

1: Elite - Wikipedia

The politics of local elite: manipulating links between the state and the local community in Eastern Indonesia / monograph.. [Y Argo Twikromo] -- This study aims at understanding the dynamics of state formation and the interaction between national states and local communities by focusing upon the agents involved in that interaction.

Wright Mills painted nearly half a century ago. When you were eight years old, the stock market crashed, and the resulting Clutch Plague began just as you started third or fourth grade. Hence your childhood was consumed with fighting off the poverty of the single greatest economic catastrophe in American history. When you were 20, the Japanese invaded Pearl Harbor, ensuring that your years as a young adult, especially if you were male, would be spent fighting on the ground in Europe or from island to island in Asia. If you were lucky enough to survive that experience, you returned home at the ripe old age of 24, ready to resume some semblance of a normal life—only then to witness the Korean War, McCarthyism, and the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Into this milieu exploded *The Power Elite*. Wright Mills was one of the first intellectuals in America to write that the complacency of the Eisenhower years left much to be desired. His indictment was uncompromising. On the one hand, he claimed, vast concentrations of power had coagulated in America, making a mockery of American democracy. On the other, he charged that his fellow intellectuals had sold out to the conservative mood in America, leaving their audience—the American people themselves—in a state of ignorance and apathy bearing shocking resemblance to the totalitarian regimes that America had defeated or was currently fighting. One of the goals Mills set for himself in *The Power Elite* was to tell his readers—again, assuming that they were roughly 35 years of age—how much the organization of power in America had changed during their lifetimes. In the 1950s, when this typical reader had been born, there existed what Mills called "local society," towns and small cities throughout America whose political and social life was dominated by resident businessmen. Small-town elites, usually Republican in their outlook, had a strong voice in Congress, for most of the congressmen who represented them were either members of the dominant families themselves or had close financial ties to them. By the time Mills wrote his book, this world of local elites had become as obsolete as the Model T Ford. Power in America had become nationalized, Mills charged, and as a result had also become interconnected. *The Power Elite* called attention to three prongs of power in the United States. First, business had shifted its focus from corporations that were primarily regional in their workforces and customer bases to ones that sought products in national markets and developed national interests. What had once been a propertied class, tied to the ownership of real assets, had become a managerial class, rewarded for its ability to organize the vast scope of corporate enterprise into an engine for ever-expanding profits. No longer were the chief executive officers of these companies chosen because they were of the right social background. Connections still mattered, but so did bureaucratic skill. The men who possessed those skills were rewarded well for their efforts. Larded with expense accounts and paid handsomely, they could exercise national influence not only through their companies, but through the roles that they would be called upon to serve in "the national interest. Mills wrote that the "warlords," his term for the military and its civilian allies, had once been "only uneasy, poor relations within the American elite; now they are first cousins; soon they may become elder brothers. Of all the prongs of the power elite, this "military ascendancy" possessed the most dangerous implications. And within that branch, Mills could count roughly 50 people who, in his opinion, were "now in charge of the executive decisions made in the name of the United States of America. These people were not attracted to their positions for the money; often, they made less than they would have in the private sector. Rather they understood that running the Central Intelligence Agency or being secretary of the Treasury gave one vast influence over the direction taken by the country. Firmly interlocked with the military and corporate sectors, the political leaders of the United States fashioned an agenda favorable to their class rather than one that might have been good for the nation as a whole. Although written very much as a product of its time, *The Power Elite* has had remarkable staying power. The book has remained in print for 43 years in its original form, which means that the year-old who read it when it first came out is now 78 years old. *Changing Fortunes* The obvious question for any contemporary reader of *The*

Power Elite is whether its conclusions apply to the United States today. Each year, Fortune publishes a list of the leading American companies based on revenues. Roughly 30 of the 50 companies that dominated the economy when Mills wrote his book no longer do, including firms in once seemingly impregnable industries such as steel, rubber, and food. Putting it another way, the list contains the names of many corporations that would have been quite familiar to Mills: General Motors is ranked first, Ford second, and Exxon third. But the company immediately following these giants—Wal-Mart Stores—did not even exist at the time Mills wrote; indeed, the idea that a chain of retail stores started by a folksy Arkansas merchant would someday outrank Mobil, General Electric, or Chrysler would have startled Mills. Furthermore, just as some industries have declined, whole new industries have appeared in America since ; IBM was fifty-ninth when Mills wrote, hardly the computer giant—sixth on the current Fortune list—that it is now. Compaq and Intel, neither of which existed when Mills wrote his book, are also in the top To illustrate how closed the world of the power elite was, Mills called attention to the fact that one man, Winthrop W. Aldrich, the American ambassador to Great Britain, was a director of 4 of the top 25 companies in America in Despite these changes in the nature of corporate America, however, much of what Mills had to say about the corporate elite still applies. It is certainly still the case, for example, that those who run companies are very rich; the gap between what a CEO makes and what a worker makes is extraordinarily high. But there is one difference between the world described by Mills and the world of today that is so striking it cannot be passed over. Mills was disdainful of the idea that leading businessmen were especially competent. If you were the head of General Motors in , you knew that American automobile companies dominated your market; the last thing on your mind was the fact that someday cars called Toyotas or Hondas would be your biggest threat. You did not like the union which organized your workers, but if you were smart, you realized that an ever-growing economy would enable you to trade off high wages for your workers in return for labor market stability. Smaller companies that supplied you with parts were dependent on you for orders. Each year you wanted to outsell Ford and Chrysler, and yet you worked with them to create an elaborate set of signals so that they would not undercut your prices and you would not undercut theirs. Whatever your market share in , in other words, you could be fairly sure that it would be the same in Why rock the boat? It made perfect sense for budding executives to do what Mills argued they did do: Very little of this picture remains accurate at the end of the twentieth century. Union membership as a percentage of the total workforce has declined dramatically, and while this means that companies can pay their workers less, it also means that they cannot expect to invest much in the training of their workers on the assumption that those workers will remain with the company for most of their lives. Foreign competition, once negligible, is now the rule of thumb for most American companies, leading many of them to move parts of their companies overseas and to create their own global marketing arrangements. These radical changes in the competitive dynamics of American capitalism have important implications for any effort to characterize the power elite of today. Wright Mills was a translator and interpreter of the German sociologist Max Weber, and he borrowed from Weber the idea that a heavily bureaucratized society would also be a stable and conservative society. Only in a society which changes relatively little is it possible for an elite to have power in the first place, for if events change radically, then it tends to be the events controlling the people rather than the people controlling the events. But not even they can control rapid technological transformations, intense global competition, and ever-changing consumer tastes. American capitalism is simply too dynamic to be controlled for very long by anyone. Personnel were constantly shifting back and forth from the corporate world to the military world. Big companies like General Motors had become dependent on military contracts. Scientific and technological innovations sponsored by the military helped fuel the growth of the economy. And while all these links between the economy and the military were being forged, the military had become an active political force. Members of Congress, once hostile to the military, now treated officers with great deference. And no president could hope to staff the Department of State, find intelligence officers, and appoint ambassadors without consulting with the military. Mills believed that the emergence of the military as a key force in American life constituted a substantial attack on the isolationism which had once characterized public opinion. He argued that "the warlords, along with fellow travelers and spokesmen, are attempting to plant their metaphysics firmly among the population at large. In this state of

constant war fever, America could no longer be considered a genuine democracy, for democracy thrives on dissent and disagreement, precisely what the military definition of reality forbids. If the changes described by Mills were indeed permanent, then *The Power Elite* could be read as the description of a deeply radical, and depressing, transformation of the nature of the United States. Much as Mills wrote, it remains true today that Congress is extremely friendly to the military, at least in part because the military has become so powerful in the districts of most congressmen. Military bases are an important source of jobs for many Americans, and government spending on the military is crucial to companies, such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, which manufacture military equipment. Some weapons systems never seem to die, even if, as was the case with a "Star Wars" system designed to destroy incoming missiles, there is no demonstrable military need for them. Yet despite these similarities with the 1950s, both the world and the role that America plays in that world have changed. For one thing, the United States has been unable to muster its forces for any sustained use in any foreign conflict since Vietnam. Worried about the possibility of a public backlash against the loss of American lives, American presidents either refrain from pursuing military adventures abroad or confine them to rapid strikes, along the lines pursued by Presidents Bush and Clinton in Iraq. China, which at the time Mills wrote was considered a serious threat, is now viewed by American businessmen as a source of great potential investment. Domestic political support for a large and permanent military establishment in the United States, in short, can no longer be taken for granted. At the time Mills wrote, defense expenditures constituted roughly 60 percent of all federal outlays and consumed nearly 10 percent of the U.S. By the late 1950s, those proportions had fallen to 17 percent of federal outlays and 3.3 percent of the U.S. And how could he have been right? Business firms, still the most powerful force in American life, are increasingly global in nature, more interested in protecting their profits wherever they are made than in the defense of the country in which perhaps only a minority of their employees live and work. Mills believed that in the 1950s, for the first time in American history, the military elite had formed a strong alliance with the economic elite. The Power Elite failed to foresee a situation in which at least one of the key elements of the power elite would no longer identify its fate with the fate of the country which spawned it. Mass Society and the Power Elite Politicians and public officials who wield control over the executive and legislative branches of government constitute the third leg of the power elite. Mills believed that the politicians of his time were no longer required to serve a local apprenticeship before moving up the ladder to national politics. Because corporations and the military had become so interlocked with government, and because these were both national institutions, what might be called "the nationalization of politics" was bound to follow. The new breed of political figure likely to climb to the highest political positions in the land would be those who were cozy with generals and CEOs, not those who were on a first-name basis with real estate brokers and savings and loan officials. For Mills, politics was primarily a facade. Historically speaking, American politics had been organized on the theory of balance: But the emergence of the power elite had transformed the theory of balance into a romantic, Jeffersonian myth. So anti-democratic had America become under the rule of the power elite, according to Mills, that most decisions were made behind the scenes. As a result, neither Congress nor the political parties had much substantive work to carry out. But he was not necessarily correct that politics would therefore become something of an empty theatrical show. Mills believed that in the absence of real substance, the parties would become more like each other. Yet today the ideological differences between Republicans and Democrats are severe—as, in fact, they were in 1950. Joseph McCarthy, the conservative anticommunist senator from Wisconsin who gave his name to the period in which Mills wrote his book, appears a few times in *The Power Elite*, but not as a major figure. Had he paid more attention to McCarthyism, Mills would have been more likely to predict the role played by divisive issues such as abortion, immigration, and affirmative action in American politics today. Real substance may not be high on the American political agenda, but that does not mean that politics is unimportant. Through our political system, we make decisions about what kind of people we imagine ourselves to be, which is why it matters a great deal at the end of the twentieth century which political party is in power.

2: How to reduce elite capture: Watch out for local elites during democratic transitions | VoxDev

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Concept, Orientations and Role in Social Change! Concept of Political Elite: Who are the elite? Elite are the most influential and prestigious stratum in a society. The members of an elite group have important influence in shaping the values and attitudes held by their segment of society. Lastly, elite is a relative term. If we were to operationalise this term, we could say, political elite include those: This change can be analysed by classifying the political elite in five phases: Vajpayee March to April Who were the elite in the first phase? These elite were those who had a stable economic background though politics was not their profession for earning their livelihood, were highly educated, mostly belonged to the upper castes, and were committed to societal interests. Their socio-political ideology was based on nationalism, liberalism and religio-cultural reforms. They wanted rewards in the form of a political office for participating in the national struggle for independence. These elite were not as highly politicized as their older counterparts. They thought that since they could trust the integrity of old professional politicians, they need not concern themselves quite so directly with politics. There was thus toleration on the part of the new and accommodation on the part of the old elite. They believed more in using the ties of kinship, caste and language to smoothen the way through the corridors of power. They posed as democrats; even their slogans were democratic but their actions belied their utterances. Ideologically, there were four types of elite functioning in , , and phases: The second and the third types had two sub-variations: Since these elite with different ideologies functioned within the party, the variation in their ideologies led to segmentation of the party which affected the functioning of both the party and its elite at various levels. Even the BJP-led government of A. Vajpayee which came in power in March proved unstable because of constant threats from 3 or 4 of its constituent parties. Their political affiliations are guided more by their particularistic loyalty rather than by their ideology commitment. Barring a few activist elite, most of the present elite do not believe in militating against the status quo. As such, the task of social engineering becomes far more difficult for those few activist revolutionary elite who are really committed to modernisation and believe in economic radicalism, political democratisation and social growth. Referring to changing eliteship in India, Yogendra Singh has averred: All of them came from upper castes and had an urban, middle-class background of English education. The top group was exposed to foreign culture and was educated there; hence their self-image in terms of expected roles was also that of a generalist rather than a specialist. Following independence, this pattern of elite composition has considerably changed. And what was stated by Yogendra Singh 25 years ago is true even today. Typology of Political Elite: We can term these four types as indifferent, manipulative, progressive, and rationalist elite respectively. In this classification, though both the progressive and the rationalist elite work for public interest, the former believe that the course of progress moves on automatically regardless of the interference of men and is not subject to human control while the latter believe that progress rests upon conscious control. Circulation of Political Elite: Once these elite rise from state or district level, they never go back to the old level but continue to function at the higher political level as long as they remain active in politics. This, however, does not mean that they cease to take interest in politics at the level from which they have moved up in the hierarchy. This means, there is no circulation but only an upward movement of the elite. My study of political elite revealed two types of movements not circulations: This elite mobility may be explained in terms of: Schumpeter also believed that both the individual qualities and the social factors are important in the circulation of elite. We have to use different approach for analysing the recruitment and the changing structure of elite in India. Political Elite, Social Change and Modernisation: The former seek to reconstruct society by attempting to mobilise and tap available resources and political energies. The political party or governmental apparatus serves for them as the central instrument for modernisation. They create new institutions or change old institutions to remove obstacles to economic and social growth. They believe in compromise among competing political and interest groups. The elite of this system are characterised by multiple loyalties, tactical flexibility, acceptance of compromise and ideological diffuseness. Thus, power elite in the maintenance system have a much more

limited scope of action, and a wider variety of constraints operates on their development policies. In the Leninist variant of Marxism, they have failed to convert the masses from automatically separated inchoate individuals into conscious and disciplined agents of total social change. We in this country can understand this better if we could know first the goals we had set for ourselves in economic, social and political fields after independence and then find out the extent to which our political elite have attempted to achieve these goals and ideals. Our goals in the economic field are: But have we achieved these goals? Nobody would deny that we have made progress in different fields. But this also is a fact that if our country has as yet reached only its half-way point, it is because our political elite have proved to be a barrier in the process of modernisation of our society in several ways. Can an average Indian be a beneficiary of programmes and policies which are motivated by monopoly-dominated and by powerful pressure per capita consumer expenditure of a few rupees a day? Words and promises can never raise the standards of living of an impoverished people. It should not be a snowballing of public opinion. Campaigns should not be based on advertising gimmicks. The elite are not selling any commodity; they are trying to sell people pipe dreams about their whole life. This requires a different kind of insight. Barriers for Political Elite: There are some oligarchic activist elite who do possess this insight and who are committed to development, but they too have not been able to do much in our country because of several problems they face in their functioning. The main problems they face are: When it becomes difficult to find a solvent to dissolve political and ideological divergences, some members either become apolitical or start encouraging centrifugal forces in the country or in the state or quit the party and join some other party which may offer them some public office. We could say that the ideologically-oriented elite occupy the political left and right while the office-seeking elite pre-empt the centre. The upper-stratum elite accuse lower-stratum elite of casteism, regionalism, linguistic divisions and communalism while the lower-rung elite blame the ruling elite for parochialism, corruption and slow progress of the country. Dahrendorf has also maintained that mutual suspicion and differential distribution of authority invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflicts. The oligarchic elite and the subjacent elite do not find a common set of goals. The subjacent elite are also unable to articulate their desire for economic improvement and social development or for getting higher offices, much less to organise themselves to obtain them. As long as the subjacent elite remain inarticulate and thus incapable of holding the oligarchic elite responsible for their suppression, both the big as well as small political cultural groups will continue to be dominated by the oligarchic elite and they will continue to deny political legitimacy to the leaders of the lower rung as well as to the new entrants. To understand modernisation at a macrocosmic level in India, we have to assess the pattern of economic, social and political development at microcosmic level in its constituent states, and have also to examine the relations between the elite functioning at two different levels, viz. The higher the monopolies at the higher political cultural base, the lesser are the elite to participate in public welfare issues at lower political cultural base. This is because the greater monopoly of elite at the national level discourages the oligarchic elite at the state level in expressing their views freely and frankly. The underlying assumption here is that the active oligarchic elite at the state level are likely to be those who aspire to play a significant role not only in the state political culture but also in the larger national political culture. As such, criticism of the oligarchic elite at the national level decreases among the oligarchic political activists at the state level since they are aware of the fact that compliance with the norms of monopolists at the centre has greater relevance to the political roles they hope to play at the country level. This tendency of the activists creates discontent among the non-activists because of which they refuse to cooperate with the activist elite in the state. As an illustration, we can cite one case. I would say that the elite—the politicians, the intellectuals, the bureaucrats and even the elite in the judiciary—instead of exposing the megalomaniac leaders and the monstrous coercion, corruption and unscrupulousness to the public—became victims of their own prejudice and subconsciously saw in one individual leader the protector of its narrow class interests. During 19 months, the elite cheered like a mob and abdicated its responsibility of giving sober counsel to the government and to the nation. How is it that the decisions of the emergency passed muster with all types of political decision-makers in parliament? Are we to understand that when laws were passed in Parliament in conditions so blatantly malafide, the activist political elite had no remedy? These are questions that the political elite had best ask of

themselves. The point that is being made is that the activist political elite in power fail to perform their roles in a crisis of vast dimensions and delivery in the interests of the society. I would as well maintain that even after the historic national and state elections of November and again in May and February , though the new political elite got an opportunity to exercise their judgement, yet, unfortunately, they wasted this opportunity. We can now reiterate what was said earlier:

3: Political Elite: Concept, Orientations and Role in Social Change

The adoption of democratic decentralization across the developing world has been critiqued by scholars and practitioners for both macro-level institutional shortcomings and, on a more micro scale, for falling prey to elite capture.

History[edit] Italian school of elitism[edit] Vilfredo Pareto “ , Gaetano Mosca “ , and Robert Michels “ , were cofounders of the Italian school of elitism, which influenced subsequent elite theory in the Western tradition. Power lies in position of authority in key economic and political institutions. The psychological difference that sets elites apart is that they have personal resources, for instance intelligence and skills, and a vested interest in the government; while the rest are incompetent and do not have the capabilities of governing themselves, the elite are resourceful and strive to make the government work. For in reality, the elite would have the most to lose in a failed state. Vilfredo Pareto[edit] Pareto emphasized the psychological and intellectual superiority of elites, believing that they were the highest accomplishers in any field. He discussed the existence of two types of elites: Governing elites Non-governing elites He also extended the idea that a whole elite can be replaced by a new one and how one can circulate from being elite to non-elite. Gaetano Mosca[edit] Mosca emphasized the sociological and personal characteristics of elites. He said elites are an organized minority and that the masses are an unorganized majority. The ruling class is composed of the ruling elite and the sub-elites. He divides the world into two groups: Ruling class Class that is ruled Robert Michels[edit] Sociologist Michels developed the iron law of oligarchy where, he asserts, social and political organizations are run by few individuals, and social organization and labor division are key. He believed that all organizations were elitist and that elites have three basic principles that help in the bureaucratic structure of political organization: Need for leaders, specialized staff and facilities Utilization of facilities by leaders within their organization The importance of the psychological attributes of the leaders Contemporary elite theorists[edit] Elmer Eric Schattschneider[edit] Elmer Eric Schattschneider offered a strong critique of the American political theory of pluralism: Rather than an essentially democratic system in which the many competing interests of citizens are amply represented, if not advanced, by equally many competing interest groups , Schattschneider argued the pressure system is biased in favor of "the most educated and highest-income members of society", and showed that "the difference between those who participate in interest group activity and those who stand at the sidelines is much greater than between voters and nonvoters". The "range of organized, identifiable, known groups is amazingly narrow; there is nothing remotely universal about it" and the "business or upper-class bias of the pressure system shows up everywhere". He says the "notion that the pressure system is automatically representative of the whole community is a myth" and, instead, the "system is skewed, loaded and unbalanced in favor of a fraction of a minority". Wright Mills[edit] Mills published his book *The Power Elite* in , claiming a new sociological perspective on systems of power in the United States. He identified a triumvirate of power groups“political, economic and military“which form a distinguishable, although not unified, power-wielding body in the United States. Mills proposed that this group had been generated through a process of rationalization at work in all advanced industrial societies whereby the mechanisms of power became concentrated, funneling overall control into the hands of a limited, somewhat corrupt group. *The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, “ , a study of how Nazism came to power in the German democratic state. It provided the tools to analyze the structure of a political system and served as a warning of what could happen in a modern capitalistic democracy. Floyd Hunter[edit] The elite theory analysis of power was also applied on the micro scale in community power studies such as that by Floyd Hunter Hunter examined in detail the power of relationships evident in his "Regional City" looking for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions. He posited a structural-functional approach that mapped hierarchies and webs of interconnection within the city“mapping relationships of power between businessmen, politicians, clergy etc. The study was promoted to debunk current concepts of any "democracy" present within urban politics and reaffirm the arguments for a true representative democracy. Schwartz examining the power structures within the sphere of the corporate elite in the United States. William Domhoff researched local and national decision making

process networks seeking to illustrate the power structure in the United States. He asserts, much like Hunter, that an elite class that owns and manages large income-producing properties like banks and corporations dominate the American power structure politically and economically. Francis and Paul Gottfried in their theories of the managerial state. Burnham described his thoughts on elite theory more specifically in his book, *The Machiavellians*, which discusses, among others, Pareto, Mosca, and Michels. Burnham attempts a scientific analysis of both elites and politics generally. Putnam[edit] Putnam saw the development of technical and exclusive knowledge among administrators and other specialist groups as a mechanism that strips power from the democratic process and slips it to the advisors and specialists who influence the decision process. Gonzalez writes on the power of U. In *The Politics of Air Pollution: Urban Growth, Ecological Modernization and Symbolic Inclusion* and also in *Urban Sprawl, Global Warming, and the Empire of Capital* Gonzalez employs elite theory to explain the interrelationship between environmental policy and urban sprawl in America. His most recent work, *Energy and Empire: The Politics of Nuclear and Solar Power in the United States* demonstrates that economic elites tied their advocacy of the nuclear energy option to post American foreign policy goals, while at the same time these elites opposed government support for other forms of energy, such as solar, that cannot be dominated by one nation. Ralf Dahrendorf[edit] In his book *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, [16] Ralf Dahrendorf asserts that, due to advanced level of competence required for political activity, a political party tends to become, actually, a provider of "political services", that is, the administration of local and governmental public offices. During the electoral campaign, each party tries to convince voters it is the most suitable for managing the state business. The logical consequence would be to acknowledge this character and openly register the parties as service providing companies. In this way, the ruling class would include the members and associates of legally acknowledged companies and the "class that is ruled" would select by election the state administration company that best fits its interests. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page[edit] In their statistical analysis of 1, policy issues professors Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page found that "economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U. Set out most extensively in his book *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-driven Political Systems*, the theory begins by noting that in modern political systems the cost of acquiring political awareness is so great that no citizen can afford it.

4: Project MUSE - Local Political Elites in Indonesia: "Risers" and "Holdovers"

The Rise of Libya's Local Elites. The emergence of local power centres during and after the war was closely linked to the disintegration of central authority, but the fact that political and military organization mainly occurred on a local basis during the war had its roots in the Qadhafi era () and the monarchy that preceded it ().

PhD student in Economics, CEMFI Allowing old-regime agents to remain in power during democratic transitions facilitates elite capture, which lowers public good provision In most developing countries, the poor outnumber the rich. However, this numeric superiority does not typically translate into influence in policymaking. This is the case even in democratic regimes. While there could be multiple reasons for this phenomenon, an extensive literature has suggested that elite capture can explain a great deal. Powerful groups can control the political process through vote buying and clientelism see, among others, Bardhan and Mookherjee , Acemoglu and Robinson , Finan and Schechter Despite the potential negative consequences of elite capture, we only have a limited understanding of what factors affect the power of elites and what policies could be implemented to limit their influence in policymaking. Democratic transitions as a determinant of elite capture In recent research, we argue that elites oftentimes have their roots in the recent authoritarian past of countries Martinez-Bravo et al. Non-democratic regimes are fertile grounds for powerful groups to amass resources and consolidate their grip on power. Consequently, the way democratic transitions unfold can have substantial effects on the degree of elite persistence in the subsequent democratic regime. To examine this, we exploit a natural experiment that took place in the Indonesian transition to democracy and that generated exogenous variation in how easy it was for local elites to perpetuate their hold on power. What happened is the followingâ€”after the unexpected demise of the Soeharto regime, Soeharto-appointed mayors were not immediately replaced. Instead, they were allowed to finish their five-year terms before being replaced by newly-elected mayors. Interestingly, the appointment cycles of Soeharto mayors were not synchronised. Hence, mayors that were appointed later in the Soeharto regime were able to stay for more years in office during the democratic transition than mayors that were appointed earlier. An extensive qualitative literature on Indonesian politics Hadiz , among others has documented that the first years of the democratic transition were an intense period in the development of elite capture strategies. The new political scenario forced elites to develop new strategies such as constructing networks of political brokers to buy votes, or striking deals with the local military units to intimidate voters. Our hypothesis is that Soeharto mayors that, by chance, were in office for longer during the democratic transition had an advantage in the development of these elite capture strategies. These mayors had more time to re-adjust to the new political scenario. Hence, we expect to find more elite capture and worse outcomes in districts where the last Soeharto mayor was appointed later in the non-democratic regime. First, we document that districts where the Soeharto mayor was in office for longer during the transition exhibit greater levels of elite persistence. Figure 1 demonstrates that districts where the last Soeharto mayor was appointed one year later hence, allowing him to serve one extra year in office during the transition, on expectation , have an 11 percentage point-higher probability of having a subsequent mayor connected to the Soeharto elite. This is consistent with the idea that those districts had more persistence of Soeharto-era elites in power about a decade after the fall of the regime. This is what we would expect from areas with high levels of elite captureâ€”entrenched elites can use a variety of forms to block entry of other political forces in elections. More elite capture translates into lower public good provision In a second set of results, we show that districts with longer exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition also exhibit lower levels of public goods. The main results are summarised in Figure 2â€”those districts have fewer school facilities, health centres, doctors, and formally trained midwives. This is consistent with the extensive literature in political economy that suggests that elite capture is detrimental for public good provisionâ€”if mayors can easily be re-elected using vote buying or voter intimidation techniques, their incentives to provide public goods would be severely weakened. This result is remarkable, since there were no differences in public good provision across districts with different appointment timings before the fall of the Soeharto regime. The above figure depicts percentage change in standard deviations of the different outcomes due to an additional

year of exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition. In the paper, we provide further evidence that suggests that elite capture is the reason behind the deterioration of public goods during the democratic transition. In districts where the Soeharto mayors were in office for longer, citizens were less likely to vote out subsequent mayors that provided few public goods. This result is consistent with those districts experiencing higher levels of elite capture and weaker political accountability. The importance of understanding incentives of elites during democratic transitions In many developing countries, the degree of influence of elites in local politics widely differs across regions. The results of this paper suggest that, in order to understand this variation, we need to study the incentives to invest in elite capture strategies during critical historical periods. Democratic transitions are major instances of such critical junctures—new parties are created, new laws are passed, and new institutions are developed. The vacuum of national political changes can create substantial opportunities for powerful groups to develop strategies to capture power at the local level see Martinez-Bravo for another example of these dynamics at the village level. While slow transitions may suffer from fewer authoritarian reversals, the evidence in this paper suggests that they can have substantial costs at the local level, as elites have more time to find ways of capturing the new democratic system. Expediting the process of leader turnover at the local level or imposing temporary checks and balances, might be beneficial measures for new democracies. Hadiz, V R , Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Evidence from Indonesia", *American Economic Review* 4:

5: Elite (elitist) theory: A Glossary of Political Economy Terms - Dr. Paul M. Johnson

The adoption of democratic decentralization across the developing world has been critiqued by scholars and practitioners for both macro-level institutional shortcomings and, on a more micro scale, for falling prey to elite capture. This article draws on interviews with over local authorities in.

On the basis of original data, it first discusses to what extent the councils of big German cities reflect the new immigration-related diversity of the population. Second, it asks to what extent the elected immigrant officials mirror the immigrant population. The article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the selectivity of political careers in diverse societies by addressing immigration-related factors. The consequences of and Heinz, To what extent does this tion figures low, and " until EU-voting transformation of urban populations also rights were introduced " no political lead to a transformation of city politics jurisdiction allowed non-citizen electoral and local political elites? This article participation, most immigrants could not focuses on Germany and its bigger cities. Michon, ; Garbaye, ; the reforms to German citizenship Solomos and Back, , we have no law. Since then, the group of German wide-ranging systematic knowledge on citizens with an immigrant background electoral participation and representa- has been growing fast. Due to residential characteristics of concentration and voting rights for EU- foreigners, their share is often much immigrant political elites higher at the local level. Of the population of all cities with that is in conventional politics, to follow more than a hundred thousand inhabi- different logics than electoral participa- tants 27 per cent have a migration back- tion more generally, as the necessary ground,2 and the share of the German resources, motivations and contextual nationals among them is growing. To what extent do the councils of Ger- Our data come from the first systematic man cities reflect this new diversity of the and comprehensive investigation of immi- population? This question is discussed in a grant representation at the local level for first part of this article on the basis of data Germany. In order to capture develop- for the seventy-seven German cities with ments over time, we analyse the results of at least a , inhabitants. Local show that, in terms of the shares of coun- elections are held every 5 years, but the cillors with immigrant and non-immigrant dates differ between the regional states. We identified all But to what extent do the elected councillors who were either foreign born, immigrant officials mirror the immigrant that is first generation immigrants, or the population? This question is investigated children of at least one immigrant, based in a second part of this article. Does the paths and political experiences. What is the impact of additional factors related to the immigration experience? While city councils elected between and March gap is obvious; city had members with an immigrant councils are hardly background, those elected between Sep- reflective of a diverse tember and March have such councillors, an increase of 71 per cent. Again, in a few cities: Sixty-two of the the electoral and party systems see seventy-seven cities presently have such Garbaye, and in the composition councillors, while in councils elected of the immigrant population, it is highly between and March , only plausible that representation levels in fifty-two cities had immigrant represen- Germany are negatively affected by the tatives. All major political parties increa- consequences of a restrictive citizenship sed the number of immigrant councillors tradition. In contrast to some cities in the Nether- Altogether, the immigrant council- lands, Great Britain and Norway that lors equal 4 per cent of the total 4, have achieved statistical representa- councillors. Compared with the size of the tion of immigrant or ethnic minority immigrant population 27 per cent as populations5 on their local councils, none mentioned above a huge representation of the seventy-seven large German cities gap is obvious; city councils are hardly has achieved that. In Frankfurt on Main, reflective of a diverse population. Such international share of 16 per cent " the highest of all comparisons are complicated, but at first cities. Here, 42 per cent of the population blush Germany might still lag behind have a migration background. In Stutt- other European countries of longstanding gart eight of the sixty councillors have migration. However, in the Dutch cities of immigrants in the electorate, still a small similar size, the share was 11 per cent, number. Fifteen of the seventy-seven composition confirm general assumptions cities are still without any immigrant about the social selectivity of political representative on their councils, including careers and the gender imbalance? And West German cities with significant im- what do their

characteristics and experi- migrant populations⁶ Table 1. Indeed, a major factor â€” be it as time to become of the current immigrant-origin council- familiar with a new context, to become lors surveyed in our study, about one-fifth naturalised, learn a new language or has been in office for 10 or more years. On Still, it seems safe to say that never average, 29 years lie between immigra- before in the Federal Republic of Germany tion to Germany and election to a city have so many representatives of the council, 10 years is the shortest period immigrant population sat on city councils. However, contrary to find- up of the larger political parties to the ings for the United States and for voting new diversity of the resident population. But the joined a German political party before growth of immigrant representation is , and 54 per cent were party mem- also a result of the aspirations and efforts bers already prior to Nevertheless, of members of the immigrant population. To what extent do the immigrant coun- 39 , access to a council seat is not always cillors of the early twenty-first century conditional on long-term service to the reflect the socio-demographic structure party. This is true mainly for the Social of the immigrant population? Does their Democrats, 79 per cent of their immigrant european political science: General population figures are based on data of the Federal Statistical Office for 31 December In contrast, among the Conservative immigrant councillors, 71 home country is not per cent gained the council seat without typically associated with prior party office. We find Bloemraad, , with different results it more plausible to interpret this career for the United States. Labour migrants pattern as the result of a new interest of are also little represented 9 per cent. The over- these councils appear to provide a con- whelming majority entered Germany as text in and through which party repre- students 25 per cent or family members sentatives and immigrant activists met 51 per cent. To an extent this situation see Martiniello, German politi- After the recruitment stop in , labour cal parties do not seem to shy away from immigration was largely restricted to recruiting immigrants with a background citizens of European Community, later in migrant activism and associations in European Union, states. Since , spite of a common public portrayal of such family formation or reunion was, and still associations as a barrier to integration. But This practice contrasts with the situation further research is needed to explain the in France where immigrant councillors are interaction of migration biography, legal rarely affiliated to immigrant organisa- status and political careers. For immigrants, like non- city councillor. While half of the first- immigrants, political careers are socially generation immigrant councillors came highly selective. Two-thirds of the coun- to Germany as adults, only a small group cillors have a university degree, while in were politically active in those countries the population with a migration back- 12 per cent of all immigrant councillors. There are no comprehen- expect that previous political experience sive data on the social and educa- is a resource for different kinds of political tional characteristics of local councillors activities in another country. Women are better ethnic organisations, immigration history, represented among immigrant councillors legal status, discrimination. As the than among all big city councillors. Thus we links between them, increases political do not see a combined effect of dual trust and furthers participation in the main- disadvantage, as intersectional appro- stream. With regard to the formation of aches might suggest. This may be a result immigrant elites, it is plausible that diverse of preferences within the political parties and multiple organisational structures pro- that are interested in having both more duce a pool of activists who can then be female and more minority representation recruited by the political parties or who Bergh and Bjorklund, In addition, Rahsaan Maxwell in women. Female immigrant councillors this issue has emphasised that for dis- are a bit younger than their male counter- criminated groups, ethnic loyalties provide parts; they also entered German party a basis for representation as they can thus politics later. Their ethnic community ties counterbalance the effects of exclusion. On ish background, while among the immi- the basis of his research on Latinos in New grant population, those of Turkish origin York, Michael Jones-Correa has account for only 16â€”20 per cent and even suggested how gender-specific immigra- less in the immigrant electorate. As he believes, the the average educational level among common loss of status motivates men those of Turkish background is lower than to seek compensation in the sphere of in other major immigrant groups. How- homeland-oriented politics while women, ever, it seems that other factors counter- who may even gain status through em- balance that. Those of Turkish origin ployment, have more reason to engage in have well-developed ethnic structures in issues pertaining to the country of resi- Germany. In addition, the disadvantaged dence. It would be desirable to explore position of the Turkish

population and the occurrence and explanation of gender the experience of discrimination may pro- differences further in a comparative fra- vide a stronger motivation to become nework. An increase of the share of voted to explaining different levels of Turkish-German councillors from 28 per representation across ethnic or national- cent in the councils elected between origin groups. Theoretically such differ- and , to 38 per cent at present, also ences could be caused by several factors points to possible party selection effects, relating to the characteristics of the group but may also reflect the influence of role and to the context of reception such as models on co-ethnics. This is close to their com- the whole picture. Legal status and poli- bined share in the immigrant population. We might assume that racist dis- citizenship have been elected; without crimination and the weak legal status of the extended voting rights given to those people who often entered Germany as from EU countries, the proportion of EU- refugees would depress levels of activ- origin officials would certainly be lower. In the case of councillors that roughly corresponds to the share of with an Asian or African background, the this group in the immigrant population. It comes citizenship rights and thus full voting as no surprise that in German cities, rights from their arrival. Partly, immigra- as in other countries, the political parties tion from these regions is relatively recent, are not equally attractive to immigrants that is a phenomenon of the s. As in Immigrants of the s may need more other countries see e. Brouard and time to find their way into German political Tiberj, , immigrants tend to sup- structures. In addition, socialisation in a port left-wing parties. Three quarters of former socialist country seems to go along the immigrant officials were elected for with a low motivation to aspire to political the Social Democratic Party of Germany office12 “ an assumption that is supported SPD , for the Green Party and The Left, a by the weak representation of those from relatively new socialist party. The Social former Yugoslavia only five councillors. Democrats have the largest number of How does racist discrimination affect immigrant councillors but taken together, entry into local political elites? But neither Conservatives nor Liberals The social selectivity of political careers as yet fully exploit their existing pool of presents a major barrier to equal repre- aspirants for office. Their immigrant can- sentation of immigrant and non-immi- didate pools and , respectively grant populations. A to be explored further. Apart from immi- small share of city councillors are immi- grant participation in general, immigrant grants or the children of immigrants. Over activism in its more demanding forms “ in the past decade the representation of the conventional politics but also in other immigrant population in city councils contexts “ is a topic worth more extensive has increased steeply but, in terms of empirical research and theoretical gener- immigrant political incorporation, Germany alisation. In England, ethnic minorities in Birmingham were, in , represented roughly according to their numbers Garbaye, The average age of immigrant councillors is forty-four. All data reported in this section are based on our own analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of the councillors and the results of our survey. As many other cities do not provide detailed biographies of councillors on their websites we cannot tell how representative this picture is. Breakdowns are only available for some cities. The microcensus comprises 1 per cent of all households. There are no exact figures for ethnic German immigrants. Those from former Yugoslavia number about 1. Available figures are estimates based on the microcensus. Cornell University Press, pp. The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: University of California Press. Unsere Perspektiven “, Berlin, www. Federal Election Commissioner Bundeswahlleiter.

6: Elite theory - Wikipedia

Where political power is concentrated more in the hands of the few oligarchic elite at the national level, the desire to participate in local socio-political issues increases dissatisfaction among the non-monopolistic non-activist elite at the state base, leading to their withdrawal of support to the activist elite in their own state.

Wright Mills wrote of the "elite" in his book *The Power Elite* as "those political, economic, and military circles, which as an intricate set of overlapping small but dominant groups share decisions having at least national consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them". These memberships in turn pave the way to the prominent social clubs located in all major cities and serving as sites for important business contacts". Mills contended that since the end of World War II, corporate leaders had become more prominent in the political process, with a decline in central decision-making for professional politicians. Most prominent corporate leaders and politicians were strong proponents of military spending. According to Mills, in the 1950s when the military emphasis was pronounced, it was corporate leaders working with prominent military officers who dominated the development of policies. These two groups tended to be mutually supportive. According to Mills, the power elite rose from "the managerial reorganization of the propertied classes into the more or less unified stratum of the corporate rich". Instead, class rule is manifested through the activities of a wide variety of organizations and institutions. Leaders within the upper class join with high-level employees in the organizations they control to make up what will be called the power elite". Wright Mills to describe a relatively small, loosely connected group of individuals who dominate American policy making. This group includes bureaucratic, corporate, intellectual, military, media, and government elites who control the principal institutions in the United States and whose opinions and actions influence the decisions of the policymakers. Bush in office identified 7, institutional positions of power encompassing 5, individuals. Age Corporate leaders aged about 60; heads of foundations, law, education, and civic organizations aged around 62; government employees aged about 65. In the economic denomination, as of October [update], only 32.6. Social clubs Most holders of top positions in the power elite possess exclusive membership to one or more social clubs. About a third belong to a small number of especially prestigious clubs in major cities like London, New York City, Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D. Sociologist Christopher Doob gives a hypothetical alternative, stating that these elite individuals would consider themselves the overseers of the national economy. Also appreciating that it is not only a moral, but a practical necessity to focus beyond their group interests. Doing so would hopefully alleviate various destructive conditions affecting large numbers of less affluent citizens. They therefore, have a wide range of knowledge and interests in many influential organizations, and are, as Mills describes, "professional go-betweens of economic, political, and military affairs". Sociologist Manuel Castells writes in *The Rise of the Network Society* that contemporary globalization does not mean that "everything in the global economy is global".

7: Elite | Define Elite at www.enganchecubano.com

Though both state and local elite consider neoliberal ideas as the 'best practice' in the local context and reshape the higher education to produce skilled labour for global market; however, 'political-business' interests of local elite have been worked at behind neoliberal ideas and thinking in the higher education policies in Bangladesh.

8: The Power Elite Now

regimes, elite actors, political machines, or growth coalitions? Or have interest and community groups gained access to the government and been able to influence policy.

Himself and Whistlers niece Python cheat sheet 2.7 Flow cytometry protocols second edition Snell clinical anatomy by regions 9th edition Global Conjectures 340. Billboard Top Country Songs of the 60s (Billboard Top Country Songs of the 60s) Picking pin tumbler locks Persian art and design influences from the Near and Middle East. Easy to Sound/Book 7C. (Key Words) Buttons, bones, and the organ-grinders monkey Beautiful bottom, beautiful shame Constantines Sword: The Church and the Jews From isolation to containment, 1921-1952 Refugees The Asylum Dilemma Generating awareness on disaster management 6.5 Conclusions and Discussion Rancor Reconciliation in Medieval England (Conjunctions of Religion Power in the Medieval Past) Transfer and diffusion of information technology for organizational resilience Wildlife management techniques manual NEEDLEWORKERS CHATELAINE 41 Bilingual Concordance to the Targum of the Prophets Gallery of Best Resumes for People Without a Four-Year Degree, Third Edition Changing conditions, changing times Part 2 : The wi-fi journey in perspective. T-1 networks, design to installation NCAA March Madness Listen To Your Hormones A nice day for murder Young Beginner Singing Method Hidden alternatives: Judi Dench, Kathy Bates, Parker Posey, Whoopi Goldberg, and Frances McDormand My Friends the Saints Selected poems of Nirala The writers reference. Reproduction : models and sources Noriko O. Tsuya, Cameron Campbell, Wang Feng Winning business in Egypt Unit one: Cells. Unit two: Genetics. Unit three: Evolution. Unit four: Ecology. V. 1. Southern region Zine Yearbook Volume 2 Everything and All That I Am Individual and social narcissism, by E. Fromm.