

## 1: Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation - Wikipedia

*The 'Crimea Question' Anew There is a sense of déjà vu surrounding the present separatist crisis in Crimea, for there was a vibrant Russian secessionist movement in the region in the early s.*

What language do they speak? Why are there so many Russian troops there? RBTH answers your questions. RBTH replies to the most frequently asked questions about the status of Crimea, its history and population. What is Crimea and to what country does it belong? Crimea is a peninsula in the south of Ukraine. Its territory consists of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea which occupies most of the peninsula , the city of Sevastopol which has a special status and is considered a separate administrative entity within Ukraine , and a small part of Kherson Region. The capital of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is Simferopol. What is the population of Crimea? At the time of the latest Ukrainian census, taken in , the population of Crimea was 2., Over 50 percent of them are Russians, some 24 percent are Ukrainians, and about 12 percent are Crimean Tatars. How did Crimea become part of Ukraine? As a result, when the Soviet Union fell apart and each Soviet Republic became an independent state, Crimea remained part of Ukraine. What languages do people in Crimea speak? Under the laws of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, there is no official language of the republic. Crimea splits Russian society in two In reality, Russian and Ukrainian are both used as official languages. According to a poll conducted by the Kiev-based International Institute of Sociology in , Russian sometimes alongside other languages is used as a means of communication by about 97 percent of the Crimean population. What Russian troops are permanently deployed in Crimea? The original agreement was signed for a period of 20 years. The agreement was written in a way that allows it to be automatically extended for subsequent five-year periods unless one of the sides notified the other of a decision to terminate the agreement, in writing and a year in advance. Have more questions about Crimea and the situation in Ukraine? Post them here or ask us on Twitter and Facebook. All rights reserved by Rossiyskaya Gazeta. [Click here to find out more.](#)

## 2: The Crimea Question – Gwendolyn Sasse | Harvard University Press

*The 'Crimean question' has at least two dimensions - the international and the internal. One thing has, however, become clear: the 'Crimean question' has at least two dimensions - the.*

Share via Email What matters to Putin is not the Russian speakers who allegedly might suffer at the hands of a new government. What matters is the land. What about the possibility that Russia is bussing in large numbers of native Russians to stack the deck? But the real difficulty heading into this pivotal weekend for the crisis is more fundamental: Once upon a time, the right to secede was analyzed in terms of nationalist, linguistic, ethnic or religious homogeneity. Woodrow Wilson, for example, proposed redrawing the boundary lines in Europe to preserve the integrity of nationalist groups – Poland for the Polish, Serbia for the Serbians, and now Crimea for the Crimeans. This was thought to be the best way to promote self-determination and, therefore, democracy. If this is right, then all people living in Crimea should ideally vote to decide what to do. By this logic, the self-determination principle is the central consideration, and other problems – like intimidation – are just practical problems. Does no one remember the former Yugoslavia? Using principles of self-determination to justify imposing ethnic homogeneity has resulted in genocide and ethnic cleansing. This brand of nationalism carried to its logical conclusion is ugly, plain and simple. Arguments about ethnicity also overlook the central question: The answer is unambiguous: By voting for annexation to Russia, these would-be Russians are actually trying to take the territory away from Ukraine to give it to Russia. If that were the case, then under international law, any geographically cohesive group could vote on independence. That would mean the Basques should be free from Spain and France, and the Kurds would have an independent nation; the large community of Cubans living in Miami could vote to separate from the United States. If a referendum were the right way to decide these issues, Russia ought to be holding a referendum to determine the future of Chechnya. International law is unambiguous on how countries should decide the fate of disputed territories like Crimea. The legal methods for resolving questions of sovereignty are founded on widely recognized principles of international law. These do not include, and have never included, a simple referendum of people living in a contested territory. Thus the Baltic states argued that they were illegally conquered by the Soviet Union; Tibet says the same about China; and Eritreans fought for decades to reverse their illegal annexation by Ethiopia. What makes a secessionist claim successful in the eyes of the international community – indeed, in the eyes of the people fighting for secession – is the existence of a historical grievance over territory. No such legal claim can be made surrounding Crimea. What matters is the land – the port and its value to the Russian fleet. No referendum is going to transfer valid title to that land to Moscow. Everyone knows that the territory in question is Ukrainian. At least, everyone should before Sunday.

## 3: Autonomous Republic of Crimea - Wikipedia

*In the early to mids, the Western media, policymakers, and academics alike warned that Crimea was a potential center of unrest in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution.*

After more than two decades belonging to an independent Ukraine, the Crimean peninsula has become part of Russia, which has thereby gained an extra 27, km<sup>2</sup> of territory and over two million new citizens. One thing has, however, become clear: Politics as fudge Until , Crimea was nowhere near the top of the list of geopolitical problems in the post-Soviet space. The peninsula, unlike the Caucasus, was free from armed conflict involving refugees and displaced persons, not to mention dead bodies. Its status as an autonomous republic within Ukraine was also respected. Occasionally, voices could be heard in Kyiv calling for an end to Crimean autonomy, but such bizarre ideas never got very far. Before , there was also no question of a de facto state with a separate, non-Ukrainian infrastructure. This independence was however extremely short-lived: He called for a return of Crimea to the rouble zone, a military-political alliance with Russia and the adoption of Moscow time in the peninsula. All these changes were widely discussed at the time; and conflict between Kyiv and Simferopol the capital of Crimea was seen by many, then, as unavoidable. The central Ukrainian government, however, had no desire for direct confrontation with pro-Russia elements in Crimea or with Moscow. Recent events are to some extent the result of this fudge. Crimea and Kyiv Crimea was of course an exceptional region within Ukraine, with even less engagement with the general social, political, and cultural life of the country than the Donbas, let alone other parts of the country. To see this, one has only to analyse the political assessments and pronouncements made by the Crimean regional government i. And even when, in the last days of and the first of , local community defence groups started appearing in the peninsula, and the idea of a referendum on its status began to emerge, the idea of secession from Ukraine was still far from explicit. And those who, only a few days before, were ready to discuss various options with Kyiv, in part under pressure from the public this factor should not be ignored just because it represented a rejection of the idea of integration within the EU and NATO began to tilt the balance in favour of Moscow. Moscow moves Did Moscow take advantage of this situation? Of course it did! And upped the stakes at the same time! Could it have played a more subtle game and supported Crimea without recognising it as with Transnistria or recognised its independence and signed an intergovernmental treaty on the continued presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet as it did with South Ossetia and Abkhazia? It probably could have. But the Kremlin decided to cut this Gordian knot with a single slash, to minimise, as it saw it, every potential danger. However, while agreeing that some features of an annexation are indeed present in Crimea, other aspects of the situation there do not fit that definition. Russia has inherited a wide range of inter-ethnic issues that the Ukrainian government failed to tackle over two decades. Given the tragic history of this ethnic group, deported en masse to Central Asia by Stalin in and only allowed to return to Crimea at the beginning of Perestroika in the mids, it is hardly surprising that this is a sensitive topic. Vladimir Putin has also not managed to initiate any dialogue with Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev. A number of important symbolic steps were taken: Confrontation with the Mejlis remains, however, a thorny problem for Russian Crimea. And it is not just a question of its leadership, some of whom have been banned from entering their homeland. The fact is that a significant proportion of the Crimean Tatar people support the Mejlis. Government and opposition The situation is, of course, not so simple and straightforward. We also need to take into account the politics of the regional government, which has a general tendency towards prescriptive measures and defensive strategies. On 16 May eve of the deportation anniversary , Sergei Aksyonov, then head of the regional government, banned all public demonstrations until 6 June, on the pretext of avoiding incidents connected with the conflict in south-eastern Ukraine. But at the same time we have to look at the confrontational attitude of the opposition, which was particularly obvious in its campaign to boycott the parliamentary elections of 14 September the first to be held in Crimea after unification with Russia. Dzhemilev repeatedly called on young Tatars to boycott their military call-up, as well as constantly urging world leaders to be more resolute in their relations with Moscow. Opposition figures have urged world leaders to be harsher in their relations with Moscow. These conflicts

have been the subject of discussion within the Russian government. At a meeting of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, in October, Vladimir Putin heard a presentation by the well-known Russian journalist and historian Nikolai Svanidze, in which he strongly criticised the Crimean regional authorities and Special Services. The argument was interesting for the language used by the two sides: Both these positions have an important role. Neither the president nor the journalist minced their words as they discussed both the challenges to Russian national interests, and discrimination as an extra risk. The two positions exist, however, in parallel dimensions, never intersecting. Indeed, the prominent Russian orientalist Aleksei Malashenko has cautioned against resorting to excessive measures against the opposition, citing the counter-productive results of that strategy in the North Caucasus: The summer season was a washout, and power blackouts imposed by Ukraine in December showed just how vulnerable the peninsula is to pressure from Kyiv which has its own energy problems. And these heightened expectations need to be satisfied soon, to avoid serious public discontent. Heightened public expectations need to be satisfied soon, to avoid serious discontent. Many Russian journalists and experts who have visited Russian Crimea have noted that, despite a strong hostility to American and Western, in general politics, most of the local public are keen to retain their former electoral rights and democratic procedures. If that is successful, it will be easier for the Kremlin to defend its position in talks with Western partners. If, on the other hand, it fails to solve its internal problems, whether of governance or linked to the economy or inter-ethnic tensions, then international pressure is sure to grow, simply because there will be good reason for it. This article first appeared on Politcom.

## 4: The Crimean "question" | openDemocracy

*In the early to mids, the Western media, policymakers, and academics alike warned that Crimea was a potential center of unrest in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution. However, large-scale conflict in Crimea did not materialize, and Kyiv has managed to integrate the peninsula into the new Ukrainian polity.*

This concept by Russia envisaged that the norms of international maritime law would not apply to the Sea of Azov. The concept was partially implemented after the Tuzla conflict in Back in the day, following the crisis, Russia succeeded in pressing Ukraine into signing an agreement on the use of the Azov Sea by Ukraine and Russia. In particular, this agreement contains the phrase that the Azov Sea is historically the inland sea of Ukraine and Russia. However, there is another interesting point in the agreement. It also says that the borders in the Azov Sea shall be determined by a separate agreement. Negotiations on the issue between Ukraine and Russia have dragged for many years, but the parties have never reached any common solution. As a result, as of the start of Russian aggression in Crimea and then against mainland Ukraine the question remained uncertain, just as it does today. That is, there is no delimitation deal on the Azov water area. That is, the present legal vacuum in the Sea of Azov allows Russia to freely interpret and independently determine such borders, acting as a more powerful player it considers itself This means that Russia has created a situation where international law cannot be applied in the Azov water area. At the same time, there is no clearly defined border between Ukraine and Russia, in accordance with the bilateral agreement. That is, the present legal vacuum in the Sea of Azov allows Russia to freely interpret and independently determine such borders, acting as a more powerful player it considers itself. Moreover, in view of the Crimea annexation, Russia now proceeds from the fact that the Sea of Azov is no longer just an inland sea of Ukraine and Russia, but actually a Russian sea. After all, one of the positions on how the borders of Ukraine and Russia in the Azov Sea could be determined was to see them as a continuation of land borderlines. Now, of course, Russia believes that if Crimea is Russian, and, according to the approach mentioned, much of the Azov Sea is now Russian. The Ukrainian side for some reason proved unprepared for such developments. Although the authorities have long been aware of the fact that the legal status of the Azov Sea and the border between Russia and Ukraine in the area are not entirely regulated. Plenty of rounds of negotiations have already been held to no avail. Therefore, Ukraine, from the moment of the Crimea annexation, should have prepared a military response to such moves by Russia by creating a naval system of countering the Kremlin forces in the Azov Sea. A clear diplomatic position should have also been defined. But this has not been done so far. Regarding diplomatic efforts, I believe that Ukraine needs to take much more active steps, in particular, to constantly inform the international community about the latest developments in the area and to explain the background and the legal vacuum that has developed. But there are some absolutely clear issues that need to be covered in media and brought to the attention of foreign diplomats, the expert community, and the public in other countries " the international community in general. It needs to be explained that Russia is deliberately blocking the process of defining the legal status of the Azov Sea, while following the annexation of Crimea, Moscow generally considers the sea its territory, trying to prevent the application of international maritime law in the area. It is also necessary to consider the possibility of denouncing the agreement with Russia on the use of the Sea of Azov, which says that this is an inland sea, and proceeding from the fact that it is an international sea, we need to start unilaterally applying international maritime law there. As reported earlier, Ukraine has closed down for fire exercises three areas of the Sea of Azov near its coast. In other words, it can be stated that Ukraine closed down its territorial waters We should proceed from the fact that, if Russia refuses to properly negotiate with Ukraine on border delimitation, while starting to pose a threat to both the economic and maritime security of Ukraine, Kyiv needs to act more rigorously, to abandon the agreement, insisting on the international status of the Azov Sea with appropriate steps taken, as well as to address the UN and other bodies dealing with international maritime law, as well as the courts. It seems to me that now the position of the Ukrainian side is not sufficiently active. In other words, it can be stated that Ukraine closed down its territorial waters. For Russia, this does not create any significant obstacles. However, this is an indication that Ukraine is beginning

to act and take some steps in the Azov Sea, and that Ukraine is about to move toward addressing the issue. But this is still not enough. Meanwhile, Ukraine would gain from putting relations with Russia on the rails of international law rather than the rules of street gangs. It is critically important for Ukraine to prevent these relations from being brought to the level of "I will block the area here and here, and there I will sink your vessel, etc. So, whenever we decide to appeal to some international authorities, they will respond that this is a purely internal conflict, because both parties act the same. It is important for Ukraine to move this issue to the format of international law and denounce the treaty with Russia no problem here , since, in fact, Russia has long ceased implementing it and the deal now brings Ukraine more harm than it does benefits. And, of course, it is necessary to begin to establish in the Sea of Azov international rules that apply to any seas. Of course, Russia will resist, but Ukraine should have its own clear position to be voiced at all international platforms. All this is totally unacceptable in terms of international law. But within the framework of the agreement, which defines the Sea of Azov an inland sea, both parties can allow themselves pretty much anything. But in a situation where Ukraine and Russia are in a state of war, the treaty looks very confusing.

## 5: Why the Crimean referendum is illegal | Lea Brilmayer | Opinion | The Guardian

*The Crimea question: identity, transition, and conflict. [Gwendolyn Sasse] -- "Crimea's multiethnicity is the most colorful and politically relevant expression of Ukraine's regional diversity. History, memory, and myth are deeply inscribed in Crimea's landscape.*

Crimea, Ukraine and Russia: The law is still the law, and we must follow it whether we like it or not. International law is crucial to the situation in the Ukraine. It is of particular relevance to the right of self-determination of the people of Crimea and whether Russia can lawfully intervene on the territory of Ukraine. The right of self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter and international human rights treaties, enables a people to determine for themselves their political, economic, social and cultural status. It is certainly arguable that the people in the Crimea have a distinct identity and territory, created over centuries and fostered by decisions of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine. This includes its status as an autonomous region within the state of Ukraine and by specific agreements about it between Russia and Ukraine. It is not unlawful for it to have a referendum and declare itself independent or that it wishes to merge with Russia, as this was allowed by the International Court of Justice in its poorly reasoned advisory opinion on the declaration of independence by Kosovo. However, such a declaration of independence or merging is not effective in international law by itself. There are two key factors that are relevant: In relation to the first factor, if that state is oppressing the people, discriminating against them, violating their human rights and not allowing them freely to be involved in the politics and internal affairs of the state. If the people are able freely to participate in governance and are not being oppressed as a group, then these actions of secession are not lawful. This was made clear by the Canadian Supreme Court in its advisory opinion in the secession of Quebec. They went further to make clear that the referendum result by itself would have no legal effect on its own without further negotiation with the people of the rest of Canada this is also of relevance to the people of Scotland as they vote in their referendum. The second factor of the responses of the international community can be significant in terms of the recognition or not of the entity as a state. Indeed, Russia has not recognised Kosovo as a state. The situation in Ukraine is such that the new government is just starting to be in a position to govern. It is trying to restore law and order. It has taken no major military or other oppressive actions against the people of Crimea or in other areas of Ukraine. There are at this time no clear actions by it that would be sufficient to justify under international law any independence or merger with another state by the people of Crimea. Thus there can be no international legal effect of any independence or merger declaration that might arise from a referendum. The right of self-determination does not of itself give rise to a legal right for a state to intervene in the territory of another state, whether directly or through private actors. Where a people are being oppressed and force is being used against them by their own state, it is, I would argue, possible for them to seek and obtain military assistance of a defensive kind from another state. This is preferably through a resolution of the UN, as collective action by a number of states or as part of a self-defence agreement. However, a unilateral military action where there is no such oppression or force is unlawful. This was made clear by an independent fact-finding commission in their report on international law in relation to the military intervention by Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in , which they considered to be generally contrary to international law. If Russia, and all other states, are to comply with international law then they must first allow the new Ukrainian government whether or not they are seen as the legitimate government to resolve the situation in Crimea and ensure that the people of Crimea are allowed internal self-determination. Only if that does not occur then can other possibilities, such as secession and merging with Russia, be possible lawful responses. In any event, that decision is one for all the people of Crimea, and not just for those who are of Russian nationality or heritage or there only for military purposes, and should not be subject to military or other pressure by any other state.

### 6: What is the Crimea, and why does it matter? - Telegraph

*Sasse is the author of "The Crimea question: identity, transition, and conflict" (Harvard University Press, ). Links to previous Monkey Cage posts regarding developments in Ukraine can be.*

Events leading up to the referendum[ edit ] Russian president Vladimir Putin has an experience with similar referendums. According to Vladimir Chuykin, who was head of Narva city council in , Putin who was the Saint Petersburg city official aided the Russian majority population in the Estonian city in a referendum on autonomy that was later regarded as unconstitutional. The Narva referendum was not backed by Moscow. Cossacks were amassed on the other side of the Narva River before the referendum. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak managed to prevent Cossacks from crossing the border. On February 27, amidst tensions in the region during the Ukrainian revolution , the Supreme Council of Crimea voted to hold a referendum on the status of Crimea on May Andriy Krysko, head of the Crimean branch of the Voters Committee of Ukraine, announced that no one from the parliament secretariat was in the building when voting took place. This decision was made with 78 votes in favor and 8 abstentions. We will defend the inviolability of the Ukrainian territory. There were two choices to choose from on the ballot. Voters were able to choose only one of these. Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia with all the rights of the federal subject of the Russian Federation? Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea in and the status of the Crimea as part of Ukraine? Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar in the Cyrillic script. There were two simultaneous referendums, one organised by the city council of Sevastopol[ citation needed ] and another organised by a special committee[ citation needed ] set up by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Only Crimean residents with Ukrainian passports were allowed to vote. The interim Ukrainian government , United States , European Union , and several other nations stated that any referendum held by the local government of Crimea without the express authority of Ukraine is unconstitutional and illegitimate. The interim government in Kiev and the pro-Russian Crimean faction do not recognize each other as legitimate. Moreover, the Venice Commission opined, any referendum on the status of a territory should have been preceded by serious negotiations among all stakeholders, and that such negotiations did not take place. Bellinger III , Marc Weller among others have stated that the referendum was conducted under the cover of assault rifles and, thus, the result was obtained through violence. Simferopol city administration confirmed these claims and declared these actions unlawful. According to his discussions with people, even the Tatars inclined towards Russia.

## 7: Five questions about Crimea - Russia Beyond

*By failing to ask the International Court of Justice to declare Crimea's secession from Ukraine and subsequent union with Russia to be contrary to international law Ukraine appears to be conceding the point.*

Authored by Dmitry Babich via Strategic Culture: Increasingly tragic and violent events are taking their toll on the plight of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Ukraine. After a brief arrest, Amvrosyi was put on a plane and sent back to Moscow. This is not the first such humiliation of the Orthodox Church and its priests that has taken place since the new pro-Western regime came to power in Kiev in Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church has been declared persona non grata throughout Ukraine since That decision was made by humiliatingly low-level officials. Not even under the Bolsheviks did such prohibitions exist. So, for Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church to be denied permission to visit Kiev can only be compared to a possible prohibition against the pope visiting Rome. This has been interpreted by the Ukrainian state authorities as a call for soldiers to desert the army. President Poroshenko was visibly happy to sign the document “ the contents of which have not yet been made public ” on cooperation between the Ukrainian state and the Constantinople Patriarchate, in the office of Bartholomew, the head of the Constantinople Patriarchate. Kirill, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church ROC , as well as Onufriy, the Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine, are protesting loudly, viewing this situation as a breach of two basic principles. Second, Constantinople itself has interfered in the affairs of two autonomous national churches, the Russian and the Ukrainian. That situation was explained by Patriarch Kirill. What many Russian and Ukrainian believers fear is that the Istanbul-based Patriarch Bartholomew will eventually grant Kiev what is being called autocephaly. In that event, the UOC-MP may be forced to merge with two other, non-canonical churches in Ukraine that have no apostolic liaison. A hierarchical Orthodox Church is considered to have autocephalous status, as its highest bishop does not report to any higher-ranking bishop. This 17th-century decision reflected the political reality of the merger between the states of Russia and Ukraine and established some order in the matters of church administration. That is why our Holy Synod made the decision to end eucharistic communication with the Constantinople Patriarchate. It will be maintained as long as the threat of autocephaly continues. The Western mainstream media, however, interpreted this decision by the Russian church as a unilateral aggressive act. Bartholomew said in a recent statement that Russia should just follow the example of Constantinople, which once granted autocephaly to the churches of the Balkan nations. So, by undoing that decision, Constantinople has interfered in the canonical territory of both the Ukrainian and the Russian churches. Our church did not ask for autocephaly, because we already have independence. We have our own Synod church council and our own church court. Decisions are made by a congress of bishops and priests from all over Ukraine. We have financial and administrative independence, so autocephaly for us will be a limitation, not an expansion of our rights. Now the state will appoint our communities of believers as the new guardians of this heritage. There is still a chance to prevent the schism from occurring. There are big scandals, big fights, and big disappointments ahead. Take a second to support The Duran on Patreon!

## 8: Here's why Ukraine is suing Russia in the International Court of Justice

*Thus your question is moot, since the Russian Federation did not annex Crimea! The people of Crimea and Sevastopol had voted in a plebiscite on March 16, to secede from Ukraine, following an anti-constitutional coup in Kiev in February*

## 9: Crimea’s economy in numbers and pictures” RT Business News

*This paper sets out the international law on territorial protection and raises the question whether and how Ukraine's territorial integrity has been violated by Crimean separatists and Russia. After a general introduction (I), it lays out the dimensions of territorial protection under international law (II) and then applies these notions to.*

*Fisher Price Ready Readers Doing gender in media, art and culture 1F4. High cooling water temperature (fresh). 6 Appendix. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of the Cutting the gordian knot : gonads, marriage, and surgery 1920s and 1930s Landing page optimization book Hiring and employment practices and the law Mother of all Terrorist Acts All my puny sorrows chapter summary Military reform and democratisation Part III. On utopia and America: post-constitutional America; Ameritopia. Send to onedrive Preparing to be a long-distance dad 5 Canadian Foreign Policy towards Latin America: Is genius generic? Crazy little thing called love piano Buku supernova ksatria puteri dan bintang jatuh What is namaste care? The philosophy and mission statement Hey, I Didnt Sign Up for This! A personal story of living with and surviving lymphoma and breast cancer The classical epic tradition Song for one or two Bill Nye and Boomerang or The Tale of a Meek Eyed Mule and Other Literary Gems Early society in East Asia Clean coder robert martin Louisiana Code of Evidence practice guide Shelly laurenston howl for it Scott foresman ing street grade 5 practice book CHAPTER 2. General 5-10 3 Definition and some examples of covering spaces A Guide to Oracle8 Music and conceptualization Fighting for 4 Letters Volume I Women with adult stepchildren : lessons from / Painted warriors and wild lions The Rolling Stones Tattoo You Nina and Little Duck The Journey into the Miraculous What youth say about themselves Cousin Hattys hymns and twilight stories Vassilisa the Wise*