

## 1: The Topology of the Kantian Sublime

*Thus, in Kant, the sublime leads us from the autonomy of the beautiful experience to a 'superior autonomy', that of reason and the super-sensible world. 'Lyotard,' Rancière says, 'turns this logic strictly on its head' ( 93).*

It may not have been checked over by human eyes. For matters of precision please consult the original pdf. Two closely interconnected questions will be raised: What makes this theoretical construction possible? What is at stake in it? At the beginning of this text, Lyotard makes the following proposition: And for Lyotard it is jeopardized by some new artistic currents – such as trans-avant-gardism or neo-expressionism – which either come back to old artistic formulas or blend them with the modernist tradition. The sublime does not designate the product of an artistic practice as such. Lyotard is of course aware of the problem. But he states it in a way that amounts to dismissing it. Of primary interest is the very formulation of his question. What is an art in this context. That is, what art is possible under the category of the sublime? But obviously this question skips over the logically prior question: How is it possible that any art be subsumed under it? And this answer substantializes in advance the idea of a sublime art. Hegel changed the Kantian feeling of the sublime into the characteristic of an art, the symbolic art. He makes the sublime discrepancy into a property of artworks themselves. But Lyotard apparently takes a step further: In a word, the point is to approach matter in its alterity. The art of the sublime is art responding to the alterity of its matter, to the aistheton. What are the characteristics of this alterity? It aims at giving matter the properties that Kant gives only to aesthetic form. Form is no longer what it had been with Aristotle: On the contrary, there is aesthetic form in so far as the active power no longer imposes its law on passive matter. The chief property of aesthetic form is its unavailability. Aesthetic judgement is referred to a form that is precisely not a conceptual form imposing its law to the manifold of sensation. The beautiful is beautiful as such to the extent that it is neither an object of cognition, subjecting sensation to the law of the understanding, nor an object of desire, subjecting reason to the anarchy of sensations. This neither – nor is the presupposition of aesthetic experience as such. It is unclear whether such pleasure belongs to the mere agreement of the sensation, which is an effect of the regularity of vibrations on our senses, or whether it depends on the perception of the regularity as a form. This ambiguity helps to restore the traditional opposition of form and matter and to reset the stage of an either – or, as is obvious in the fourteenth paragraph of the Critique of Judgement. It is no coincidence that Lyotard brings the status of tone and colour to the heart of his argumentation; or that he wants precisely to claim that colour and tone have the autonomy, the unavailability of the aesthetic form. There is either the autonomy of the mind in knowledge or its heteronomy in Ethics. All these terms are interchangeable. They all designate the event of a passion, a possibility for which the mind will not have been prepared, which will have unsettled it and of which it conserves only the feeling – anguish and jubilation – of an obscure debt. Clearly the second characteristic is borrowed from the Analytic of the Sublime with the result of yet another displacement. This means that the aistheton is two things at once: It is the sign of an unrepresentable. Put simply, in Lyotard the tone or the nuance seems to play the same role as the pyramid or the stormy ocean in Kant. But the ways and ends of these two forms of disagreement are diametrically opposed. It cannot offer Reason an apprehension of the magnitude as a whole. In so doing it proves two things: It also leads from the autonomy of aesthetic free play to a superior autonomy, the autonomy of Reason as a supersensuous legislator. Lyotard turns all this on its head. The aistheton acts as a shock that induces in the mind the sensation of its radical dependence. The aesthetic condition is enslavement to the aistheton without which it is anesthesia. It invalidates any intellectual pretension to autonomy. Now this is not all. But here too Lyotard turns the conclusion of the deduction into its opposite. Enslavement to the aistheton means enslavement to the law of alterity. The experience of the sublime in Lyotard reveals the exact contrary of what is revealed in the Kantian sublime. It is pointless to argue that Lyotard has misread Kant. It would be more relevant to ask why he reads Kant the way he does. But the primary question is: This paradox cannot be resolved by reference to a postmodern turn. The standard view of Lyotard as a postmodern theorist is misleading. Postmodernity is for Lyotard a descriptive category that accounts for a state of things; it is not a new paradigm of art and of

rationality. The question thus arises, how does Lyotard reconcile two apparently opposite ideas: How can he conceive a historical task of modernity that would be witness to the originary and inescapable servitude of the subject? Mixing on the same surface neo hyperrealist motifs and abstract, lyrical or conceptual motifs means that everything is equivalent because everything is good for consumption. This is an attempt to establish and have approved a new taste. This taste is no taste. Now in my view this question is the only one worthy of what is at stake in life and thought in the coming century. It is not a taste because it must not be a taste. We easily recognize the form of this argument. It substitutes for it a quite different idea: Obviously this does not mean that they are not sold; what is suggested, rather, is something in their very sensory texture, in the way we experience them, that stands in sharp contrast to the status of consumable things. The beautiful, Kant maintains, is neither the agreeable nor the good. Artworks, Adorno or Lyotard maintain, must not be agreeable, they must not be available to the desire that holds objects as consumable. Art has to do with disagreement. And it is this power of disagreement that makes it good and ties it to another good. In Adorno the argument is clear. The disagreement of art is called contradiction. Contradiction endows the artwork with the double property of a power and a lack of power: But the ways and the ends of the artistic disagreement no longer fall under the concept of contradiction. And the disagreement no longer bears witness to an alienation that should be suppressed. It is the sheer inscription of alienation, an enslavement of the soul that cannot be suppressed. What makes this reversal possible? Here again, the reference to a postmodern break does not help account for the problem. To the extent that the notion of postmodernism makes sense – which is not much in my view – it dismisses the idea of a historical duty of the avant-garde. Agreement as disagreement What is at stake in this reading of Kant by Schiller? The free play of understanding and imagination in the experience of the beautiful puts an entirely new kind of freedom in play. It puts in play an autonomy that has nothing to do with the autonomy that the mind imposes, as its own law, to the manifold of sensation. Rather, aesthetic autonomy is the withdrawal of that kind of autonomy; its autonomy is in fact strictly related to the withdrawal of power. The free appearance stands before the subject and is unavailable to the domination of knowledge or will. So it turns out that the agreement without concept of understanding and imagination is a disagreement as well. There is no need to look in the sublime experience of magnitude, power or fear for the mark of disagreement that would found the radicality of art. The experience of beauty, the experience of the neither-nor, is already a double-bind, an experience of attraction and repulsion. It underscores the identity of Kantian opposites, charm and respect, that Schiller translates as grace and dignity. Why does the statue simultaneously draw us over and keep us at bay? She neither yields, nor resists. She is free from the links of will and obedience. It turned to terror because the revolutionary power had played the traditional part of the Understanding – meaning the state – imposing the law of universality onto the matter of the sensations – meaning the masses. The Revolution remained true to the traditional opposition between a class of the mind and a class caught in sensation. This new partition represents precisely what is at stake in the aesthetic experience, which, far from simply reversing the power of understanding over sensuousness, as the Revolutionary power had done, instead neutralizes it. There is a new meaning to universality, a new sensuous equality, involved in the experience of free play and pleasure in appearance. For Schiller, this new sense carries the promise of equality, the promise of a new way of sharing a common world. This sensory experience is the experience of a heterogeneous sensuousness, cancelling the oppositions of activity and passivity, or form and matter, which frame ordinary experience. This means that the sublime disagreement is already involved in the beautiful agreement.

## 2: Transcending Equality: Jacques Rancière and the sublime in politics | Daniel Tkatch - [www.enganche.com](http://www.enganche.com)

*10 The Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Political in Burke's Work with the micro-politics of individual self-formation, just as it is possible to read the work of thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault in this way.*

The pleasure, however, is of a distinctive kind: But the disinterested character of the feeling distinguishes them from other judgments based on feeling. In particular, it distinguishes them from i judgments of the agreeable, which are the kind of judgment expressed by saying simply that one likes something or finds it pleasing for example, food or drink , and ii judgments of the good, including judgments both about the moral goodness of something and about its goodness for particular non-moral purposes. It follows from this that judgments of beauty cannot, despite their universal validity, be proved: More strongly, judgments of beauty are not to be understood as predicating the concept beauty of their objects: The fact that judgments of beauty are universally valid constitutes a further feature in addition to the disinterestedness of the pleasure on which they are based distinguishing them from judgments of agreeable. For in claiming simply that one likes something, one does not claim that everyone else ought to like it too. But the fact that their universal validity is not based on concepts distinguishes judgments of beauty from non-evaluative cognitive judgments and judgments of the good, both of which make a claim to universal validity that is based on concepts. This is closely related to the point that their universality is not based on concepts. On the one hand, judgments of beauty are based on feeling, they do not depend on subsuming the object under a concept in particular, the concept of a purpose which such an object is supposed to satisfy , and they cannot be proved. This combination of features seems to suggest that judgments of beauty should be assimilated to judgments of the agreeable. These features seem to suggest that they should be assimilated, instead, to objective cognitive judgments. In claiming that judgments of beauty have both sets of features, Kant can be seen as reacting equally against the two main opposing traditions in eighteenth-century aesthetics: But this insistence confronts him with the obvious problem of how the two features, or sets of features, are to be reconciled. As Kant puts it: The rules prescribed by the understanding, are, or correspond to, particular concepts which are applied to the object. For example, when a manifold is synthesized in accordance with the concepts green and square, the outcome is a perceptual experience in which the object is perceived as green and square. In this relationship, imagination and understanding in effect do what is ordinarily involved in the bringing of objects under concepts, and hence in the perception of objects as having empirical features: So rather than perceiving the object as green or square, the subject whose faculties are in free play responds to it perceptually with a state of mind which is non-conceptual, and specifically a feeling of disinterested pleasure. It is this kind of pleasure which is the basis for a judgment of taste. Kant appeals to this account of pleasure in the beautiful in order to argue for its universal validity or universal communicability: We are entitled to claim that everyone ought to agree with our cognitions: But in order for this demand for agreement to be possible, he suggests, it must also be possible for me to demand universal agreement for the subjective condition of such cognitions. The most serious objection to the argument can be put in the form of a dilemma; see for example Guyer , p. Either the free play of the faculties is involved in all cognitive perceptual experience, or it is not. If it is, then it would seem, counterintuitively, that every object should be perceived as beautiful. But if it is not, then the central inference does not seem to go through. From the fact that I can demand agreement for the state of my faculties in experiencing an object as, say, green or square, it does not follow that I can demand agreement for a state in which my faculties are in free play, since the possibility of experiencing the free play would seem to require something over and above what is required for cognition alone. Most defenders of the argument have grasped the second horn of the dilemma. One such defence, originally proposed by Ameriks in his subsequently incorporated into Ameriks , relies on an understanding of judgments of taste as objective, and hence as making a claim to universal agreement which is akin to that made by cognitive judgments. For more on the objectivity of taste, see Section 2. Another, offered by Allison, rejects the objection as presupposing an overly strong interpretation of what the Deduction is intended to accomplish. The objection tells against the Deduction only if it is construed as entitling us to claim universal agreement for particular judgments of taste; but, as Allison

reads it, the Deduction is intended only to establish that such claims can, in general, be legitimate Allison , ch. A similar position is taken by Kalar , However, some commentators have taken this kind of defence to be inadequate, holding that the argument must establish not only a general entitlement to demand agreement for judgments of beauty, but an entitlement in each particular case Savile , Chignell However, approaches along these lines have not figured prominently in the literature on the Deduction. As noted below Section 2. This seems to imply that the pleasure is distinct from the act of judging, and more specifically that the pleasure precedes the judging: An approach along these lines is developed in detail by Paul Guyer, who draws on passages elsewhere in the text to defend the view that a judgment of taste results from two distinct acts of reflective judgment, the first identifiable with the free play of the faculties and resulting in a feeling of pleasure, the second an act of reflection on the pleasure which results in the claim that the pleasure is universally communicable. See his , especially pp. This implies that the act of judging which precedes the pleasure must be one in which the subject takes her state of mind to be universally communicable, requiring us to identify it with the judgment of taste proper rather than with an activity of the faculty prior to that judgment. This requires addressing the textual difficulty just mentioned. Guyer himself proposes disregarding the problematic passage at 5: The free play of the faculties on this approach is identical with the judging of the object to be beautiful and in turn with the feeling of pleasure: In its identification of the pleasure and the judgment the view is like that of Richard Aquila , see especially and, more recently, Robert Wicks , 43â€”45 , although neither Aquila nor Wicks explicitly endorses the apparent consequence, that the pleasure or judgment must involve a claim to its own universal communicability. However, rather than understand the pleasure as awareness of its own universal communicability, Longuenesse takes it to be awareness of a prior, and independent, feeling of pleasure elicited by the free play of the faculties, so that there are two distinct feelings of pleasure involved in judging an object to be beautiful , â€” ; , pp. Imagination in the free play, he says, conforms to the general conditions for the application of concepts to objects that are presented to our senses, yet without any particular concept being applied, so that imagination conforms to the conditions of understanding without the constraint of particular concepts. It is left to commentators to try to explain how such an activity is intelligible and why, if it is indeed intelligible, it should give rise to, or be experienced as, a feeling of pleasure. Some commentators try to make sense of the free play by appealing to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, for example to the kind of experience involved in appreciating an abstract painting, where the subject might imaginatively relate the various elements of the painting to one another and perceive them as having an order and unity which is non-conceptual; see for example Bell , p. As with the deduction of taste see Section 2. A particularly detailed and thorough treatment of this approach is offered in Rogerson for an earlier and briefer treatment, see Rogerson Many commentators assume, whether tacitly or explicitly, that the free play of imagination and understanding represents a natural psychological process, taking place in time and thus subject to natural causal laws. The views touched on in this section represent only a sampling of the various accounts of the free play which have been offered. A useful survey is offered by Guyer , who classifies various accounts under three heads: A variety of still more recent approaches to the free play are summarized and discussed in Guyer According to Guyer, the answer is no see especially , pp. Although Kant sometimes describes pleasure as awareness of the free play of the faculties, Guyer takes the relation between the free play and the feeling of pleasure to be merely causal. While many commentators follow Guyer on this point, opposing views have been taken by e. Kant suggests that a judgment of taste demands agreement in the same way that an objective cognitive judgment demands agreement see e. Guyer argues that the claim should be understood as a rational expectation or ideal prediction: Savile and Chignell follow Guyer in understanding the claim in this way. It is tempting to assimilate it to cognitive or epistemic normativity, where this in turn might be understood as the normativity involved in the putative principles that one ought to believe what is true, or, alternatively, what is justified in light of the evidence. Granted, pace Guyer, that the claim is normative without being moral, further questions can be raised about its strength and character. Moran understands the demand as reflecting a sense of obligation or requirement, distinct from moral obligation, but stronger than that present in the case of empirical cognitive judgment. A similar suggestion is made in Makkai Roughly, on the view suggested by Moran and Makkai, the claim implicit in a judgment of beauty is not merely the

conditional claim that others, if they perceive the object, ought to judge it to be beautiful; it is the unconditional claim that others ought to perceive it and, in so doing, judge it to be beautiful. The idea that Kant takes us to be subject to a demand to attend to beautiful objects is also put forward in Kalar , but Kalar understands that demand as one of two distinct normative demands made in the judgment of beauty: Should judgments of beauty be regarded as objective? Similar views are proposed by Savile and Kulenkampff ; see also the references offered by Ameriks at , n. The question of whether Kant should be interpreted as committed to the objectivity of taste is closely related to the question of whether there can be erroneous judgments of taste; for some discussion see Cohen , pp. He has very little to say about the judgment that an object is not beautiful, or about the displeasure associated with judging an object to be ugly. As noted in Section 2. Does his treatment allow for negative judgments of beauty, either that an object is not beautiful or that it is ugly? It is useful, in considering this topic, to distinguish the question of how we can judge that something is not beautiful, from that of how we can judge it to be ugly. The former question can be seen an aspect of a more general problem about how we can make judgments in which ascriptions of beauty figure in embedded contexts, for example as the antecedents of conditionals; this is akin to what is often referred to as the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism. The second question is more specific and can be framed in terms of aesthetic experience: Some commentators, for example Ginsborg , pp. Guyer argues that while there is displeasure in the ugly it always involves an interest; Ginsborg allows also for disinterested judgments of ugliness, but denies that these involve a characteristic feeling of displeasure; rather, we judge that something is ugly if it lacks beauty in a context where beauty is expected. Some Criticisms As noted at the end of Section 2. For discussion of the questions of disinterestedness and formalism, see Guyer , chs. A different kind of objection, based on an appeal to the cognitive role of aesthetic judging, is made in Pillow This criticism is addressed in Janaway Relatedly, it has been objected Kant does not allow room for reason-giving, and more generally, criticism in aesthetics; that objection is addressed in Crawford and on lines suggested by Crawford in Wilson But Kant also allows for judgments of beauty which fall short of being pure. Judgments of beauty can fail to be pure in two ways. One reason to think that the distinction is important is that Kant seems to suggest that all judgments of beauty about representational art are judgments of adherent rather than of free beauty, and hence that they are all impure. However, this consequence is debatable. For example, Allison argues that judgments of adherent beauty contain, as a component, a pure judgment of beauty. This objection is challenged by Schaper , ch. Further discussions of the distinction between free and adherent beauty include Scarre , Lorand , Gammon , Kalar , pp. The artist cannot produce a beautiful work by learning, and then applying, rules which determine when something is beautiful; for no such rules can be specified see the sketch of the Second Moment in Section 2. An artist endowed with genius has a natural capacity to produce objects which are appropriately judged as beautiful, and this capacity does not require the artist him- or herself to consciously follow rules for the production of such objects; in fact the artist himself does not know, and so cannot explain, how he or she was able to bring them into being. A work of art expresses or exhibits an aesthetic idea in so far as it succeeds in giving sensible form to a rational idea. This claim has been thought by some commentators to be problematic. A related question concerns the relative importance for Kant of natural as opposed to artistic beauty. In such a situation imagination strives to comprehend the object in accordance with a demand of reason, but fails to do so. We have the feeling of the dynamically sublime when we experience nature as fearful while knowing ourselves to be in a position of safety and hence without in fact being afraid. The feeling associated with the sublime is a feeling of pleasure in the superiority of our reason over nature, but it also involves displeasure. Kant is not consistent in his descriptions of how the pleasure and the displeasure are related, but one characterization describes them as alternating:

## 3: The Poetics of Political Thinking |

*Illuminates the role of aesthetic concepts and devices - such as metaphor, mimesis, and the sublime - in structuring the thought of political figures from Thomas Hobbes to Jacques Ranciere.*

Stephen Zepke Contemporary art - beautiful or sublime? Stephen Zepke Recent French aesthetic theory remains fixated on the realm of sensation that was laid out for art by Kant. We might find this surprising given that art since the end of the 60s " and with Duchamp earlier " took a path that rejected sensation or at least challenged its privilege in favor of conceptual and political practices that mixed art with philosophy, the mass-media, information technology and the rest of the world. Tracing these differences provides a Kantian topology of contemporary aesthetics, and reveals some of the deeper implications these different philosophies of difference have for contemporary art and aesthetics. We can clearly see Kant in this last suspended opposition, which occurs in the aesthetic experience of beauty. In their place emerges difference in itself, a super-sensible but nevertheless immanent element that is the vital and virtual principle of sensation, a sensation-event that is expressed or actualized in an art work adequate to its sublime dimensions. Lyotard therefore places his sublime aesthetics directly against those of the beautiful; The analysis of the beautiful allows one to hope for the advent of a subject as unity of the faculties, and for a legitimation of the agreement of real objects with the authentic destination of this subject, in the Idea of nature. Yet what is of interest in sublime feeling is precisely what detonates this disappointment This is a *sensus* but not a *communis*, or at least not yet. The sublime, Kant says, is a reflexive judgment, and so it takes us from the particular to the universal. But what, Lyotard asks, is this universal? This universal is nothing, a void, a radical absence, and aesthetics " and its politics " is the sensible manifestation of this universal and transcendental lack. For Lyotard, the pain of the excessive sublime sensation does not lead to the pleasure of knowing the absolute certainty of the Ideas. In fact its the other way around; The despair of never being able to present something within reality on the scale of the Idea then overrides the joy of being nonetheless called upon to do so. We are more depressed by the abyss that separates heterogeneous genres of discourse [ie. There is, in other words, no redemption. There is a partial echo with Deleuze here, who will also find the irreducible difference between the faculties to be genetic, and will found his system on this differential genesis. But in Deleuze the priority Kant gives the Ideas over their sensible actualization will be retained, and not " as in Lyotard " reversed. It does not belong to this world because it begets it, it falls from a prehistory, or from an a-history. The occurrence of this generative difference is, Lyotard believes, what is performed by Modernity. Art is ethical, Lyotard believes, because it obliges us to give way all personal interest, to subside in front of its event, to be disinterested. It is a sublime sound, a discordant accord, a presentation of the unrepresentable. It is an ethics of the Other that is a poetics and a politics, because in the pure atemporality of its event art refuses any universal, any Idea that would presume to understand the aistheton, that would wrap it within a consensus or a completeness. In other words the work " the work qua event " comes first, and in bearing witness to the Thing it gives birth to an infinite multiplicity of others, each a unique experiment and experience. This ethical necessity of art is also a politics inasmuch as bearing witness to the Other evokes the horrors of past attempts to obliterate it, especially the Holocaust. The continual eruption of the event is therefore a way of disrupting the amnesia of postmodernity, forcing us to remember the extermination of the Jews in World War 2. This prohibition, a prohibition that is as well an obligation, is nothing but the unbridgeable chasm between sensible and super-sensible worlds, between the human and the inhuman, between the individual and his or her obliteration in the absolute. But they are objections about the destiny of the avant-garde, and this is what makes them relevant for contemporary art. The statue, he claims, both attracts us and makes us recoil, calms and agitates us. The avant-garde thereby moves from inscribing the contradiction between capitalism and art to mourning the absence of the Thing the Holocaust from the sensible, forcing the subject to either submit to the violence of the aistheton, or undergo its absence. Lyotard does privilege heterogeneity as the ethical mechanism of art, but he does not efface his critique of capitalism in mourning. If this is true then we are right to consider the more radical aesthetic attacks on capitalism proposed by Lyotard and Deleuze. In fact he insists

that there is nothing that is unrepresentable, including the Holocaust. In this way he posits the dissensual democracy of his aesthetic regime as the best response to our contemporary demands for a philosophy of immanence. But is this really the case? It seems to me that from another perspective Lyotard, in a way very similar to Deleuze, locates an interior outside the inhuman as the genetic difference that insures immanence remains ontologically rather than discursively justified. In this sense the aim of aesthetics and politics in Lyotard and Deleuze is not to produce a new sensual community, a new political body whose discursive framework allows it to negotiate relative differences, but instead aesthetics as politics or ethics would introduce an immanent outside, a difference that was productive inasmuch as it was absolute and it eternally returned. In other words, the aim of politics and aesthetics for Lyotard is not to overcome alienation in a new community, but to orient the community around alienation as its productive principle. The first explores the embodiment of designation, its materialization, and the second elucidates a figural matrix that connects images to their libidinal production. For both Lyotard and Deleuze the figural emerges as the expression of invisible forces, an expression or actualization of a super-sensible realm that only appears through the destruction of the human, all too human. In this sense the experience of the figural is sublime for both thinkers, and reveals a world of pure sensation that escapes the a priori relations determining the figurative form. In fact their respective readings of the sublime reveal both the closeness and distance between their work. Both thinkers will attempt to integrate the Kantian difference between the faculties of the super-sensible and the sensible into an ontology of sensation. According to Deleuze and Guattari Lyotard does not manage to escape this logic of lack, and despite the promising developments in *Discours, Figure*, he is finally condemned for making the subject enter desire through castration. Lyotard, as we have seen, posits the Thing as absolute and super-sensible, and it is only ever its unrepresentable presence that can be revealed in the visual event or aistheton. This is the moment when the form of time is introduced into thought. In the sublime the genetic conditions of experience emerge in themselves, as the difference between the faculties, a difference Deleuze raises to a higher power that overcomes the very possibility of common sense. Deleuze however, reading Kant very literally on this point, will find in the sublime a transcendental genetic principle of discord or difference that will overcome common sense and its human, all too human sensibility. Imagination has no limit when it is apprehending successive parts because as long as it has established a unit of measure it can apprehend successive parts to infinity. But imagination does reach its limit when it attempts to simultaneously reproduce this infinity of parts, which it cannot synthesize into a single experience. An aesthetic synthesis is made up from subjective judgments Kant claims, because its unit of measure is always our body. Here we comprehend an Idea of Nature that is super-sensible and that underlies both Nature and our own faculty of reason. It is this painful harmony that is the moment of superior or transcendental empiricism, the moment when the imagination is projected beyond its human conditions of possibility, to reveal what is beyond it and yet conditions it, the transcendental Ideas. It is significant here that the sublime emerges in a reflective judgment. In the judgment of the sublime raw intuition emerges for itself in an aesthetic synthesis "a sensation that exceeds imagination, but in doing so reveals itself to be determined by the super-sensible Ideas. In *Difference and Repetition* the transcendental Ideas are real conditions that remain distinct from real experience. It is not the given but that by which the given is given. Where it differs however, is that this separation is genetic on both sides of the gap, and for Deleuze the super-sensible realm is constantly producing new Ideas and faculties. This discordant harmony is what it means to think, to think is to confront what cannot be thought, what exceeds thought and experience but by doing so also transcendently determines it. As a result, experience both expresses but also in an important sense constructs the super-sensible faculties. His examples include the faculty of speech and its transcendental object of poetry, the faculty of sociability and revolution, the faculty of physical life and its transcendental object of sensation. Nevertheless, this gap between the sensible and super-sensible realms remained a problem for Deleuze that his later work with Guattari tried to dissolve in the immanence of matter and force. There he ceases to talk about faculties and Ideas, and instead emphasizes how the sublime sensations produced by art exceed any aesthetic comprehension that uses the body as its phenomenological measure, and so gives rise to a new type of aesthetic synthesis, an inhuman synthesis in a state of continual variation. My whole structure of perception is

in the process of exploding because we have seen that this whole perceptive synthesis found its foundation in aesthetic comprehension, which is to say the evaluation of rhythm. The sublime The art work is, according to Deleuze, a raw sensation torn from the clichés and banalities of the world in such a way as to allow this genetic difference to become productive. As we have seen, it opens onto chaos. Art promises a people in two contradictory ways: Deleuze, like Lyotard, refuses this kind of reconciliation, and insists on the sublime sensation as the eruption of an inhuman art in the human. In other words, the people to come announced by art is never, for Deleuze, a *sensus communis*, it is the actualization of a transcendental difference by which human being becomes something else. Lyotard is like Deleuze in making art a sublime discord between the mind and an inhuman and excessive power. While for both the transcendental difference is genetic, in Lyotard it can only give rise to an acknowledgement of the impossibility of ever experiencing heterogeneity, to the presence of this impossibility in experience, while in Deleuze transcendental difference produces a real experience that is understood as an actual but nevertheless asubjective individuation directly expressing and constructing a virtual Idea. I fear, however, that they are more logical, that the transcendence instituted at the heart of Immanence, in fact, signifies the submission of art to a law of heteronomy which undermines every form of transmission of the vibration of colour and of the embrace of forms to the vibrations and to the embraces of a fraternal humanity. And the question remains: No doubt one could say the same of Deleuze and Lyotard, whether one wanted to choose one over the other or not. Both Deleuze and Lyotard will use the concept of the sublime to re-orient aesthetics towards the ontological eruption sensation of an absolute difference between the human and the inhuman, or, in other words, between the sensible and the super-sensible. For Lyotard this difference will forever return through the impossibility of ever breaching it, while in Deleuze it will forever return in privileged moments capable of living it. But here politics is no longer understood in the extreme ontological terms of the other two thinkers, where politics is nothing else but the ethical obligation of art and philosophy to produce inhuman transformation, but is instead seen as a discursive process negotiating the given conditions of existence. Deleuze and Lyotard will sweep such a *prioris* away in the pure heterogeneity of an event. If we are less interested today in how art might achieve such radical disintegrations of the human, both Lyotard and Deleuze vividly return us to this primal scene of overcoming. We must not succumb, as Lyotard has already remarked “and it is as true in art as it is in theory” to the taste of the supermarket shopper. We must choose then, but we must do so with a commitment that reflects that of our theorist of choice, for this is the only way “no matter who we choose” that our choice might make a difference. McMahon. Available at [www](http://www). University of Minnesota Press. Taormina, edited by D. London and New York: University of Minneapolis Press. Tomlinson and G Burchell. A Report on Knowledge.



## 4: Philosophy of Art - Curriculum Vitae

*Get this from a library! The poetics of political thinking. [Davide Panagia] -- Investigates the ways in which thinking and judgment have been represented in political philosophy from Thomas Hobbes to Jacques Ranciere, with an emphasis on the relationship between aesthetic and.*

Please contact mpub-help umich. Yet my intention is also polemical. Is not the Deleuzian turn towards imperceptibility a move altogether away from any aesthetics? Dis-agreement tells us that politics first becomes a possibility with the institution of a community, where a community itself begins with something in common. This commonality is no shared stock of goods or shared claim to a territory. Rather, it is a shared partition of the sensible: In other words, the commonality upon which a community is founded is sense, and politics first becomes a possibility with the institution of common sense. Hand in hand with the disclosure of shared modalities of sensing, moreover, comes the delimitation of each modality. The partition of the sensible thus renders some sounds intelligible logos and others unintelligible pathos, some capacities visible and other invisible, and more. Moreover, social positions are portioned out according to these delimitations, and the partitioning of the sensible upon which the community is founded ultimately determines which people are recognizable as part of a shared world and which are sanctioned in partaking of it. Yet the moment politics becomes possible is distinct from the moment politics erupts -- politics is a much rarer thing than common sense or the institution of a community. Politics not only interrupts common sense but also erupts into the shared sensible world. As the title suggests, *The Politics of Aesthetics* argues that the distribution of the sensible is an aesthetic enterprise, and what is at stake in any politics is aesthetics. Drawing this correlation between aesthetics and the distribution of the sensible and, ultimately, between aesthetics and politics requires a precise understanding of the term. Aesthetics is not any set of artistic practices nor is it the general theory that concerns these practices. Aesthetics is "the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience. Just as these a priori forms determine the organization of human experience and provide its conditions, aesthetics comes in various structural systems that serve both to condition the shared world of our daily experience and to partition that world and delimit the positions one might occupy within it. Politics is not reducible to this partitioning of the sensible on the condition of aesthetic systems, yet it is conditioned by aesthetics, just as sense experience is conditioned by the a priori, according to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, insofar as it requires the partitions of the sensible as its space of disruption. The later might be called real sense, in contrast to the merely conceptually possible sense of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The *Critique of Judgment* distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic experiences, experiences of the beautiful and of the sublime. If politics occurs in a forced eruption into the sensible of that which aesthetic systems, conceived on the model of the a priori, render insensible through a partaking in and of common sense, how could imperceptibility be political? Is not the Deleuzian turn towards imperceptibility a move altogether away from any partaking in a shared, sensory world? This form is disrupted however, as Deleuze tells us, by the force of the real itself. This is the key polemical assertion of this essay. For Aristotle, the institution of a political community requires first the existence of a being whose nature is political: It is logos - the capacity to reason and to express claims about justice and injustice through speech - that marks the human as such an animal by nature. Logos is for Aristotle set apart from pathos - the capacity to express pain and pleasure. What, then, are relations of justice and injustice and how do they configure the sensible? Aristotle, like Plato, opposes any notion of justice that would reduce it to a question of profits and losses weighed against one another, such that what is just is only so from the perspective of a single profiting party, and what is unjust is in turn only so from the perspective of a correlative party harmed. One is positioned within the community so as to give to it that which is properly theirs to give and, in portion, take from it that which is properly theirs to take. Thus, coextensive with the modality of sense experience characteristic of logos is the sensible emergence of a world composed of proper parts those with a capacity for logos, rather than simply pathos as well as, between these parts, proper relations those which accord with the nature of the parts correlated. When a proper part takes a proper place - a place proportional to what that part brings to the community, a relation of justice holds; when

either improper parts or improper relations appear on a shared horizon, injustice. Those who can be taken account of in the political community are always already those who can be counted, those who make up some recognizable part. Their words register much like a buzzing or humming in the air of which no intelligible sense can be made. The same will be true of any claim that does not fall in its proper place. This task demands reconfiguring the limits of each of our senses, and their relations to one another. In order that their speech, registering as mere background noise in the current sensory order, would be heard, they spoke in an overall sensory context mimicking that of their patricians. Just like their patricians, "they pronounce imprecations and apotheoses; they delegate one of their number to go and consult their oracles, and they give themselves representatives by rebaptizing them. Despite a strict delineation of the two, Kant critical philosophy works to articulate the process by which the a priori structures of human subjectivity are mapped onto the sensible, phenomenal domain. The shared sensory world is configured ethically for Kant only when it takes a shape expressive of the higher nature of the human being granted to that being by the transcendental form of human subjectivity. White, thin, and sheet-like bark, dark-black knots, and a thin trunk, for example, are synthesized together mentally to form the object known as a birch tree. It is because of this synthesis that the same qualia present themselves when, for example, I imagine a birch tree as when I conceptualize one. However, the object-form is not itself a transcendental form but rather an analogue of such a form. What of the transcendental human subject has the capacity to produce an analogue of itself that conditions a shared sensory world? The cogito for Kant is a unity prior conditionally to all empirical experience. Nonetheless, the cogito is neither individual nor personal. Rather, it is the universal form of reason in general. By way of analogy, Kant here further explores the relation between two mental faculties or a priori formative powers of subjectivity distinguished in the Critique of Pure Reason: Imagination is the mode by which the subject reaches out to the sensible. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant insists that the sensible can only be received in a form conditioned by the structure of the human understanding. All structural organization manifested in the sensible which is beyond the possibility of understanding is organization manifest in a particular, empirical phenomenon. The understanding finds structure only in subsuming the particular under a general concept, never in the particular itself. Conceptual matches are made only on the basis of specific regularities which a concept can be recognized to repeat itself in. The concept of a straight line, for example, is matched with any empirical instantiation of the shortest path between two points. Thus, the regularity cannot be referred back to concepts and thus to the activity of understanding as its a priori ground. The aesthetic experience of the beautiful is one example of the manifestation of such regularity in the particular. It is, Kant tells us, a single rose that one finds beautiful, not roses in general, due to a certain harmony or proportionality that appears to us in it. It is not clear that the regularity is there in the sensible itself but only that it is there in the sensible for us. Beyond the limits of the understanding, then, any apparent reference of empirical phenomena to an a priori ground both preceding and making it possible is not clearly a necessary fact but only a subjective need. We cannot presuppose "that every thinking and cognizing being is subject to the same need as a necessary condition, and hence that this condition attaches to the object rather than merely to our selves as subjects. There are two parallels with Aristotle to be drawn from this. First, it is from this transcendental form, unique to human beings as creatures of consciousness and reason, that a shared sensory world is produced, with each of the senses as well as each of the faculties taking a proper place in this production. However, it might be thought that to move away from the empirical with Kant is to move away from the very logic of natural parts and their proper relations that Aristotle posits as an alternative. What one takes -a place in the community - is always proportional to that which one brings to it, that is, certain capacities to make, say, see and do that supposedly belong to us by nature. On what basis is it determined what of the multitudinous empirical world, full of sensory shocks and vague and diffuse matter, will count as a part of an object-form? That is, what of the sensible, empirical world around us will register as perceptible? The Critique of Pure Reason does insist that what counts is simply that which can be synthesized, yet just what can be synthesized and how? The faculty of imagination, however, does not have concepts at its disposal. Thus, there must be a sensible measure by which to synthesis parts. One might, for example, "evaluate a tree in relation to the human body" or "evaluate the moon rising in terms of a coin held at close range. Rather, a bi-directional exchange occurs. As such, there is

no part regarded as theirs by nature to give to or take from a shared world. Politics is the rare event that occurs when these people nonetheless forcibly partake part-take in that community. This account begins with an acknowledgement that slaves, just like their masters, exercise moral virtue and understanding; indeed, they do so just insofar as they obey their masters. Thus, if slavery is to be upheld as a natural order, there must be something other than moral virtue and understanding that gives to a master his natural claim to rule. It is on the basis of this acknowledgement, then, that Aristotle asks, "How could it be proper for the one to rule and the other to be ruled unconditionally? It is proper, according to Aristotle, insofar as a slave is different in kind from his master. The master has a soul with a deliberative capacity, and this gives him the natural right of rule. Thus, following Aristotle, it is only insofar as the slave obeys his master that he partakes of logos, and in turn takes a proper place in the political community a place of subservience. The proletariat, just like the slaves of Athens, are rendered without any reason of their own, and "doomed to the anonymity of work and reproduction. Yet at the same time they lay claim to that which belongs only to those with a part in the political community. It should be noted that Aristotle, too, contemplated the relation of such people to the political community. Against Plato, Aristotle argues that the place of these people in the political community is ensured precisely insofar as these people do have freedom, and thus where the oligarchs contribute wealth to the community and the nobles virtue, ordinary men contribute freedom. What precisely is it that freedom brings to the community? And what makes freedom proper to the people? Moreover, freedom is not the only property that is historically contingent. The aristocracy is no more virtuous by nature and thus destined to rule over others than the oligarchs are naturally wealthy. The system of natural propriety upon which Aristotle orders the political community is thus thoroughly disrupted by the proletarian claim to freedom. A claim to freedom is not the same as either a claim to wealth or nobility. A claim to freedom, alternatively, is a partaking immediately, without any justification by way of a proportional, contributing quality. For the proletariat to partake of freedom is for the proletariat to claim it is, by nature, just like both the nobles and the oligarchs, despite historical conditions that leave them with nothing to give. The structure of the sensible, empirical world has a way of reverberating from its own conditions, that is, from those structures of human subjectivity Kant speaks of as a priori. Both illuminate a capacity for sense and its eruption that holds regardless of historically contingent and qualitatively determinable properties, such as a recognizable capacity for logos as lodged within the very push towards a shared, sensory world. This two-way relation between the mental faculty of imagination and the sensible world opens sense experience to constant variation as new units of measure emerge. Thus the constancy of a shared sensory world is called into question. In a sensible world of constant variation, what could be constantly the same not only everywhere and for everyone but even for our own senses and faculties? Here, the sublime comes crashing in. Indeed, an experience of the variation of a sensible measure is only a minor form of such loss. It can happen not only that sensible units of measure vary in accordance with the phenomena but, moreover, that for a particular phenomenon there is no commensurable measure.

5: Project MUSE - Justice, Dissent, and the Sublime

*The Poetics of Political Thinking is a compelling reappraisal of the role of representation within political thought. The Beautiful and the Sublime in Rawls and.*

Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. Penguin, , University of Minnesota Press, *A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi Minneapolis: New Essays on Byron, ed. Harvard University Press, , 35â€” Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser. Oxford University Press, , Alan Richardson, *A Mental Theater*: Pennsylvania State University Press, , Harvard University Press, , 2: Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, â€”77, â€”7. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, Victor Lyle Dowdell Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, , Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, ed. Stuart Atkins Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, , line 11, Jonathan Lamb, *The Rhetoric of Suffering*: Davies, , 7â€”8. John Rawls, *John Rawls*: Samuel Freeman Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, , Columbia University Press, , 28 hereafter cited in text. Duke University Press, Stanley Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*: Princeton University Press, , 3â€” Clarendon, , Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right: According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftlehre*, ed. Cambridge University Press, , *Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann, Princeton, NJ: Basic Books, , Will Kymlicka convincingly shows that communitarian arguments often presuppose that the Kantian commitment to practical reasoning is impossible. By insisting on shared beliefs as a limit to moral-political viewpoints, furthermore, communitarian arguments likewise insist without significant acknowledgment on excluding certain features from their designation of a common way of life. See his *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* Oxford: Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*: Graham Burchell Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, , â€” Mike Gane and Terry Johnson London: Routledge, , *Theories in Subjection* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, , See also Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, Susan Stewart, *The Open Studio: Essays on Art and Aesthetics* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , Reiman and Sharon B. Norton, , 80â€” Oxford University Press, , 46, *Reflections on Time*, trans. Blackwell, , Eagleton, *Ideology of the Aesthetic*, 23, Ralph Cohen Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, , See also the distinction between progress and emancipation in idem, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, trans. Kristin Ross Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, , â€” Free Press, ; Melissa A. Cornell University Press, Orlie, *Living Ethically, Acting Politically*, , *Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abeele Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, , *The Reparative Impulse 1*. Oxford University Press, , 8, For an account of the reading public that is more or less consistent with my own, see Andrew Franta, *Romanticism and the Rise of the Mass Public* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling*: Duke University Press, , hereafter cited in text. *Essays on Queer Culture and Critical Theory*, ed. Barber and David L. Routledge, , 88, 98, New York University Press, , Martha Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity*: Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* New York: Norton, , hereafter cited in text. Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, expanded ed. Princeton University Press, , Neil Hertz, *The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime* New York: Derrida, *Truth in Painting*, , Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich Minneapolis: Princeton University Press, , 82â€” *Deconstruction in America*, ed. University of Minnesota Press, , 3â€” Michael Warner, *The Trouble with Normal*: Harvard University Press, hereafter cited in text. *Essays on Race and Sexuality* New York: New York University Press, , 88â€” A *Critical Anthology*, ed. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Duke University Press, , â€”

## 6: Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*This paper analyses the relation between Jacques Rancière's idea of 'politics as aesthetics' and the Kantian sublime. For Rancière, politics and aesthetics are not simply analogical; they share a common mechanism.*

Kant referred to St. He held that the sublime was of three kinds: In his Critique of Judgment , [11] Kant officially says that there are two forms of the sublime, the mathematical and the dynamical, although some commentators hold that there is a third form, the moral sublime, a layover from the earlier "noble" sublime. Ultimately, it is this "supersensible substrate," underlying both nature and thought, on which true sublimity is located. For him, the feeling of the beautiful is in seeing an object that invites the observer to transcend individuality, and simply observe the idea underlying the object. The feeling of the sublime, however, is when the object does not invite such contemplation but instead is an overpowering or vast malignant object of great magnitude, one that could destroy the observer. Feeling of Beauty â€” Light is reflected off a flower. Pleasure from a mere perception of an object that cannot hurt observer. Weakest Feeling of Sublime â€” Light reflected off stones. Pleasure from beholding objects that pose no threat, objects devoid of life. Weaker Feeling of Sublime â€” Endless desert with no movement. Pleasure from seeing objects that could not sustain the life of the observer. Sublime â€” Turbulent Nature. Pleasure from perceiving objects that threaten to hurt or destroy observer. Full Feeling of Sublime â€” Overpowering turbulent Nature. Pleasure from beholding very violent, destructive objects. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel[ edit ] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel considered the sublime a marker of cultural difference and a characteristic feature of oriental art. His teleological view of history meant that he considered "oriental" cultures as less developed, more autocratic in terms of their political structures and more fearful of divine law. According to his reasoning, this meant that oriental artists were more inclined towards the aesthetic and the sublime: He believed that the excess of intricate detail that is characteristic of Chinese art , or the dazzling metrical patterns characteristic of Islamic art , were typical examples of the sublime and argued that the disembodiment and formlessness of these art forms inspired the viewer with an overwhelming aesthetic sense of awe. The numinous comprises terror, Tremendum, but also a strange fascination, Fascinans. The "tragic consciousness" is the capacity to gain an exalted state of consciousness from the realization of the unavoidable suffering destined for all men and that there are oppositions in life that can never be resolved, most notably that of the "forgiving generosity of deity" subsumed to "inexorable fate". The "dynamic sublime", on the other hand, was an excess of signifieds: The traditional categories of aesthetics beauty, meaning, expression, feeling are being replaced by the notion of the sublime, which after being "natural" in the 18th century, and "metropolitan-industrial" in the modern era, has now become technological. There has also been some resurgence of interest in the sublime in analytic philosophy since the early s, with occasional articles in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and The British Journal of Aesthetics, as well as monographs by writers such as Malcolm Budd, James Kirwan and Kirk Pillow. As in the postmodern or critical theory tradition, analytic philosophical studies often begin with accounts of Kant or other philosophers of the 18th or early 19th centuries. Noteworthy is a general theory of the sublime, in the tradition of Longinus, Burke and Kant, in which Tsang Lap Chuen takes the notion of limit-situations in human life as central to the experience. The roles of aesthetics and ethicsâ€”that is, the roles of artistic and moral judgments, are very relevant to contemporary society and business practices, especially in light of the technological advances that have resulted in the explosion of visual culture and in the mixture of awe and apprehension as we consider the future of humanity.

## 7: From Aesthetics to Politics: Ranciere, Kant and Deleuze

*To tackle Rancière's reading of Lyotard, then, to say faith," and with Schiller via Kant's Analytic of the Beautiful. (PA, 29) Kant's sublime "as.*

However, it also needlessly shakes off the sublime. Having left to conquer Media, the Scythian warriors plunged deep into Asia and were held up there for a whole generation. Over the same period, a generation of sons was born to the slaves and raised with their eyes open. Looking around at the world, they reached the conclusion that there was no particular reason why they should be slaves, being born the same way their distant masters were and with the same attributes. The assault was a failure. One of the sharper warriors took the measure of the situation and summed it up for his brothers in arms: On the other hand, I was confused by his repeated and quite blunt rejection of the sublime—“one of the two pillars of the Kantian aesthetics. Ultimately, I would like to strengthen it 1 by analysing the possible reasons for his rejection of the sublime, and 2 by discerning and explicating the implicit role it might nevertheless play in his theory. I proceed as following. His references to this aesthetic category are indirect and accompany in most—“when not all—“cases his critique of Lyotard. Thus, I was confronted with a question: They agree that the so-called political philo- 3 Arendt For example, an attempt to base politics on notions of knowledge and truth threatens to reduce it to the pure calculations of means and ends. Politics is generally seen as a set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution another name. I propose to call it the police. This implies that he sees no possibility for a perfect social organisation, i. Indeed, it is, perhaps, the only positive notion he offers. Politics exists simply because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human society. It challenges the very mode of visibility and invisibility of political subjects. For him, the problem of inclusion is a more fundamental one. The voices of the excluded are not simply disregarded; often, they are not even perceived as carrying any meaning. This makes it a problem of aesthetics. Arendt underlines the political importance of consensual or associative use of aesthetic judgement. He argues that aesthetic common sense [ It does not remain content with bringing distant classes together. It challenges the distribution of the sensible that enforces their distance. The problem is that he only does it implicitly and the question is why. As a result, she seems to opt for a separation between spectators and actors in those circumstances. Arendt , ; Arendt , The testimony is the only political role of the sublime for Lyotard. Arendt opts for a separation of political actors from political spectators. Williams , ; Lyotard , Therefore, political struggle takes place before real violence and, perhaps, precisely in order to prevent it. After all, she has good reasons to avoid its disruptive elements, as they would be potentially detrimental for her political reading of *sensus communis*. Democratic politics, in short, is a temporality that prevails if, and only if, there is a failure of representation. This shift should leave the sublime behind; it should, as it were, also be transformed accordingly. Instead, I claim that the aesthetic transformation of politics remains incomplete as long as the place of its positive moments remains empty. Though, in my opinion, Schiller would be a wrong ally here. After all, he explicitly underlines the necessity of the sublime alongside the beautiful: Without the beautiful there would be an eternal strife between our natural and rational destiny. Enervated —“wedded to this transient state, we should lose sight of our true country. Even Kant himself seems to suggest a possibility of reinterpretation of the transcendent sphere which is pointed at here. This sublime discovery is irreplaceable by the beautiful. A mere possibility of violence paralyzes politics and undermines the aesthetic disagreement as a third way between the two disasters, between domination and violence. The tale about the Scythian slaves is intended to demonstrate that their attempt to achieve equality solely by means of a violent armed resistance was doomed to fail from the very beginning. Her act was successful, as it triggered further, momentous protests. Such declaration—“whether actual or potential—“is an audacious act of self-transcendence in the name of an idea—“the idea of equality between blacks and whites or between the Scythian slaves and their masters—“and an act that seems to be informed by nothing else than a feeling of the sublime. This itself provides a tangible solution for keeping the

Kantian moralism at bay. This prevents him, in my opinion, from realising to which extent the sublime is already in use in his own conception of politics and, consequently, from fully utilising its potential there. All that would indeed be covered by the beautiful. University of Chicago Press. University of Minnesota Press, pp. Stanford University Press. Marchart, Oliver, Post-foundational Political Thought: Politics and Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Duke University Press. The Philosophy of Radical Equality, London:

## 8: Project MUSE - Black Lives Matter and the Concept of the Counterworld

*sublime, an object or event so vast and/or sudden that one's imagination is immobilized and attempts to make sense and verbalize the feeling are stymied, Kant recognized that in the experience of the sublime one's mind.*

The Topology of the Kantian Sublime: Heidegger Of the contemporary thinkers we are examining, it is certainly Lyotard who has most forcefully put a logic of the sublime directly to work in the realm of art and has even entrusted a particular group, the avant-garde, with keeping the faith. But what is this thing? We are thinking here of the use Lacan made with the figure of Antigone, that exemplary figure who achieved a sublime status by elevating her subversive act against the state to the dignity of the Thing. This is not to say that Lyotard ventures as far as Lacan did with specifying Antigone or any other figure as a stand-in for the sublime object. On the contrary, our thesis here is that Lyotard got stuck in his fascination with the purely presupposed Thing and accordingly articulates an aesthetic project to keep the monstrous jouissance that it generates at bay. To bring this out, we must consider how for Kant there are actually two sublims, or rather one sublime that is divided into two with two different corresponding logics: But this pain in turn engenders a pleasure, in fact a double pleasure—[and this] dislocation of the faculties among themselves gives rise to the extreme tension Kant calls it agitation that characterizes the pathos of the sublime, as opposed to the calm feeling of beauty. The point here is that the Thing qua being is disclosed completely within thought for Kant and Lyotard, while Lacan would contend that in truth it is only a phantasm that fills out the empty shell of the sublime object. How would a person know? In the final analysis, it is not so much the logic that underpins his aesthetic theory that we find fault with but rather that his analysis stops abruptly at this point and with such certitude. Always forgotten, it is unforgettable. This is likewise the case with his aesthetic work on Nietzsche. The problem with Heidegger is that he simply does not account for this excess of subjectivity. In spite of everything, we must try to make more explicit what is essential in Nietzsche as well, going beyond him. This concept is lacking in Heidegger. The excess of this subjectivity not only makes its ambiguous presence felt when contemplating the Ideas of reason and the massive and chaotic objects of nature, but also with the objects of everyday experience, especially artworks. This figure is usually Lyotard and we will suggest a reason why this might be the case. What this means is that any attempt to articulate just how the mathematical dissolves phenomenal reality toward the monstrous Real at once involves a dynamical gesture of establishing an exceptional point to bring out that articulation. It is for this reason that Kant much of the time lapses into a dynamical logic when speaking of the sublime and this of course makes it rather easy to compare Lyotard with Kant since both are predominately using the same dynamical-masculine logic. This faltering can be explicated through the functioning of two key components of the imagination. On the one hand, there is the apprehension of our perceptions of the dispersed multitude with which the subject is bombarded and on the other, the synthetic act of the comprehension of the unity of this multitude. What happens is that the second forever lags behind the first, so a painful gap forever exists between the two. It is as if there is not enough time to synthesize all the apprehended units. Dissensus is a conflict between a sensory presentation and a way of making sense of it. Both seem to operate as transcendental frameworks of sorts which disclose objects we see as given. His project can be seen as the eternal task of articulating and specifying this frame, of providing accounts of how and what it has disclosed throughout history and of tracing the different forms ie, Regimes it has taken in the past. Kant, Hegel, Schiller, Nietzsche, Adorno and of course Lyotard are all named as well and examined in turn. Yet, according to transcendental laws, we must presuppose such a system— a system of experience. Consistent with this reading is a striking footnote where the mathematical logic is referred to as both primal and feminine. Kant tells us there that because of our finite temporal existence, we can never access nature as the totality of phenomena: We are dealing here not with the totality of phenomena but with what is beyond phenomena, the noumenal Law. First, consider that he has a rather flattened view of history which tends to de-emphasize exceptional turning points and eschews an overall historical trajectory. And likewise with politics, as there is no possibility of rupturing the smooth operations of capitalism, since that system of organizing ourselves is a universal field constituted precisely through a lack of political alternatives:



In the end, we need to be reminded how these two strategies are not simply opposed to one another, but are antinomies for both Kant and Lacan, which means that to properly delimit the sublime object, we must accomplish the impossible task of thinking them together. The exception is always ordinary.

### 9: The Poetics of Political Thinking | Books Gateway | Duke University Press

*My view of this aspect of Rawls contrasts with Davide Panagia's account of Rawls's aesthetic of the beautiful, although I am in agreement with much of his argument in *The Poetics of Political Thinking* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, ).*

*Big Island of Hawaii Handbook The promises and pitfalls of environmental peacemaking in the Aral Sea Basin Erika Weinthal Julie Garwood shadow dance Sun certified java programmer book Pt. 5 Hearings, February 22-23, 1933. John Ciardi, a bibliography. You Can Be the Cat Al Capone and Alcatraz : the latent military resources of urban California Mystery in the old red barn LIVING WITH DINOSAURS (Aladdin Picture Books) The Healing Moment The microbiological risk L. Morelli Biblicalethics and social change Antebellum slave narratives Microsoft Word 2000 one step at a time Analysis of the banking and currency system of the United States Abolition in the U.S.A. by 2050 : on political capital and ordinary acts of resistance Bernard E. Harcourt Where is the love sheet music Lamp A337 or Flying Saucer lamp Politics and economic policy in Western democracies Planning for control in the construction industry Knowledge Competitiveness I remember Donner Howells a Century of Criticism Finding your own north star Preschool in three cultures revisited V. 8. March 1811-Oct. 1812. The unborn baby book The bone collector book Everything You Need To Know About The Menopause Prayer as conversation : the deep roots of prayer Daniel black extermination V. [13]. Cumulative index for volumes 1 to 12 Masters of the Big House Ms peregrine home for peculiar children ebook pl Jeep Cherokee workshop manual Marriage of Anansewa ; Eufa Annals of the French revolution Role and effectiveness of the World Bank in combating global poverty Clockwork by Philip Pullman*