

1: Riverwood's Truth Project: Lesson 3 - Anthropology Questions

Christian anthropology, rightly understood, is a message of freedom for every person. In particular, Church teaching on the universal vocation to chastity is an avenue through which to approach questions of sexuality, gender, love, and marriage.

Moral Philosophy and its Subject Matter Hume and Kant operate with two somewhat different conceptions of morality itself, which helps explain some of the differences between their respective approaches to moral philosophy. The most important difference is that Kant sees law, duty, and obligation as the very heart of morality, while Hume does not. Kant believes that our moral concerns are dominated by the question of what duties are imposed on us by a law that commands with a uniquely moral necessity. Like most eighteenth-century philosophers, he also believes that our moral lives are preoccupied with the question of how to be virtuous over the course of a life, but he defines virtue in terms of the more fundamental concepts of law, obligation, and duty. By contrast, these concepts certainly figure into morality as Hume understands it, but they are far less central. Our moral concerns are dominated by the question of which motives are virtuous, and we answer this question by looking to the responses of our fellow human beings, who “when viewing things properly” approve of those motives and character traits that are useful or immediately agreeable EPM 9. These are the terms that characterize duty and obligation for Hume, rather than the other way around. Two other differences are worth noting for the purposes of this article. First, Kant draws a bright line between moral and non-moral phenomena, such as prudence, politics, or art. For Hume, the line between the moral and non-moral is far blurrier. According to Hume, the strict separation of moral and non-moral virtues marks one way in which modern moral thought is inferior to ancient ethics; he also seems to suspect that it reflects an unhealthy fixation on responsibility and guilt inherited from Christianity Darwall A second important difference is closely related to the first. For Kant the moral is distinguished from the non-moral not only by a special form of obligation but also by its elevation above the rest of life. One of our chief moral concerns is to protect this status, which requires respecting the rational autonomy at its source and avoiding behavior or patterns of thought and desire that dishonor or degrade persons by treating ourselves or others as mere things. We see it also in the priority given to duties to self cf. Hume does not see things this way. For Hume, the domain of morality is not particularly pure, special, or elevated. It sometimes shows us at our most benevolent or most magnanimous, but morality is continuous with the rest of life, including politics and the pursuit of wealth and status in modern commercial society. Moral virtue is undoubtedly pleasing to us, sometimes powerfully so, but it does not command a unique form of respect or reverence. Neither do the rules and ideals of morality, which spring from the same propensities, ideas, and passions that drive the rest of human behavior. Morality has us far more concerned with promoting pleasure and utility. Hume and Kant both believe that philosophy should dig beneath the surface of morality and present a theory of its foundation. Second, it cannot be found in mind-independent facts about the world. Yet they disagree about the rest of the story. Hume locates the foundation of morality in human nature, primarily in our emotional responses to the behavior of our fellow human beings. By contrast, Kant locates the foundation of morality in the rational nature that we share with all possible finite rational beings. According to Kant, the will of a moral agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law is self-legislating and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law is self-constraining or self-motivating. A heteronomous will, on the other hand, is governed by something other than itself, such as an external force or authority. These rival conceptions of morality and its foundation correspond to two very different approaches to moral philosophy. His moral philosophy is part of his larger endeavor to provide a naturalistic explanation of human nature as a whole. Hume often seems more interested in explaining morality as a natural phenomenon than in setting out a normative ethical theory, treating moral action as part of the same physical world in which we explain things in terms of cause and effect EHU 8. On this view, everything we do is open to empirical investigation and explanation. In fact,

Hume often compares humans with other animals, tracing the bases of human morality to features of the mind that human beings and other animals have in common T 2. His detailed treatment of virtue and moral judgment draws heavily on observations and ideas about human nature. But Kant makes explicit that morality must be based on a supreme moral principle, which can only be discovered a priori, through a method of pure moral philosophy G 4: We could never discover a principle that commands all rational beings with such absolute authority through a method of empirical moral philosophy. An empirical approach, he argues, can tell us how people do act, but it cannot tell us how we ought to act. Moreover, we must keep the pure and empirical parts of moral philosophy clearly distinguished, since if we do not we could find ourselves confusing conditional truths, such as what is prudentially good for certain individuals or species, with unconditional truths about fundamental moral requirements G 4: Once one has in hand the supreme principle of morality, however, one requires an understanding of human beings in order to apply it to them MM 6: One can say little about what the supreme moral principle requires as duties human agents have to themselves and to one another without knowing such things as the sorts of ends people may be inclined to adopt and the conditions under which human agency will characteristically thrive or wither. Early in his career Kant endorsed an idiosyncratic form of sentimentalism. But he often indicated that he saw Hutcheson as more significant to ethics than Hume. He seems to have associated Hutcheson more with the positive insights about the role of sensibility in ethics, whereas he seems to have associated Hume more with skepticism about practical reason Kuehn In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, which often reads like the work of a mid-eighteenth century British thinker, Kant notes and analyzes the various feelings of pleasure or displeasure, and attraction and aversion, people feel to different traits and temperaments in themselves and others and to different types of literature, objects in nature, kinds of relationships, and other things. His statements about the foundation of morality and its principles convey a commitment to some form of sentimentalism, however idiosyncratic. He claims, for example, that the principles of morality are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance. Kant expresses a similar line of thought in another work from the period, *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, where he distinguishes between the faculty for representing truth and the faculty for experiencing the good, identifying the latter with feeling. For example, in the announcement of his lectures for the winter semester of 1781, he explains one difference between ethics and metaphysics by remarking that the distinction between good and evil in actions, and the judgment of moral rightness, can be known, easily and accurately, by the human heart through what is called sentiment, and that without elaborate necessity of proofs. If Kant was genuinely trying out a version of sentimentalism in the 1780s, this phase did not last long, nor was it a simple adoption of the theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, or Hume. Morality imposes unconditional requirements, and he became increasingly convinced that sentimentalism could not explain or justify such requirements. In a number of works, Kant creates taxonomies of misguided, heteronomous ethical theories based on material determining groundsâ€”in contrast to his theory of autonomy, in which the moral motive constitutes an objective, formal determining ground see Wood b [Other Internet Resources]; Irwin Kant distinguishes among these theories based on their accounts of the basis of moral obligation or the fundamental moral principle G 4: Such theories may assume either subjective empirical or objective rational determining grounds for the moral principle; and within each of these categories, there are theories that assume these determining grounds are external, and others that assume they are internal. Objective, internal grounds include perfection e. Objective, external grounds include the will of God e. Subjective, external grounds include education e. Subjective, internal grounds can include physical feeling, such as self-love e. Thus, Kant locates moral sense theories among those theories that assume a subjective, empirical, internal determining ground of moral feeling as the principle of morality cf. From the *Groundwork* on, Kant registers a number of complaints against sentimentalism, all of which cluster around what he takes to be the core insight into its inadequacy. No empirical principles can ground moral laws, because moral laws bind all rational beings universally,

necessarily, and unconditionally; empirical principles are contingent in various ways, for example, on aspects of human nature G 4: Variance in moral feelings makes them an inadequate standard of good and evil G 4: Moral feelings cannot be the source of the supreme moral principle, because the supreme moral principle holds for all rational beings, whereas feelings differ from person to person M If duty were grounded in feeling, it would seem that morality would bind some people e. Even if people were in complete agreement regarding their moral feelings, the universality of these feelings would be a contingent matter, and thus an inadequate ground for the unconditionally binding moral law. Indeed, if morality were grounded in feeling, it would be arbitrary: God could have constituted us so that we would get from vice the pleasurable, calm feelings of approval that we now allegedly get from virtue M So for Kant, the contingency of the ground of obligation offered by moral sense theories renders those theories inadequate; only a priori determining grounds will do. In his notes Kant remarks that moral sense theories are better understood as providing a hypothesis explaining why we in fact feel approval and disapproval of various actions than as supplying a principle that justifies approval or disapproval or that guides actions NF For this [compassion] is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish MM 6: Reason and Emotion in Morality Kant, as discussed above, underwent a decisive change of mind about the views of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. We can see this opposition at work in their respective accounts of moral judgment and moral motivation. According to Hume, moral judgments typically concern the character traits and motives behind human actions. To make a moral judgment is to detect, by means of a sentiment, the operation of a virtuous or vicious quality of mind. Reason and experience are required for determining the likely effects of a given motive or character trait, so reason does play an important role in moral judgment. For example, a person might hate or envy the courage of her enemy but this is not necessarily a moral response. On the contrary, rather than eliminating her sentiments, the judicious spectator enlarges them by means of sympathy, which enables her to resent the misery of others or rejoice in their happiness. Regarding the mechanism of sympathy, see Taylor Kant offers a very different account of moral judgment. He focuses on the first-person judgments an agent not a spectator must make about how to behave. In his view, the primary question is whether a particular mode of conduct is permissible, required, or forbidden in light of the moral law, and sentiment or emotion has no authority in this matter. It is an imperative because it commands and constrains us; it is categorical because it commands and constrains us with ultimate authority and without regard to our personal preferences or any empirically contingent ends G 4: Scholars disagree about the relationship between these two formulations of the CI, as well as their relationship to the other formulations Kant provides. Kant claims that FUL is the standard everyone actually does employ in moral judgment G 4: Others argue in favor of FEI, emphasizing, in particular, its role in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, where FEI seems to play the fundamental role in guiding judgment about specific ethical duties e. A rational being equipped with a purely formal procedure for testing maxims has all she needs. Yet such passages are misleading when read in isolation. Second, Kant frequently emphasizes that no formal procedure could specify all the principles for applying higher-order principles. The wider the duty, the more latitude for individual judgment and experience MM 6: For example, without these, one might be unable to determine whether a particular act of beneficence is more condescending than kind MM 6: Proper moral judgment in such circumstances requires attunement to the feelings of others, but also facility with the social conventions that shape the dynamics of personal interaction. Kant and Hume are clearly opposed on the question of whether reason or feeling has the final say in moral matters. Hume assigns reason to a subordinate role, while Kant takes reason to be the highest normative authority. However, it is important not to misunderstand the nature of their opposition. This is his main focus. He says relatively little about what is going on in our heads or the surrounding social environment when we actually make moral judgments. As noted above, Kant at least entertained the possibility that sentimentalism provides the correct empirical explanation of why human beings tend to approve or disapprove of the actions and motives that they do NF A similar contrast between Hume and Kant can be found in their respective accounts of moral motivation. The claim is not that reason has

THE INCLINATIONS OF NATURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE PERSON

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no role in human action, but rather that its role is subordinate to passion. Hume offers three main arguments for this claim in *A Treatise of Human Nature*.

2: Kant on Inclinations: 'Alien' or 'Human'? | Saju Chackalackal - www.enganchecubano.com

follow its own "natural" inclinations.) 8) How might a person's understanding of human nature and the meaning of human life determine his or her behavior or lifestyle?

Direct all questions and comments to frierspr whitman. The best known account of the passions and affects is from the *Metaphysics of Morals*. There, Kant says the following: Affects and passions are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to feeling insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult. Hence an affect is called precipitate or rash animus praecipuus, and reason says, through the concept of virtue, that one should get hold of oneself. It even has one good thing about it: Accordingly a propensity to an affect e. A passion is a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination e. The calm with which one gives oneself up to it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it and so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil as something premeditated into its maxim. And the evil is then properly evil, that is, a true vice. I will also have something to say about how each of these points connect to the third point, the different durations of affects and passions. In particular, since affects and passions interfere with normal processes of choice, it is important to briefly clarify what goes into a normal choice for a human agent. According to this account, feelings lead to inclinations, which lead to interests, which lead to a choice, which leads to action. One can distinguish five stages in normal action. This involves the agent viewing the object of interest as both capable of being brought about and as something to be actually brought about through her activity. She must, in other words, decide to act for an end. Much more could be said about this account of action, but this summary suffices to make sense of the ways in which affects and passions disease the soul. He says in the published *Anthropology*, The inclination that can hardly, or not at all, be controlled by reason is passion. On the other hand, affect is the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure at a particular moment, which does not give rise to reflection namely the process of reason whether one should submit to it or reject it. Affect is a feeling through which we come out of composure [of soul]. Passion is rather a desire that brings us out of composure. In the next two sections, I will look at affects and passions in turn. Affects disrupt the normal process of choice because feeling completely dominates. When this occurs, one is either incapable of action or acts purely on the basis of feeling, without any reflection at all. Thus Kant says that Affect is a surprise through sentiment, whereby the composure of soul. Affect therefore is precipitate, that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling which makes reflection impossible it is thoughtless. Feeling simply leads directly to action not, of course, intentional action. Thus one goes directly from the first stage of choice feeling to the final stage action without any intermediate inclination, interest, or choice. Kant illustrates this bypassing of choice with several examples. I will mention two of the most illuminating. The first example of an affect bypassing choice is shock. Shock anaesthetizes someone such that one is thereby totally incapable of doing anything. The strength of the feeling of shock prevents the normal process by which various feelings, like sympathetic pain, become desires and thereby bases on which one can act. In contrast, a feeling of concern, however intense, that does not incapacitate will issue forth in an inclination to help, which may be taken up as an interest, made the basis of a choice, and thus lead to action. A very different example is rage. The feeling bypasses the normal process of choice and issues forth in action. It is important to remember that even when one acts according to choice step 5, above, that action is always effected through feeling. In this case, feeling motivates directly, without any intervening choice. These affects lead one to act immediately on the basis of feeling, without any deliberation at all, but once the object of feeling ceases to provoke, the impetus to action vanishes as well. This inclination may then become an interest, which one weighs against others in deliberation about whether or not to do harm. The affect of rage, in contrast to this feeling of anger, prevents this reflection. Acting or failing to act due to affects is morally similar to acting or failing to act when one is asleep. In both cases one is morally unconscious, so to speak, rather than morally corrupt. Thus affects hinder the development of virtue

only in the negative sense. One is not made less virtuous because of them, but one does not progress in virtue. Still Kant does claim that affects are to be prevented and cured. One obvious reason, of course, is that insofar as one is morally obligated to promote the happiness of others, one should prevent those affects that will inhibit this end. A more important reason for Kant, however, is that affects undermine self-mastery, which is a condition of moral agency. In his lectures on ethics, Kant explains that The self-regarding duties are the conditions under which alone the other duties can be performed. But what is the subjective condition of the performance of duties to oneself? Here is the rule: Seek to maintain self-mastery; thou wilt then be fit to perform thy self-regarding duties. It is clear from the account of affects I have offered how they interfere with self-mastery. But this account of affect also seems to undermine the importance of constant self-mastery for being dutiful. If being under the occasional, or even frequent, sway of affect is consistent with a good will, one might wonder why affect would be a moral problem at all. To be sure, one is not virtuous during the instant in which one is affected, but one might still be virtuous overall and be influenced by affects often. I do not have the time in this talk to give a full account of the moral danger of affects, but one passage from the *Metaphysics of Morals* provides a least of hint of how that account would go. If it is not rising, [it] is unavoidably sinking. Needless to say, this account needs more elaboration. For now we will move on to the passions, which Kant considers to be direct threats to morality. Passions do not bypass the normal process of choice and action. Feeling still leads to inclination, interest, choice, and then action, but all of these steps are immediate, without full control by reason. Although they do not allow full rational control, however, passions still allow reflection in a certain sense. Since the passions can be coupled with the calmest reflection, one can easily see that they must neither be rash like affects, nor stormy and transitory; instead, they must take roots gradually and even be able to coexist with reason. Thus they persist even when the initial feeling is gone. Inclination that hinders the use of reason to compare, at a particular moment of choice, a specific inclination against the sum of all inclinations, is passion. But this reflection is not a self-conscious choice of this inclination over some particular others, or of this inclination over the moral law per se. Passion undermines consideration of those other interests. Still, deliberation is important and sets passions apart from affects. When one acts on a passion, one chooses. Kant reiterates the extent to which passions are rational when he claims that Passion always presupposes a maxim of the subject, namely, to act according to a purpose prescribed for him by his inclination. Passion is, therefore, always associated with the purposes of reason, and one cannot attribute passions to mere animals any more than to purely rational beings. And on that basis, one acts. Rather, one intentionally disregards those other interests without consideration. The fact that passions are perversions of choice, that they are reflective even if not rational, has two important implications. It makes passions extremely difficult to cure, and makes them properly evil. Passions are more difficult than affects to cure because one infected with a passion resists cure. But passions persist [21] as stable frameworks of choice according to which one never wants to be rid of the passion. Therefore, passion is by far worse than all those transitory affects, which stir themselves at least to the good intention of improvement; instead passion is an enchantment which also rejects improvement. Passions are cancerous sores for pure practical reason, and most of them are incurable because the sick person does not want to be cured and avoids the dominion of the principles by which alone a cure could be effected. Affect produces a momentary loss of freedom and self-control. Passion surrenders both, and finds pleasure and satisfaction in a servile disposition. But because reason does not desist from its summons to inner freedom, the unfortunate victim is suffering under the chains from which he cannot free himself, because they have already grown into his limbs, so to speak. Hence passions are incurable, as Kant says, because the sick person does not want to be cured. The other and more important reason is that they are morally evil. And they involve a will that deliberately rejects all interests, including the moral law, in favor of the pursuit of an inclination. To set any inclination, however kind-hearted, above the moral law is evil. So all passions are utterly incompatible with having a good will. They thus pervert choice and are evil. Similarly rage is an affect that we would call an emotion, but so is shock, which we might be less likely to consider an emotion. Thus, examples will be taken primarily from the lectures. See Sources of

Normativity. The wanton is someone who chooses to endorse every one of his desires. He feels like attacking someone who gave him a funny look, so he decides that he will. He feels like relaxing for a beer, so he decides that he will. By contrast, one who attacks another out of affect never even endorses his feeling. He just acts on it. The distinction might be made clearer by saying that for one who acts according to affects, there is no first person perspective.

3: Homosexuality - 13

The rehabilitation of nature and of corporeality in ethics cannot, however, be equated with any kind of "physicalism." In fact some modern presentations of natural law have seriously denied the necessary integration of natural inclinations in the unity of the person.

Kant defends the necessity and universality that are characteristic features of the moral law with a view to safeguard its transcendental justification and employment in the sensible world. Pure Reason versus Impure Inclinations Kant clearly holds that only a moral theory based on reason could be sufficiently universal, and command with necessity. To this effect, both Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason approach human cognitions and faculties from the perspective of maintaining the synthetic a priori nature of the moral law, so much so that anything other than the rational moral motive is rejected as spurious. Everyone must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid morally – valid, that is, as a ground of obligation; Saju Chackalackal 2 Kant on Inclinations: Moreover, both in the intent and the content of his critical philosophy, Kant is explicit with regard to the unique place of reason in human beings and, thus, in the whole architectonic of pure reason. His insertion of the word pure along with practical reason in each of the main headings of the second Critique indicates the difference in the viewpoints of the theoretical and the practical approach with regard to empirical aspects. He writes at the end of the introduction: In the present work we begin with principles and proceed to concepts, and only then, if possible, go on to the senses, while in the study of speculative reason we had to start with the senses and end with principles. Again the reason for this lies in the fact that here we have to deal with a will and to consider reason not in relation to objects but in relation to this will and its causality. The principles of the empirically unconditioned causality must come first, their application to objects, and finally their application to the subject and its sensuous faculty. The law of causality from freedom, i. As early as in , i. While he insists in the first Critique that no concepts, including the formulation of the categories, can be thought without first being given in possible or actual intuition, practical concepts are justified by the fact of pure reason, without needing any appeal to empirical or pure intuitions. Consciousness of the moral law for a moral agent, according to Kant, requires no further confirmation as against the injunction of the first Critique; for practical reason deals not with what is, but what ought to be, which, he insists, cannot be confirmed or validated by anything in the realm of the actual: Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done As against such theories, he maintains that the key to the determination of the will and, hence, any valid moral theory, is only through the moral law: It results when the predisposition to the desire of some enjoyment has been fulfilled, and the object of desire has been experienced or enjoyed in a habitual manner: Therefore, he is against according any value to them in determining the moral law. In the second Critique he writes: Inclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish; reason, when it is a question of morality, must not play the part of mere guardian of the inclinations, but, without regard to them, as pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the exclusion of all else. Even the feeling of sympathy and warm-hearted fellow-feeling, when preceding the consideration of what is duty and serving as a determining ground, is burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing their considered maxims and creating the wish to be free from them and subject only to law-giving reason. In contrast to those actions done from duty aus Pflicht , those from inclination aus Neigung stem from our sensuous, as opposed to our rational, nature. However, as they emerge from a need, and as they are being incorporated into our maxims, it is possible that they be mistakenly identified as supreme practical principles, whereby rendering actions heteronomous and, thus, uprooting moral intentions. On this basis he finds empiricism more reprehensible than mysticism: It substitutes for duty something entirely different, namely, an empirical interest, with which inclinations generally are secretly in league. For this reason empiricism is allied with the inclinations, which, no matter what style they wear, always degrade mankind when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme practical principle. So, both the

source of inclination and its dependence on sensibility, and its aligning with empirical interests 28 29 with a motive for happiness, and the thrust on striving for its own satisfaction set it apart as unworthy of a moral motive and even detrimental to it. Moreover, these natural inclinations cannot be entirely satisfied, as a result of which they create an ever-changing set of needs, the fulfilment of which would be self-defeating with regard to the moral law which is marked by necessity and universality: The inadequacy of inclinations to originate a priori necessity and universality characteristic of the moral law, according to Kant, indicates the need to establish the reign of reason by curbing the rule of the former in the practical realm. As it is with the concept of freedom, it is only in being independent from all sensuous impulses 37 that one is free, and can exercise the capacity of rational choice and spontaneity of reason. Motive of Duty along with Inclination In this connection, there arises the question of the moral worth of those actions done both from duty and from inclination. It stands on the same footing as other inclinations – for example, the inclination for honour, which if fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of 43 such actions, not from inclination, but from duty. The alternative is to act only from maxims with moral content: He continues to hold the same all through his ethical writings: In this regard, his injunction in the *Metaphysic of Morals* is clear enough: Constructive Role of Human Inclination Kant seems, however, to be increasingly positive towards the contributions of the non-rational faculties, although he is unmoved in his central thrust of duty. It should be noticed that, as respect is an effect on feeling and thus on the sensibility of a rational being, it presupposes the sensuous and hence the finitude of such beings on whom respect for the moral law is imposed; thus respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being or even to one free from all sensibility, since to such a being there could be no obstacle 49 to practical reason. That is, as our rationality is mixed with sensibility, in order that the moral law is carried out but not as a motive it must be able to generate specifically moral sentiments that can counter other opposing incentives. Further in the *Metaphysic of Morals*, he holds that we have an indirect duty to cultivate sympathetic feelings, which would strengthen our resolve for duty: It is our duty: For this is still one of the impulses which nature has 50 implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish. The intent of this passage is not to say that such feelings would motivate a moral agent to act from duty, but only that with them he or she would be in a better position to practise duty, though clearly it is not to act from inclination, but only with it. To be more precise, strictly speaking it is not an inclination as if an impulse or emotion, or passion but an interest which can lead us to actions directed according to policies and plans under the dictates of the moral law: Hence only of a rational being do we say that he takes an interest in 51 something: This creates a peculiar situation with regard to their nature and status, and reflects the unease with which Kant deals with them in critical philosophy. At least, it must be admitted that inclinations are not the result of a mechanical causality as it is assumed to be functioning in the animal kingdom. In fact, they cannot be held to be responsible for moral 57 evil, which can be attributed only to our will. His own recognition of moral feelings, especially the respect for the moral law, points to the fact that they are the result of an integral and simultaneous application of 58 human reason and human desire; and what results is uniquely human and it cannot be animal in any way. This is not to be seen merely as occasioning a battle between two opposing and impersonal forces, and the human being to be a helpless and passive spectator of the war between reason and desire. For, we are endowed not merely with rationality in order to fully realize our humanity, but a whole lot of other faculties all of them being fully human, an integration of which is essential to any theory – including ethics – that has humanity at its centre. Undue stress on this 62 division, in terms of a watertight compartmentalization, identifying their roles in opposition to each other, which Kant utilizes to formulate his critical human faculty structure, is suspicious. The question before us is: An integral view of a human being which is 63 at the basis of an integral ethics, too prompts for an integral faculty having its source in our intellect. In this understanding laws are derived by reason, as it is able to make abstractions and generalizations on the content of subjective experiences, from which principles and 66 laws can be arrived at. So also, then, their functions cannot be

opposed to each other. Acting solely based on inclination is erroneous, especially when applied in relation to our uniquely human actions by the will, as it would then disregard the capacity of the same intellect for acting according to principles, which it has given rise to and, thus, acting against itself. It is the unique function of the will to bring together in action the principles of reason and the concrete and subjective elements of inclinations, and to give rise to an integral dimension to the working of the intellect in a human person. The stress that Kant lays on reason and will, at the exclusion of inclinations, reflects the undue importance that he grants to necessity and 68 universality as the characteristic elements of critical philosophy. Any step in such a direction is unbecoming of considering human person in totality. Therefore, everything, including inclinations, has its rightful place and role in a human person, without being detrimental to the primacy of duty. Kant rightly expresses it in the first Critique: Towards an Integral Personality By nature a human being is endowed with three original drives Anlagen or predispositions the fulfilment or realization of which would be the key to a truly human existence and the attainment of the highest good in 72 the moral world. They are the predispositions to animality, to humanity, and to personality. Animality is our predisposition as a physical being, which strives for self-preservation and preservation of the species as a whole. In other words, it involves our pre-rational, or instinctual basis that preserves, propagates, and cares for our own physical being and our offspring. The predisposition to humanity lays stress on our social being, which sees to it that our natural self-development is achieved, whereby we also acquire worth in the opinion 73 of others. Left to itself, it considers man as a rational animal, and is said to involve a capacity to use reason in the service of inclinations. However, Kant holds that the characteristic of humanity is the power to 74 set an end and to work towards its realization, which involves our capacity to choose, and to desire. The third, the predisposition to personality is our power to adopt the moral law as the end, and our consciousness of being obligated to respect it. What is called for is to complete and perfect our humanity by fully determining our ends by reason, thus responding to the moral incentives: What we try to achieve is the full blossoming of our humanity, of course, in view of realizing our personality, though, according to Kant, we can never be certain of having achieved it. It is in our ability to choose the moral law, and in setting our ends only from the motive of duty, taking into consideration the whole human being "with all limitations and prospects" that we can see ourselves as fulfilling our moral vocation. Realization of our humanity, which is 77 in our reach, is the task entrusted to us as human beings, and, what ensues from it "on its own" is personality, the perfect realization of our nature: Thus, becoming worthy of this unique gift of personality is a great burden "as one does not 78 always act spontaneously out of duty" and the sublime vocation, as it is the final destiny "of every human being. IV, Paton VI, Gregor VI, Gregor 15, emphasis added. V, 76 Beck V, 61 Beck 63; Kant, Education, Ak. IX, Churton 2, V, 16 Beck V, 90 Beck V, 66 Beck V, 68 Beck V, 69 Beck V, Beck V, 72 Beck V, 73 Beck VI, Gregor 9. V, 71 Beck VI, Gregor, See Kant, Religion, Ak. V, 65 Beck V, 82 Beck V, 93 Beck VIII, Ashton It may be added that for Kant there is no question of considering an action as morally worthy when done both from duty and from inclination at the same time. In order to be moral it has to be performed from duty, and only from duty; if not, he would insist that it is risky *bedenklich* to let other motives cooperate *mitwirken* with the moral law.

4: Temperament | Definition of Temperament by Merriam-Webster

Kant on Inclinations: 'Alien' or Human? associated with inclinations against developing a morality founded only on the motive of duty seems not to do justice to the former as they are very much part and parcel of every human being.

I think that Thomas implicitly thinks that the others can know the morality of our exterior acts as well as those virtues that are the sources of those acts, better than we do. This is why they can advise us. We might say that the others are somehow "in ourselves". Nowadays we talk very much about the "community", because we are not very often communitarians. On the contrary community was very important in everyday life during the Middle ages. Still the relationship with other people is natural and we always need that. Therefore we need to develop ourselves, facing the challenges of reality, i. This is the meaning of experience as self-actualization. As in Aristotle, also in Thomas only some natural acts, deeply connected with the first principles, which have in themselves their own end the praxis teleia or actio immanens such as living, being happy, contemplating the truth, living friendship and love, although some of them seldom occur in our lives, are paradigmatic for every other kind of acts which have their ends outside themselves the kinesis or actio transitiva This is the case of art. Those natural acts, having their end in themselves, are somehow circular. Only those perfect and fulfilled kind of acts are at the very root of our natural desire for happiness and of hope. We can speak in contemporary terms of basic human experiences. Prominent among those acts is the act of living, because we are always living, also when we are angry or when we commit sin and make mistakes. From the biological point of view we do not live more or less, but we live. And when we live there is always, within ourselves, an order, an actio immanens, a goodness in an ontological sense, because there is an inclination of our body towards preservation and fulfilment and an integrity integritas , which means unity of the parts of a whole among themselves It maybe that we do not pay explicit attention to them, but still those natural acts are implicitly the very source of our desire for happiness. Of course we have to note that in us life is not only biological life, but is also intellectual and moral life in an analogous way: This is the Aristotelian difference between zen and bionai. These kinds of life always presuppose biological life. The intentional and transcendental character of our knowledge both preserves and deeply changes our biological life. As happens in our biological life, also in our intellectual life and in our conduct or ethical life , in facing reality, we always have to come back to our first principles, theoretical and practical, as if in a circular movement. We cannot abandon those first principles and go on without them. The ground of ratio as discursus from currere - to run is intellectus principiorum, the apprehension of the first principles of theoretical reason, as well as the ground of our own ethical choices is the apprehension of the first principles of natural law. The insight of the first principles of knowledge prima principia indemonstrabilia per se nota is paradigmatic, because even when we make mistakes in our reasoning and in our conduct, our first principles can grasp always and immediately the truth and the good. Therefore, although we may not understand the truth and make mistakes, we can always have a new start in our search for truth and moral good. It is noteworthy that Thomas calls the first natural principles theoretical and practical also habitus prima principia quorum est habitus, habitus principiorum , because we always can use them, since they are in potency in ourselves Particularly in our relationships with other people, in friendship amor amicitiae and in love particularly in the contemplation - love of Christ we can make experience of happiness, of the top level of life. That is why we always remember some happy periods of our life. Aquinas makes an interesting comparison between the "fresh start" of the first principles and the newness novitas essendi of creation, and between creation and the gift of Grace. Human beings, who have a nature, always face events of which they cannot have foreknowledge and which seem not to have an order and a nature. We may speak of chance or luck. Chance nowadays has an ambiguous meaning. On the one hand it deals with the chaotic universe of the ideology of evolutionism and nihilism according to which "in principle there was Chance". Although - I suppose - we cannot logically deduce from evolutionism the negation of human nature in the classical sense , it is a fact that people often use this argument. But, on the other hand,

chance is also very important in our lives, particularly nowadays, because we are always looking for something new, for something exceptional for our lives. This is apparent, if we consider some slang expressions of ordinary language. From this point of view the study of everyday language is very interesting. I believe we can say that we are always by nature looking for something exceptional. Only what appears new, really new we might say *cum novitate essendi*, as grounded in the newness of the act of being, can fulfil our natural desire for happiness and truth. Chance and luck are very important in our lives. But this newness always requires nature and necessity as its ground. Thomas holds that we can know that there is chance, because we know - at least implicitly - that there is nature, order and necessity in ourselves and in the world in general. In fact it is absurd to oppose to each other, nature and chance or nature and history. This happens - maybe - because we often have too static and essentialistic a concept of nature and of God. But the internal logic of his metaphysics of creation is deeply open to the newness *novitas* of historical events and therefore to chance. This is not strange for a philosopher who is also a great Christian theologian. This means that the events of history, of contemporary history, help us, more and more, to discover human nature and natural law also by way of negation in a dialectical way. If this is true, we ought to look with open eyes at the events of the times we live in, and not only at those of past times, because in this way we can get to know in greater depth human nature and natural law. Nature and history, nature and time are not against each other, but they are complementary living polarities. Recovering Human Nature Nowadays somebody holds: A consideration of the biological work determining a specific unity to human beings as members of a natural kind; there may be more unity than cultural anthropologists have been wont to admit; A consideration of the psychological unity which appears in constant studies of human behaviour. Carl Rogers has suggested similarities in his discussion of self-actualization theories of human development" But also this kind of comprehension always presupposes that we know something of their nature. I think that human experience, the apex of the evolution of nature, in its natural openness to the totality of being and to other men as they are *quodammodo omnia* as we are, is the living criterion of our approaching reality. But this does not mean subjectivism, thanks to intentionality we can recognize other beings as different and thanks to the fact that in man the main dimensions of reality are integrated at a higher level or sketched at a lower level. *Materia enim dicitur esse natura, quia est formae susceptibilis. Et generationes habent nomen naturae, quia sunt motus procedentes a forma, et iterum ad formas. Et idipsum, scilicet forma est principium motus rerum existentium secundum naturam, aut in actu, aut in potentia. Forma enim non semper facit motum in actu, sed quandoque in potentia tantum: IV, 11"Quanto natura est altior, tanto emanans ex ea est intimior". Summa theologiae, I-II, 10, 1. Summa theologiae I, 60, 1 ad 2. In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere, et alia huiusmodi opera vitae exercere". In I Politicorum, 1. Sed loquutio humana significat quid est utile et quid nocivum. Ex quo sequitur quod significet iustum et iniustum. Consistit enim iustitia et iniustitia ex hoc quod aliqui adaequantur vel non adaequantur in rebus utilibus et nocivis. Et ideo loquutio est propria hominibus; quia hoc est proprium eis in comparatione ad alia animalia, quod habeant cognitionem boni et mali, iusti et iniusti, et aliorum huiusmodi, quae sermone significari possunt". Summa theologiae I, 18, 2 ad 2: On the deep relationship between speculative and ethical virtues see Summa theologiae I-II, 57, 1, 2: The consideration of truth since this is the good work of the intellect: For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. An Analytic Reconstruction, Clarendon press, Oxford, p. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life. Runggaldier, Was sind Handlungen? Utrum aliqua delectatio sit non naturalis. Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi potest. Uno modo prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur. Et secundum hoc, naturales delectationes hominis dici possunt quae sunt in eo quod convenit homini secundum rationem: Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod dividitur rationi: Secundum utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales*

secundum quid. III, in particolare 5. Among these principles there is a hierarchical order. The principle of contradiction is the ground of the principle according to which the whole is larger than its parts, the first principle of practical reason is the ground of the other practical principles. Summa theologiae I-II, 2, 5 This point is very much stressed by N. Hartmann in many works. Summa theologiae, I, 63, 3 Summa theologiae I-II, 5, 5 ad 2. Jonas, The Principle Responsibility, Summa theologiae I-II, 2, 2, 3. Summa theologiae I, 82, 3. Frankfurt, On the Importance of What we care about. Unde manifestum est , quod etiam felicitas in tali operatione consistit, quae est in operante, non quae transit in rem exteriorem, cum felicitas sit bonum felicitis, et perfectio eius. Est enim aliqua vita felicitis, scilicet vita perfecta eius. Unde sicut vita est in vivente, ita felicitas in felice. Et sic patet quod felicitas non consistit nec in aedificando, nec in aliqua huiusmodi actione, quae in exterius transeat, sed in intelligendo et volendo".

5: Causes of Homosexuality: A Christian Appraisal of the Data by Andrew J. Sodergren

The rejection of the true understanding of original sin and its effects led a number of early Protestant theologians to accept the notion of human nature's "total depravity" – that the Fall so corrupted man that the very inclinations we experience that tempt us to sin are actually sinful in themselves.

It is rare to find the complex psychological problems which are typical of the homosexually oriented personality distinguished from questions associated with the "gay" culture and the life-styles influenced by it; it is even harder to separate the just requirements of non-discrimination from demands for the full legalization of homosexual unions. In this situation, the positive achievement of the due respect that should always be shown a person, who can never be identified merely by his sexual orientation or actions, and the discovery of the deep psychological and social influences inherent in homosexuality are confused with other cultural factors, giving rise to a growing uncertainty and virtual eclipse of the ability to determine the objective criteria for moral evaluation. The loss of the authentic normative value of human nature and the consequent subjectivization of the moral sense are associated with an erotization of the surrounding culture and an emphasis on the right to sexual pleasure, which after exalting personal freedom, paradoxically submits the individual to the determinism of his impulses by censoring any moral demand. In this paper, we will distinguish three aspects of the problem: Moral evaluation of homosexual acts 1. The choice to begin with an evaluation of homosexual acts depends precisely on the moral viewpoint we adopt. In fact morality is concerned with what proceeds from personal freedom, that is, those human acts which, "to the extent that they are deliberate choices,.. Like every human act, homosexual behaviour must also be evaluated first of all on the basis of "objective criteria Now, the moral tradition of the Church, based on the light of Revelation and natural reason, has always stressed unequivocally that "the use of the sexual function has its true meaning and moral rectitude only in legitimate marriage" Persona humana, n. 5. Human sexuality is included in that primordial and good plan of God the Creator, who called man and woman with their reciprocal complementarity to be an image of his own love and responsible collaborators in the procreation of new individuals. The Second Vatican Council, speaking of the norms of conjugal morality, justified their value precisely as being directed to keeping the exercise of sexual acts within "the context of true love", by safeguarding "the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation" Gaudium et spes, n. Through the symbolism of the sexual difference which marks their bodily nature, man and woman are called to achieve two closely connected values: Only in the context of legitimate marriage are these values proper to sexuality adequately respected and achieved. If we now consider homosexual activity in the light of these objective criteria and in comparison to the heterosexual marital relationship, its intrinsic contradiction to the above-mentioned meanings is obvious. First, homosexual behaviour lacks that unitive meaning in which "an authentic gift of self" can take place. In fact, only in the conjugal sexual relationship between a man and woman does their reciprocal complementarity, based on their sexual difference, allow them to become the "one flesh" of a communion of persons who together constitute one and the same procreating principle. The gift of self and the acceptance of the other are real, because they are based on the recognition of otherness and on the totality of the act which expresses them. The gift of the body is a real sign of self-giving at the level of the persons. The meeting of one person with another is expressed with respect for the symbolism of the sexed body. It therefore takes place as a true gift of self and as true acceptance of the other, and includes body and soul in a single and intentionally totalizing act. In the homosexual act, on the other hand, that true reciprocity which makes the gift of self and the acceptance of the other possible cannot take place. At the same time, homosexual activity also involves the illusion of a false intimacy that is obsessively sought and constantly lacking. The other is not really "other"; he is like the self: Hence great instability and promiscuity prevail in the most widespread model of homosexual life, which is why the view advanced by some of encouraging "stable" and institutionalized unions seems completely unrealistic J. Secondly, it is obvious that the homosexual act also lacks openness to the procreative

meaning of human sexuality. In the sexual relationship of husband and wife, their bodily act of mutual self-giving and acceptance is ordered to a further good which transcends both of them: It is the logic of love itself, which requires this further dimension and transcendence without which the sexual act risks turning in on itself, by concentrating on the search for pleasure alone and literally sterilizing itself. Through its openness to procreation, the intimate act of the spouses becomes part of time and history, and is woven into the fabric of society. The homosexual act, on the contrary, has no roots in the past and does not extend to any future; it is not grafted onto the community or the succession of generations. It remains locked in an "aesthetic pointillism" A. Chappelle, in an unreal moment, outside time and social responsibility. To speak of the "spiritual fruitfulness" of homosexuality is unduly to ascribe the positive aspect, which is always involved in true friendship and of which homosexual persons are also capable, to homosexual practices that are also psychologically marked by a frustrating sterility. In fact, psychologists with broad clinical experience state that when an authentic personal friendship forms between male homosexuals, it frequently happens that they are unable to continue having sexual relations J. At the root of these inclinations there seem to be gaps in the process of psychosexual identification rather than biological conditioning E. Van den Aardweg, which lead to the search for an inadequate response in the homosexual relationship to a real difficulty resulting from the absence of an identifying relationship with a parental figure of the same sex. Experience and therapeutic programmes demonstrate the possibility in many cases of recovering a basic heterosexual identity or at any rate the capacity for self-control of erotic homosexual inclinations J. Therefore it is important when making a moral evaluation to draw from these psychological studies the distinction between the homosexual condition or inclination and homosexual acts, a distinction which has also been recognized by two documents of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: *Persona humana* of 29 December n. If homosexual acts must be described as intrinsically disordered because they lack an essential and indispensable goal, in so far as the homosexual orientation is not the result of morally negative choices it cannot be defined as a sin for which persons are to be held responsible. How then should one judge the homosexual condition or homosexual tendency which inclines the person to erotic relations with persons of the same sex? Even while it forcefully denies that this condition can be called a sin, the *Letter Homosexualitatis problema* describes it as "intrinsically disordered" n. This definition caused controversy and the Church was accused of unjustly discriminating against homosexuals. It is actually not a question of making a moral accusation against these individuals, but rather of recognizing that a homosexual orientation, to the extent that it represents a more or less strong inclination to intrinsically evil behaviour from the moral viewpoint, cannot be simplistically described as neutral or good. In fact, from this erroneous reasoning some people then drew the conclusion that for homosexuals whose orientation is truly irreversible, the sexual acts they perform in relationships dictated by love would even be morally acceptable. As happens in the case of so many other negative conditions e. These are not sins in themselves. But they stem from sin: Above all, these inclinations tend to lead to sin. In the light of faith, this challenge of a negative influence on freedom should be seen as a sharing in suffering and a test, in solidarity with humanity fallen in Adam. Awareness of the complexity of the conditioning involved in the homosexual tendency requires great caution in evaluating personal responsibility for homosexual acts. Nevertheless, no matter how great the difficulties may be, it would be a serious lack of respect and consideration for their dignity to deny homosexual persons their basic freedom *Homosexualitatis problema*, n. The "gay" culture 3. A very different aspect of the question is presented by the so-called "gay" culture. Today this term is highly politicized and does not simply mean a homosexually oriented person but one who publicly adopts a homosexual "lifestyle" and is committed to having it accepted by society as fully legitimate. In fact a systematic plan for the public justification and glorification of homosexuality is taking shape, starting with the attempt to make it fully accepted in the mind of society. It aims, through increasing pressure, at a change in legislation so that homosexual unions may enjoy the same rights as marriage, including that of adoption. It respects for every person is promoted in society even when he may privately behave according to questionable moral criteria, and if civil law is not required to impose moral values in the sphere of private life, nevertheless

THE INCLINATIONS OF NATURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE PERSON

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the State cannot fail to recognize the promotion and defence of families founded on monogamous heterosexual marriage as an essential part of the common good.

6: inclination | Definition of inclination in English by Oxford Dictionaries

Simply put, some theologians argue that the magisterium has placed too much emphasis on human nature itself; or, more pointedly, on the biology or inclinations of the human person. They argue that the magisterium has fallen prey to the naturalistic fallacy by deducing moral principles from biological data.

Kant defends the necessity and universality that are characteristic features of the moral law with a view to safeguard its transcendental justification and employment in the sensible world. Pure Reason versus Impure Inclinations Kant clearly holds that only a moral theory based on reason could be sufficiently universal, and command with necessity. To this effect, both Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason approach human cognitions and faculties from the perspective of maintaining the synthetic a priori nature of the moral law, so much so that anything other than the rational moral motive is rejected as spurious. Everyone must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid morally – valid, that is, as a ground of obligation; Moreover, both in the intent and the content of his critical philosophy, Kant is explicit with regard to the unique place of reason in human beings and, thus, in the whole architectonic of pure reason. His insertion of the word pure along with practical reason in each of the main headings of the second Critique indicates the difference in the viewpoints of the theoretical and the practical approach with regard to empirical aspects. IV, Paton VI, Gregor VI, Gregor 15, emphasis added. V, 76 Beck V, 61 Beck 63; Kant, Education, Ak. IX, Churton 2, He writes at the end of the introduction: In the present work we begin with principles and proceed to concepts, and only then, if possible, go on to the senses, while in the study of speculative reason we had to start with the senses and end with principles. Again the reason for this lies in the fact that here we have to deal with a will and to consider reason not in relation to objects but in relation to this will and its causality. The principles of the empirically unconditioned causality must come first, their application to objects, and finally their application to the subject and its sensuous faculty. The law of causality from freedom, i. As early as in , i. While he insists in the first Critique that no concepts, including the formulation of the categories, can be thought without first being given in possible or actual intuition, 7 Kant, CPrR Ak. V, 16 Beck V, 90 Beck Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done V, 66 Beck V, 68 Beck V, 69 Beck V, Beck As against such theories, he maintains that the key to the determination of the will and, hence, any valid moral theory, is only through the moral law: It results when the predisposition to the desire of some enjoyment has been fulfilled, and the object of desire has been experienced or enjoyed in a habitual manner: V, 72 Beck V, 73 Beck VI, Gregor 9. Therefore, he is against according any value to them in determining the moral law. In the second Critique he writes: Inclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish; reason, when it is a question of morality, must not play the part of mere guardian of the inclinations, but, without regard to them, as pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the exclusion of all else. Even the feeling of sympathy and warm-hearted fellow-feeling, when preceding the consideration of what is duty and serving as a determining ground, is burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing their considered maxims and creating the wish to be free from them and subject only to law-giving reason. However, as they emerge from a need, and as they are being incorporated into our maxims, it is possible that they be mistakenly identified as supreme practical principles, whereby rendering actions heteronomous and, thus, uprooting moral intentions. On this basis he finds empiricism more reprehensible than mysticism: It substitutes for duty something entirely different, namely, an empirical interest, with which inclinations generally are secretly in league. For this reason empiricism is allied with the inclinations, which, no matter what style they wear, always degrade mankind when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme practical principle. V, 71 Beck VI, , Gregor , See Kant, Religion, Ak. The inadequacy of inclinations to originate a priori necessity and universality characteristic of the moral law, according to Kant, indicates the need to establish the reign of reason by curbing the rule of the former in the practical realm. Motive of Duty along with Inclination In this connection, there arises the question of the moral worth of those

actions done both from duty and from inclination. It stands on the same footing as other inclinations – for example, the inclination for honour, which if fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of such actions, not from inclination, but from duty. V, 65 Beck V, 82 Beck

In this regard, his injunction in the *Metaphysic of Morals* is clear enough: Constructive Role of Human Inclination Kant seems, however, to be increasingly positive towards the contributions of the non-rational faculties, although he is unmoved in his central thrust of duty. V, 93 Beck VIII, Ashton It may be added that for Kant there is no question of considering an action as morally worthy when done both from duty and from inclination at the same time. In order to be moral it has to be performed from duty, and only from duty; if not, he would insist that it is risky *bedenklich* to let other motives cooperate *mitwirken* with the moral law. IV, Paton ; see also *Groundwork*, Ak. IV, n Paton V, 30 Beck It should be noticed that, as respect is an effect on feeling and thus on the sensibility of a rational being, it presupposes the sensuous and hence the finitude of such beings on whom respect for the moral law is imposed; thus respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being or even to one free from all sensibility, since to such a being there could be no obstacle to practical reason. Further in the *Metaphysic of Morals*, he holds that we have an indirect duty to cultivate sympathetic feelings, which would strengthen our resolve for duty: It is our duty: For this is still one of the impulses which nature has implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish. To be more precise, strictly speaking it is not an inclination as if an impulse or emotion, or passion but an interest which can lead us to actions directed according to policies and plans under the dictates of the moral law: Hence only of a rational being do we say that he takes an interest in something: We find Kant insisting on this from his *Groundwork* onwards: This creates a peculiar situation with regard to their nature and status, and reflects the unease with which Kant deals with them in critical philosophy. His overstress on the problems 51 Kant, *Groundwork*, Ak. V, Bernard At least, it must be admitted that inclinations are not the result of a mechanical causality as it is assumed to be functioning in the animal kingdom. In fact, they cannot be held to be responsible for moral evil, which can be attributed only to our will. This is not to be seen merely as occasioning a battle between two opposing and impersonal forces, and the human being to be a helpless and passive spectator of the war between reason and desire. For, we are endowed not merely with rationality in order to fully realize our humanity, but a whole lot of other faculties all of them being fully human , an integration of which is essential to any theory – including ethics – that has humanity at its centre. V, Beck ; Kant, *Religion*, Ak. See Cox, *The Will at the Crossroads*, Undue stress on this division,62 in terms of a watertight compartmentalization, identifying their roles in opposition to each other, which Kant utilizes to formulate his critical human faculty structure, is suspicious. The question before us is: An integral view of a human being which is at the basis of an integral ethics, too prompts for an integral faculty having its source in our intellect. In this understanding laws are derived by reason, as it is able to make abstractions and generalizations on the content of subjective 61 Kant, *Groundwork*, Ak. So also, then, their functions cannot be opposed to each other. Acting solely based on inclination is erroneous, especially when applied in relation to our uniquely human actions by the will , as it would then disregard the capacity of the same intellect for acting according to principles, which it has given rise to and, thus, acting against itself. It is the unique function of the will to bring together in action the principles of reason and the concrete and subjective elements of inclinations, and to give rise to an integral dimension to the working of the intellect in a human person. Chackalackal, *Unity of Knowing and Acting in Kant*, ff. V, 84 Beck 86 , emphasis added. See also Kant, *Enlightenment*, Ak. VIII, 34 Beck 4. The stress that Kant lays on reason and will, at the exclusion of inclinations, reflects the undue importance that he grants to necessity and universality as the characteristic elements of critical philosophy. Any step in such a direction is unbecoming of considering human person in totality. Therefore, everything, including inclinations, has its rightful place and role in a human person, without being detrimental to the primacy of duty. Kant rightly expresses it in the first *Critique*: Along this line, it may be pointed out that the source of evil can be located in the lack of integration among these three

functions of the intellect, where an undue stress on any one at the exclusion of the others would be against the person considered as a single whole, and it is this condition that is known as moral evil. V, 79 Beck Towards an Integral Personality By nature a human being is endowed with three original drives Anlagen or predispositions the fulfilment or realization of which would be the key to a truly human existence and the attainment of the highest good in the moral world. Animality is our predisposition as a physical being, which strives for self-preservation and preservation of the species as a whole. In other words, it involves our pre-rational, or instinctual basis that preserves, propagates, and cares for our own physical being and our offspring. The predisposition to humanity lays stress on our social being, which sees to it that our natural self-development is achieved, whereby we also acquire worth in the opinion of others. However, Kant holds that the characteristic of humanity is the power to set an end and to work towards its realization, which involves our capacity to choose,⁷⁴ and to desire. The third, the predisposition to personality is our power to adopt the moral law as the end, and our consciousness of being obligated to respect it. The true nature of a human being can be realized, it seems, only when all of these aspects and faculties of a human person operate in a concerted and integrated manner, where, of course, respect for the moral law, which is our predisposition to personality assumes the decisive role. What is called for is to complete and perfect our humanity by fully determining our ends by reason, thus responding to the moral incentives: In the third Critique humanity is considered as the ultimate end of nature, which can be realized through the exercise of freedom. V, , Bernard ,

7: Inclination | Definition of Inclination by Merriam-Webster

The doctrine of the two inclinations (or drives) is a major feature of rabbinic psychology and anthropology. As a personification of the permanent dualism of the choice between good and evil, the rabbinic notion of the two inclinations shifts this dualism from a metaphysical to a more psychological level (i.e., two tendencies in man rather than.

John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family Abstract This paper discusses some of the recent scientific findings on the causes of homosexuality in the context of a Christian anthropology. After reviewing the major findings in the empirical literature, the discussion focuses on how such an anthropology can account for these findings without compromising the traditional Christian ethical teaching that homosexual acts are intrinsically immoral and the homosexual inclination is objectively disordered. Of particular importance here are notions of original sin, fallen nature, the sexual difference, and the virtue of chastity. A Christian Appraisal of the Data Debates over the morality of homosexual acts and same-sex unions inevitably contain some inferences and remarks about the supposed causes of homosexual inclinations. Likewise, researchers who examine the causes of homosexuality are often unable to refrain from commenting on the ethical debate. Thus, these issues seem intertwined, at least in the minds of many well-intentioned people. This interlinking, however, tends to result in misunderstanding and in fallacious assumptions on the sides of both ethicists and scientists because of a lack of understanding across disciplines. For instance, many in the ethical debate over homosexuality hold that not only are homosexual acts always immoral but also the very disposition is in some way morally disordered. On the other hand, scientists often oppose such a view and hold that a homosexual orientation is morally neutral. In this paper I will attempt to steer a path through this tangled forest. I will begin by providing an overview of the major empirical findings on the causes of homosexuality. I will then attempt to show that a Christian anthropology can account for these findings without compromising a firm ethical stance on homosexual acts and inclinations. Research on the Etiology of Homosexuality The most publicized research studies on the causes of homosexuality have been those examining the role of genetics. Indeed, a number of studies have attempted to assess the heritability of the homosexual orientation. The primary way of examining the genetic contribution to a given behavior or disposition such as sexual orientation is through twin studies. However, in order to truly assess the effects of genes, one has to control or neutralize the contribution of environmental factors in the development of the characteristic in question. Such environmental factors could include anything from position in the womb, maternal nutrition, and the hormonal milieu of the uterine environment to post-natal care, early illnesses, parenting style, family constellation, education, socialization, and so forth. It is important to note that several of the factors listed above pertain to the prenatal environment. In this period of development, the environment can have profound effects on the organism, and this will be discussed further below. In the most desirable type twin study, researchers examine MZ twins who were separated at birth and reared apart. This is considered the ideal in behavioral genetics. As the reasoning goes, since such twins have the same genetic code but are reared in different environments, any behavioral similarities they manifest likely have a strong genetic basis. Unfortunately, these situations are rare, and they are extremely so if the trait being studied is itself uncommon. Homosexuality is just such a case. Thus, locating MZ twins who were separated at birth and of whom at least one twin developed a homosexual orientation is unfeasible. Moreover, such a twin study MZ twins reared separately does not in fact neutralize the environment to the extent that researchers surmise. The reason for this is that MZ twins, even if they are separated from the moment of birth forward, still shared the same, profoundly influential environment for the previous nine months. Thus, every twin study, no matter how elegant in design, cannot fully tease apart the effects of genes and environment. Researchers try to cope with these difficulties by comparing MZ twins who were reared together with other sibling pairs such as DZ twins, normal biological siblings, and adopted siblings with no biological relation between them. Bailey and Pillard followed this general paradigm by examining family patterns of adult males with homosexual orientation who had either a MZ twin, DZ twin, or

adopted brother. What this study shows is that there may be a genetic component to homosexuality, but there appear to be substantial environmental factors as well. Though far from conclusive, this study by Bailey and Pillard was highly influential. However, the samples of twins included in these studies were largely recruited through advertising in gay or lesbian publications. This non-random sampling, of course, would result in biased data. In that study, the researchers identified 27 pairs of male twins in which at least one of the men was homosexual. However, only 3 of these pairs were concordant both twins were homosexual. They go on to state, Consistent with several studies of siblings we found that sexual orientation is familial. In contrast to most prior twin studies of sexual orientation, however, ours did not provide statistically significant support for the importance of genetic factors for that trait p. A second line of research examining the supposed genetic basis for homosexuality employs the molecular analysis of blood samples from relatives of homosexuals and a method called linkage analysis, which maps genes onto chromosomal regions, to identify the specific gene or genes that influence sexual orientation. Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, and Pattatucci, initially reported findings consistent with this hypothesis that implicated the chromosomal region Xq28 in the heritability of male homosexuality. A similar though weaker relationship was reported later by members of the same research group Hu et al. However, the methods used in these studies and therefore the reported results have been called into question. Risch, Whleeler, and Keats criticized the research design and statistical methods used by Hamer et al. In addition, Rice et al. Because our study was larger than that of Hamer et al. Nonetheless, our data do not support the presence of a gene of large effect influencing sexual orientation at position Xq28 Rice et al. These issues were again revisited in the journal Science in Hamer et al. It is clear from these articles that because scientists are treading on new methodological ground, there is no simple solution to this question. The methods being used in these studies have not been tested and verified in studying a trait as complex as sexual orientation. A study conducted by Bailey et al. Three sampling techniques were utilized: All participants were interviewed about familial patterns of non-heterosexuality. Only the sample attained through magazine advertisement knew of this purpose of the study. The researchers found a rate of occurrence of homosexuality among brothers of a homosexual male ranging from 7. This suggests a modest familial not necessarily genetic component to the origin of male homosexuality. However, the familial patterns of homosexuality observed in this study did not support the Xq28 hypothesis. Using blood samples of individuals from unrelated families, the researchers conducted for the first time a search of the entire human genome for a genetic basis to male homosexuality. Though three gene regions resulted in elevated values, none were large enough to generate a statistically significant result. In addition, they found no evidence of a link to the Xq28 region. Thus, as stated above, research into the genetic basis for homosexuality, taken as a whole, is inconclusive. While there may be a modest heritability to such an orientation, the existence of an overriding gay gene seems highly unlikely at this time. Another biologically based line of research bearing on the question of the etiology of homosexuality deals with the pre-natal environment. As already alluded to, fetal development is a remarkably crucial time in the development of the human organism. In particular, brain systems develop rapidly during this period and are quite sensitive to hormonal and other biochemical influences. Normally in a male child, his testes will begin producing testosterone during the fetal period which masculinizes various body structures and systems. Girls produce androgens as well from their adrenal glands, though usually in much smaller quantities than boys who produce them in their testes and adrenals. Besides the obvious differences such as genitalia, musculature, etc. Researchers have made various attempts to study such an effect upon the development of homosexual orientations. While for ethical reasons, experimenters cannot manipulate the hormonal milieu of the prenatal environment in humans, they can study cases in which such abnormalities occur naturally to see if a homosexual orientation is more likely to result. In addition, a certain amount can be learned from animal studies. Finally, somatic and neuropsychological variables known to be strongly affected by prenatal hormones can be compared in adults to see if they differ according to sexual orientation. All of these methods have been utilized, and it appears that in some respects, female homosexuals appear to have experienced increased prenatal androgenization compared to heterosexuals more masculine auditory systems and

waist-to-hip ratio, higher salivary testosterone levels, less desire to give birth, etc. Likewise, on some measures homosexual men appear to have been less androgenized than heterosexual men more female-like pubertal onset, weight, height, cognitive spatial abilities, and language abilities; higher rates of non-right handedness. However, on other measures homosexual men appear hypermasculine, i. Some differences in the size and shape of certain adult brain structures have also been identified across sexual orientation categories, but it is unknown whether these neural differences cause or are consequent upon homosexual lifestyles. Thus, the data on the role of prenatal androgens are very complex, and no scholarly consensus exists on how to integrate and interpret them. If abnormal androgen levels are what drive these differences, they appear to affect males and females differently since homosexual men and homosexual women do not always differ from their heterosexual counterparts on the same variables. Moreover, the data on homosexual men are mixed. Rahman and Wilson put forward the hypothesis that perhaps a genetic factor in some men alters the distribution of androgen receptors in various brain structures. Thus, when exposed to prenatal androgens at whatever level, the result will be that some brain structures will be more masculinized than normal and others will be less masculinized than normal because of the redistribution of the receptors. While this makes a good deal of sense, the research has not yet shown this to be the case. Thus, something about being born later in a line of several brothers seems to increase the likelihood of male homosexuality. Researchers believe that the fraternal birth order effect per se is not the ultimate causal factor of male homosexuality in these cases but that there is some other mechanism in place that mediates the effect. However, what this causal mechanism is is still highly debated. Most favor a biological explanation such as a fluctuation in prenatal androgens or increased maternal immune system response related to multiple, successive male pregnancies. Another possibility with mixed empirical support suggests that maternal stress, which could increase with the births of multiple sons, may alter fetal development in such a way as to increase the likelihood of a homosexual orientation. Stress hormones are in fact produced in the adrenal glands and are therefore, androgens or at least androgen-like and can interfere with normal fetal development. Other explanations for the fraternal birth order effect are psychosocial in nature and posit such potential causes as ostracization of boys by older brothers or increased early sex play among boys with several older brothers see James, a; b. Presently, however, the fraternal birth order effect remains largely unexplained in the absence of any overwhelmingly conclusive evidence. Moreover, it is important to note that according to researchers only Though it is a well established and easily identifiable phenomenon connected with the genesis of male homosexuality, the fraternal birth order effect does not appear to be the primary cause of homosexuality in the majority of gay men. Nothing analogous to this effect has been found in women. In light of the foregoing, it is important to recall that sexual orientation does not emerge immediately upon conception and birth but takes time to develop throughout childhood, adolescence, and even adulthood. Thus, there is a great deal of room for experience to affect this process. The term coined for this is childhood gender nonconformity CGN , which simply refers to a certain conglomeration of sex atypical traits physical, psychological, and behavioral features. However, since not everyone with CGN develops an adult homosexual orientation, there must be some environmental influences that contribute to such a development. Indeed, classic psychodynamic theory held that male homosexuality was primarily caused by a maladaptive family pattern in which the father is weak and distant and the mother is over-controlling roughly the reverse is posited for females. While there has been very little data in the last 20 years supporting these specific claims, research does emphasize the importance of relationships in the development of sexual orientation. For instance, an interesting study by Landolt, Bartholomew, Saffrey, Oram, and Perlman examined the relationship between CGN and rejection from parents and peers in a sample of gay and bisexual men.

8: Thomistic Institute Campodónico

Considering inclinations and desires as "alien sources" in critical philosophy is a strange conclusion, especially because inclinations, too, are part of our human nature, and are the most characteristic expressions of a person.

What do you say that marriage is? Christian anthropology teaches that each person is called to accept his or her sexual identity as a man or as a woman. Catechism, no. This is consistent with the understanding that man and female is a unity of body and soul. Catechism, no. Our identity as human persons is intimately connected with our identity as a man or as a woman. In short, the body matters. Keep talking about Christian anthropology and chastity. As Catholics, we have an immense treasury of insight into who the human person is—a study called anthropology, a treasury of truth about the human condition that applies to everyone, not only Catholics. Bringing it back to the human person also helps defend against the charge that the Church is being selective and only cares about married people. Christian anthropology, rightly understood, is a message of freedom for every person. In particular, Church teaching on the universal vocation to chastity is an avenue through which to approach questions of sexuality, gender, love, and marriage. Is defending marriage only about injuring others? Every person, male and female, is created in the image of God with full human dignity. Every person is a gift, created to be a child of God. This identity of the person goes deeper than any inclination. Further, the Church teaches that, while homosexual acts are always sinful and contrary to the true good of the person, the experience of same-sex attraction is not sinful in itself. Because of free will, men and women can choose which inclinations or desires to act on. Actions and the inclinations toward them can be either objectively ordered toward the good, meaning toward the flourishing of the person, or not. But the person, regardless of the inclinations they experience, can never be described as fundamentally flawed or disordered. The people of California passed prop 22 and prop 8 which declared that marriage is only between one man and one woman and twice the California Courts ruled against the Majority Vote of their state. The Supreme Court Judges said that people should not be dictated to and then allowed that to happen by not ruling on the right of the Majority to make Laws in California, but instead allowed the California Judges to make a new Law. I am seeking legal advice on how to proceed in this matter and would appreciate any assistance, advice or comments that you might have. Thank you, Joseph Elliott.

9: Inclination, Good and Evil

Culture, for Kant, is the work that nature does to discipline our inclinations in order to prepare us for the sovereignty of reason. Culture is what 'nature is capable of doing in order to prepare [the human being] for what he must himself do in order to be a final end' (Kant Kant, Immanuel.

A Critical Guide Published: April 06, Alix Cohen ed. In her introduction, the editor Alix Cohen admits that these lectures have long been ignored and "deemed a peculiar collection of more or less pointless remarks on a variety of random topics vaguely related to human beings" 2 , and that they are criticized for their "stereotyping, prejudice and bigotry" 2. Yet, the last twenty years have seen a revival of scholarly interest in them. This rediscovery has helped to correct or mitigate some long-standing misunderstandings, for instance the notion that Kant is only interested in abstract, transcendental matters and that he pays no attention to the social and historical embeddedness of human existence. I propose to add a fourth reason: Pragmatic anthropology differs from science such as empirical anthropology and empirical psychology in its standards, methods and goals. As Cohen rightly states, Kant intends his lectures on anthropology as a way to help students "make their knowledge relevant, applicable and useful" 1 and to convey material to his young students that would be useful for many aspects of their lives. The lecture notes on anthropology therefore also help us to understand what Kant thought the responsibilities of academics himself included towards the public are, and how philosophers can and should engage and educate the public. I will discuss this theme first, and then the essays that do not develop this point. For this purpose Kant starts from the "everyday phenomenology of sensory experience" 39 of his audience. He makes use of scientific, psychological theory for a deeper explanation of this phenomenology and to facilitate his pragmatic purpose. Kant aims to distinguish his pragmatic anthropology both from empirical psychology and from physiology, which is the study of human beings according to nature or as part of nature, not as what they make of themselves. She argues that Kant "not only acknowledges the empirical, contingent and messy features of our cognition," but that his account "also helps us become better, more efficient knowers" Natural and cognitive differences result in antagonism and disagreement. For the resolution of disagreement we need to develop our cognitive capacities. Furthermore, we need to institute laws or procedures to regulate disagreement and antagonism. Cohen then criticizes Kant. His Lectures on Anthropology are supposed to "provide the empirical knowledge we need to succeed and reach our vocation" The problem is that Kant seems to think that our faculty and process of cognition are not in our control and we therefore cannot improve them Cohen cites XXV: Cohen argues against Kant that an agent has sufficient control over cognitive matters. We have control over what to investigate, and it is up to us to withhold judgment. Most importantly, we have control over our epistemic principles or our way of thinking. Against these deficiencies four levels of constraint are imposed on rational agents: These constraints establish conditions under which morality can develop. The philosopher can facilitate this development by educating the educators who in turn educate the broader public. The moral formation of the human being is made possible by nature, but is only realized by education. The reader will wonder as much as before how society and education can facilitate the first steps to moral agency. His aim was to teach his young hearers something useful for their lives without overburdening them with theory, and he thought the characteristics can help students make sense of and deal with people and that they are generally accessible. Zammito emphasizes that, even though Kant claims that his teachings concerning the characteristics are systematic and empirical, or grounded in observation, they are a "practical guide" and not science. Kant believes that philosophers can and should philosophize about a great range of subjects and can engage the public with useful lessons from all areas of philosophy. If philosophers start from everyday phenomenology or ordinary elements of human existence and articulate these elements clearly and in a systematic manner, the audience can benefit from this with regard to a great variety of subjects the senses, cognition, psychology, etc. Apart from the four essays I already discussed, I want to draw attention to two more that I found particularly interesting. Passions are

disordered inclinations or disordered desires and evil; affects are disordered feelings. Frierson discusses why Kant thinks that only passions are evil. The answer, according to Frierson, is that affects bypass choice and do not give rise to actions in the strict sense of the term: Actions under the influence of affects cannot be imputed. By contrast, we are responsible for actions in the heat of passion, since passions do not exclude rational deliberation. Kant assumes that all living creatures have inherent purpose and that this purpose will eventually be realized. This adds a prescriptive dimension to his anthropology. Anthropology can function as a map for future development, if we can discover the inherent potential of human beings as a species. He also reminds us of how realistic Kant considers the prospect of mankind achieving its final purpose: Let me finally briefly summarize the themes of the other essays. The First Critique focuses on sensibility in general space and time, and explains the a priori conditions for cognition to be possible. The lectures focus on the individual sensory modalities and on the empirical conditions requisite for cognition to be actual, and they tell us how our cognition can be object directed, intersubjective, how objects can be cognized as substantial, what the contribution of the imagination is for cognition of objects, and how our understanding can be perfected as well as fall into deficiency. Allen Wood partly covers the same ground as Frierson. Wood discusses the difference between inclinations and desires; his essay contains interesting thoughts on passions and their social nature. Wood stresses the role of the social world for the forming and content of inclinations, desires and passions. Only around *Naturrecht* Feyerabend and the *Groundwork* does Kant introduce the notion of freedom as an intrinsic value and as something suited to be an end in itself. The essays of Guyer and Wood, have similar strengths and weaknesses. For those who are not already convinced of these readings, however, the essays will do little to change their minds. Kant is a proponent of secularization, rejects animalism or at least emphasizes that we should consider human beings also as rational beings, and rejects historical pessimism. Due to the high standard of the Cambridge Critical Guides in general, my expectations for the volume on the Lectures on Anthropology were high. Cohen and her authors, on the whole, do not disappoint. Firstly, the Lectures on Anthropology have a much more difficult publication history than, for instance, the *Groundwork*. Some of these notes were later published as a version authorized by Kant, while others exist in unauthorized versions. This is a shortcoming since these issues have recently become of considerable interest. The volume, however, does contain brief discussions of these issues by Zammito and Wilson.

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