

1: Progress (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Modern rationalism: being a sketch of the progress of the rationalistic spirit in the nineteenth century [Joseph McCabe] on www.enganchecubano.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This is a reproduction of a book published before*

Volume 4, Issue 3, May , Pages: To cite this article: International Journal of Literature and Arts. March 29, ; Accepted: April 9, ; Published: April 27, Abstract: Western civilisation originated in the age of ancient Greece. The general characteristics of western civilisation have ever suggested their original source from ancient Greek culture, in which, the idea "rationalism" has been viewed as the main property of cultural foundation. This very idea was not only showed upon the western ancient philosophy, the principles and the applications of modern science and technologies, but it also unfolded its ray in the region of western literature and arts. Particularly, the tendency of "rationalism" revealed itself in many periods of western art history. Under a brief historical review and the method of morphological research in visual form, this discussion tried to clarify the idea of "rationalism", which embodied itself in many masterful works of different historical ages or presented its effects on such aesthetic standards as "imitation" and "ideal" in history. As the result, it will be exhibited clearly the historical evolution of this idea and its relationship with the development of western art and culture. The Contribution of Thinkers 2. Influences in History 4. The Contribution of Thinkers Immanuel Kant had commented ancient Greek thoughts in his philosophy critique: Greeks firstly began to think in philosophical way among all ancient nations. For they tried to avoid following the trace of images, they were to cultivate rational knowledge with abstraction. Instead, the other nations always had the concepts intelligible by concreteness of image [1]. Such contribution came at first from ancient Greek philosophers. Thales, Pythagoras, and Heraclitus could be the representatives, but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were the best well known. The reason why they were mentioned here in advance is, as the agents of ancient Greek thoughts, they provided a foundation for thinking way in that civilisation region. Although they presented in diversified even opposite methods in our minds, we still discover the consistency under the multifarious expresses. We call such think way as "rationalism". Socrates had stated "the unexamined life is not worth living". This remembered sentence once reflected their characteristics of prudence and reason. So, the author of A Global History has said the ancient Greek spirit: We could have some associations to this narration: Still in the same book A Global History, Stavrianos remarked: This statement hit a key point. It is that rationalism may deeply influence the artistic creativity of ancient Greece. The ancient Greek art indeed received affect from ancient Egypt in its early age, but then, it developed its own attributes gradually. The invention of "foreshortening" in painting was ever an important landmark within such development [3]. The perspective contradiction of ancient Egyptian art had been overcome by Greek artists. They began to make realistic visual observation as the basis of artistic creation [3]. There is no doubt that the realistic observation basis disclosed the reason hold by Greeks at that time. In the process of artistic creation, the Greek arts already had the objects into perspective space which they had recognised logically. There was an essential concept in ancient Greek aesthetics. Imitation was the name. Imitation itself contained the factor of rational cognition. However, the imitation in ancient Greek mind was not ever the photographic copy in present. Their imitation was viewed as a way for realisation of ideas. On the concept of imitation as ancient Greek aesthetical thought, Lionello Venturi has told that imitation of nature is necessary, but similarly, idealisation of nature is also necessary, which accord with physical and ethical good, and conform to mathematical relationship and noble sentiments [4]. The idealised art by imitation corresponded to their rationalism. It could be regarded as artistic manifestation of such idea. Another point is worthy to be mentioned here, it is the scientific trend in ancient Greek art. The mathematical idea of Pythagoras gave a foundation for their relationship, as he said "Everything is number" [5]. Indeed, the thinking way of "Everything is number" permeated into art and evolved to arithmetic or geometric analysis and the consequent emphasis on form and scale. When talking about an ancient Greek painter, Xenocrates said that his general contribution was the scientific base for painting [4]. The intensive consideration of form and scale were still obvious in ancient Greek architecture. This idea was already developed into a series principle terms. Vitruvius commented the architectural design

with the words as "regulation", "placement", and "symmetry". The ancient Greek architectures had more rational characteristics than other artistic categories. The theme of ancient Greek architecture was shrine building, whose architectural configuration paralleled with the ideal purpose. If compared such style and its successors in the age of ancient Rome, Renaissance, and Neoclassicism with other architectural styles as Baroque or romanticism, we could easily find the keynote of solemn and rationality, which was expressed very well in Argive Heraion and Parthenon with Dorian style Figure 1. Only had ignored the detailed rilievo decoration, it appeared instantly the geometrical abstraction as a whole, which presented the absolute idea of spirit in a perfect way. Moreover, it contained the rigorous mathematical logic narrated above to define its form: Ancient Greek architecture was based upon a set of mathematical relation. Its key point was "modulus": The height and distance of column, even the size of architecture as whole were all related on this "modulus", which could keep the correct relationship in scale between whole and parts. It did reflect the idea of harmony in ancient Greek philosophy. There were certain relationships of scale within all things in nature. Human were the lord of creation produced by god, so the Greeks were inspired by the relationships between parts of human body, applied them into the designs of column and shrine building. This idea provided a spiritual basis for ancient Greek art and architecture. It built the groundwork for numerous artistic forms in later age as well. The historical process will gradually demonstrate them. Influences in History If recalled the art of middle ages in a historical perspective, it seemed far away from "rationalism". Although Gothic churches implied the ideal "City of God", its pinnacle could easily have people associated it with passionate expressionism. The illustrations in religious books would hardly present the same visual cognition as in ancient Greece. Gombrich commented in his work *The Story of Art*: Venturi explained it as the brilliant achievements of medieval architecture were ever based upon the ridding of early mathematic principles. However, it was just a latent state, the radiance of reason emerged again in the end of Medieval. Depth cueing with perspective effect reappeared in his fresco: Italian artists began to resume the Greek sight on art. Masaccio even went farther. He strictly combined the mathematic rules into painting perspective, and his work illustrated commendably his point of view. Then, the painting way of "linear perspective" was invented by another Florence artist named Filippo Brunelleschi. His contributions were also included in architectural art. The typical characters of classical building displayed by his hands, and the churches with concordant relationship in scale were to replace the radical Gothic style [3]. However, the achievements of Leonardo da Vinci became the best interpretation on the relationship between Greek artistic spirit and Renaissance. We can not only define this historical figure with simple term of "artist". Although he created masterpieces as *The Last Supper* or *Mona Lisa*, he still anatomised corpse, designed weapon, and even studied on physical law. Such activities were just the work burdened by later scientists and engineers with their intelligence we can not ignore the similarity between standard proportions of the human figure of Leonardo da Vinci and modern ergonomics. For Leonardo da Vinci, the painting was a way to explore the universe, but not the exclusive one Figure 2. Idealism was revealed itself again in Renaissance. The sculpture *David* of Michelangelo, it unfolded the externalisation of idea, instead of expression of emotion. Such an externalised process of shaping cast the light of reason. *Vitruvian Man*, by Leonardo da Vinci. Neoclassicism was once the major successor of ancient Greek spirit after Renaissance. The activists of neoclassicism competed by reason and solemnity with preciousness of rococo style. In the field of architecture, the similar inheritance was continued as well. Like Pantheon in France, Brandenburger Tor in Germany, and Capitol in America, they all paid a tribute to harmonious classical structure forms with their visual language in every detail. The development of western art faced a complicated situation after the birth of modernism. There were some artists with rationalism tendency as Paul Cezanne and Piet Cornelies Mondrian in that time, but drain of emotion and awareness of irrationalism was becoming the fundamental key. We could easily find its manifestation in the works from Edvard Munch and surrealists Figure 4. Similarly as in Medieval, the rationality began to fall into the state of dormancy again. However, the western art after modernism can hardly have any rational ideal: The architectural creations were able to be the sole identity of rational spirit. The term "new objective" *Neue Sachlichkeit* in German was the best notion for such a circumstances. As opposed to mania in modern art, modern architecture along with industrial design since modern age revealed reasoning and logic everywhere

Figure 5.

L. Neil Smith's The Libertarian Enterprise electronic magazine, Number , February 13, - A History of Freedom of Thought - Chapter VII - The Progress of Rationalism (Nineteenth Century), by John Bagnell Bury.

In *Wissenschaftslehre*, Fichte argues that the self posits itself and is a self-producing and changing process. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, a student of Fichte, continued to develop many of the same ideas and was also assimilated by the Romantics as something of an official philosopher for their movement. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. His work revealed the increasing importance of historical thinking in German thought. Arthur Schopenhauer, rejecting Hegel and also materialism, called for a return to Kantian transcendentalism, at the same time adopting atheism and determinism, amongst others. His secular thought became more popular in Europe in the second half of the 19th century, which coincided with the advents of Darwinism, positivism, Marxism and philological analysis of the Bible. In the second half of the 19th century, an even more orthodox return to Kantian thought was espoused by a number of Neo-Kantian philosophers based in two main locations: This trend of thought survived into the beginning of the next century, influencing 20th century philosophical movements such as Neopositivism and Phenomenology. One of the most famous opponents of idealism in the first half of the German 19th century was Ludwig Feuerbach, who advocated materialism and atheism. Utilitarianism In early 19th century Britain, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill promoted the idea that actions are right as they maximize happiness, and happiness alone. Marxism Developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the mid-to-late 19th Century, Marxism is a sociopolitical and economic view based on the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which opposes idealism in favour of the materialist viewpoint. Marx analysed history itself as the progression of dialectics in the form of class struggle. From this it is argued that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Marxism had a profound influence on the history of the 20th Century. In the 19th century, academic philosophy in Europe, following Hegel, was almost completely divorced from the concerns of individual human life, in favour of pursuing abstract metaphysical systems. Kierkegaard sought to reintroduce to philosophy, in the spirit of Socrates: Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche saw the moral values of 19th-century Europe disintegrating into nihilism Kierkegaard called it the levelling process. Nietzsche attempted to undermine traditional moral values by exposing its foundations. Both philosophers are precursors to existentialism, among other ideas, for their importance on the "great man" against the age. Kierkegaard wrote of 19th-century Europe, "Each age has its own characteristic depravity. Ours is perhaps not pleasure or indulgence or sensuality, but rather a dissolute pantheistic contempt for the individual man. Positivism Auguste Comte, the self-professed founder of modern sociology, put forward the view that the rigorous ordering of confirmable observations alone ought to constitute the realm of human knowledge. He had hoped to order the sciences in increasing degrees of complexity from mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and a new discipline called "sociology", which is the study of the "dynamics and statics of society".

3: Project MUSE - Empiricism and Rationalism in Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy

Excerpt from Modern Rationalism: Being a Sketch of the Progress of the Rationalistic Spirit in the Nineteenth Century
Rationalism is a term of such diverse connotations in the minds of different writers that, like the term Socialism, it is not susceptible of any brief definition which should be free from ambiguity.

Sorokin said, "The ancient Chinese, Babylonian, Hindu, Greek, Roman, and most of the medieval thinkers supporting theories of rhythmical, cyclical or trendless movements of social processes were much nearer to reality than the present proponents of the linear view". Therefore, Chinese proponents of modernization have looked to western models. According to Thompson, the late Qing dynasty reformer, Kang Youwei, believed he had found a model for reform and "modernisation" in the Ancient Chinese Classics. The last two centuries were familiar with the myth of progress. Our own century has adopted the myth of modernity. The one myth has replaced the other. Men ceased to believe in progress; but only to pin their faith to more tangible realities, whose sole original significance had been that they were the instruments of progress. This exaltation of the present The present is superior to the past, by definition, only in a mythology of progress. Thus one retains the corollary while rejecting the principle. There is only one way of retaining a position of whose instability one is conscious. One must simply refrain from thinking. World War I , World War II , and the rise of totalitarianism demonstrated that progress was not automatic and that technological improvement did not necessarily guarantee democracy and moral advancement. British historian Arnold J. Toynbee " felt that Christianity would help modern civilization overcome its challenges. Besides rejecting the lessons of the past, they Americanized the idea of progress by democratizing and vulgarizing it to include the welfare of the common man as a form of republicanism. As Romantics deeply concerned with the past, collecting source materials and founding historical societies, the Founding Fathers were animated by clear principles. They saw man in control of his destiny, saw virtue as a distinguishing characteristic of a republic, and were concerned with happiness, progress, and prosperity. Bury wrote in It cannot be proved that the unknown destination towards which man is advancing is desirable. The movement may be Progress, or it may be in an undesirable direction and therefore not Progress The Progress of humanity belongs to the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. It is true or it is false, and like them it cannot be proved either true or false. Belief in it is an act of faith. In the postmodernist thought steadily gaining ground from the s, the grandiose claims of the modernizers are steadily eroded, and the very concept of social progress is again questioned and scrutinized. In the new vision, radical modernizers like Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong appear as totalitarian despots, whose vision of social progress is held to be totally deformed. Postmodernists question the validity of 19th century and 20th century notions of progress"both on the capitalist and the Marxist side of the spectrum. They argue that both capitalism and Marxism over-emphasize technological achievements and material prosperity while ignoring the value of inner happiness and peace of mind. Postmodernism posits that both dystopia and utopia are one and the same, overarching grand narratives with impossible conclusions. Progress trap Some 20th-century authors refer to the "Myth of Progress" to refer to the idea that the human condition will inevitably improve. In , English physician Montague David Eder wrote: Philosophers, men of science and politicians have accepted the idea of the inevitability of progress. The strongest critics of the idea of progress complain that it remains a dominant idea in the 21st century, and shows no sign of diminished influence. As one fierce critic, British historian John Gray b. The interaction of quickening scientific advance with unchanging human needs is a fate that we may perhaps temper, but cannot overcome Those who hold to the possibility of progress need not fear. The illusion that through science humans can remake the world is an integral part of the modern condition. Renewing the eschatological hopes of the past, progress is an illusion with a future. Recently the idea of progress has been generalized to psychology, being related with the concept of a goal, that is, progress is understood as "what counts as a means of advancing towards the end result of a given defined goal. Bury said that thought in ancient Greece was dominated by the theory of world-cycles or the doctrine of eternal return, and was steeped in a belief parallel to the Judaic " fall of man ," but rather from a preceding " Golden Age " of innocence and simplicity. Time was generally regarded as the enemy of

humanity which depreciates the value of the world. He credits the Epicureans with having had a potential for leading to the foundation of a theory of progress through their materialistic acceptance of the atomism of Democritus as the explanation for a world without an intervening deity. Xenophanes said "The gods did not reveal to men all things in the beginning, but men through their own search find in the course of time that which is better. The Renaissance of the 15th, 16th and 17th Centuries changed the mindset in Europe towards an empirical view, based on a pantheistic interpretation of Plato. This induced a revolution in curiosity about nature in general and scientific advance, which opened the gates for technical and economic advance. Furthermore, the individual potential was seen as a never-ending quest for being God-like, paving the way for a view of Man based on unlimited perfection and progress. Age of Enlightenment In the Enlightenment , French historian and philosopher Voltaire " was a major proponent. His subsequent notion of the historical idea of progress saw science and reason as the driving forces behind societal advancement. Immanuel Kant " argued that progress is neither automatic nor continuous and does not measure knowledge or wealth, but is a painful and largely inadvertent passage from barbarism through civilization toward enlightened culture and the abolition of war. Kant called for education, with the education of humankind seen as a slow process whereby world history propels mankind toward peace through war, international commerce, and enlightened self-interest. The difficulties and dangers of life provided the necessary stimuli for human development, while the uniquely human ability to evaluate led to ambition and the conscious striving for excellence. Man found his happiness only in effort. He said, "Had population and food increased in the same ratio, it is probable that man might never have emerged from the savage state". Most scholars concluded this growth of scientific knowledge and methods led to the growth of industry and the transformation of warlike societies into an industrial and pacific one. They agreed as well that there had been a systematic decline of coercion in government, and an increasing role of liberty and of rule by consent. There was more emphasis on impersonal social and historical forces; progress was increasingly seen as the result of an inner logic of society. He describes the mid century condition in The Communist Manifesto as follows: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty, and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all which is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his relations with his kind. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Marxism further states that capitalism, in its quest for higher profits and new markets, will inevitably sow the seeds of its own destruction. Marxists believe that, in the future, capitalism will be replaced by socialism and eventually communism. The unreasonable man persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man. Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, two opposing schools of thought "Marxism and liberalism" believed in the possibility and the desirability of continual change and improvement. Marxists strongly opposed capitalism and the liberals strongly supported it, but the one concept they could both agree on was modernism , a trend of thought which affirms the power of human beings to make, improve and reshape their society, with the aid of scientific knowledge, technology and practical experimentation.

Modern Rationalism Being a Sketch of the Progress of the Rationalist Spirit in the 19th Century by Joseph McCabe

Rationalism is a term of such diverse connotations in the minds of different writers that, like the term "Socialism," it is not susceptible of any brief definition which should be free from ambiguity. The intellectual method, or attitude, or spirit which is suggested by it has inspired such heterogeneous systems in the controversial struggle of the last few centuries that it can no longer be said to describe any actual system with clearness. It is applied equally to Agnosticism, the extreme revolutionary form of heterodoxy, and to a certain theological school that professes to remain within the precincts of the orthodox temple; and it is frequently taken to be synonymous with a destructive system of Biblical criticism. Rationalism, in the earlier part of the last century, was a school of anti-Christian Deists in England and France; towards the close of the century, and in the earlier part of the present century, it was a system of Biblical criticism, usually of a hostile character; modern Rationalism is a system which rejects both natural and supernatural theology, and is antagonistic to the orthodox Churches on every point, although the term is still often used in its earlier senses. However, it is easy to trace through all these systems, divergent and even contradictory as they would have been if they had co-existed, the operation of one and the same spirit. The Deist rejected supernatural religion, but emphatically retained belief in a personal God; whereas the modern Rationalist declines all profession of a Theistic nature—or, at the most, retains only a profession of the most evanescent character. Yet the principle which actuated the departure from orthodoxy was the same in both cases: Both schools, and indeed all systems to which the name is applied, accepted as their primary and fundamental principle that reason is the supreme criterion of all truth, whether in secular or religious, natural or supernatural, spheres. Any thesis, on whatever authority it may be asserted, which violates the dictates of reason must be rejected. On that test were rejected, first the mysterious rites and dogmas of Christianity, then its sacred literature, and, finally, even the positions of natural theology. From Collins and Shaftesbury to Mill and Huxley the history of Rationalism is but a consistent and progressive application of that principle. Rationalism, therefore, is rather a "cast of thought" and "bias of reasoning," as Mr. Lecky says, than a stereotyped system, although he would seem to define it inadequately in saying that "its central conception is the elevation of conscience into a position of supreme authority as the religious organ, a verifying faculty discriminating between truth and error;" for speculative reason has been as operative as practical reason in the destructive progress of Rationalism. From all time there have been religious statements current among all nations which purported to come from a source other than the natural activity of the human mind, from a higher authority, and before which the vast majority of mankind have bent in feeble and unquestioning submission. Sooner or later, however, a departure from that attitude is inevitable. Reason claims its prerogative as the ultimate test of all truth, applies its first principles and the knowledge it has already acquired to all ethical and religious traditions, and comes to reject a greater or less section, or even the whole, of its inherited profession. Unless, however, this activity of reason yields conspicuous destructive results, it does not attract the title of Rationalism. So, also, in the Church of England and Germany only that school is called Rationalistic which departs in a marked degree, in dogma or Biblical criticism, from the formulae which have been sanctioned by the religious acceptance of many centuries, and which constitute what may safely be called orthodoxy. The Rationalistic spirit is, therefore, a critical action of reason on authoritative religious tradition, which leads to its partial or entire rejection, either from defect of satisfactory evidence to recommend it, or because it conflicts with known facts or evident moral or speculative principles—the negative and positive criterion of the Catholic theologian. The importance of that spirit in the modern world of thought cannot be exaggerated. Lecky states that it "seems absolutely to over-ride our age. Reason has ever protested, in its nobler embodiments, against the excessive tyranny of authority and the excessive credulity of the majority. At least, in such nations as had a body of cultured laymen, distinct from the sacerdotal body, it led to the formation of powerful antagonistic systems. In Greece, which enjoyed that prerogative to an extent which has found a parallel only in the modern civilized world, speculation had the utmost freedom, and was indulged without a glance at the religious traditions of the race. From Thales to

Carneades a marvellous diversity of systems crossed the intellectual arena, the majority of them freely modifying and combating the most fundamental points of tradition. At Rome there was less originality, but equal liberty and scepticism, when the great military nation found time at length for culture and reflection; all educated Romans were Stoics or Neo-Academic sceptics. And from the very commencement of the Christian era the spirit manifests itself in revolt. The Gnostics attempted a curious blending of Oriental mysticism and Platonic philosophy applied to Christianity. The great Trinitarian struggles of the fourth and fifth centuries were due to its operation. A continuous series of heresiarchs illustrate it until the twelfth century, some of whom, as John Scotus Erigena, the celebrated Irish scholar of the tenth century, professed scepticism on the most fundamental points, such as the fire of hell and even the personal existence of the Deity. In the twelfth century the fierce renewal of intellectual life developed much Rationalism. Abelard seems to have been a typical, though a timid, free thinker, and made a strenuous effort to disentangle philosophy from theology. At the same time, Rationalism of a profound character was brought to bear upon the theological world from the Arab schools in Spain. So powerful was their influence, indeed, that Averroes came to be identified with Antichrist. Even among the pious schoolmen there were Rationalists. Joannes Paulus de Oliva cowardly retracted his teaching. Scotus was a semi-Rationalist; his English pupil, Occam, a thorough Rationalist, who boldly rejected the authority of the Church. In the fifteenth century the immigration of the Greeks to Italy after the fall of Constantinople led to a splendid revival of Greek art and literature. A freethought movement, culminating in Pomponatius, was very powerful in the universities of Padua and Bologna, and philosophy once more made an effort to speculate apart from theology. But the Church was still all-powerful; it crushed the Renaissance which it had at first patronized. In the sixteenth century came the great revolt against the time-honoured authority of the Church, which effectively prepared the way for the marvellous development of Rationalism in the last three centuries. The reformers, indeed, extended little patronage to the exercise of reason in religious matters; they denounced it and its fruit, philosophical speculation, as an evil not to be tolerated; and Luther went so far as to assert even to the disgust of the Church of Rome that a proposition may be true in theology and false in philosophy. Still, by the force of their own example, they inevitably introduced the Rationalistic spirit, the right of personal speculation on authoritative teaching: At the same time, no adequate and permanent authority was established in place of the rejected papacy; an admittedly fallible authority only encourages criticism and individual speculation. The iron bond of unity and discipline was broken, never to be replaced; no authority remained that could absolutely enforce a devised formula, and against which revolt would have a supernatural demerit. A Church teaching in virtue of its collective wisdom, and expounding an obscure objective code of faith and morals, could never hope to repress individual vagaries. Other causes co-operated happily in hastening the dawn of perfect liberty of thought. The rapid multiplication of sects and dissipation of spiritual jurisdiction made it possible for independent thinkers to escape a persecuting authority and take up a bold, isolated position. Culture, too, began to pass more extensively into the ranks of the laity, who were naturally more ready to express their scepticism than the professional theological caste. Secular sciences, history, and physics began to breathe freely at last and develop in utter disregard of religious doctrines. Printing was introduced; a religious controversy thus obtained an infinitely wider audience than it had had formerly, and the writings of sceptics were universally diffused. The destruction of a venerable authority, the violent changes of theological schemes, the deafening roar of controversy, the accumulation of diverse and contradictory opinions, tended to produce distrust in the educated and bewilderment in the uneducated. Such, briefly, were the predisposing conditions of modern Rationalism. One important Rationalistic school, Socinianism, the revival of Arianism, and predecessor of modern Unitarianism, dates from the time of the Reformation itself. Still, it is only attributable to the Reformation in the sense that that movement afforded it some liberty of utterance and expansion. It may easily be traced through the Italian-Greeks of the Renaissance to the earlier Greek heresy; if, indeed, it may not be said to voice the unceasing impatience of the mind in all ages under the Christian mysteries, especially the dogma of the Trinity. This time, however, the system came to stay, and it has played a most important part in the rationalization of theology. But the broader Rationalistic movement soon began in earnest with the appearance of isolated writers of great authority, of enduring influence, and often of the most destructive

scepticism. In Montaigne published the first great sceptical work of a thoroughly Pyrrhonist character. A literary critic of profound influence, he was in effect a Rationalist of the most advanced type; his essays were the inauguration of the modern period of Freethought. He was warmly supported by Charron, a French priest, and is even said to have profoundly influenced Pascal. Descartes also, with his system of philosophic doubt, assisted the growth of freedom and reflection. Bayle was not only profoundly sceptical in the composition of his Dictionary, but he made a most eloquent and effective appeal in smaller works, as the *Compelle Intrare*, for liberty of thought and expression. Spinoza was profoundly destructive. In England a series of powerful writers embodied the Rationalistic spirit with great effect in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Bacon had virtually commenced the movement with his protest against "idols" and authority and the insistence on an empirical method. Hobbes followed with a most uncompromising iconoclasm. Locke introduced the empiric philosophy, which is so largely responsible for the Agnosticism of the nineteenth century. Hume developed the system and indicated its true conclusion, and diffused a literary scepticism with far-reaching effect. Gibbon brought the Rationalistic spirit to bear on history. If it is true that "the controversialists of successive ages are the puppets and unconscious exponents of the deep under-currents of their time," the Rationalistic spirit must have made rapid progress in England since the rejection of Papal despotism. One salutary effect of the controversies and of the downfall of Rome was the birth of a spirit of toleration for the first time in the history of Christianity; even orthodox writers, such as Chillingworth the first to do so, began to teach "the absolute innocence of error. Rationalistic criticism passed from the contents of Christianity to its external defences; the spirit was penetrating deeper every century. There was, it is true, a fierce revival of the Trinitarian controversy. The Unitarians waxed bolder and stronger in their attempt to rationalize theology, and some of their Trinitarian opponents, headed by Bull and Waterland, developed a semi-Rationalism on their own side, dropping off, as in the ancient controversy, into semi-Arianism on the one side, and Tritheism on the other. But the struggle is principally characterized by the rise of the Deistic school. Allied with the Voltairean school, which was permeating France with Rationalism, there was in England a powerful body of writers—Toland, Collins the first to bear the title of Freethinker, Chubb, Woolston, Tindal, Shaftesbury, and Bolingbroke, who made a virulent organized attack upon the very credentials of Christianity, ridiculing its history and its mysterious contents, and denying the very possibility of miracles. They were opposed by Dr. Butler the first two again developing a certain amount of private Rationalism in the course of their apologetic efforts. The rise and spread of Wesleyanism created a diversion in favour of the Rationalists by slighting the efforts of the evidential school and creating an emotional concentration upon the Atonement and similar doctrines. The fall of High-Churchism and the ascendancy of the Broad Church tended to produce a similar effect. Still, it is not too much to say that the Deistic controversy remains buried in the eighteenth century. As a consecration and development of the Rationalistic spirit, the Deistic school wrought an enduring effect. But even the brilliant writings of Bolingbroke and Shaftesbury are now practically shelved. Hume and Gibbon are the only Rationalists whose works pass on into the nineteenth century. Such had been the progress of the Rationalistic spirit up to the period with which this sketch will deal. As a spirit, or method, it had been extensively used against orthodox belief; but few of its results were useful in the great struggle of the present century. The controversy once more changes its entire character, though animated by the same spirit. Modern Rationalism differs in two ways from Voltairean or Deistic Rationalism. It is more fundamental, and it is not merely destructive, but teaches also elevated social and ethical ideals to humanity. Once the spirit of criticism had successfully attacked the evidences of supernatural religion, it turned its attention to the evidences of natural religion, or pure Theism, which the older Rationalists had respected. The century opens with a development of the empirical philosophy which rapidly produces its most negative results. In the course of the century the empirical philosophy develops into pure Agnosticism and Positivism, evokes a brilliant series of exponents from James Mill to Spencer, and obtains a wide acceptance from the gradually-educated country. German philosophy runs its course into Hegelian Pantheism, and its moral anxiety, in virtue of which it still clung to Theism, finds a relief in the rise and rapid growth of a system of purely rational ethics. Biblical criticism, availing itself of the growing effectiveness of philology and archaeology, works a revolution in the educated and the popular view of the Bible. Physical science makes gigantic progress throughout the century,

THE PROGRESS OF RATIONALISM (NINETEENTH CENTURY) pdf

rising like a flood over the successive entrenchments of retreating theologians, and constructing a new view of man and his material environment, which induces a profound modification of the earlier theological teaching. History throws new and wondrous light upon the origin and nature and ethical contents of non-Christian religions, and the strange analogy of their myths to Christian dogmas. Education is improved and secularized; the spirit of inquiry pervades the masses. By the end of the century a sceptical Rationalism "absolutely over-rides our age," [1] and "is found in every able book" which we open.

5: Enlightenment - HISTORY

Rationalism, in the earlier part of the last century, was a school of anti-Christian Deists in England and France; towards the close of the century, and in the earlier part of the present century, it was a system of Biblical criticism, usually of a hostile character; modern Rationalism is a system which rejects both natural and supernatural.

Overview of Conceptual Issues The problem of progress can be approached from many directions. Three questions will provide the starting points for this particular analysis. Note that the first question is normative, the second belongs to social science, and the third is methodological and epistemological. To argue successfully that human well-being is increasing over the long term, theorists of progress must offer an interpretation of well-being compatible with that claim. They are committed either to interpret human well-being as a single value, or as a set of incommensurable values that are empirically connected. In the first case, value monism, the list of compelling alternatives is not long. It includes freedom, happiness or utility, and the realization of human capabilities. In the second case, theorists can draw on a wider range of values, but will have to show that the incommensurable components of human well-being reinforce each other causally or at least do not clash. As we will see, faced with the difficulties of the task, some theorists do not define well-being rigorously. They may, however, formulate a conception of improvement for a circumscribed domain of social life, the description of which is a part of their overall account. Next, each theorist of progress offers a causal story to explain the improvement in the human condition that he thinks has occurred. The notion of a universal history, a historical narrative taking all of humanity as its subject, came to prominence during the Enlightenment. Universal historians aspired to surpass ordinary historians in breadth and depth and aimed to penetrate the surface play of events to discover fundamental laws of historical development. These laws would not only explain the past, but could be used to predict the future. Although a universal history need not be an account of improvement, all accounts of progress rest explicitly or implicitly on a universal history. The content of the laws of progress, however, is an object of contention. Many thinkers, including Hegel and Auguste Comte, view the development of ideas over time as the fundamental change that causes overall improvement. Marx, in contrast, regards the growth of the means of production as primary. Kant represents a third category, arguing that a tension within human nature itself is the source of change. We will also see theorists who offer more eclectic causal stories and, because their accounts of change are more complicated, are less inclined to formalize their conclusions. Next to content, thinkers differ in their treatment of episodes of devastation and conflict and periods of decline. It is hard for anyone to sustain the argument that improvement is perfectly linear, but some theorists more than others emphasize that such episodes and eras can be part of a pattern of long-term improvement. Furthermore, the extent to which the laws are deterministic varies. Some authors leave little room for choice and contingency, while others frame their generalizations as loose trends that constrain rather than determine the course of events. Authors in the latter category often present their writings as political interventions that can shape the future as well as predict it. Finally, the question of method arises. Most of the authors treated in this study wrote before quantitative and statistical methods in the social sciences became widespread. Nevertheless, they do remark on method, in some cases in detail. The most striking distinction is between those who rely on a priori reasoning and those who generalize from empirical facts in a social scientific fashion. While this study will not concentrate on method, a priori reasoning and problematic empirical assumptions will be attended to.

Pre-Enlightenment Thought Whether any ancient philosophers proposed a doctrine of progress is a matter of scholarly contention Bury, 11; Nesbit, xi. However, it is clear that the figures of antiquity who exerted the most influence on later thinkers did not believe in progress in the robust sense used in this article. Plato and Aristotle hold a cyclical view of human affairs. They allow that certain developments occur spontaneously, but also see disaster and decline as inevitable. In the *Laws*, Plato proposes that human society begins with the family, then moves through intermediate forms, and finally arrives at the city-state. In the *Politics*, Aristotle also presents this progression of forms. Not only is man a political animal as a matter of fact *Politics*, a2, it is also true that human excellence is only possible within a city-state with a good constitution. But unhappily there is

no tendency for the city-state, once achieved, to realize or maintain such a constitution. For instance, while Aristotle cautiously admits that laws can and should improve a12â€™14 , Book V of the Politics shows that all constitutional formsâ€™bad and goodâ€™are unstable. In the Statesman, Plato adopts the traditional Greek story of a golden age and a subsequent decline, written down by Hesiod in Works and Days. Hesiod tells the story of five races of men: The golden race is the best of all, and the present race, the iron race, is the worst. While the earth moves in the first direction, the gods oversee the affairs of mankind. As a herdsman looks after his flock, the gods tend to the needs of human beings. Because they are under the perfect care of the gods, humans do not need to govern themselves Statesman, ea. Plato suggests that the golden age, the era of the golden race, occurred during such a period. When the earth changes course, a period of chaos ensues, which corresponds to the end of the golden age. Finally, when the earth moves in the second direction, people are left on their own, which explains the other ages described by Hesiod. Aristotle also entertains the possibility of periodic flooding Meteorology, a29â€™32 and suggests that myths may contain the remnants of the wisdom of destroyed civilizations Metaphysics, b9â€™ After Plato and Aristotle, the most influential early philosopher is St. Augustine of Hippo â€™ C. The rest of humanity is predestined for damnation. Augustine rejects cyclical accounts of human affairs for a linear one. He is especially concerned to repudiate the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which says that events identical in all respects repeat over and over again. He emphasizes that the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ are unique occurrences , XII. But his emphasis on the City of God contrasts with the worldly, inclusive vision of theorists of progress. As we will see, these theorists are concerned with humanity as a whole, rather than with a part of it. And their focus is on earth rather than on heaven. Enlightenment Views on Progress The writings on progress of the 18th century drew inspiration from the intellectual achievements of the 16th and 17th centuries. During this time, Europe witnessed an explosion of scientific and mathematical activity. In the natural sciences, the main fields of investigation were physics and astronomy. Major figures included Copernicus â€™ , Galileo â€™ , Kepler â€™ , and Newton â€™ Newton synthesized the work of the previous thinkers to bring the behavior of bodies on earth and bodies in space under a single scientific law, the law of universal gravitation. This law states that two bodies attract each other in proportion to their masses and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance between them Palmer , â€™ The discoveries of these scientists had broad implications. First of all, the success of the new physics in unifying distinct phenomena and predicting behavior vindicated an underlying paradigm of scientific investigation and explanation. Here was a clear example of a communal activity in which one human built on and improved the work of his predecessor. The activity resulted in the discovery of a scientific law, the law of universal gravitation, of unprecedented power Palmer , â€™ Although Condorcet wrote his essay in prison during the Terror, he, like Turgot, evinces optimism about the future of France and of humanity as a whole. Both authors suggest that philosophical progress is the deepest condition of scientific progress. Influenced by British empiricism, Turgot and Condorcet assert that all human knowledge is grounded in experience. According to Turgot, the renaissance of science first required an empiricist turn, the abandoning of explanations appealing to faculties and essences. The scientific experiment then found its place as the centerpiece of the scientific method and the vehicle of further progress Turgot , 45; , â€™ Condorcet reiterates these points and also provides a wealth of examples of recent scientific discoveries , â€™ Turgot and Condorcet agree that scientific progress is dependent on mathematical and technological progress, and vice versa Turgot , 45; Condorcet , Although neither author rigorously defines human well-being, both believe that, over the long term, scientific discoveries and political freedom reinforce each other and together further it. Turgot considers the role that political institutions play in advancing science. He thinks that individual genius moves science forward. Political institutions are important to scientific progress insofar as they allow geniuses to flourish. Variation in scientific achievement is to be explained not by the concentration of genius but by the institutions that either suppress or encourage it , Despotism is bad for genius, while republics nurture it. Condorcet also remarks that free institutions are the native environment of scientific discovery , In turn, the growth of scientific knowledge will advance political freedom Turgot , Turgot and Condorcet also hold that short-term decline can be part of a pattern of long-term improvement. In the intellectual realm, the path to truth is rocky, and errors are frequently the first result of reflection Turgot , 44; Condorcet , 37â€™ For

instance, the false scientific philosophy of faculties and essences is born of reflection on phenomena. In the realm of action, devastating events like war and conquest can ultimately unite scattered groups of people and ameliorate political organization Turgot , 71â€”2; Condorcet , Moreover, Turgot argues that individuals and groups that contribute to progress are often motivated by emotion or personal interest , 69â€” The second observation is related to the first, since Turgot thinks that the agents of creative destruction are usually narrowly self-interested or emotion-driven. Despite their many common convictions, Condorcet and Turgot part ways on the question of religion. Condorcet states that as scientific knowledge spreads, an enlightened population will throw off the shackles of religion and its priests and demand greater freedom. The Scottish and French Enlightenment were roughly contemporaneous and grappled with the same social phenomena. It is difficult to draw hard and fast contrasts between the two bodies of thought, and better to consider individual authors. So we turn to writings of David Hume â€” , which are characterized by both naturalism and skepticism. Although he is less likely than Condorcet and Turgot to make sweeping comments about progress, he explores the topic of social development in various interesting ways. He begins with the presumption that scientific and artistic progress requires a background of political security. From this claim, he argues that the arts and sciences cannot arise in a society without the rule of law. Hume also asserts that no monarchy can develop the rule of law on its own, while republics must develop the rule of law if they are to survive at all. He concludes that the arts and sciences first emerge in republics, not monarchies , 59â€”

6: 19th-century philosophy - Wikipedia

Get this from a library! Modern rationalism: being a sketch of the progress of the rationalistic spirit in the nineteenth century. [Joseph McCabe; Mahmoud Saba].

These social and pedagogic changes were bound up with new tendencies in philosophy. Sir Francis Bacon of England was one who criticized the teachers of his day, saying that they offered nothing but words and that their schools were narrow in thought. He believed that Types and expressions of rationalism Rationalism has somewhat different meanings in different fields, depending upon the kind of theory to which it is opposed. Similarly, rationalism is opposed to transactionalism, a point of view in psychology according to which human perceptual skills are achievements, accomplished through actions performed in response to an active environment. On this view, the experimental claim is made that perception is conditioned by probability judgments formed on the basis of earlier actions performed in similar situations. These presettings, which have their basis in the brain, set the pattern for all experience, fix the rules for the formation of meaningful sentences, and explain why languages are readily translatable into one another. It should be added that what rationalists have held about innate ideas is not that some ideas are full-fledged at birth but only that the grasp of certain connections and self-evident principles, when it comes, is due to inborn powers of insight rather than to learning by experience. Common to all forms of speculative rationalism is the belief that the world is a rationally ordered whole, the parts of which are linked by logical necessity and the structure of which is therefore intelligible. Thus, in metaphysics it is opposed to the view that reality is a disjointed aggregate of incoherent bits and is thus opaque to reason. In particular, it is opposed to the logical atomisms of such thinkers as David Hume (1726) and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (1918-1951), who held that facts are so disconnected that any fact might well have been different from what it is without entailing a change in any other fact. Rationalists have differed, however, with regard to the closeness and completeness with which the facts are bound together. In the field where its claims are clearest—in epistemology, or theory of knowledge—rationalism holds that at least some human knowledge is gained through a priori prior to experience, or rational, insight as distinct from sense experience, which too often provides a confused and merely tentative approach. In the debate between empiricism and rationalism, empiricists hold the simpler and more sweeping position, the Humean claim that all knowledge of fact stems from perception. Rationalists, on the contrary, urge that some, though not all, knowledge arises through direct apprehension by the intellect. What the intellectual faculty apprehends is objects that transcend sense experience—universals and their relations. A universal is an abstraction, a characteristic that may reappear in various instances: Though these cannot be seen, heard, or felt, rationalists point out that humans can plainly think about them and about their relations. This kind of knowledge, which includes the whole of logic and mathematics as well as fragmentary insights in many other fields, is, in the rationalist view, the most important and certain knowledge that the mind can achieve. Such a priori knowledge is both necessary i. In the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), epistemological rationalism finds expression in the claim that the mind imposes its own inherent categories or forms upon incipient experience see below Epistemological rationalism in modern philosophies. In ethics, rationalism holds the position that reason, rather than feeling, custom, or authority, is the ultimate court of appeal in judging good and bad, right and wrong. Among major thinkers, the most notable representative of rational ethics is Kant, who held that the way to judge an act is to check its self-consistency as apprehended by the intellect: Is theft, then, right? In religion, rationalism commonly means that all human knowledge comes through the use of natural faculties, without the aid of supernatural revelation. Reason, for the rationalist, thus stands opposed to many of the religions of the world, including Christianity, which have held that the divine has revealed itself through inspired persons or writings and which have required, at times, that its claims be accepted as infallible, even when they do not accord with natural knowledge. Religious rationalists hold, on the other hand, that if the clear insights of human reason must be set aside in favour of alleged revelation, then human thought is everywhere rendered suspect—even in the reasonings of the theologians themselves. There cannot be two ultimately different ways of warranting truth, they assert; hence

rationalism urges that reason, with its standard of consistency, must be the final court of appeal.

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The progress of Western nations from the system of unity which prevailed in the fifteenth, to the system of liberty which was the rule in the nineteenth century, was slow and painful, illogical and wavering, generally dictated by political necessities, seldom inspired by deliberate conviction.

Until around 1800, Hegel devoted himself to developing his ideas on religious and social themes, and seemed to have envisaged a future for himself as a type of modernising and reforming educator, in the image of figures of the German Enlightenment such as Lessing and Schiller. In the 1790s the University of Jena had become a center for the development of critical philosophy due to the presence of K. Reinhold and then Fichte, who taught there from until his dismissal on the grounds of atheism at the end of the decade. By that time, Schelling, who had first been attracted to Jena by the presence of Fichte, had become an established figure at the university. By late 1807 Hegel had completed his first major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* published in 1807, which showed a divergence from his earlier, seemingly more Schellingian, approach. Now without a university appointment he worked for a short time, apparently very successfully, as an editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, and then from 1808 as the headmaster and philosophy teacher at a gymnasium high school in Nuremberg. During his time at Nuremberg he married and started a family, and wrote and published his *Science of Logic*. In 1817 he managed to return to his university career by being appointed to a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, but shortly after, in 1818, he was offered and took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, the most prestigious position in the German philosophical world. In 1818, while in Heidelberg he published the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, a systematic work in which an abbreviated version of the earlier *Science of Logic* the *Encyclopaedia Logic* or *Lesser Logic* was followed by the application of its principles to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. In 1820 in Berlin Hegel published his major work in political philosophy, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, based on lectures given at Heidelberg but ultimately grounded in the section of the *Encyclopaedia* *Philosophy of Spirit* dealing with objective spirit. During the following ten years up to his death in 1831 Hegel enjoyed celebrity at Berlin, and published subsequent versions of the *Encyclopaedia*. After his death versions of his lectures on philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy were published. Hegel himself had been a supporter of progressive but non-revolutionary politics, but his followers divided into factions broadly groupable as those of the left, right and centre Toews; from the left, Karl Marx was to develop his own purported scientific approach to society and history which appropriated many Hegelian ideas into a materialistic outlook. Later, especially in reaction to orthodox Soviet versions of Marxism, many so-called Western Marxists re-incorporated further Hegelian elements back into their forms of Marxist philosophy. In academic philosophy, Hegelian idealism had seemed to collapse dramatically after the failure of the revolutionary movements of that year, but underwent a revival in both Great Britain and the United States in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In Britain, where philosophers such as T. However, a later generation of French philosophers coming to prominence in the 1830s tended to react against Hegel in ways analogous to those in which early analytic philosophers had reacted against the Hegel who had influenced their predecessors. In the 1840s the German philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed what was termed a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel which, together with the work of Dieter Henrich and others, played an important role in the revival of interest in Hegel in academic philosophy in the second half of the century. By the close of the twentieth century, even within core logico-metaphysical areas of analytic philosophy, a number of individuals such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell had started to take Hegel seriously as a significant modern philosopher, although generally within analytic circles a favorable reassessment of Hegel has still a long way to go. The contents of philosophical knowledge, we might suspect, will come from the historically changing contents of its cultural context. On the other, there is the hint of such contents being raised to some higher level, presumably higher than other levels of cognitive functioning such as those based in everyday perceptual experience, for example, or those characteristic of other areas of culture such as art and religion. This higher level takes the form of conceptually articulated thought, a type of cognition commonly

taken as capable of having purportedly eternal contents think of Plato and Frege, for example. In line with such a conception, Hegel sometimes referred to the task of philosophy as that of recognising the concept *Der Begriff* in the mere representations *Vorstellungen* of everyday life. In contrast, the British Hegelian movement at the end of the nineteenth century tended to ignore the Phenomenology and the more historicist dimensions of his thought, and found in Hegel a systematic metaphysician whose Logic provided the basis for a definitive philosophical ontology. This latter traditional metaphysical view of Hegel dominated Hegel reception for most of the twentieth century, but from the 1950s came to be challenged by scholars who offered an alternative non-metaphysical, post-Kantian view. But in turn, this post-Kantian reading has been challenged by a revised metaphysical view, critical of the purported over-assimilation of Hegel to Kant by the post-Kantians. Thus, for example, Leibniz had contrasted Plato as an idealist with Epicurus as a materialist. The opposition to materialism here, together with the fact that in the English-speaking world the Irish philosopher and clergyman George Berkeley is often taken as a prototypical idealist, has given rise to the assumption that idealism is necessarily an immaterialist doctrine. This assumption, however, is mistaken. The type of picture found in Berkeley was only to be found in certain late antique Platonists and, especially, early Christian Platonists like Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. It thus had features closer to the more pantheistic picture of divine thought found in Spinoza, for example, for whom matter and mind were attributes of the one substance. The materialists to which he was opposed mechanistic corpuscularists of his time conceived of unformed matter as a type of self-subsistent substance, and it seems to have been that conception to which he was opposed, at least in some periods of his work, not the reality of matter per se. In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua Absolute Spirit, as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought processes alone. Indeed, Hegel often seems to invoke imagery consistent with the types of neo-Platonic conceptions of the universe that had been common within Christian mysticism, especially in the German states, in the early modern period. Thus, in our consciousness of God, we somehow serve to realize his own self-consciousness, and, thereby, his own perfection. In English-language interpretations, such a picture is effectively found in the work of Charles Taylor and Michael Rosen, for example. With its dark mystical roots, and its overtly religious content, it is hardly surprising that the philosophy of Hegel so understood has rarely been regarded as a live option within the largely secular and scientific conceptions of philosophy that have been dominant in the twentieth century. To critics, such as Karl Popper in his popular post-war *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Hegel had not only advocated a disastrous political conception of the state and the relation of its citizens to it, a conception prefiguring twentieth-century totalitarianism, but he had also tried to underpin such advocacy with dubious theo-logico-metaphysical speculations. With his idea of the development of spirit in history, Hegel is seen as literalising a way of talking about different cultures in terms of their spirits, of constructing a developmental sequence of epochs typical of nineteenth-century ideas of linear historical progress, and then enveloping this story of human progress in terms of one about the developing self-consciousness of the cosmos-God itself. The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind. But this objective world itself had to be understood as conceptually informed: Thus in contrast to Berkeleyan subjective idealism it became common to talk of Hegel as incorporating the objective idealism of views, especially common among German historians, in which social life and thought were understood in terms of the conceptual or spiritual structures that informed them. But in contrast to both forms of idealism, Hegel, according to this reading, postulated a form of absolute idealism by including both subjective life and the objective cultural practices on which subjective life depended within the dynamics of the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualisation of God, the Absolute Spirit. Despite this seemingly dominant theological theme, Hegel was still seen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristically secular strands of modern thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism. Existentialists were thought of as taking the idea of the finitude and historical and cultural dependence of individual subjects from Hegel, and as leaving out all pretensions to the Absolute, while Marxists were thought of as taking the historical dynamics of the Hegelian picture but reinterpreting this in materialist rather than idealist categories. As for understanding Hegel himself, the traditional metaphysical view remained the dominant interpretative approach

of Hegel scholars throughout much of the twentieth century. Thus it is commonly asserted that implicit within the metaphysical Hegel is an anti-metaphysical philosopher struggling to get outâ€”one potentially capable of beating the critical Kant at his own game. More controversially, one now finds it argued that the traditional picture is simply wrong at a more general level, and that Hegel, even in his systematic thought, was not committed to the bizarre, teleological spirit monism that has been traditionally attributed to him because he was free of the type of traditional metaphysical commitments that had been criticized by Kant. Prominent among such interpretations has been the so-called post-Kantian interpretation advanced by North American Hegel scholars Robert Pippin , , and Terry Pinkard , , From an explicitly analytic perspective, broadly similar views have been put forward by Robert Brandom , , and John McDowell With this notion, it is claimed, Hegel was essentially attempting to answer the Kantian question of the conditions of rational human mindedness, rather than being concerned with giving an account of the developing self-consciousness of God. But while Kant had limited such conditions to formal abstractly conceived structures of the mind, Hegel extended them to include aspects of historically and socially determined forms of embodied human existence. Proponents of the post-Kantian view, it is commonly said, are guilty of projecting onto Hegel views they would like to find there rather than what is actually to be found. Here one tends to find interpreters attributing to Hegel some type of conceptual realism, sometimes appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics for the legitimacy of metaphysics conceived as inquiry into the fundamental features or structures of the world itself. Among the interpreters advancing something like this revised metaphysical view might be counted Stephen Houlgate b , Robert Stern , , Kenneth Westphal , James Kreines , and Christopher Yeomans On a number of points, the proponents of the revised conceptual realist metaphysical interpretation will agree with advocates of the post-Kantian non-metaphysical approach. First, they tend to agree in dismissing much of the extravagant metaphysics traditionally ascribed to Hegel. While it is for the most part clear what sets both post-Kantians and conceptual realists against the traditional view, it is still not clear which issues dividing them are substantive and which are ultimately verbal. After all, Kant himself was not critical of metaphysics per se. His claim was that existing so-called dogmatic metaphysics was in a state analogous to that in which, say, physics had been in before the scientific revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rather than wanting to eliminate metaphysics, after the style, say, of Hume or the modern logical positivists, Kant had wanted to put metaphysics itself on a secure scientific basis analogous to what Galileo and Newton had achieved for physics. The relevant differences between revised metaphysical and the non-metaphysical views would need to be established with respect to such particular issues as, for example, the nature of acceptably Kantian metaphysical claims. In the next category are works that were published at the time as handbooks for use in student teaching such as the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* first published in while he was teaching at Heidelberg and subsequently revised and republished in and again in , and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, effectively an expansion of a section of the *Encyclopaedia* and published in after his move to Berlin. Transcripts of his earlier lectures on this topic delivered in Heidelberg have also since been published. Along with the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Philosophy of Right* might be added similar teaching-related writings from the Jena period, prepared as lectures but only published as such much later. Here we will restrict the discussion to the first three categories. The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the phenomena known through the faculty of sensibility from the noumena known purely conceptually. It is meant to function as an induction or education of the reader to the standpoint of purely conceptual thought from which philosophy can be done. As such, its structure has been compared to that of a *Bildungsroman* educational novel , having an abstractly conceived protagonistâ€”the bearer of an evolving series of so-called shapes of consciousness or the inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worldsâ€”whose progress and set-backs the reader follows and learns from. Or at least this is how the work sets out: Hegel constructs a series of such shapes that maps onto the history of western European civilization from the Greeks to his own time. When Kant had broached the idea of a phenomenological propaedeutic to Lambert, he himself had still believed in the project of a purely conceptual metaphysics achievable by the use of the regressive or analytic method, but this project conceived as an exercise in theoretical reason was just what Kant in his later critical philosophy had come to disavow. Supporters of the post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel obviously interpret this work and its telos differently.

For example, it has been argued e. As Pinkard had pointed out in that work, this was a conception of the normatively structured practices of human reason found in the American pragmatist Wilfrid Sellars, the inspiration behind the Hegelian dimensions of analytic philosophers such as Willem deVries, Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct shapes of consciousness—jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge, and from the other, criteria for the nature of the objects of such knowledge. In chapter 1, the attitude of Sense-certainty takes immediately given perceptual simples—the sort of role played by the so-called sense-data of early twentieth-century analytic epistemology, for example, with which a subject is purportedly acquainted as bare thises—as the fundamental objects known. Hegel is clear that these contents are not merely qualitative simples that are immediately apprehended, but comprehended instances of the conceptual determination of singularity [Einzelheit] Phen: The idea seems to be that for Hegel, the same content can play the roles played by both concepts and intuitions in Kant. By the end of this chapter our protagonist consciousness and by implication, we the audience to this drama has learnt that the nature of consciousness cannot be as originally thought: The general truth that was learned about the apparent qualitative simples in Sense-certainty that they were instances of generals is now explicitly taken as the truth of the object of Perception Wahrnehmung—in German this term having the connotations of taking nehmen to be true wahr. In contrast to the purported single object of Sense-certainty the object of Perception is taken as instantiating general properties: But this can be conceived in a variety of ways: Predictably, problems will be revealed in these various different ways of thinking of the nature of those everyday objects of our experience. In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generated skepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes. But this is not the type of skepticism that is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used by Descartes in his attempt to find some foundation of indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built Forster As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel was attracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates in his efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyond that given immediately in sensation LHP II: For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skeptical moment of thought that is the means by which thought progresses beyond the particular categories that have given rise to contradictions. Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape of consciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3, is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that, rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, posits underlying forces involved in the production of the perceptual episode. The transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, The Truth of Self-Certainty, also marks a more general transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness. It is in the course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known part of the Phenomenology, the account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Such complex patterns of mutual recognition constituting objective spirit thereby provide the social matrix within which individual self-consciousnesses can exist as such. But this is only worked out in the text gradually. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of reason in Chapter 5 before objective spirit can become the explicit subject matter of Chapter 6 Spirit. Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves—the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific, shareable forms of life made actual in the lives of particular individuals who had in turn internalized such general patterns in the process of acculturation. It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel, in employing such phrases, is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious being or beings.

8: Modern Rationalism

Romanticism And Rationalism Romanticism began in the mid-eighteenth century and reached its height in the 19th century. The Romantic literature of the nineteenth century holds in its topics the ideals of the time period, concentrating on emotion, nature, and the expression of "nothing."

The true nature of comets was ascertained, and they ceased to be regarded as signs of heavenly wrath. But several generations were to pass before science became, in Protestant countries, an involuntary arch-enemy of theology. Till the nineteenth century, it was only in minor points, such as the movement of the earth, that proved scientific facts seemed to conflict with Scripture, and it was easy enough to explain away these inconsistencies by a new interpretation of the sacred texts. Yet remarkable facts were accumulating which, though not explained by science, seemed to menace the credibility of Biblical history. And what about the new species which were constantly being found in the New World and did not exist in the Old? Where did the kangaroos of Australia drop from? The only explanation compatible with received theology seemed to be the hypothesis of innumerable new acts of creation, later than the Flood. It was in the field of natural history that scientific men of the eighteenth century suffered most from the coercion of authority. Linnaeus felt it in Sweden, Buffon [Page] in France. Buffon was compelled to retract hypotheses which he put forward about the formation of the earth in his *Natural History*, and to state that he believed implicitly in the Bible account of Creation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Laplace worked out the mechanics of the universe, on the nebular hypothesis. His results dispensed, as he said to Napoleon, with the hypothesis of God, and were duly denounced. His theory involved a long physical process before the earth and solar system came to be formed; but this was not fatal, for a little ingenuity might preserve the credit of the first chapter of Genesis. Geology was to prove a more formidable enemy to the Biblical story of the Creation and the Deluge. It was not till that he presented fully, in his *Antiquity of Man*, the [Page] evidence which showed that the human race had inhabited the earth for a far longer period than could be reconciled with the record of Scripture. That record might be adapted to the results of science in regard not only to the earth itself but also to the plants and lower animals, by explaining the word "day" in the Jewish story of creation to signify some long period of time. But this way out was impossible in the case of the creation of man, for the sacred chronology is quite definite. An English divine of the seventeenth century ingeniously calculated that man was created by the Trinity on October 23, B. Other evidence reinforced the conclusions from geology, but geology alone was sufficient to damage irretrievably the historical truth of the Jewish legend of Creation. The only means of rescuing it was to suppose that God had created misleading evidence for the express purpose of deceiving man. Geology shook the infallibility of the Bible, but left the creation of some prehistoric Adam and Eve a still admissible hypothesis. Here however zoology stepped in, and pronounced upon the origin of man. It was an old conjecture that the higher forms of life, including [Page] man, had developed out of lower forms, and advanced thinkers had been reaching the conclusion that the universe, as we find it, is the result of a continuous process, unbroken by supernatural interference, and explicable by uniform natural laws. But while the reign of law in the world of non-living matter seemed to be established, the world of life could be considered a field in which the theory of divine intervention is perfectly valid, so long as science failed to assign satisfactory causes for the origination of the various kinds of animals and plants. When this book appeared, Bishop Wilberforce truly said that "the principle of natural selection is incompatible with the word of God," and theologians in Germany and France as well as in England cried aloud against the threatened dethronement of the Deity. The appearance of the *Descent of Man*, in which the evidence for the pedigree of the human race from lower animals was marshalled with masterly force, renewed the outcry. The Bible said that God created man in his own image, Darwin said that man descended from an ape. The feelings of the orthodox world may be [Page] expressed in the words of Mr. If Darwin did not, as is now recognized, supply a complete explanation of the origin of species, his researches shattered the supernatural theory and confirmed the view to which many able thinkers had been led that development is continuous in the living as in the non-living world. Another nail was driven into the coffin of Creation and the Fall of Adam, and the doctrine of

redemption could only be rescued by making it independent of the Jewish fable on which it was founded. Darwinism, as it is called, has had the larger effect of discrediting the theory of the adaptation of means to ends in nature by an external and infinitely powerful intelligence. The impropriety of the analogy has been [Page] pointed out, in a telling way, by a German writer Lange. If a man wants to shoot a hare which is in a certain field, he does not procure thousands of guns, surround the field, and cause them all to be fired off; or if he wants a house to live in, he does not build a whole town and abandon to weather and decay all the houses but one. If he did either of these things we should say he was mad or amazingly unintelligent; his actions certainly would not be held to indicate a powerful mind, expert in adapting means to ends. But these are the sort of things that nature does. Her wastefulness in the propagation of life is reckless. For the production of one life she sacrifices innumerable germs. The "end" is achieved in one case out of thousands; the rule is destruction and failure. If intelligence had anything to do with this bungling process, it would be an intelligence infinitely low. And the finished product, if regarded as a work of design, points to incompetence in the designer. Take the human eye. An illustrious man of science Helmholtz said, "If an optician sent it to me as an instrument, I should send it back with reproaches for the carelessness of his work and demand the return of my money. Darwin showed how the phenomena might be explained as events not brought about [Page] intentionally, but due to exceptional concurrences of circumstances. The phenomena of nature are a system of things which co-exist and follow each other according to invariable laws. This deadly proposition was asserted early in the nineteenth century to be an axiom of science. It was formulated by Mill in his System of Logic, as the foundation on which scientific induction rests. It means that at any moment the state of the whole universe is the effect of its state at the preceding moment; the casual sequence between two successive states is not broken by any arbitrary interference suppressing or altering the relation between cause and effect. Some ancient Greek philosophers were convinced of this principle; the work done by modern science in every field seems to be a verification of it. But it need not be stated in such an absolute form. Recently, scientific men have been inclined to express the axiom with more reserve and less dogmatically. But they are not [Page] readier to admit exceptions to this uniformity than their predecessors were to admit exceptions to the law of causation. The idea of development has been applied not only to nature, but to the mind of man and to the history of civilization, including thought and religion. The first who attempted to apply this idea methodically to the whole universe was not a student of natural science, but a metaphysician, Hegel. His extremely difficult philosophy had such a wide influence on thought that a few words must be said about its tendency. He conceived the whole of existence as what he called the Absolute Idea, which is not in space or time and is compelled by the laws of its being to manifest itself in the process of the world, first externalizing itself in nature, and then becoming conscious of itself as spirit in individual minds. His system is hence called Absolute Idealism. The attraction which it exercised has probably been in great measure due to the fact that it was in harmony with nineteenth-century thought, in so far as it conceived the process of the world, both in nature and spirit, as a necessary development from lower to higher stages. He treats the process as if it were practically complete already, and does not take into account [Page] the probability of further development in the future, to which other thinkers of his own time were turning their attention. It is true that some have claimed it as supporting Christianity. His influence in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere has entirely made for highly unorthodox thought. His French contemporary, Comte, who also thought out a comprehensive system, aggressively and explicitly rejected theology as an obsolete way of explaining the universe. He rejected metaphysics likewise, and all that Hegel stood for, as equally useless, on the ground that metaphysicians explain nothing, but merely describe phenomena in abstract terms, and that questions about the origin of the world and why it exists are quite beyond the reach of reason. It differs from the great religions of the world in having no supernatural or non-rational articles of belief, and on that account he had few adherents. But the "Positive Philosophy" of Comte has exercised great influence, not least in England, where its principles have been promulgated especially by Mr. Frederic Harrison, who in the latter [Page] half of the nineteenth century has been one of the most indefatigable workers in the cause of reason against authority. Another comprehensive system was worked out by an Englishman, Herbert Spencer. His Synthetic Philosophy perhaps did more than anything else to make the idea of evolution familiar in England. I must mention one other

modern explanation of the world, that of Haeckel, the zoologist, professor at Jena, who may be called the prophet of evolution. His *World-riddles* enjoys the same popularity. He has taught, like Spencer, that the principle of evolution applies not only to the history of nature, but also to human civilization and human thought. He differs from Spencer and Comte in not assuming any unknowable reality behind natural phenomena. His adversaries commonly stigmatize his theory as materialism, but this is a mistake. Like Spinoza he recognizes matter and mind, body and thought, as [Page] two inseparable sides of ultimate reality, which he calls God; in fact, he identifies his philosophy with that of Spinoza. And he logically proceeds to conceive material atoms as thinking. His idea of the physical world is based on the old mechanical conception of matter, which in recent years has been discredited. I will return later to this Monistic movement. It had been a fundamental principle of Comte that human actions and human history are as strictly subject as nature is, to the law of causation. Men act in consequence of motives; their motives are the results of preceding facts; so that "if we were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents [Page] and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results. Chance is excluded; it is a mere name for the defects of our knowledge. Mysterious and providential interference is excluded. The science of anthropology has in recent years aroused wide interest. Inquiries into the condition of early man have shown independently of Darwinism that there is nothing to be said for the view that he fell from a higher to a lower state; the evidence points to a slow rise from mere animality. The origin of religious beliefs has been investigated, with results disquieting for orthodoxy. It may be said that in themselves they are not fatal to the claims of the current theology. Some minds may find satisfaction in this sort of explanation, but it may be suspected that most of the few who study modern researches into the origin of religious beliefs will feel the lines which were supposed to mark off the Christian from all other faiths dissolving before their eyes. The general result of the advance of science, including anthropology, has been to create a coherent view of the world, in which the Christian scheme, based on the notions of an unscientific age and on the arrogant assumption that the universe was made for man, has no suitable or reasonable place. If Paine felt this a hundred years ago, it is far [Page] more apparent now. All minds however are not equally impressed with this incongruity. There are many who will admit the proofs furnished by science that the Biblical record as to the antiquity of man is false, but are not affected by the incongruity between the scientific and theological conceptions of the world. For such minds science has only succeeded in carrying some entrenchments, which may be abandoned without much harm. It has made the old orthodox view of the infallibility of the Bible untenable, and upset the doctrine of the Creation and Fall. But it would still be possible for Christianity to maintain the supernatural claim, by modifying its theory of the authority of the Bible and revising its theory of redemption, if the evidence of natural science were the only group of facts with which it collided. It might be argued that the law of universal causation is a hypothesis inferred from experience, but that experience includes the testimonies of history and must therefore take account of the clear evidence of miraculous occurrences in the New Testament evidence which is valid, even if that book was not inspired. Thus, a stand could be taken against the generalization of science on the firm ground of historical fact. That solid ground, however, has given [Page] way, undermined by historical criticism, which has been more deadly than the common-sense criticism of the eighteenth century. The methodical examination of the records contained in the Bible, dealing with them as if they were purely human documents, is the work of the nineteenth century. Something, indeed, had already been done. Spinoza, for instance above, p. His German contemporary, Reimarus, a student of the New Testament, anticipated the modern conclusion that Jesus had no intention of founding a new religion, and saw that the Gospel of St.

9: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Progress is the idea that advances in technology, science, and social organization can produce an improvement in the human condition, and therefore that entire societies, and humanity in general, can improve in terms of their social, political, and economic structures.

Saint Albertus Magnus https: The following are some of its constituent parts: A Rejection of Scholasticism, either in the name of returning to the wisdom of the ancients or pressing forward to new philosophies such as Cartesianism, Kantianism, Positivism, etc. Cultural Relativism, which came out of the age of exploration, making western men see the value of other cultures while questioning the relative value of their own. It affected religion and philosophy as well as well as purely cultural matters, thus becoming a greater force for subjectivism and skepticism. Democracy, which enshrines a radical equality of all men, governments whose authority comes from the people and not from God, and the consequent determination of public standards of truth and morals by the opinion of the majority, not by transcendent, objective standards. Historical Consciousness, the sense of our living in history or an acute awareness of change as a constant. Historicism, the theory in which general laws of historical development are the determinant of events. According to this, all things are subject to progressive evolutionary processes. It has spawned such diverse progeny as Darwinism biological evolution, Communism dialectical materialism, and Hegelianism dialectical idealism. Liberalism, in the eighteenth-century meaning of that word: This leads to indifferentism, the heresy that all religions are salvific, not only Catholicism. Scientism, empiricism, or positivism: Rationalism, the error that human reason is the sole reliable source and determinant of truth. There are variations of this e. Subjectivism, which was born out of Cartesian solipsism and which eventually made the individual intellect the final determinant of truth and the individual conscience the ultimate measure of morality. He also received the submission of a French priest named Louis Eugene Bautain, who had held various errors regarding faith and reason rationalism. Blessed Pius IX returned to the theme of faith and reason several times in his pontificate, reissuing the condemnations of rationalism while asserting the capacity of the intellect to know truth against Kantianism and skepticism. Pio Nono also condemned rationalism and indifferentism in *Singulari Quadem Dec.* As the name would suggest, it is something of a locus classicus for studying the authoritative and authentic nineteenth-century Catholic response to modernity. Some excerpts from this are, therefore, in order: The beginnings of Biblical Modernism based on historicism, rationalism, and positivism were censured in his *Providentissimus Deus* November What most interests us about Americanism is its foundational notion, namely, that the Faith in America could somehow be different than it was elsewhere. This idea was a concentrate of many of the trends we catalogued above, since America was viewed as a very progressive, democratic nation with religious liberty i. The prolific Pope Leo also encouraged a revival of scholastic philosophy in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* August 4, While, on the whole, the Popes strongly combated the currents which define modernity, there were Catholic thinkers who were for a more accommodating approach, and not all of these were themselves liberal. He did gladly submit once it was defined. Many Catholic intellectuals, including bishops, were of this mind. Others were simply opposed to the dogma on theological grounds. The fact that all on this list were French except the Spaniard, Cortes agrees with Dr. Peter Julian Eymard, St. Madeleine Sophie Barat, St. Peter Mary Chanel, St. Theophane Venard, and St. Robert Appleton Company, Online Edition by K. Obviously, these propositions were condemned.

Against the Drimlith Sociology of early Palestinian Christianity Particle physics in a historical perspective Video Editing (Fast Bytes: Visual Reference Guide in Full Color) Kaplan usmle step 2 ck qbook 6th edition forum A priest for all liturgical seasons Arizona Wildlife Viewing Guide (Watchable Wildlife (Adventure Publications)) 10. Ambiguity and relevance in the works of Khannatha Bannuna Return to Scripture in Judaism and Christianity Signifying contamination : on Austin Clarkes Nine men who laughed Smaro Kambourelli. Playground problem The West in the World, Renaissance to the Present Glossary of investment terms Minutes of the Kings County Baptist Sabbath School Convention, held at North Kingston, Kings County, Sept The War Lord (Casca, No. 3) Who am i piano Effectiveness training for women, E.T.W. Expansion and coexistence Establishment of a light at New Bedford, Mass. The passing of Dora. Cheap lives and dear limbs Basic general knowledge mcqs with answers Great Vacations for You Your Dog, USA, 2001-02 (Great Vacations for You Your Dog, USA) Capital investment in forestry You can choose to be rich The power of prayer sunday school lesson Family-focused care Ronald fisher the design of experimnts Vatuka bhairava stotram in telugu U00a7 75. The so-called Apostolic Constitutions 349 Historical dictionary of Chinese theater Judges : power-hungry from the beginning Beacon Bible Expositions, Volume 2 North, South, and the environmental crisis The Drake guide to Gilbert and Sullivan Philosophy in classical India The court martial of Robert E. Lee Pulling the plug early Report on the East Gippsland area, review, August 1985. Complete idiots guide to private investigating