

1: Proposed Japanese Plan to invade Australia during WW2

In Australia, the government, the military and the people were deeply alarmed after the fall of Singapore in February about the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Australia. Japan had the military capability, and Australia lacked defenses.

Some scholars are convinced that the Japanese had made solid preparations to invade mainland Australia but their plans were thwarted by the Allied victory at the Battle of the Coral Sea. Others state that the Japanese were too busy consolidating their position in South East Asia in preparation for the inevitable entry of significant US forces into the region. The theories touted by both of these parties are irrelevant for our purposes. The important issue is that Australia was fortified for invasion and that plans were drawn up for a guerrilla campaign to wear out the Japanese forces before an allied counter-attack. It is known that part of these plans involved pre-positioning stockpiles of civil relief materials and food for use by civilians and military personnel caught in areas of the Australian mainland overrun by the enemy. The Curtin government openly admitted its concerns to its citizens and implemented a massive civil defense program. This was accompanied by public announcements about the Japanese threat as evidenced by official posters, pamphlets and radio recordings that exist at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. The enemy Thunders at our very gates. Everything we cherish is in immediate peril. There is no time: Strikes, lockouts, provocation, profiteering, and exploitation increase our national danger. What we have done, or are doing, is not as good as what we can do "should do" and must do. You must make a complete sacrifice for Australia or become a complete sacrifice to the enemy. John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia. The report extract below appears to be derived from minutes of a Japanese Imperial War Council meeting and details Japanese motivations for carrying out such a costly operation. The costly lesson learned by the Japanese during their attack at Midway has resulted in the opinion, apparently held by Admiral Suetsugu, that surface operations even with carrier air support cannot successfully be carried out within miles of a strong enemy base of shore-based aircraft. He believes that the Japanese possessions in the Western Pacific can only be made impregnable by concentrating on the strengthening of their air defense and that only Australia remains as an obstacle to the creation of a perfect defensive chain. However, he appears to have felt that Australia has already been reinforced to such an extent that operations designed only to isolate it would cause such heavy losses that its subsequent invasion would be rendered impossible. General Tojo, the Prime Minister, agreed that Australia must be reduced. General Asaka and General Terauchi supported General Tojo but pointed out that unless Fiji, the New Hebrides, and New Caledonia were soon captured, such a plan would have little chance of success and the Japanese gains in the South West Pacific Area would become increasingly endangered. General Tojo expressed the opinion that in order to cut down the losses of naval operations against the Australian mandates, a simultaneous attack by the landing of a massive expeditionary force at several points on the Australian mainland should be undertaken. In December, Chinese Intelligence sources provided details of what appears to be the general strategic concepts of the proposed operation. The Japanese Military Headquarters had drawn up plans for a large-scale military incursion into the Australian mainland in mid The concept of the operation was described as follows: By adopting a defensive strategy against the US naval forces the Japanese hoped to be able to defend their left flank. The main defense for this flank was a massive minefield in the Straits of Malacca. This would effectively block any naval force attacking the Japanese supply areas from the Indian Ocean. A force consisting of warships and transports was to make a lightning attack on Darwin in the hope of drawing the US and Australian forces into the isolated areas between Katherine and Birdum. Then the main invasion force would set out from Sunda Strait and Christmas Island and land on the Australian coast in the vicinity of Fremantle. The Japanese would then attempt to control the railways and harbor facilities west of Esperance Bay and Sandstone before advancing eastward. The operation was originally planned to take place in mid-June with Japanese military supplies stockpiled at a large base at Java in the Netherlands East Indies now the Republic of Indonesia. Japanese troop transportation and reception centers were established throughout the area and plans were drawn to secure the sea and air routes down the Northwest coast of

Australia. The attack was apparently postponed on account of US-led counter-attacks such as the Battle of the Coral Sea and once the Japanese started to lose their initiative and were forced to concentrate on defending the areas they had already annexed, the Invasion of Australia plans were never implemented. The authenticity of the invasion plan as described by the Chinese sources is a matter of contention. Some academics argue that the above plan is a fake and that the Chinese may have thought that an authentic-looking Japanese invasion plan might have forced the Allies to fast-track plans to clear the enemy from Southeast Asia. This would have helped make China a major theatre for Allied operations rather than the Southwest Pacific. The truth is almost certainly lost to the mists of time, but the plan is included here to illustrate the kind of intelligence acted upon by the Curtin government. It certainly helps to explain why the Australian government was publicly discussing a pending Japanese invasion well into when, as we know now, the Japanese were barely capable of defending the Japanese Home Islands, the Philippines, and their Mandated Territories.

2: Operation Downfall - Wikipedia

It is a matter of historical record that Australian government and military planners were deeply worried about the prospect of a Japanese invasion and extensive plans and "defence schemes" were devised to defend Australia in the event of large areas of the mainland being occupied by the Japanese.

Moreover, the Army was not willing to release the large number of troops it calculated were needed for such an operation from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria as it both feared that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War and wanted to preserve an option for Japan to invade Siberia. Instead, Tojo favoured a policy of forcing Australia to submit by cutting its lines of communication with the US. We had already far out-stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasionâ€”no, at no time. The proposed offensive on Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia is depicted in the lower right corner. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions between , and , men would be needed. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji , Samoa , and New Caledonia , and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured , the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. Axis naval activity in Australian waters and Air raids on Australia, â€”43 As the option of invading Australia was rejected in February and was not revisited, the Japanese attacks on Australia during the war were not precursors to invasion, as is sometimes claimed. The large air raid on Darwin on 19 February and the Attack on Broome on 3 March were conducted to prevent the Allies from using these towns as bases to contest the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies and was not related to an invasion. The generals were confident that Australia could be bullied into surrender to Japan by isolating it completely from the United States and by applying intense psychological pressure. The dozens of subsequent air raids on Northern Australia in and were mainly small and aimed to prevent the Allied air units based there from attacking Japanese positions. The Attack on Sydney Harbour in May had the goal of diverting Allied forces away from Midway Island prior to the Japanese attempt to capture it and the subsequent Japanese submarine campaigns off the Australian east coast in and were attempts to break the supply line between Australia and New Guinea during the New Guinea Campaign. Once secured, Port Moresby was to have been used as a base from which Japanese aircraft could dominate the Torres Strait and Coral Sea , and not to support an invasion of Australia. Matsu Kikan "Pine Tree" , a joint army-navy intelligence unit, landed to assess reports that the Allies had begun to build major new bases on the northernmost coast of the Kimberley region of Western Australia , facing the Timor Sea. After leaving their base at Kupang , West Timor , the unit â€” comprising 10 Japanese personnel in a commandeered fishing vessel crewed by West Timorese civilians â€” made brief visits to the uninhabited Ashmore Reef and Browse Island. While smoke was seen in hills to the east, the Japanese vessel was anchored and camouflaged with tree branches. Landing parties went ashore near the mouth of the Roe River. The following day, Matsu Kikan personnel again reconnoitred the area, before returning to Kupang. Matsu Kikan did not see any signs of recent human activity, and little of military significance was learnt from the mission. This suggestion was not, however, adopted.

3: Battle for Australia - Wikipedia

Bombing of Darwin; Part of World War II, Pacific War The explosion of a ship, filled with TNT and ammunition, hit during the first Japanese air raid on Australia's mainland, at Darwin on 19 February

The fall of Singapore opens the Battle for Australia. Text and Web-site by James Bowen initiated 9 May Last updated 30 January When challenged, Dr Stanley was unable to produce any credible historical evidence to support his controversial claims. Pacific War historian James Bowen argues that Dr Stanley reached incorrect conclusions about the gravity of the Japanese threat to Australia in and Prime Minister Curtin based upon inadequate knowledge of the Pacific War and flawed research. Drawing extensively on high quality archival cinematic footage that has been skilfully blended with dramatised re-enactments of important aspects, including numerous battle scenes, this splendid new docudrama provides a truly riveting account of the bloody Kokoda Campaign. At times, I found myself so absorbed in the story that I forgot that I was watching a docudrama. Smith This superb painting by a master of aviation painting, the late R. Lieutenant Richard Best and his two wingmen in their Douglas Dauntless SBD dive-bombers have just launched a successful attack on the Japanese flagship aircraft carrier Akagi. The attack was not preceded by a declaration of war, and took place while Japanese diplomats were in Washington discussing American concerns about continuing Japanese military aggression in East Asia. These diplomatic discussions were intended by the Japanese to distract the attention of Americans while Japan secretly positioned a powerful aircraft carrier striking force off the Hawaiian islands. On 23 January , Japanese troops landed at Rabaul in the Australian Territory of New Guinea and overwhelmed the heavily outnumbered Australian garrison. When Singapore fell to the Japanese on 15 February , the British government was not prepared to assist Australia to resist a Japanese invasion, preferring instead to allocate all available British and Australian military resources to the defence of India. Having been abandoned by Britain to a likely Japanese invasion, Australia turned to the United States for help, and it was generously given. Thereafter, the Americans, the Australians, and the Dutch fought together as allies to stem, and ultimately repel the Japanese military onslaught in the South-West Pacific. This web-site is one of two linked web-sites that trace the history of Japanese military aggression in the Pacific War. The viewer will then be taken to the Kokoda and Guadalcanal Campaigns that brought Japanese military aggression to a halt in the South-West Pacific, and forced Japan on the defensive. This internet web-site is dedicated to the courageous Australians who resisted, and ultimately repulsed the Japanese military attack on their country in It is also intended to honour the Americans and the Dutch who gave their lives and their service in the defence of Australia in Smith, was generously given by his daughter Mrs Sharlyn Marsh. History enthusiasts who are interested in acquiring an R. Smith signed aviation print or lithograph may contact Sharlyn Marsh at: All of several hundred links on this web-site are examined at least once every fourteen days for breaks. If a link is found to be broken, visitors are invited to try an indirect approach to the specific object of their search such as the powerful Google search engine which can be accessed at the end of the main index to this web-site. If this approach fails, visitors are invited to return after the expiration of two weeks. The web-master apologises for any inconvenience caused by a broken link. The previous hot-linked address produced a continuing flood of unsolicited junk mail, or "spam". To browse visit [Here](#).

4: Japanese invasion of Australia - Axis History Forum

JAPANESE LANDINGS IN AUSTRALIA DURING WORLD WAR 2. There have been many stories about Japanese landings on Australian soil during WW2. The majority of these stories are unsubstantiated and more than likely not true.

However, the proposal to promote MacArthur was only at the level of informal discussion by the time World War II ended. Once the atomic bomb became available, General Marshall envisioned using it to support the invasion if sufficient numbers could be produced in time. Allied command was divided into regions: A unified command was deemed necessary for an invasion of Japan. Interservice rivalry over who it should be the United States Navy wanted Nimitz, but the United States Army wanted MacArthur was so serious that it threatened to derail planning. Ultimately, the Navy partially conceded, and MacArthur was to be given total command of all forces, if circumstances made it necessary. Prior to the Quebec Conference, a joint British-American planning team produced a plan "Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan" which did not call for an invasion of the Japanese home islands until 1945. They proposed operations to capture airbases in nearby Shanghai, China, and Korea, which would give the United States Army Air Forces a series of forward airbases from which to bombard Japan into submission. They supported mounting a large-scale thrust directly against the Japanese homeland, with none of the side operations that the Navy had suggested. The Allies decided to launch a two-stage invasion. Airbases would be established, which would give cover for Operation Coronet, the attack on Tokyo Bay. Based on intelligence available early in 1945, their assumptions included the following: That under such circumstances he can possibly amass from 2,000 to 2,500 planes in that area by exercise of rigid economy, and that this force can operate against KYUSHU landings by staging through homeland fields. Operation Coronet was planned to take Tokyo. The combined Allied naval armada would have been the largest ever assembled, including 42 aircraft carriers, 24 battleships, and destroyers and destroyer escorts. This area would then be used as a further staging point to attack Honshu in Operation Coronet. Olympic was also to include a deception plan, known as Operation Pastel. Pastel was designed to convince the Japanese that the Joint Chiefs had rejected the notion of a direct invasion and instead were going to attempt to encircle and bombard Japan. This would require capturing bases in Formosa, along the Chinese coast, and in the Yellow Sea area. These were responsible for attacking Japanese airfields and transportation arteries on Kyushu and Southern Honshu. The Twentieth Air Force was to have continued its role as the main Allied strategic bomber force used against the Japanese home islands, operating from airfields in the Mariana Islands. Following the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, plans were also made to transfer some of the heavy bomber groups of the veteran Eighth Air Force to airbases on Okinawa to conduct strategic bombing raids in coordination with the Twentieth. Miyazaki, Ariake, and Kushikino. The 35 landing beaches were all named for automobiles: In early 1945, Miyazaki was virtually undefended, while Ariake, with its nearby good harbor, was heavily defended. The invasion was not intended to conquer the entire island, just the southernmost third of it, as indicated by the dashed line on the map labeled "general limit of northern advance". In 1945, early planning proposed a force of 1,000 aircraft, including units dedicated to aerial refueling. Planning was later scaled back to 22 squadrons and, by the time the war ended, to 10 squadrons: Tiger Force was to have included the elite Squadron, also known as "The Dambusters", which carried out specialist bombing operations. Had reinforcements been needed at an early stage of Olympic, they would have been diverted from US forces being assembled for Coronet for which there was to be a massive redeployment of units from the U.S. These redeployments would have been complicated by the simultaneous demobilization and replacement of highly experienced, time-served personnel, which would have drastically reduced the combat effectiveness of many units. Reinforcements would have been available from those countries, as well as other parts of the Commonwealth. However, MacArthur blocked proposals to include an Indian Army division because of differences in language, organization, composition, equipment, training and doctrine. Projected initial commitment[edit].

5: Bombing of Darwin - Wikipedia

An Australian propaganda poster from referring to the threat of Japanese invasion. This poster was criticised for being alarmist when it was released and was banned by the Queensland government.

Moreover, the Army was not willing to release the large number of troops it calculated were needed for such an operation from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria as it both feared that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War and wanted to preserve an option for Japan to invade Siberia. Instead, Tojo favoured a policy of forcing Australia to submit by cutting its lines of communication with the US. We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out-stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion—no, at no time. The proposed offensive on Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia is depicted in the lower right corner. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions between , and , men would be needed. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". He said that after he had taken Singapore, he wanted to discuss with Tojo a plan for the invasion of Australia Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. The large air raid on Darwin on 19 February and the Attack on Broome on 3 March were conducted to prevent the Allies from using these towns as bases to contest the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies and was not related to an invasion. The generals of the Army General Staff, and the Prime Minister of Japan, General Hideki Tojo, did not see a need to commit massive troop resources to the conquest of Australia, with the massive logistical problems that would produce. The generals were confident that Australia could be bullied into surrender to Japan by isolating it completely from the United States and by applying intense psychological pressure. The Attack on Sydney Harbour in May had the goal of diverting Allied forces away from Midway Island prior to the Japanese attempt to capture it and the subsequent Japanese submarine campaigns off the Australian east coast in and were attempts to break the supply line between Australia and New Guinea during the New Guinea Campaign. Once secured, Port Moresby was to have been used as a base from which Japanese aircraft could dominate the Torres Strait and Coral Sea, and not to support an invasion of Australia. This party consisted of four Japanese officers on board a small fishing boat and it investigated the York Sound region for a day and a night before returning to Kupang in Timor on 20 January. While the junior officer who commanded the party suggested using Japanese prison inmates to launch a guerrilla campaign in Australia when he returned to Japan in February, nothing came of this and the officer was posted to other duties.

An invasion of Australia was seriously considered and almost launched in There was a huge debate between the Japanese Navy and the Army over the desirability and feasibility of invading Australia.

The RAN ships in port were the sloops Swan and Warrego , corvettes Deloraine and Katoomba , auxiliary minesweepers Gunbar and Tolga , patrol boat Coongoola, depot ship Platypus , examination vessel Southern Cross , lugger Mavie , and four boom-net ships. Several USN and Australian troop ships were in the harbour along with a number of merchant vessels of varying sizes. All four carriers had participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor at the start of the Pacific War. The main objective of their crews was attacking ships and port facilities in Darwin Harbour. All of these aircraft were launched by 8. As a result, the air raid sirens at Darwin were not sounded before the raid. The Japanese bombers then conducted dive bombing and level bombing attacks on the ships in Darwin Harbour. The oil tanker Karalee and the coal storage hulk Kelat [38] sank later. At least 21 labourers working on the wharf were killed when it was bombed. All of these facilities were seriously damaged. This information contributed to planning for the second raid that afternoon which sank both vessels. Japanese losses may have been as few as five aircraft and three crew. Tadao Minami was taken prisoner after crash-landing his damaged Zero bu. BII on Melville Island. The two formations arrived over the base at the same time, and dropped their bombs simultaneously. The Japanese bombers then turned, and made a second attack on the base. Due to defective fuses, the Australian heavy anti-aircraft flak gunners were unable to shoot down or damage any of the high-flying Japanese aircraft. Two American Ps and a B Liberator bomber were also destroyed. Six RAAF personnel were killed. Eleven of her strong crew were killed. The dive bombers also attacked Florence D. Some of Florence D. Army volunteers along with survivors of the U. There were reports of looting, with Provost Marshals being among the accused. At this vague rendezvous point The order led to utter chaos. In being passed by word of mouth from one section to another, sometimes with officers present and sometimes not, it became garbled to the extent it was unrecognisable against the original. In its ultimate form it was interpreted, especially by those desiring such an interpretation, of an impending order for immediate and general evacuation of the area. Highly exaggerated rumours of an impending Japanese invasion had already reached the base from the town and spread quickly among those wanting to believe them. In the absence of restraint, men gathered their belongings and abandoned their stations.

7: Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II | Revolv

I've been reading that the Australian plan was to fall back and defend the southern part of the continent (where most of the population is) in the event of a Japanese invasion.

The superiority of the Japanese advanced fighter plane technology gave the Japanese forces an overwhelming advantage. US naval forces were unable to locate and engage the Japanese carriers. This gave the Japanese sufficient time to organize their forces and strike at the American fleet, sinking the USS Enterprise and severely damaging the carrier Hornet. Admiral Spruance is killed in the aerial bombardment on his flagship. Midway Island is successfully invaded, and the Japanese make use of the surviving airfield to launch air raids over Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands. American resistance in both areas was severely reduced by the loss of the remainder of its naval power at Midway. Resistance by the Island Defense Battalion of the U. Marine Corps at Pago Pago was epic. A small unit of the survivors of 3rd company established a stronghold in the Sadie Thompson Hotel and held off over Japanese troops of the 2nd Kure Kaigun Rikusentai, for three days before the Marines surrendered. The surviving 14 Marines were executed, and a retaliation targeting the population of Tuituila rivaled the atrocities of Nanking. The battle was long and arduous. The bulk of the remaining Pacific American forces were stationed on Oahu, Maui and the big island of Hawaii, but the lack of logistical support from mainland America and the overwhelming size of the surrounding Japanese invasion fleet caused the Americans to capitulate. In total, 26, Americans were lost in the defense of the Territory of Hawaii. The Soviet Union, wishing to avoid a two-front war, and aware of the symbolism of the United States facilitating the end of the Russo-Japanese war, was quick to intervene and help negotiate peace. The "Japanization" of the Hawaiian Islands is quick and ruthless. The coronation of King Kamehameha VI on November 3rd, and the simultaneous inclusion of the Kingdom of Hawaii into the Japanese Empire sealed the fate of the island chain stretching from Midway to the big island of Hawaii, and at the same time, the fate of the western Pacific Ocean. On December 7th, , the Cartagena Entente is signed, creating a co-defense treaty between the Empire of Japan and Colombia. On February 2nd, Japanese forces destroyed the last remaining resistance on the island of New Guinea, leaving Australia and New Zealand vulnerable to attack. Australia calls on the United States for aid, but the US does not wish to fight a naval battle with so few remaining ships. Instead, America sends 10, infantry troops that will fight under the Australian flag in the event of a Japanese invasion. The Australian Defense Forces were ill-prepared for the ruthless and determined Japanese forces and were quickly forced out of the majority of Queensland and the Northern Territory within weeks. Aid from United States forces at this time was sadly limited, as they were confined to protecting Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne on the southeastern coast. The only true resistance met by Japanese forces in the western part of Australia occurred at Perth, but was quickly subdued by a Japanese naval bombardment of the city. In the major cities, the fighting was more intense. However, a lack of supplies and support forced the US and ADF forces back to a small area surrounding the capital city, Canberra. The Christmas Agreement On Christmas Day, , British, Australian and Japanese delegates met in Adelaide and signed a temporary ceasefire, which was effective until a permanent treaty could be decided upon. One week later, on February 26th, they signed the Treaty of Peking. In the treaty, Japan agreed to return sovereign control of Australia. However, the British Commonwealth and allied nations had to recognize the permanent annexations of the Japanese Empire.

8: The Japanese Invasion Threat of Australia - News - War History Online

I've read that any Japanese plans for an invasion of Australia was aimed, not at conquering the entire country, but in forcing Australia to seek a separate peace with Japan that separated it from Britain and the USA.

This poster was criticised for being alarmist when it was released and was banned by the Queensland government. In Australia, the government, the military and the people were deeply alarmed after the fall of Singapore in February about the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Australia. Japan had the military capability, and Australia lacked defenses. Japan never actually planned an invasion, but the fear of one led Australia to form a close reliance on the United States to protect itself. Instead, the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States by advancing through the South Pacific. This offensive was abandoned following the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway in May and June, and all subsequent Japanese operations in the vicinity of Australia were undertaken to slow the advance of Allied forces. Moreover, the Army was not willing to release the large number of troops it calculated were needed for such an operation from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria as it both feared that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War and wanted to preserve an option for Japan to invade Siberia. Instead, Tojo favoured a policy of forcing Australia to submit by cutting its lines of communication with the US. We had already far out-stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasionâ€”no, at no time. The proposed offensive on Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia is depicted in the lower right corner. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions between, and, men would be needed. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured, the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack. The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. The large air raid on Darwin on 19 February and the Attack on Broome on 3 March were conducted to prevent the Allies from using these towns as bases to contest the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies and was not related to an invasion. The generals were confident that Australia could be bullied into surrender to Japan by isolating it completely from the United States and by applying intense psychological pressure. The dozens of subsequent air raids on Northern Australia in and were mainly small and aimed to prevent the Allied air units based there from attacking Japanese positions. The Attack on Sydney Harbour in May had the goal of diverting Allied forces away from Midway Island prior to the Japanese attempt to capture it and the subsequent Japanese submarine campaigns off the Australian east coast in and were attempts to break the supply line between Australia and New Guinea during the New Guinea Campaign. Once secured, Port Moresby was to have been used as a base from which Japanese aircraft could dominate the Torres Strait and Coral Sea, and not to support an invasion of Australia. Matsu Kikan "Pine Tree", a joint army-navy intelligence unit, landed to assess reports that the Allies had begun to build major new bases on the northernmost coast of the Kimberley region of Western Australia, facing the Timor Sea. After leaving their base at Kupang, West Timor, the unitâ€”comprising 10 Japanese personnel in a commandeered fishing vessel crewed by West Timorese civiliansâ€”made brief visits to the uninhabited Ashmore Reef and Browse Island. While smoke was seen in hills to the east, the Japanese vessel was anchored and camouflaged with tree branches. Landing parties went ashore near the mouth of the Roe River. The following day, Matsu Kikan personnel again reconnoitred the area, before returning to Kupang.

Matsu Kikan did not see any signs of recent human activity, and little of military significance was learnt from the mission. This suggestion was not, however, adopted.

9: Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II - Wikipedia

In my new book 'Australia's greatest peril' (Pan Macmillan), I outline the genuine and imminent invasion threat to Australia in the first three months of After four research trips to Japan, I quote official Japanese documentation, minutes of meetings between the Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy, memoirs, and interviews with.

Some scholars are convinced that the Japanese had made solid preparations to invade mainland Australia but their plans were thwarted by the Allied victory at the Battle of the Coral Sea. Others state that the Japanese were too busy consolidating their position in South East Asia in preparation for the inevitable entry of significant US forces in the region. The theories touted by both of these parties are irrelevant for our purposes. The important issue is that Australia was fortified for invasion and that plans were drawn for a guerrilla campaign to wear out the Japanese forces before an allied counter attack. It is known that part of these plans involved pre-positioning stockpiles of civil relief materials and food for use by civilians and military personnel caught in areas of the Australian Mainland overrun by the enemy. The Curtin government openly admitted its concerns to its citizens and implemented a massive civil defence program. This was accompanied by public announcements about the Japanese threat as evidenced by official posters, pamphlets and radio recordings that exist at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. The enemy Thunders at our very gates. Everything we cherish is in immediate peril. There is no time: Strikes, lockouts, provocation, profiteering and exploitation increase our national danger. What we have done, or are doing, is not as good as what we can doâ€”should doâ€”and must do. You must make complete sacrifice for Australia or become a complete sacrifice to the enemy. John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia. The report extract below appears to be derived from minutes of a Japanese Imperial War Council meeting and details Japanese motivations for carrying out such a costly operation. The costly lesson learned by the Japanese during their attack at Midway has resulted in the opinion, apparently held by Admiral Suetsugu, that surface operations even with carrier air support cannot successfully be carried out within miles of a strong enemy base of shore-based aircraft. He believes that the Japanese possessions in the Western Pacific can only be made impregnable by concentrating on the strengthening of their air defence and that only Australia remains as an obstacle to the creation of a perfect defensive chain. However, he appears to have felt that Australia has already been reinforced to such an extent that operations designed only to isolate it would cause such heavy losses that its subsequent invasion would be rendered impossible. General Tojo, the Prime Minister, agreed that Australia must be reduced. General Asaka and General Terauchi supported General Tojo, but pointed out that unless Fiji, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia were soon captured, such a plan would have little chance of success and the Japanese gains in the South West Pacific Area would become increasingly endangered. General Tojo expressed the opinion that in order to cut down the losses of naval operations against the Australian mandates, a simultaneous attack by the landing of a massive expeditionary force at several points on the Australian mainland should be undertaken. In December , Chinese Intelligence sources provided details of what appears to be the general strategic concepts of the proposed operation. The Japanese Military Headquarters had drawn up plans for a large-scale military incursion into the Australian mainland in mid The concept of the operation was described as follows: By adopting a defensive strategy against the US naval forces the Japanese hoped to be able to defend their left flank. The main defence for this flank was a massive minefield in the Straits of Malacca. This would effectively block any naval force attacking the Japanese supply areas from the Indian Ocean. A force consisting of warships and transports was to make a lightning attack on Darwin in the hope of drawing US and Australian forces into the isolated areas between Katherine and Birdum. Then the main invasion force would set out from Sunda Strait and Christmas Island and land on the Australian coast in the vicinity of Fremantle. The Japanese would then attempt to control the railways and harbour facilities west of Esperance Bay and Sandstone before advancing eastward. The operation was originally planned to take place in mid-June with Japanese military supplies stockpiled at a large base at Java in the Netherlands East Indies now the Republic of Indonesia. Japanese troop transportation and reception centres were established throughout the area and plans were drawn to secure the sea and air routes down the Northwest coast of

Australia. The attack was apparently postponed on account of US-led counter-attacks such as the Battle of the Coral Sea and once the Japanese started to lose their initiative and were forced to concentrate on defending the areas they had already annexed, the Invasion of Australia plans were never implemented. The authenticity of the invasion plan as described by the Chinese sources is a matter of contention. Some academics argue that the plan above is a fake and that the Chinese may have thought that an authentic-looking Japanese invasion plan might have forced the Allies to fast-track plans to clear the enemy from Southeast Asia. This would have helped make China a major theatre for Allied operations rather than the Southwest Pacific. The truth is almost certainly lost to the mists of time, but the plan is included here to illustrate the kind of intelligence acted upon by the Curtin government. It certainly helps to explain why the Australian government was publicly discussing a pending Japanese invasion well into when, as we know now, the Japanese were barely capable of defending the Japanese Home Islands, the Philippines and their Mandated Territories. Continued on Page 2.

The successful housekeeper. Leonard and Virginia Woolf Translating and resisting empire: cultural appropriation and postcolonial studies Jonathan Hart The Spread of Islam to India Teachers Guide Chemical oxidations with microorganisms Quickbooks p&l sheet One Night in Paradise Feeding your child The other Hollywood. The future of adult education The mills of the gods Networking mcq Regional development and transportation in Argentina Product management system project 4th grade science worksheets Sea stingers-and other venomous and poisonous marine invertebrates of Western Australia Future preconditional Malaysian foreign policy in the Mahathir era, 1981-2003 Sexual exploitation : child prostitution or child protection? Across a moonswept moor Plant (Eye Wonder) 40 St. Luke, ed. by F. W. Farrar. 1895. The labours of kingship Jennas Big FAT Secret Small and medium size enterprises and regional development 2006 mazda 6 repair manual The governors vices and virtues The first three sections [also sections nine and eleven of Newtons Principia. Wind turbine installation project report Bound to you Macroscopic theories of superfluids The Virginia State Convention of 1861 James I. Robertson , Jr. Progress in industrial geography Effects of games to students thesis National formulary of Unani medicine. Building operational excellence Sword coast adventurers guide google drive Banging your head against a brick wall The New Chinese Empire Gitanjali by rabindranath tagore in bengali