

1: Philosophy News | Information Technology and Moral Values

Today, "The Future of Moral Values". Moral values was not, as an early exit poll suggested, the factor in George Bush's re-election. Nevertheless, Steven Waldman believes that this phrase points at new dynamics that challenge the religious values of all kinds of Americans and the health of our common life.

Additional comments may be available at the original post. A popular idea in the effective altruism community is the idea that most of the people we can help with our giving, our work, etc. We are often asked about our views on these topics, and this post attempts to lay them out. There is not complete internal consensus on these matters, so I speak for myself, though most staff members would accept most of what I write here. I broadly accept the idea that the bulk of our impact may come from effects on future generations, and this view causes me to be more interested in scientific research funding , global catastrophic risk mitigation , and other causes outside of aid to the developing-world poor. If not for this view, I would likely favor the latter and would likely be far more interested in animal welfare as well. However, I place only limited weight on the specific argument given by Nick Bostrom in Astronomical Waste - that the potential future population is so massive as to clearly in a probabilistic framework dwarf all present-day considerations. More I reject the idea that placing high value on the far future - no matter how high the value - makes it clear that one should focus on reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, misuse of advanced artificial intelligence, etc. As discussed previously , we are investigating this area actively. More Those interested in related materials may wish to look at two transcripts of recorded conversations I had on these topics: The importance of the far future As discussed previously, I believe that the general state of the world has improved dramatically over the past several hundred years. It seems reasonable to state that the people who made contributions large or small to this improvement have made a major difference to the lives of people living today, and that when all future generations are taken into account, their impact on generations following them could easily dwarf their impact in their own time. I place some probability on global upside possibilities including breakthrough technology, space colonization, and widespread improvements in interconnectedness, empathy and altruism. In Astronomical Waste , Nick Bostrom makes a more extreme and more specific claim: I see no obvious analytical flaw in this claim, and give it some weight. More on my epistemology and method for handling non-robust arguments containing massive quantities here. Catastrophic risk reduction vs. For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. A few brief arguments in support of this position: I laid some of these out in a blog post and discussed them further in my conversation with Luke and Eliezer. For one who accepts these considerations, it seems to me that: In both cases, attempts to reduce global catastrophic risks and otherwise plan for far-off events must be weighed against attempts to do tangible good, and the question of which has more potential to shape the far future will often be a difficult one to answer. This line of reasoning is not the only or overwhelming consideration in our current top charity recommendations. As discussed in the previous section, we place some weight on the importance of the far future but believe it would be irrational to let our beliefs about it take on excessive weight in our decision-making. The possibility that arguments about the importance of the far future are simply mistaken, and that the best way to do good is to focus on the present, carries weight. I also do not claim that the above reasoning should push all those interested in the far future into nearer-term, higher-certainty actions. People who are well-positioned to take on low-probability, high-upside projects aiming to make a huge difference - especially when their projects are robustly worthwhile and especially when their projects represent promising novel ideas - should do so. People who have formed the deep understanding necessary to evaluate such projects well should not take us to be claiming that their convictions are irrational given what they know though we do believe some people form irrationally confident convictions based on speculative arguments. The better-informed we become, the more willing we will be to go out on a limb. Global catastrophic risk reduction as a promising area for philanthropy I see global catastrophic risk reduction as a promising area for philanthropy, for many of the reasons laid out in a previous post: It is a good conceptual fit for philanthropy, which is seemingly better suited than other approaches to

working toward diffused benefits over long time horizons. Many global catastrophic risks appear to get little attention from philanthropy. I place some though not overwhelming weight on the argument that the implications of a catastrophe for the far future could be sufficiently catastrophic and long-lasting that even a small mitigation could have huge value. I believe that declaring global catastrophic risk reduction to be the clearly most important cause to work on, on the basis of what we know today, would not be warranted. A broad variety of other causes could be superior under reasonable assumptions. Scientific research funding may be far more important to the far future especially if global catastrophic risks turn out to be relatively minor, or science turns out to be a key lever in mitigating them. Helping low-income people including via our top charities could be the better area to work in if our views regarding the far future are fundamentally flawed, or if opportunities to substantially mitigate global catastrophic risks turn out to be highly limited. Working toward better public policy could also have major implications for both the present and the future, and having knowledge of this area could be an important tool no matter what causes we end up working on. We also will become more broadly informed, something we believe will be very helpful in pitching funders on the best giving opportunities we can find - whatever those turn out to be.

2: Moral foundations theory - Wikipedia

*The Future of Moral Values: Predictions [A. C. Grayling] on www.enganchecubano.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Human rights and freedom, sex, drugs, abortion, assisted suicide, war and religion. Moral Values confronts the issues at the heart of the moral debate and examines alternatives to repressive legislation.*

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clearly most important cause to work on, on the basis of what we know today, would not be warranted. A broad variety of other causes could be superior under reasonable assumptions. Scientific research funding may be far more important to the far future especially if global catastrophic risks turn out to be relatively minor, or science turns out to be a key lever in mitigating them. Helping low-income people including via our top charities could be the better area to work in if our views regarding the far future are fundamentally flawed, or if opportunities to substantially mitigate global catastrophic risks turn out to be highly limited. Working toward better public policy could also have major implications for both the present and the future, and having knowledge of this area could be an important tool no matter what causes we end up working on. We also will become more broadly informed, something we believe will be very helpful in pitching funders on the best giving opportunities we can find – whatever those turn out to be.

3: How has technology changed our moral values? | eNotes

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Basic Questions The theory of value begins with a subject matter. It is hard to specify in some general way exactly what counts, but it certainly includes what we are talking about when we say any of the following sorts of things compare Ziff []: And these words are used in a number of different kinds of constructions, of which we may take these four to be the main exemplars: It is good that you came. It is good for him to talk to her. That is a good knife. Many of the basic issues in the theory of value begin with questions or assumptions about how these various kinds of claim are related to one another. Some of these are introduced in the next two sections, focusing in 1. Consequentialism, so understood, is the view that you ought to do whatever action is such that things would be best if you did it. The point of view theory reduces both good for and good simpliciter to good from the point of view of, and understands good simpliciter claims as about the point of view of the universe. One problem for this view is to make sense of what sort of thing points of view could be, such that Jack and the universe are both the kinds of thing to have one. Certainly it is not one of the things whose good classical utilitarians would want to add up. So the fact that sapient and even sentient beings are not the only kinds of thing that things can be good or bad for sets an important constraint both on accounts of the good for relation, and on theories about how it is related to good simpliciter. Rather than accounting for either of goodness simpliciter or goodness-for in terms of the other, some philosophers have taken one of these seriously at the expense of the other. Thomson [] famously defends a similar view. Moore [], in contrast, struggled to make sense of good-for claims. What, after all, are the kinds of things to which we attribute goodness simpliciter? According to many philosophers, it is to propositions, or states of affairs. If complementizer phrases denote propositions or possible states of affairs, then it is reasonable to conjecture, along with Foot [] that being good simpliciter is being a good state of affairs, and hence that it is a special case of attributive good if it makes sense at all. Geach and Foot both argue that it does not, on the ground that states of affairs are too thin of a kind to support attributive good claims. Some philosophers have used the examples of attributive good and good for in order to advance arguments against noncognitivist metaethical theories See the entry cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The basic outlines of such an argument go like this: Hence, there is a general problem with noncognitivist theories, or at least a significant lacuna they leave. The claim about goodness is then relativized accordingly. Finlay [], in contrast, argues that he can use ordinary pragmatic effects in order to explain the appearances. Suppose, for example, with G. Moore, that pleasure is good and knowledge is good. Which, we might ask, is better? This question does not appear to make very much sense, until we fix on some amount of pleasure and some amount of knowledge. But if Sue is a good dancer and Huw is a good dancer, then it makes perfect sense to ask who is the better dancer, and without needing to fix on any particular amount of dancing. much less on any amount of Sue or Huw. In general, just as the kinds of thing that can be tall are the same kinds of thing as can be taller than each other, the kinds of thing that can be good are the same kinds of thing as can be better than one another. According to a very different kind of theory, the value-first theory, when we say that pleasure is good, we are saying that pleasure is a value, and things are better just in case there is more of the things which are values. These two theories offer competing orders of explanation for the same phenomenon. This view debunks the issue over which the views discussed in the last paragraph disagree, for it denies that there is any such distinct topic for value claims to be about. It may also explain the failures of comparative forms, above, on the basis of differences in the elided material. On standard views, gradable adjectives are analyzed in terms of their comparative form. At bottom is the relation of being taller than, and someone is the tallest woman, just in case she is taller than every woman. Similarly, someone is tall, just in case she is taller than a contextually appropriate standard Kennedy [], or taller than sufficiently many this many be vague in some contextually appropriate comparison class. Jon is a better sprinter than Jan not because it is more the case that Jon is a good sprinter than that Jan is a good sprinter. they are both excellent sprinters, so neither one of these is more the case than the other. If

good is to better as tall is to taller, then the analogue of value should intuitively be height. One person is taller than another just in case her height is greater; similarly, one state of affairs is better than another just in case its value is greater. It is not particularly plausible that there is such a thing as can-opener value, such that one can-opener is better than another just in case it has more can-opener value. In general, not all comparatives need be analyzable in terms of something like height, of which there can be literally more or less. The analogy with height would yield the prediction that if one horror film is scarier than another, it is because it has more of something "scariness" than the other. This may be right, but it is not obviously so. In this case, it may be that being better than does not merely amount to having more value than. A is better than B just in case B is worse than A. The same point goes if to be good is just to be better than a contextually set standard. But it has been held by many moral philosophers that an inventory of what is better than what would still leave something interesting and important out: But it is important to be careful about this kind of argument. Traditional Questions Traditional axiology seeks to investigate what things are good, how good they are, and how their goodness is related to one another. Of course, the central question philosophers have been interested in, is that of what is of intrinsic value, which is taken to contrast with instrumental value. Paradigmatically, money is supposed to be good, but not intrinsically good: These things, in turn, may only be good for what they lead to: And those things, in turn, may be good only for what they lead to, but eventually, it is argued, something must be good, and not just for what it leads to. Such things are said to be intrinsically good. This idea is supported by a natural argument: The premise in this argument is highly controversial Schroeder [], and in fact many philosophers believe that something can be non-instrumentally good in virtue of its relation to something else. The idea behind this distinction is that instrumental values lead causally to intrinsic values, while constitutive values amount to intrinsic values. For example, my giving you money, or a latte, may causally result in your experiencing pleasure, whereas your experiencing pleasure may constitute, without causing, your being happy. For many purposes this distinction is not very important and often not noted, and constitutive values can be thought, along with instrumental values, as things that are ways of getting something of intrinsic value. It does not make sense, for example, to say that something is a good can opener, but only instrumentally, or that Sue is a good dancer, but only instrumentally. This is not right. So they are not really in parallel to pleasure or knowledge. For more discussion of intrinsic value, see the entry on intrinsic vs. This question only makes sense as a question about intrinsic values; clearly there is more than one instrumental value, and monists and pluralists will disagree, in many cases, not over whether something is of value, but over whether its value is intrinsic. For example, as important as he held the value of knowledge to be, Mill was committed to holding that its value is instrumental, not intrinsic. This point will be important in what follows. Some monists have held that a plural list of values would be explanatorily unsatisfactory. If pleasure and knowledge are both values, they have held, there remains a further question to be asked: If this question has an answer, some have thought, it must be because there is a further, more basic, value under which the explanation subsumes both pleasure and knowledge. Hence, pluralist theories are either explanatorily inadequate, or have not really located the basic intrinsic values. This argument relies on a highly controversial principle about how an explanation of why something is a value must work "a very similar principle to that which was appealed to in the argument that intrinsic value must be an intrinsic property [section 2. If this principle is false, then an explanatory theory of why both pleasure and knowledge are values can be offered which does not work by subsuming them under a further, more fundamental value. Reductive theories of what it is to be a value satisfy this description, and other kinds of theory may do so, as well Schroeder []. If one of these kinds of theory is correct, then even pluralists can offer an explanation of why the basic values that they appeal to are values. Moreover, against the monist, the pluralist can argue that the basic posits to which her theory appeals are not different in kind from those to which the monist appeals; they are only different in number. This leads to the second major issue that is at stake in the debate between monists and pluralists. Monistic theories carry strong implications about what is of value. Given any monistic theory, everything that is of value must be either the one intrinsic value, or else must lead to the one intrinsic value. This means that if some things that are intuitively of value, such as knowledge, do not, in fact, always lead to what a theory holds to be the one intrinsic value for example, pleasure, then the theory is committed to

denying that these things are really always of value after all. Monists, in contrast, have a choice. They can change their mind about the basic intrinsic value and try all over again, they can work on developing resourceful arguments that knowledge really does lead to pleasure, or they can bite the bullet and conclude that knowledge is really not, after all, always good, but only under certain specific conditions. If the explanatory commitments of the pluralist are not different in kind from those of the monist, but only different in number, then it is natural for the pluralist to think that this kind of slavish adherence to the number one is a kind of fetish it is better to do without, if we want to develop a theory that gets things right. This is a perspective that many historical pluralists have shared. If one state of affairs is better than another just in case it contains more value than the other, and there are two or more basic intrinsic values, then it is not clear how two states of affairs can be compared, if one contains more of the first value, but the other contains more of the second. Which state of affairs is better, under such a circumstance? Reasoning like this has led some philosophers to believe that pluralism is the key to explaining the complexity of real moral situations and the genuine tradeoffs that they involve. If some things really are incomparable or incommensurable, they reason, then pluralism about value could explain why. Very similar reasoning has led other philosophers, however, to the view that monism has to be right: But that would be impossible, if the options available in some choice were incomparable in this way. So if pluralism leads to this kind of incomparability, then pluralism must be false. But even if we grant all of the assumptions on both sides so far, monists have the better of these two arguments. Value pluralism may be one way to obtain incomparable options, but there could be other ways, even consistently with value monism. For example, take the interpretation of Mill on which he believes that there is only one intrinsic value – "happiness" – but that happiness is a complicated sort of thing, which can happen in each of two different ways – either through higher pleasures, or through lower pleasures. If Mill has this view, and holds, further, that it is in some cases indeterminate whether someone who has slightly more higher pleasures is happier than someone who has quite a few more lower pleasures, then he can explain why it is indeterminate whether it is better to be the first way or the second way, without having to appeal to pluralism in his theory of value. The pluralism would be within his theory of happiness alone. See a more detailed discussion in the entry on value pluralism. This is consequently an area of active dispute in its own right. There are, in fact, many distinct issues in this debate, and sometimes several of them are run together.

4: Americans Negative About United States' Moral Values, Poll | HuffPost

As parents and educators, we should all advocate the teaching of moral values in our schools for the following reasons:

- 1. Preparing Our Children For Future Roles In Society: Knowledge gained in school is only one goal of education. The primary goals of education should be enabling students to gain.*

This synopsis relies too much on references to primary sources. Please improve this synopsis by adding secondary or tertiary sources. Granting this, Harris says we must conclude that there are facts about which courses of action will allow one to pursue a better life. Harris attests to the importance of admitting that such facts exist, because he says this logic applies to groups of individuals as well. He suggests that there are better and worse ways for whole societies to pursue better lives. Just like at the scale of the individual, there may be multiple different paths and "peaks" to flourishing for societies - and many more ways to fail. Often his arguments point out that problems with this scientific definition of morality seem to be problems shared by all science, or reason and words in general. Harris also spends some time describing how science might engage nuances and challenges of identifying the best ways for individuals, and groups of individuals, to improve their lives. Many of these issues are covered below. Philosophical case[edit] Harris says science requires that one acknowledge certain values e. Furthermore, he says that this is the case for almost all scientific investigation. He mentions that modern science amounts to careful practice of accepted first philosophical principles like empiricism and physicalism. Harris says a science of morality may resemble Utilitarianism , but that the science is, importantly, more open-ended because it involves an evolving definition of well-being. Rather than committing to Reductive materialism , then, Harris recognizes the arguments of revisionists that psychological definitions themselves are contingent on research and discoveries. Harris adds that any science of morality must consider everything from emotions and thoughts to the actual actions and their consequences. He mentions the research of Paul Slovic and others to describe just a few of these established mental heuristics that might keep us from reasoning properly. For instance, he references one poll that found that 36 percent of British Muslims think apostates should be put to death for their unbelief, [20] and he says that these individuals are "morally confused". This, he thinks, is intuitive; "trains of thought But from a deeper perspective Consider what would happen if we discovered a cure for human evil. Imagine, for the sake of argument Would this make any moral sense at all? He says it follows that there could, in principle, be a species compared to which we are relatively unimportant although he doubts such a species exists. He also supports the formation of an explicit global civilization because of the potential for stability under a world government. Harris criticizes the tactics of secularists like Chris Mooney , who argue that science is not fundamentally and certainly not superficially in conflict with religion. Harris sees this as a very serious disagreement, that patronizingly attempts to pacify more devout theists. To my surprise, The Moral Landscape has changed all that for me. It should change it for philosophers too. Reading this thrilling, audacious book, you feel the ground shifting beneath your feet. Reason has never had a more passionate advocate. Diller [35] and Andrew E. Nuzzolilli wrote a generally favorable review in a journal of the Association for Behavior Analysis International: The Moral Landscape represents an important contribution to a scientific discussion of morality. Cognitive scientist and anthropologist Scott Atran criticized Harris for failing to engage with the philosophical literature on ethics and the problems in attempting to scientifically quantify human well being, noting that Nobel Prizeâ€™winner Daniel Kahneman studies what gives Americans pleasureâ€™watching TV, talking to friends, having sexâ€™and what makes them unhappyâ€™commuting, working, looking after their children. So this leaves us where. Imagine a sociologist who wrote about evolutionary theory without discussing the work of Darwin, Fisher, Mayr, Hamilton, Trivers or Dawkins on the grounds that he did not come to his conclusions by reading about biology and because discussing concepts such as "adaptation", "speciation", "homology", "phylogenetics" or "kin selection" would "increase the amount of boredom in the universe". How seriously would we, and should we, take his argument? Science does not generate its own moral values; it can be used for good or ill and has been. Harris dismisses the argument as a word game easily avoided, but he never explains the game nor how to avoid it. He just ignores it. Weinberg went on to say: I

regard human welfare and the way Sam Harris refers to it as sort of halfway in that direction to absolute nonsense.

5: The Moral Value of the Far Future | Open Philanthropy Project

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Introduction Information technology is ubiquitous in the lives of people across the globe. These technologies take many forms such as personal computers, smart phones, internet technologies, as well as AI and robotics. In fact, the list is growing constantly and new forms of these technologies are working their way into every aspect of daily life. They all have some form of computation at their core and human users interface with them mostly through applications and other software operating systems. In some cases, such as massive multiplayer online games see section 3. Information technologies are used to record, communicate, synthesize or organize information through the use of computer technologies. Information itself can be understood as any useful data, instructions, or meaningful message content. Which raises the question, what is information itself? Unfortunately there is not a completely satisfying and philosophically rigorous definition available, though there are at least two very good starting points. For those troubled by the ontological questions regarding information, we might want to simply focus on the symbols and define information as any meaningfully ordered set of symbols. Shannon working at Bell Labs in the forties produced a landmark mathematical theory of communication In this work he utilized his experiences in cryptography and telephone technologies to work out a mathematical formulation describing how syntactical information can be turned into a signal that is transmitted in such a way as to mitigate noise or other extraneous signals which can then be decoded by the desired receiver of the message Shannon ; Shannon and Weaver The concepts described by Shannon, along with additional important innovations made by others who are too many to list , explain the way that information technology works, but we still have the deeper questions to resolve if we want to thoroughly trace the impact of information technologies on moral values. Some philosophers noted the fact that information technologies had highlighted the distinction between syntax and semantics, and have been vocal critics about the inability of technologies to bridge the gap between the two concepts. Meaning that while information technologies might be adept at manipulating syntax, they would be incapable of ever understanding the semantics, or meanings, of the information upon which they worked. The argument rests on the claim that if you replaced the workings of the machine with a person who was not a native Chinese speaker who would then painstakingly follow a set of rules to transform the set of Chinese logograms input into other output symbols. The claim is that that person would not understand the input and also would not know what the system is saying as its output, it is all meaningless symbol manipulation to them. The conclusion is that this admittedly strange system could skillfully use the syntax of the language and story while the person inside would have no ability to understand the semantics, or meaning, of the stories Searle Replace the person with electronics and it follows that the electronics also have no understanding of the symbols they are processing. This argument, while provocative is not universally accepted and has lead to decades worth of argument and rebuttal see the entry on The Chinese Room Argument. Information technology has also had a lasting impression on the philosophical study of logic and information. In this field logic is used as a way to understand information as well as using information science as a way to build the foundations of logic itself see the entry on logic and information. The issues just discussed are fascinating but they are separate arguments that do not necessarily have to be resolved before we can enter a discussion on information technology and moral values. Even purely syntactical machines can still impact many important ethical concerns even if they are completely oblivious to the semantic meaning of the information that they compute. The second starting point is to explore the more metaphysical role that information might play in philosophy. If we were to begin with the claim that information either constitutes or is closely correlated with what constitutes our existence and the existence of everything around us, then this claim means that information plays an important ontological role in the manner in which the universe operates. Adopting this standpoint places information as a core concern for philosophy and gives rise to the fields philosophy of information and

information ethics. In this entry, we will not limit our exploration to just the theory of information but instead look more closely at the actual moral and ethical impacts that information technologies are already having on our societies. Philosophy of Information will not be addressed in detail here but the interested reader can begin with Floridi b, b for an introduction. Some of the most important aspects of Information Ethics will be outlined in more detail below. The Moral Challenges of Information Technology The move from one set of dominant information technologies to another is always morally contentious. Socrates lived during the long transition from a largely oral tradition to a newer information technology consisting of writing down words and information and collecting those writings into scrolls and books. Famously Socrates was somewhat antagonistic to writing and scholars claim that he never wrote anything down himself. Socrates tells a fable of an Egyptian God he names Theuth who gives the gift of writing to a king named Thamus. Thamus is not pleased with the gift and replies, If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. Phaedrus, section a Socrates, who was adept at quoting lines from poems and epics and placing them into his conversations, fears that those who rely on writing will never be able to truly understand and live by these words. For Socrates there is something immoral or false about writing. Books can provide information but they cannot, by themselves, give you the wisdom you need to use or deeply understand that information. Conversely, in an oral tradition you do not simply consult a library, you are the library, a living manifestation of the information you know by heart. For Socrates, reading a book is nowhere near as insightful as talking with its author. Written words, "seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you the same thing forever. His criticism of writing at first glance may seem humorous but the temptation to use recall and call it memory is getting more and more prevalent in modern information technologies. Why learn anything when information is just an Internet search away? Information technologies change quickly and move in and out of fashion at a bewildering pace. This makes it difficult to try to list them all and catalog the moral impacts of each. The very fact that this change is so rapid and momentous has caused some to argue that we need to deeply question the ethics of the process of developing emerging technologies Moor It has also been argued that the ever morphing nature of information technology is changing our ability to even fully understand moral values as they change. The legal theorist Larry Lessig warns that the pace of change in information technology is so rapid that it leaves the slow and deliberative process of law and political policy behind and in effect these technologies become lawless, or extralegal. This is due to the fact that by the time a law is written to curtail, for instance, some form of copyright infringement facilitated by a particular file sharing technology, that technology has become out of date and users are on to something else that facilitates even more copyright infringement Lessig But even given this rapid pace of change, it remains the case that information technologies or applications can all be categorized into at least three different types " each of which we will look at below. For example, a book is a record of information, a telephone is used to communicate information, and the Dewey decimal system organizes information. Many information technologies can accomplish more than one of the above functions and, most notably, the computer can accomplish all of them since it can be described as a universal machine see the entry on Computability and Complexity , so it can be programmed to emulate any form of information technology. In section 2 we will look at some specific example technologies and applications from each of the three types of information technology listed above and track the moral challenges that arise out of the use and design of these particular technologies. In addition to the above we will need to address the growing use of information environments such as massive multiplayer games, which are environments completely composed of information where people can develop alternate lives filled with various forms of social activities see section 3. Finally we will look at not only how information technology impacts our moral intuitions but also how it might be changing the very nature of moral reasoning. In section 4 , we will look at information as a technology of morality and how we might program applications and robots to interact with us in a more morally acceptable manner. We live in a world rich in data and the technology to produce, record, and store vast amounts of this data has developed rapidly. As was mentioned above, each of us produces a vast amount of information every day that

could be recorded and stored as useful data to be accessed later when needed. But moral conundrums arise when that collection, storage and use of our information is done by third parties without our knowledge or done with only our tacit consent. The social institutions that have traditionally exercised this power are things like, religious organizations, universities, libraries, healthcare officials, government agencies, banks and corporations. These entities have access to stored information that gives them a certain amount of power over their customers and constituencies. Today each citizen has access to more and more of that stored information without the necessity of utilizing the traditional mediators of that information and therefore a greater individual share of social power see Lessig One of the great values of modern information technology is that it makes the recording of information easy and almost automatic. Today, a growing number of people enter biometric data such as blood pressure, calorie intake, exercise patterns, etc. This type of data collection could become almost fully automated in the near future. How long until a smartphone collects a running data stream of your blood pressure throughout the day perhaps tagged with geolocation markers of particularly high or low readings? In one sense this could be immensely powerful data that could lead to much healthier lifestyle choices. But it could also be a serious breach in privacy if the information got into the wrong hands, which could be easily accomplished, since third parties have access to information collected on smartphones and online applications. In the next section 2. But here we must address a more subtle privacy breach – the collection and recording of data about a users without their knowledge or consent. When searching on the Internet, browser software records all manner of data about our visits to various websites which can, for example, make webpages load faster next time you visit them. Even the websites themselves use various means to record information when your computer has accessed them and they may leave bits of information on your computer which the site can use the next time you visit. Some websites are able to detect which other sites you have visited or which pages on the website you spend the most time on. If someone were following you around a library noting down this kind of information, you might find it uncomfortable or hostile, but online this kind of behavior takes place behind the scenes and is barely noticed by the casual user. According to some professionals, information technology has all but eliminated the private sphere and that it has been this way for decades. Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems famously announced in Helen Nissenbaum observes that, [w]here previously, physical barriers and inconvenience might have discouraged all but the most tenacious from ferreting out information, technology makes this available at the click of a button or for a few dollars Nissenbaum and since the time when she wrote this the gathering of personal data has become more automated and cheaper. Clearly, earlier theories of privacy that assumed the inviolability of physical walls no longer apply but as Nissenbaum argues, personal autonomy and intimacy require us to protect privacy nonetheless Nissenbaum If you load all the photographs of your life to a service like Flickr and they were to somehow lose or delete them, this would be a tragic mistake that might not be impossible to repair. The moral values that coalesced around these earlier technologies have been sorely stretched by the easy way that information can be shared and altered using digital information technologies and this has required the rapid development of new moral theories that recognize both the benefits and risks of communicating all manner of information using modern information technologies. The primary moral values that seem to be under pressure from these changes are privacy, confidentiality, ownership, trust, and the veracity of the information being communicated in these new ways. Who has the final say whether or not some information about a user is communicated or not? Who is allowed to sell your medical records, your financial records, your email, your browser history, etc.? If you do not have control over this process, then how can you enforce your own moral right to privacy? It follows that if we care about privacy, then we should give all the control of access to personal information to the individual. Most corporate entities resist this notion for the simple reason that information about users has become a primary commodity in the digital world boosting the vast fortunes of corporations like Google or Facebook. Indeed, there is a great deal of utility each of us gains from the services provided by internet search companies like Google and social networks such as Facebook. It might be argued that it is actually a fair exchange we receive since they provide search results and other applications for free and they offset the cost of creating those valuable serviced by collecting data from individual user behavior that can be monetized in various lucrative ways. A major component of the profit

model for these companies is based on directed advertising where the information collected on the user is used to help identify advertising that will be most effective on a particular user based on his or her search history and other online behaviors. Simply by using the free applications offered, each user tacitly agrees to give up some amount of privacy that varies with the applications they are using. Even if we were to agree that there is some utility to the services users receive in this exchange, there are still many potential moral problems with this arrangement. If we follow the argument raised by Westin earlier that privacy is equivalent to information control *ibid*. There is a counterargument to this. Herman Tavani and James Moor argue that in some cases giving the user more control of their information may actually result in greater loss of privacy. Their primary argument is that no one can actually control all of the information about oneself that is produced every day by our activities. If we focus only on the fraction of it that we can control, we lose sight of the vast mountains of data we cannot. Tavani and Moor, Tavani and Moor argue that privacy must be recognized by the third parties that do control your information and only if those parties have a commitment to protecting user privacy, will we actually acquire any privacy worth having. Towards this end, they suggest that we think in terms of restricted access to information rather than strict personal control of information *ibid*. Information security is another important moral value that impacts the communication and access of user information.

6: AI Principles - Future of Life Institute

None, moral values are cultural and temporal. They are not important to make the world greater. Ethics on the other hand is what keeps the species alive. Understand and follow ethics.

He is the founder and former editor of Beliefnet and now heads Daily Bridge Media. This is Speaking of Faith, conversation about belief, meaning, ethics and ideas. Today, "The Future of Moral Values". After all the dust had settled, the phrase "moral values" was largely debunked as the defining concern of the electorate. But the passion it sparked and its divisive effects remain. Even though we have more media and more sophisticated ways of exchanging information, we seem to be less able to really see other people around us accurately. In the late s, he pioneered and founded Beliefnet, which is now an eminent Internet site for religious news, ideas and resourcing used by millions. He also analyzes the intersection of religion and politics for other media, from Salon. And so the document got named, by default, Dizzying doc. And I thought that was appropriate. So here are two headlines from the day after the election, and one is Christianity Today, the conservative Christian intellectual publication. I know you know it well. Well, first thing to understand about where this idea came from is that it came from a single question in the exit poll where they asked which issue mattered to you most, and 22 percent of people cited moral values. That 78 percent of the electorate decided that factors other than moral values were the most important factors in the election. I think what happened is an unusual, perhaps never-to-be-repeated case of religious conservatives and liberals conspiring to push a story line for very different reasons. They wanted to go into the new term with President Bush and the rest of Congress and the media thinking that they were the ones who gave Bush the election. And by the way, that is not unusual. Every group tries to take credit for the electoral victory. These religious conservatives were out front aggressively and quickly claiming credit for the victory. It was comforting to think that it was just the case of those wacky conservative Christians coming out and outvoting us. There was a Pew poll which changed the dynamics a little bit by posing the question differently, right, in November?

7: The Relevance of Religion & Moral Values in | Freedom Magazine

The future of moral values by A. C. Grayling starting at \$ The future of moral values has 1 available editions to buy at Alibris.

The surgeon of the future: Anchoring innovation and science with moral values Presidential Address: Anchoring innovation and science with moral values By Carlos A. The following is an edited version of the Presidential Address that Dr. In addition to the text below, Dr. Pellegrini presented a short video that centered on the significance of ACS and the meaning of Fellowship. The video is available at www. I want to offer my heartfelt congratulations to the 1, Initiates, now new Fellows of the American College of Surgeons ACS, and to their families and their friends. I also extend my warm welcome to the new Honorary Fellows, and my sincere thanks to all those of you who chose to join this celebration. Few events in our lives become permanently etched in our memory. Those events define for a person or for an organization a before and an after in their life cycle. Those are the events that make history. Tonight, we are gathered here to celebrate two such events. For our organization, the American College of Surgeons, it is the celebration of its th year. Indeed, on a night like tonight, in the fall of , the College celebrated its first Convocation and admitted 1, initiates from Canada and the U. Tonight, I would like to highlight the significance of this event for both the College and the Fellows. I hope you all feel as proud as I felt in when I was initiated as a Fellow of our College. Now let me turn to you, the new Fellows of our College. You are exceptional, and you are diverse. You are exceptional in that this group totaling 1, Initiates is one of the largest ever admitted to Fellowship. You are diverse in age, gender, interests, and origins. As for age, you span generations X, Y, and the Baby Boom, and although the great majority of you are younger than 50 years of age, we welcome 24 new Fellows who are older than As for gender, of you are women—the largest number ever admitted to the College in one group. As for your interests, you represent 14 specialties of surgery. As for your country of origin, 1, of you are from the U. The future of surgery and surgeons Now I want to talk about your future. I do not pretend to have a crystal ball, and I would much prefer to have a conversation with you rather than give a lecture, but due to the physical impossibilities of the former, we will have to settle for the latter. I believe that the lessons I have learned in my work as a surgeon and my involvement with our College will be useful to some of you as you move into this new era of your life, the one after Fellowship. There are three general aspects of your future I would like to touch upon. First, I want to describe some of the major forces affecting the practice of surgery in the course of the next decade or two. Second, I want to convince you that you can shape your future, you can craft it, and you can define it. Third, I want to suggest to you that this College, your College, provides you not only with the best and most comprehensive platform to leverage your quest in shaping your future, but also provides you with a set of values that can serve as your moral compass. To accomplish this task I will reflect on the past as needed, I will examine some aspects of our current practice, and, when discussing the future, I will describe it as I wish it to be: Major forces affecting surgery Some significant forces are changing the way we practice surgery in a manner that I believe will significantly impact the way you will practice in the next decade. I have chosen three as examples that will affect all of you equally, regardless of country of origin or site of practice. These external influences reflect for the most part advances in medicine, and I am not here to criticize them, but rather to describe them. Surgeons need to know and understand them to better position themselves and the profession, and although they may pose challenges, I am an optimist and to paraphrase Winston Churchill, every challenge also represents a great opportunity. For many years, however, the pace at which innovation occurred allowed for intervals of time to test and validate the new idea and, when useful, to design educational and training methods that ensured its safe adoption. In some ways it resembled a trip down a river with rapids interspersed with waters of relative tranquility in which to recover. The pace of change has increased substantially over the last few years, and I predict that this pace will only accelerate in the future: However, it is not change, but the nature and pace of it that poses a significant challenge for the surgeon of the future. On the one hand, many innovations end up in failure, as they do not survive the test of time. Thus, decisions need to be made fast, and they need to be right. Does this

innovation fulfill a clinical need? Does it add value to the existing options? Is it financially viable? Can it be adopted by the average surgeon with relative ease? The meeting you are about to attend this week with its many offerings is one example. The network of Accredited Educational Institutes that your College has created and which now extends beyond the U. Adapting to rapid change and learning how to choose the right path is as imperative to your survival and growth as avoiding boulders and finding the right currents is for those navigating white waters. Blurring of the boundaries As the specialties of medicine developed during the 20th century, they did so within well-established boundaries. For example, when I started the practice of surgery, we all knew that there was a clear delineation between what I did as a surgeon—primarily open operations—and what most of the medical specialists did—primarily diagnostic and noninvasive therapy. However, in the latter part of the last century, as innovation led to the development of new ideas, methods, and devices, the boundaries between specialties started to blur. The treatment of common bile duct stones, once the domain of the general surgeon, became part of the practice of a gastroenterologist; the treatment of intra-abdominal abscesses or the placement of central venous lines, done only by surgeons in the past, was now in the hands of interventional radiologists. In some of these situations, the loss to surgery was caused by our failure to seize new opportunities. Many surgeons felt that retreating to the operating room and continuing to use the tools of the past was better than retraining and embracing the future. These boundaries continue to fade away, and my prediction is that the process will accelerate in the future. We see signs of it when we look at who cares for our complex patients in the intensive care units today or who uses the new endoscopic techniques to treat incipient mucosal cancers of the gastrointestinal tract. I believe that surgeons should think of themselves as uniquely qualified to perform interventions—interventions that may be done by the open approach, or through endoscopes, or through percutaneous approaches, or through natural orifices. Surgeons, in essence, should become what Thomas R. General surgeons are continuing to develop minimally invasive approaches. More recently, vascular surgery has transformed from a traditional open approach to image-guided endovascular approaches. These changes have had a major impact on the survival of patients with vascular disease. We must continue with this strategy. As I see it, the intelligent surgeon of the future will be someone who embraces the management of diseases, not just the use of techniques, and will also be someone who becomes knowledgeable of, and masters all, diagnostic and therapeutic aspects of his or her specialty beyond traditional boundaries. Given that the practice of surgery involves greater risk than most other specialties, preserving and improving safety and being able to measure quality in a reliable way will continue to be an essential part of practice. Furthermore, since we do use substantial resources to fulfill the needs of our patients, our institutions and our society at large will put pressure on us to be accountable for these expenditures. For example, when undergoing spine surgery for back pain, it will not just be a demonstration of fusion on X rays, but the relief of pain and the ability to return to work that will matter; when undergoing anti-reflux surgery it will not just be the normalization of esophageal pH, but the complete relief of heartburn as perceived by the patient. Delivery of this type of care cannot be done by individuals acting alone; it requires the development of teams, high-performance teams. These teams require leadership. Not the authoritarian leadership of the past but the kind of leadership that fosters exceptional communication, mutual respect and support, and the development of the best and most straightforward ways to achieve the goals of the mission: Leadership is an area that needs our direct involvement, and the smart surgeon of the future will devote a substantial portion of his or her time to the study of qualities of effective leaders, to the development of emotional intelligence, and to the improvement of so-called non-technical skills. Your College is deeply involved in these areas and has developed the infrastructure to support it. I encourage you to get involved, not only because it will help your future, but because it is the right thing to do for our patients and our society. Shaping your future It is my hypothesis that, to a great extent, each of us has the opportunity to create the future. True, there are external influences, some of which I described earlier, over which we may not have total control, but our direct involvement will help to modulate those forces and change the outcome they would otherwise produce. Of course, there are pessimists who will tell you that the sky is falling. They usually start by pointing out how much the world has changed, how perfect things used to be, and how little reward you are likely to get for the many hours you will be working. Furthermore, they will suggest that there is

nothing you can do to change things. They will portray us surgeons as victims. I ask you, using the words of former U. Secretary of State and retired U. Tonight I am here to tell you that the path you have chosen, which is the same I chose, is a most rewarding one and that, given the chance, I would do it all over again. Indeed, I feel extremely privileged for having been given the opportunity to touch so many lives, for having my patients entrust me with their most valuable asset: And I am here to tell you that there is not enough money in the world to provide that satisfaction, the satisfaction of helping someone in need. I am also here to tell you that the future is not predetermined, that your future can be shaped and that each of you can make it happen. That is the only way to make a difference, one little bit at a time. So, next time you see something that needs fixing, get involved rather than blame the system. Your College, your platform, your moral compass I hope that throughout my talk tonight I have shown you a few of the many areas in which your College, under the excellent leadership of its Executive Director David B. Whether it is through the Division of Education filling the gap between your practice and the current state of knowledge; or through the Division of Research and Optimal Patient Care with its measurements of quality, safety, and costs; or through the Division of Advocacy and Health Policy efforts to help modulate the implementation of policy that will influence the provision of health care; or through the Division of Member Services with its focus on you, your chapters, your projects—the College provides you with the right platform to exercise your leadership. My call to action today is for you to get involved and to get involved now, at this stage of your lives, to help you and your patients by defining an ideal future. As you travel this path you will need a moral compass, something that you can use to guide your actions and to help you distinguish right from wrong. The American College of Surgeons staff has led by example this last year when through a thoughtful and well-defined process that lasted six months, they identified a set of values that they have made their own. These values I believe reflect not only the ideas of the great staff of our College, but I hope they also reflect their observation of the values expressed by the many surgeons with whom they have worked so closely. As I have had an opportunity to examine them I realize that they speak for me, as a surgeon, as much as they speak for our College staff. I offer the five values to you tonight: Professionals exemplify the highest standards of honesty, responsibility, respect, and accountability. The importance of professionalism to us surgeons was highlighted by LaMar S. Our staff believes excellence represents an aspirational goal—the goal to always exceed internal and external standards and the expectations of others.

8: Responsibility of a Teacher: Developing the Moral Values of Students | Soapboxie

Moral Value refers to the good virtues such as honesty, integrity, truthfulness, compassion, helpfulness, love, respectfulness, hard-work, etc. Students are the future of India. The future of our country depends upon the moral values imparted to them during their student life.

What are moral values? When moral values derive from society and government they, of necessity, may change as the laws and morals of the society change. An example of the impact of changing laws on moral values may be seen in the case of marriage vs. In recent years, couples that set up household without marriage are nearly as plentiful as traditional married couples. But, not only are such couples more plentiful, they are also more accepted by other individuals in our society. In earlier society, the laws and morals simply came from the Roman system of law, which was largely based on the Ten Commandments. As society moved into the modern era, that earlier system of laws became more and more eroded. This is clearly demonstrated in the behavior of older infants and young toddlers. If a child has been forbidden to touch or take a certain object early on, they know enough to slowly look over their shoulder to see if they are being observed before touching said object. There is no need for this behavior to be taught; it is instinctive. Now, the child can make correct choices based on his own knowledge. The choices that are made by an individual from childhood to adulthood are between forbidden and acceptable, kind or cruel, generous or selfish. A person may, under any given set of circumstances, decide to do what is forbidden. If this individual possesses moral values, going against them usually produces guilt. Religion is another source of moral values. It is interesting to note that these codes may widely vary; a person whose religion provides for polygamy will experience no guilt at having more than one spouse while adherents to other religions feel they must remain monogamous. Christians ideally behave correctly because they love God and want to please Him. This is at once a high calling and a low position. It is a high calling because God has required that all who love Him should keep His commandments; therefore it is an act of obedience. Christ Jesus as He lived His life on earth is our supreme example; if we pattern our behavior after Him then our lives are most valuable.

9: Information Technology and Moral Values (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Moral values are the standards of good and evil, which govern an individual's behavior and choices. Individual's morals may derive from society and government, religion, or self. When moral values derive from society and government they, of necessity, may change as the laws and morals of the society change.

Denise Hawkins Being a teacher is an inherently moral endeavorâ€”but do enough educators truly understand the moral value of their work? Osguthorpe, dean of the College of Education at Boise State University, would like to see more teachers who understand the moral value of what they do and teacher education programs that are prepared to show them how. I realized then, that in order to teach French well, I needed to develop relationships with students and show them that I cared about them as people. Preparing and Supporting Practitioners with Matthew N. Sanger, spoke recently with NEA Today. Matthew Sanger and I conceptualize the moral work of teaching as the aspects of teaching practice that are inherently connected to the moral domainâ€”any issue that relates to what is good, right, virtuous, and caring in our personhood, actions, and relationships with others. These issues include those that are connected to the teacher being a morally good person, as well as to the teacher having an impact on the moral development of students. Why focus now on the moral work of teaching? Perhaps the most powerful reason for focusing on the moral work of teaching in teacher education is that teaching is inherently moralâ€”thus, the moral work of teaching cannot be avoided. Teacher education ought to attend to the commitments, values, and beliefs that teacher candidates bring with them into the teacher education classroom. Thus, helping teacher candidates understand these aspects of their future work are paramount to helping them realize the moral outcomes they anticipate experiencing in their future classrooms. We can prepare teachers for this work by helping them understand that moral values infuses their work; helping them to engage in their practice in ways that align with what we call good, virtuous, and caring. If a teacher education program purports to prepare teacher candidates for the profession, and if it has a constructivist bent, then the moral work of teaching must be addressed in meaningful ways. But it must also continue, as a part of in-service teacher professional development. Seeking a deeper understanding of teaching practice and connecting that understanding to quality improvement will always be integral to the education of teachers. What does or should that preparation entail and look like? That preparation could take on a lot of different forms. It might be something connected to pro-social development for students. It could be as simple as developing a classroom that is caring or having their sense of fairness, justice, and caring infuse the process of grading. Whether or not they can go into the classroom and impact the moral development of children, some would say, yes and some would say, no. But we can say that the school does have an impact. Having a teacher equipped to engage in that work is pretty important. But whatever form that preparation takes, it should be purposeful, systematic, and thematically driven. One argument for being concerned with the moral work of teaching rests on the assumption that teachers are not able to check their dispositions and moral character at the classroom door. The dispositions that they bring into the classroom infuse and inform all activities of teaching, from how teachers interact with students in the hallway to the way that they deliver instruction, grade papers, set rules for conduct, and on and on. Teachers simply cannot avoid the moral work of teaching; it is an inherent part of teaching. And I think that we would do well to attend to it in teacher education. Your data gathering on the moral work of teaching has focused on student teachers at Boise State University. One of the most striking commonalities was the way that our teacher candidates focused on their desires to be role models for their future students. That surprised us a little. We also saw some commonalities in the way that they described morality and moral development in strictly behavioral terms. Very few of our teacher candidates described morality and moral development in terms related to care theories or relational theories. We anticipated that more of them would suggest an affinity for practices that connected to an ethic of care, but hardly any of the teacher candidates mentioned caring in their responses. But the current practice in teaching and teacher education is moving us away from concentrating on the moral work of teaching.

Effects of pensions on labor markets and retirement Robert L. Clark and Joseph F. Quinn The Love That Laughs At Mathematics Voice interaction design Human genome project applications Weary Souls, Shattered by Life Photoshop cs3 myanmar ebook Silent hill book of lost memories Advanced engineering mathematics by dennis zill warren wright Blairs contribution to elaborating a new / Student management system project in java umentation Hornady reloading manual 9th Rampart Street (Valentin St. Cyr Mysteries) The cultural revolution a very short introduction Treasures Underfoot Shifting course on Iran Understanding Christian spirituality 2005 powerstroke 6.0 service manual American history first hand second edition vol 1 Mrs. Bluezettes grammar guide Semimartingale theory and stochastic calculus Living with Stalins ghost Disorders of the male reproductive tract New Grand Opera House Functional outcome after MTBI Learning perl 7th edition github Days in the lives of counselors Treasures of a decade, 1968-1978 Levels of Activism at different moments of the career Allergy frontiers If the Shoe Fits (Twice Upon a Time) How To Enjoy Playing Around The Way Of The Master Evidence Bible The shaping of Maltese throughout the centuries: Linguistic evidence from a diachronic-typological analys Burn and external injury Freud in the Antipodes Art, culture, and pediatric mental behavioral health : an interdisciplinary, public health approach Micha Process and device modeling for integrated circuit design Know and tell the art of narration 3.5 dm manual Introduction to sanskrit for yoga