unconditionally binding moral law. Indeed, if morality were grounded in feeling, it would be arbitrary: God could have constituted us so that we would get from vice the pleasurable, calm feelings of approval that we now allegedly get from virtue. So for Kant, the contingency of the ground of obligation offered by moral sense theories renders those theories inadequate; only a priori determining grounds will do. In his notes Kant remarks that moral sense theories are better understood as providing a hypothesis explaining why we in fact feel approval and disapproval of various actions than as supplying a principle that justifies approval or disapproval or that guides actions. For this [compassion] is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish. MM 6: Reason and Emotion in Morality Kant, as discussed above, underwent a decisive change of mind about the views of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. We can see this opposition at work in their respective accounts of moral judgment and moral motivation. According to Hume, moral judgments typically concern the character traits and motives behind human actions. To make a moral judgment is to detect, by means of a sentiment, the operation of a virtuous or vicious quality of mind. Reason and experience are required for determining the likely effects of a given motive or character trait, so reason does play an important role in moral judgment. For example, a person might hate or envy the courage of her enemy but this is not necessarily a moral response. On the contrary, rather than eliminating her sentiments, the judicious spectator enlarges them by means of sympathy, which enables her to resent the misery of others or rejoice in their happiness. Regarding the mechanism of sympathy, see Taylor. Kant offers a very different account of moral judgment. He focuses on the first-person judgments an agent not a spectator must make about how to behave. In his view, the primary question is whether a particular mode of conduct is permissible, required, or forbidden in light of the moral law, and sentiment or emotion has no authority in this matter. It is an imperative because it commands and constrains us; it is categorical because it commands and constrains us with ultimate authority and without regard to our personal preferences or any empirically contingent ends. G 4: Scholars disagree about the relationship between these two formulations of the CI, as well as their relationship to the other formulations Kant provides. Kant claims that FUL is the standard everyone actually does employ in moral judgment. G 4: Others argue in favor of FEI, emphasizing, in particular, its role in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, where FEI seems to play the fundamental role in guiding judgment about specific ethical duties. e. A rational being equipped with a purely formal procedure for testing maxims has all she needs. Yet such passages are misleading when read in isolation. Second, Kant frequently emphasizes that no formal procedure could specify all the principles for applying higher-order principles. The wider the duty, the more latitude for individual judgment and experience. MM 6: For example, without these, one might be unable to determine whether a particular act of beneficence is more condescending than kind. MM 6: Proper moral judgment in such circumstances requires attunement to the feelings of others, but also facility with the social conventions that shape the dynamics of personal interaction. Kant and Hume are clearly opposed on the question of whether reason or feeling has the final say in moral matters. Hume assigns reason to a subordinate role, while Kant takes reason to be the highest normative authority. However, it is important not to misunderstand the nature of their opposition. This is his main focus. He says relatively little about what is going on in our heads or the surrounding social environment when we actually make moral judgments. As noted above, Kant at least entertained the possibility that sentimentalism provides the correct empirical explanation of why human beings tend to approve or disapprove of the actions and motives that they do. NF. A similar contrast between Hume and Kant can be found in their respective accounts of moral motivation. The claim is not that reason has no role in human action, but rather that its role is subordinate to passion. Hume offers three main arguments for this claim in *A Treatise of Human Nature*.

3: Library Resource Finder: Table of Contents for: Consequentialism and its critics

Conrad D. Johnson - Cambridge University Press. This is a book about moral reasoning: how we actually reason and how we ought to reason. It defends a form of 'rule' utilitarianism whereby we must sometimes judge and act in moral questions in accordance with generally accepted rules, so long as the existence of those rules is justified by.

Share on Facebook A moral agent has the ability to make moral distinctions and moral decisions. Individual people, under most circumstances, are considered morally responsible for the decisions they make. When an organized group of people makes a decision, it can be difficult to assess who is responsible for the decision. Definition and Distinction To be a moral agent in any situation, a person must be in a position to choose between two or more courses of action. For instance, if a person suffers a stroke while driving and causes an accident, she is not considered morally responsible for the accident because she could not have chosen not to have a stroke. If the same person gets in an accident under the the influence of alcohol, she would be considered morally responsible because she could have chosen not to drink. Therefore, moral agency depends on a choice by a person capable of making such a choice. The question of organizational moral agency depends on whether organizations can be thought of as entities capable of making choices. Organizations and Moral Agency An owner of a small business is generally held responsible for all of the actions of that business because the decision is his alone. For example, if the owner of a convenience store decides to charge double for water bottles during a drought, he is personally responsible for the decision. However, if a corporation that owns hundreds of convenience stores starts doing the same thing, it is not always clear who is responsible. The executives who create the policy might argue they are legally obligated to maximize shareholder profits. If neither the executives nor the employees are moral agents in the situation, the organization itself might be considered a moral agent. Corporate Entities The trouble with treating an organization as an entity for moral purposes is that an organization is just a hypothetical construct. The individual people who work for the organization make moral choices every day, but an abstract entity such as a corporation is incapable of making moral choices. This can create situations in which the organization appears to make decisions, but no individual person will claim responsibility for those decisions. If the owner of a small business suddenly loses access to her bank account due to a technical error, she could fall behind on payroll and other bills, and potentially go out of business. Yet if the bank has a policy that delays the resolution of the issue until certain conditions are met, the owner might be told that nothing can be done because the policy cannot be violated under any conditions. Assigning Moral Agency Unless the capability of making moral decisions can be assigned to a particular person or entity, there can be no moral agency in the situation. Large organizations will make decisions through a process in which all parties involved disavow moral responsibility for the decisions they are making. Some theories of business ethics treat companies as moral agents on the basis that the existence of a corporate culture and a corporate personality is sufficient to consider the organization as an entity in its own right with the capability of making moral choices. However, this view is controversial and has no clear legal application. Small-business owners and other individuals can gain some power to put moral pressure on large organizations by buying a small amount of stock in the company and speaking up at shareholder meetings about policy changes they would like to see.

4: Library Resource Finder: Staff View for: Consequentialism and its critics

In this anthology, distinguished scholars--Thomas Nagel, T.M. Scanlon, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Samuela Scheffler, Conrad D. Johnson, Bernard Williams, Peter Railton, Amartya Sen, Philippa Foot, and Derek Parfit-- debate arguments for and against the moral doctrine of consequentialism to present a.

5: STEPHEN DARWALL

2 Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Gregor, M. J., Cambridge, , p. 35 [].When

citing all works by Kant except the Critique of Pure Reason, the first number will refer to the page in the edition cited.

6: Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its Critics - PhilPapers

For a recent statement of this point, well-known to students of legal and political philosophy, by a moral philosopher see Conrad D. Johnson, 'The Authority of the Moral Agent,' Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 82, No. 8,), pp.

7: The Definition of Morality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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8: Works by Conrad D. Johnson - PhilPapers

assessed by ordinary moral agents from the plural perspective. Thus, Johnson needs an account of this plural deliberative per- spective if his project is to succeed.

Extrusion coating a process manual Kaplan NCLEX-RN 2004-2005 with CD-ROM The Complete Resume Book Job-Getters Guide Philosophy of legal reasoning Development of an integrated aeroservoelastic analysis program and correlation with test data The Suggested Relationship between Sabbatianism, Haskalah, Evaluation of social programs XI. Talk and talkers: second paper Fascism, comparison and definition Orthogonal Methods for Array Synthesis General knowledge in gujarati 2016 White As Whales Bone Assad brothers rhapsody in blue. scribd Health Care Disparities: Respiratory Outcomes in Minorities, An Issue of Clinics in Chest Medicine (The C Santa Fe Trail Days at Fort Larned Mr. Traven, I Presume? Fuji finepix s2000hd manual Culture in language learning Microwave engineering and systems applications Importance of event management Billy Graham, Day-By-Day-1992 Calendar Classical European furniture design Counsels for the New Year Childbirth With Hypnosis Philosophical letters between the late learned Mr. Ray and several of his ingenious correspondents, nativ Performance dimensions Challenge of hidden profits Phylogeny of anguimorph lizards A simple crystal receiver 88 The Christmas cookie book Cultural anthropology and human experience the feast of life Cicero De Natura Deorum I Engineering metallurgy Knowing Jesus through the Old Testament Frommers Vancouver Victoria for Dummies Challenges in Hand Surgery, An Issue of Clinics in Plastic Surgery The Arabian Nights (Large Print Edition) Beat the market, 1985 V.10. In a hollow of the hills and other tales. Turkish foreign policy and Turkish identity