

## 1: Rationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Explain the difference between a "common sense" and a "sociological" view of human behaviour, giving relevant examples. Sociology is a social science that enables people to understand the structure and dynamics of society.*

Aristotelian[ edit ] The origin of the term is in the works of Aristotle. For example, sight can see colour. But Aristotle was explaining how the animal mind, not just the human mind, links and categorizes different tastes, colours, feelings, smells and sounds in order to perceive real things in terms of the "common sensibles" or "common perceptibles". As examples of perceiving by accident Aristotle mentions using the specific sense perception vision on its own to see that something is sweet, or to recognize a friend by their distinctive color. Lee , p. So the normal five individual senses do sense the common perceptibles according to Aristotle and Plato , but it is not something they necessarily interpret correctly on their own. Aristotle proposes that the reason for having several senses is in fact that it increases the chances that we can distinguish and recognize things correctly, and not just occasionally or by accident. And it receives physical picture imprints from the imaginative faculty, which are then memories that can be recollected. Aristotle, trying to give a more general account of the souls of all animals, not just humans, moved the act of perception out of the rational thinking soul into this *sensus communis*, which is something like a sense, and something like thinking, but not rational. The passage is difficult to interpret and there is little consensus about many of the details. For example, in some passages in his works, Aristotle seems to use the term to refer to the individual sense perceptions simply being common to all people, or common to various types of animals. There is also difficulty with trying to determine whether the common sense is truly separable from the individual sense perceptions and from imagination, in anything other than a conceptual way as a capability. They may even be the same. Under the influence of the great Persian philosophers Al-Farabi and Avicenna , several inner senses came to be listed. The great anatomist Andreas Vesalius however found no connections between the anterior ventricle and the sensory nerves, leading to speculation about other parts of the brain into the s. However, in earlier Latin during the Roman empire the term had taken a distinct ethical detour, developing new shades of meaning. This refers to shared notions, or common conceptions, that are either in-born or imprinted by the senses on to the soul. Unfortunately few true Stoic texts survive, and our understanding of their technical terminology is limited. Lewis , p. He uses the word on its own in a list of things he learned from his adopted father. The sense of the community is in this case one translation of "*communis sensus*" in the Latin of Cicero. Schaeffer , p. Peters Agnew argues, in agreement with Shaftesbury in the 18th century, that the concept developed from the Stoic concept of ethical virtue, influenced by Aristotle, but emphasizing the role of both the individual perception, and shared communal understanding. But in any case a complex of ideas attached itself to the term, to be almost forgotten in the Middle Ages, and eventually returning into ethical discussion in 18th-century Europe, after Descartes. As with other meanings of common sense, for the Romans of the classical era "it designates a sensibility shared by all, from which one may deduce a number of fundamental judgments, that need not, or cannot, be questioned by rational reflection". This was a term that could be used by Romans to imply not only human nature , but also humane conduct, good breeding, refined manners, and so on. Quintilian says it is better to send a boy to school than to have a private tutor for him at home; for if he is kept away from the herd congressus how will he ever learn that *sensus* which we call *communis*? On the lowest level it means tact. In other words, these Romans allowed that people could have animal-like shared understandings of reality, not just in terms of memories of sense perceptions, but in terms of the way they would tend to explain things, and in the language they use. Sensations from the senses travel to *sensus communis*, seated in the pineal gland inside the brain, and from there to the immaterial spirit. One of the last notable philosophers to accept something like the Aristotelian "common sense" was Descartes in the 17th century, but he also undermined it. He described this inner faculty when writing in Latin in his *Meditations on first philosophy*. Unlike Aristotle, who had placed it in the heart, by the time of Descartes this faculty was thought to be in the brain, and he located it in the pineal gland. To get a more distinct understanding of things, it is more important to be methodical and mathematical. The French philosopher did not fully reject the idea of the inner senses, which

he appropriated from the Scholastics. But he distanced himself from the Aristotelian conception of a common sense faculty, abandoning it entirely by the time of his *Passions of the Soul*. According to Hobbes [ He accepted mental representations but [ But Descartes used two different terms in his work, not only the Latin term "sensus communis", but also the French term *bon sens*, with which he opens his *Discourse on Method*. And this second concept survived better. This work was written in French, and does not directly discuss the Aristotelian technical theory of perception. *Bon sens* is the equivalent of modern English "common sense" or "good sense". As the Aristotelian meaning of the Latin term began to be forgotten after Descartes, his discussion of *bon sens* gave a new way of defining *sensus communis* in various European languages including Latin, even though Descartes himself did not translate *bon sens* as *sensus communis*, but treated them as two separate things. Gilson noted that Descartes actually gave *bon sens* two related meanings, first the basic and widely shared ability to judge true and false, which he also calls *raison lit*. The Latin term Descartes uses, *bona mens lit*. Descartes was being original. It was promoted further by people such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and others and continues to have important impacts on everyday life. In France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy, it was in its initial florescence associated with the administration of Catholic empires of the competing Bourbon, and Habsburg dynasties, both seeking to centralize their power in a modern way, responding to Machiavellianism and Protestantism as part of the so-called counter reformation. The Enlightenment after Descartes[ edit ] Epistemology: On the one hand, the approach of Descartes is and was seen as radically sceptical in some ways. On the other hand, like the Scholastics before him, while being cautious of common sense, Descartes was instead seen to rely too much on undemonstrable metaphysical assumptions in order to justify his method, especially in its separation of mind and body with the *sensus communis* linking them. The alternative to induction, deductive reasoning, demanded a mathematical approach, starting from simple and certain assumptions. This in turn required Descartes and later rationalists such as Kant to assume the existence of innate or "a priori" knowledge in the human mind—a controversial proposal. In contrast to the rationalists, the "empiricists" took their orientation from Francis Bacon, whose arguments for methodical science were earlier than those of Descartes, and less directed towards mathematics and certainty. Bacon is known for his doctrine of the "idols of the mind", presented in his *Novum Organum*, and in his *Essays* described normal human thinking as biased towards believing in lies. So while agreeing upon the need to help common sense with a methodical approach, he also insisted that starting from common sense, including especially common sense perceptions, was acceptable and correct. He influenced Locke and Pierre Bayle, in their critique of metaphysics, and in Voltaire "introduced him as the "father" of the scientific method" to a French audience, an understanding that was widespread by. While Descartes had distanced himself from it, John Locke abandoned it more openly, while still maintaining the idea of "common sensibles" that are perceived. But then George Berkeley abandoned both. In his synthesis, which he saw as the first Baconian analysis of man something the lesser known Vico had claimed earlier, common sense is entirely built up from shared experience and shared innate emotions, and therefore it is indeed imperfect as a basis for any attempt to know the truth or to make the best decision. But he defended the possibility of science without absolute certainty, and consistently described common sense as giving a valid answer to the challenge of extreme skepticism. Concerning such sceptics, he wrote: But would these prejudiced reasoners reflect a moment, there are many obvious instances and arguments, sufficient to undeceive them, and make them enlarge their maxims and principles. Do they not see the vast variety of inclinations and pursuits among our species; where each man seems fully satisfied with his own course of life, and would esteem it the greatest unhappiness to be confined to that of his neighbour? Do they not feel in themselves, that what pleases at one time, displeases at another, by the change of inclination; and that it is not in their power, by their utmost efforts, to recall that taste or appetite, which formerly bestowed charms on what now appears indifferent or disagreeable? Once Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza had applied Cartesian approaches to political philosophy, concerns about the inhumanity of the deductive approach of Descartes increased. With this in mind, Shaftesbury and, much less known at the time, Giambattista Vico, both presented new arguments for the importance of the Roman understanding of common sense, in what is now often referred to, after Hans-Georg Gadamer, as a humanist interpretation of the term. One ethical concern was the deliberately simplified

method that treated human communities as made up of selfish independent individuals methodological individualism , ignoring the sense of community that the Romans understood as part of common sense. Another connected epistemological concern was that by considering common good sense as inherently inferior to Cartesian conclusions developed from simple assumptions, an important type of wisdom was being arrogantly ignored. An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour was a highly erudite and influential defense of the use of irony and humour in serious discussions, at least among men of "Good Breeding". He drew upon authors such as Seneca , Juvenal , Horace and Marcus Aurelius , for whom, he saw, common sense was not just a reference to widely held vulgar opinions, but something cultivated among educated people living in better communities. One aspect of this, later taken up by authors such as Kant, was good taste. Another very important aspect of common sense particularly interesting to later British political philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson was what came to be called moral sentiment, which is different from a tribal or factional sentiment, but a more general fellow feeling that is very important for larger communities: Now there are none so far from being Partners in this Sense, or sharers in this common Affection, as they who scarcely know an Equall, nor consider themselves as subject to any law of Fellowship or Community. And thus Morality and good Government go together. Indeed, this approach was never fully rejected, at least in economics. By the late enlightenment period in the 18th century, the communal sense or empathy pointed to by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had become the "moral sense" or " moral sentiment " referred to by Hume and Adam Smith , the latter writing in plural of the "moral sentiments" with the key one being sympathy , which was not so much a public spirit as such, but a kind of extension of self-interest. Jeremy Bentham gives a summary of the plethora of terms used in British philosophy by the nineteenth century to describe common sense in discussions about ethics: Another man comes and alters the phrase: This understanding of a moral sense or public spirit remains a subject for discussion, although the term "common sense" is no longer commonly used for the sentiment itself. For example, French sens commun and German Gemeinsinn are used for this feeling of human solidarity, while bon sens good sense and gesunder Verstand healthy understanding are the terms for everyday "common sense". According to Gadamer, at least in French and British philosophy a moral element in appeals to common sense or bon sens , such as found in Reid, remains normal to this day. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger , who appealed to Shaftesbury and other Enlightenment figures in his critique of the Cartesian rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff , who were the most important German philosophers before Kant. A defender of classical education in rhetoric, who analysed evidence of ancient wisdom in common sense. Vico, who taught classical rhetoric in Naples where Shaftesbury died under a Cartesian-influenced Spanish government, was not widely read until the 20th century, but his writings on common sense have been an important influence upon Hans-Georg Gadamer , Benedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci. It presents common sense as something adolescents need to be trained in if they are not to "break into odd and arrogant behaviour when adulthood is reached", whereas teaching Cartesian method on its own harms common sense and stunts intellectual development. Rhetoric and elocution are not just for legal debate, but also educate young people to use their sense perceptions and their perceptions more broadly, building a fund of remembered images in their imagination, and then using ingenuity in creating linking metaphors, in order to make enthymemes. Enthymemes are reasonings about uncertain truths and probabilities€”as opposed to the Cartesian method, which was skeptical of all that could not be dealt with as syllogisms , including raw perceptions of physical bodies. Hence common sense is not just a "guiding standard of eloquence " but also "the standard of practical judgment ". Vico proposed his own anti-Cartesian methodology for a new Baconian science, inspired, he said, by Plato , Tacitus , [71] Francis Bacon and Grotius. In this he went further than his predecessors concerning the ancient certainties available within vulgar common sense. What is required, according to his new science, is to find the common sense shared by different people and nations. He made this a basis for a new and better-founded approach to discuss Natural Law , improving upon Grotius, John Selden , and Pufendorf who he felt had failed to convince, because they could claim no authority from nature. Unlike Grotius, Vico went beyond looking for one single set of similarities amongst nations but also established rules about how natural law properly changes as peoples change, and has to be judged relative to this state of development. He thus developed a detailed view of an evolving wisdom of peoples. Ancient forgotten wisdoms, he claimed, could

be re-discovered by analysis of languages and myths formed under the influence of them. If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them — these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd. He believed that the term common sense as he used it did encompass both the social common sense described by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and the perceptive powers described by Aristotelians. Reid was criticised, partly for his critique of Hume, by Kant and J.

## 2: Natural Law | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Common Sense vs Science. Common sense and science are two words that are often confused when it comes to their meanings when strictly speaking, there is a difference between the two words. Common sense is our usual understand.*

Introduction The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. The defining questions of epistemology include the following. What is the nature of propositional knowledge, knowledge that a particular proposition about the world is true? To know a proposition, we must believe it and it must be true, but something more is required, something that distinguishes knowledge from a lucky guess. A good deal of philosophical work has been invested in trying to determine the nature of warrant. How can we gain knowledge? We can form true beliefs just by making lucky guesses. How to gain warranted beliefs is less clear. Moreover, to know the world, we must think about it, and it is unclear how we gain the concepts we use in thought or what assurance, if any, we have that the ways in which we divide up the world using our concepts correspond to divisions that actually exist. What are the limits of our knowledge? Some aspects of the world may be within the limits of our thought but beyond the limits of our knowledge; faced with competing descriptions of them, we cannot know which description is true. Some aspects of the world may even be beyond the limits of our thought, so that we cannot form intelligible descriptions of them, let alone know that a particular description is true. The disagreement between rationalists and empiricists primarily concerns the second question, regarding the sources of our concepts and knowledge. In some instances, their disagreement on this topic leads them to give conflicting responses to the other questions as well. They may disagree over the nature of warrant or about the limits of our thought and knowledge. Our focus here will be on the competing rationalist and empiricist responses to the second question. Some propositions in a particular subject area, *S*, are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions. Intuition is a form of rational insight. Deduction is a process in which we derive conclusions from intuited premises through valid arguments, ones in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. We intuit, for example, that the number three is prime and that it is greater than two. We then deduce from this knowledge that there is a prime number greater than two. Intuition and deduction thus provide us with knowledge a priori, which is to say knowledge gained independently of sense experience. Some rationalists take mathematics to be knowable by intuition and deduction. Some place ethical truths in this category. Some include metaphysical claims, such as that God exists, we have free will, and our mind and body are distinct substances. The more propositions rationalists include within the range of intuition and deduction, and the more controversial the truth of those propositions or the claims to know them, the more radical their rationalism. Rationalists also vary the strength of their view by adjusting their understanding of warrant. Some take warranted beliefs to be beyond even the slightest doubt and claim that intuition and deduction provide beliefs of this high epistemic status. Others interpret warrant more conservatively, say as belief beyond a reasonable doubt, and claim that intuition and deduction provide beliefs of that caliber. Still another dimension of rationalism depends on how its proponents understand the connection between intuition, on the one hand, and truth, on the other. Some take intuition to be infallible, claiming that whatever we intuit must be true. Others allow for the possibility of false intuited propositions. The second thesis associated with rationalism is the Innate Knowledge thesis. The Innate Knowledge Thesis: We have knowledge of some truths in a particular subject area, *S*, as part of our rational nature. The difference between them rests in the accompanying understanding of how this a priori knowledge is gained. The Innate Knowledge thesis offers our rational nature. Our innate knowledge is not learned through either sense experience or intuition and deduction. It is just part of our nature. Experiences may trigger a process by which we bring this knowledge to consciousness, but the experiences do not provide us with the knowledge itself. It has in some way been with us all along. According to some rationalists, we gained the knowledge in an earlier existence. According to others, God provided us with it at creation. Still others say it is part of our nature through natural selection. Once again, the more subjects included within the range of the thesis or the more controversial the claim to

have knowledge in them, the more radical the form of rationalism. Stronger and weaker understandings of warrant yield stronger and weaker versions of the thesis as well. The third important thesis of rationalism is the Innate Concept thesis. The Innate Concept Thesis: We have some of the concepts we employ in a particular subject area, S, as part of our rational nature. According to the Innate Concept thesis, some of our concepts are not gained from experience. They are part of our rational nature in such a way that, while sense experiences may trigger a process by which they are brought to consciousness, experience does not provide the concepts or determine the information they contain. Some claim that the Innate Concept thesis is entailed by the Innate Knowledge Thesis; a particular instance of knowledge can only be innate if the concepts that are contained in the known proposition are also innate. Others, such as Carruthers, argue against this connection, pp. The content and strength of the Innate Concept thesis varies with the concepts claimed to be innate. The more a concept seems removed from experience and the mental operations we can perform on experience the more plausibly it may be claimed to be innate. Since we do not experience perfect triangles but do experience pains, our concept of the former is a more promising candidate for being innate than our concept of the latter. Two other closely related theses are generally adopted by rationalists, although one can certainly be a rationalist without adopting either of them. The first is that experience cannot provide what we gain from reason. The Indispensability of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area, S, by intuition and deduction, as well as the ideas and instances of knowledge in S that are innate to us, could not have been gained by us through sense experience. The second is that reason is superior to experience as a source of knowledge. The Superiority of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in subject area S by intuition and deduction or have innately is superior to any knowledge gained by sense experience. How reason is superior needs explanation, and rationalists have offered different accounts. Another view, generally associated with Plato Republic ec, locates the superiority of a priori knowledge in the objects known. What we know by reason alone, a Platonic form, say, is superior in an important metaphysical way, e. Most forms of rationalism involve notable commitments to other philosophical positions. One is a commitment to the denial of scepticism for at least some area of knowledge. If we claim to know some truths by intuition or deduction or to have some innate knowledge, we obviously reject scepticism with regard to those truths. We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience. Insofar as we have knowledge in the subject, our knowledge is a posteriori, dependent upon sense experience. Empiricists also deny the implication of the corresponding Innate Concept thesis that we have innate ideas in the subject area. Sense experience is our only source of ideas. They reject the corresponding version of the Superiority of Reason thesis. Since reason alone does not give us any knowledge, it certainly does not give us superior knowledge. Empiricists generally reject the Indispensability of Reason thesis, though they need not. The Empiricism thesis does not entail that we have empirical knowledge. It entails that knowledge can only be gained, if at all, by experience. Empiricists may assert, as some do for some subjects, that the rationalists are correct to claim that experience cannot give us knowledge. The conclusion they draw from this rationalist lesson is that we do not know at all. I have stated the basic claims of rationalism and empiricism so that each is relative to a particular subject area. Rationalism and empiricism, so relativized, need not conflict. We can be rationalists in mathematics or a particular area of mathematics and empiricists in all or some of the physical sciences. Rationalism and empiricism only conflict when formulated to cover the same subject. Then the debate, Rationalism vs. The fact that philosophers can be both rationalists and empiricists has implications for the classification schemes often employed in the history of philosophy, especially the one traditionally used to describe the Early Modern Period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leading up to Kant. It is standard practice to group the major philosophers of this period as either rationalists or empiricists and to suggest that those under one heading share a common agenda in opposition to those under the other. We should adopt such general classification schemes with caution. The views of the individual philosophers are more subtle and complex than the simple-minded classification suggests. See Loeb and Kenny for important discussions of this point. Descartes and Locke have remarkably similar views on the nature of our ideas, even though Descartes takes many to be innate, while Locke ties them all to experience. Thus, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are mistakenly seen as applying a reason-centered epistemology to a common metaphysical agenda, with each

trying to improve on the efforts of the one before, while Locke, Berkeley and Hume are mistakenly seen as gradually rejecting those metaphysical claims, with each consciously trying to improve on the efforts of his predecessors. One might claim, for example, that we can gain knowledge in a particular area by a form of Divine revelation or insight that is a product of neither reason nor sense experience. What is perhaps the most interesting form of the debate occurs when we take the relevant subject to be truths about the external world, the world beyond our own minds. A full-fledged rationalist with regard to our knowledge of the external world holds that some external world truths can and must be known a priori, that some of the ideas required for that knowledge are and must be innate, and that this knowledge is superior to any that experience could ever provide. The full-fledged empiricist about our knowledge of the external world replies that, when it comes to the nature of the world beyond our own minds, experience is our sole source of information. Reason might inform us of the relations among our ideas, but those ideas themselves can only be gained, and any truths about the external reality they represent can only be known, on the basis of sense experience. This debate concerning our knowledge of the external world will generally be our main focus in what follows. The debate raises the issue of metaphysics as an area of knowledge.

## 3: Aristotle's Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*One distinct difference between common sense understandings and social psychological theories is the presence of scholarly rigor. Common sense understandings fit social expectation.*

A Matter of Words. Recently, many have underlined how language is crucial in order to capture how knowledge is used in practice. According to this perspective, the meaning of categories and concepts corresponds to the use that concrete actors make of them as a result of on-going negotiation processes in specific contexts. Meanings may vary dramatically across social groups moved by different interests and holding different cultures. Accordingly, we may reformulate the issue of theory and practice in terms of the connections between different language games and power relationship between segments of the professional community. Being guided by theory has been strongly associated with the effectiveness of practice. Rightly or wrongly, the assessment of the substantial impact of the profession on the problems tackled has been connected to the use of theory in practice Payne ; Johnsson et al. The debate has also been linked to the more concrete matters of social work training and of the establishment of social work as an academic discipline. Over the time, discussion on the relation between theory and practice has become polarised over two positions. On the one hand, we find approaches suggesting that good practice should be driven by theory, and regarding the gap between theory and practice as inherently problematic Howe , ; Sibeon ; Lerma ; Milana This entails a strongly negative view of practitioners. They are faulted for being neither interested in their theoretical training, nor prepared to allow theory to guide their conduct Sheldon They recognise the importance of knowledge developed through concrete experience; they consider theories, and in general the outputs of academic work, as less relevant than other forms of knowledge; they regard practice itself as an ongoing research process, rather than the implementation of models elaborated elsewhere Cellentani ; White ; Sheppard The debate, though, has often become quite complicated because of the difficulty to reach an agreement on how to define the matter itself. In a sense, the different positions seem to have developed without any common ground see Blith and Hugman , Sheldon ; Pilalis ; Clark ; Harrison ; Chan and Chan just to mention a few. All attempts to specify the meanings of these terms, though, seem to have failed. Like many others I acknowledge such failure, and the confusion that has resulted. However, rather than engage in a further attempt to give more precise definition to the concepts through speculation, trying to remove the ambiguities, I shall attempt to draw lessons from past failures. Instead of representing problems to be dealt with before substantive analysis begins, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the use of terms will become the core itself of my reflection. However, focusing on the different uses of terms as an interesting subject of reflection requires a change of perspective and attitude. How can we accept that words, terms, and concepts may be used by different subjects with different meanings? Should not we take this to be mere confusion or ignorance, a problem that requires solution, not a valuable subject for reflection? The change of perspective to which I refer requires us to take a step back from the issue of studying practices and their connection to theory. As many others have already suggested Hawkins et al. Here, focus is on language, or better, on languages as dynamic systems structuring social relations and knowledge. Categories and concepts are analysed as conventional practices that members of social groups develop through interaction in their relating to the world. The world appears as an intricate web of similarities and differences, in which everything is similar and at the same time different from everything else. From this perspective, what similarities or differences will affect how people discriminate among worldly occurrences is ultimately a social construction. This complexity leads to the under-determination of any system of categorisation, and of any form of knowledge including scientific knowledge. The latter, as the strong programme maintains, is to be considered as much a social product as any other form of knowledge, and therefore is to be looked at as a legitimate subject of sociological analysis. Obviously, systematic reference to that debate is neither possible nor necessary here. Under dispute in this argument is the assumption that our language has, or can have, unquestionable bases, so that words refer to something which exists independently of us in the concrete world or in the abstract realm of ideas Wittgenstein Wittgenstein thus invites us to reconsider taken-for-granted beliefs about the relation between

the world and words. Words, names, merely play a secondary role: Most discussions seem to posit the existence of something to which a word applies correctly, or they apparently assume that it is possible to identify abstract rules for the coherent and appropriate use of a word. Nonetheless, all exercises of this sort seem bound to fail. Whatever words we take, from those typical of everyday language to the most sophisticated and abstract of them, if we seek to identify their meaning in an uncontroversial way, we find ourselves lost in a maze. The more we try to be specific, the greater our bewilderment. On the other, verbal explanations of a term entail the definition of criteria; but criteria are just further words which require definition, and the regression from words to other words could continue indefinitely. Resorting to a single act of ostension, however, raises the same problems as does a verbal explanation. Our difficulties stem from the fact that treating languages as a stable source of meaning works extremely well for the purposes of thinking, of understanding each other, of coordinating with other people. We describe situations confident that our alters will be able to figure out what the situation is like; we give verbal orders, we obey them. But when we try to identify this meaning, we are lost. Of course, there is no need to be always aware of this difficulty. In most circumstances of our lives we use language unthinkingly; it works, and it is not necessary to consider what the words stand for. The problem arises when we no longer understand each other, when it seems that language does not work as we expect: One way to address the question is to consider how a child learns language Barnes et al. Teaching takes place through not one, but repeated acts of ostension in which the teacher spells the word while pointing at something. At the end of this process the child possesses a finite cluster of examples of situations in which the teacher will accept the use of the word. This finite cluster is the starting point for the child when faced by new examples. Rather than teaching, one could define this process as training. On examining the different ways in which we use the word game, Wittgenstein comments: There is another problem here to be solved: Each new use of a word involves a judgement: Every new use of a word starts from our previous experience of a finite number of examples; but previous examples are merely a resource, they cannot determine new uses. We proceed from one example to the next, and a new use of a word is not determined by its past use: When we learn a language, we learn to judge new instances in the same way as other people in the community do. From this perspective, the difficulty of using words confidently and effectively, without being able to clarify their meaning uncontroversially, seems to have been dispelled. Of course, we find ourselves in trouble when we use speculative procedures to identify the meaning of words: There is nothing behind words that has to be grasped; everything that is relevant is right before our eyes. We may now therefore review the debate on the key terms, theory and practice in a new light. On the contrary, the above quotation from Wittgenstein appears to urge empirical research into the use of words. Words are never considered in isolation. The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: The sign the sentence gets its significance from a system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Wittgenstein , 5 Barnes uses the reifying metaphor of a fabric for languages: Languages, therefore, are cognitive organisations within which a concept works like the fragment of a hologram and contains information about the picture as a whole: However, Barnes warns against taking this reification too seriously: What creates stability is continuous movement the repeated use of words , not a static framework to which we constantly refer. This is a crucial point if we want to treat different uses of terms and concepts as a worthwhile subject of inquiry, and not as a mistake to be corrected. The perspective introduced here entails that the world underdetermines whatever system of categorisation and language: Languages are merely the way in which we organise our interaction with the world. Barnes compare categorisation to cutting a cake: In fact, because our system of categorisation is conventional, whatever generalisation can be made about categories is bound to meet counter examples. Sooner or later the world will present instances to which current generalisations do not apply. Nonetheless, such instances cannot be said to determine anything within languages, nor do they dictate to human beings how they must be treated. They can be ignored as irrelevant, or looked upon as accidents or monsters; they may lead to the creation of another category, to a radical change in the language, or to restriction of the scope of the generalisation. If anomalies evoke crises and revolutions, the question is why those responses are preferred to more conservative alternatives. At the same time, classifications cannot follow abstract universal rules. As we remarked above, criteria cannot be other than words that should be explained. If neither the world

nor rules can provide grounds for language, languages are looked upon as institutions, or self-referential practices. Self-referentiality is defined as lying somewhere in between an independent reference and the total absence of reference: Moreover, if different groups within a community use words or concepts differently, it is impossible to establish in absolute terms who is right and who is wrong, because the only possible parameter is agreement within the group. Although prices may appear to be external and objective to the individual who participates in these transactions. The only real price is the price paid in the course of real transactions as they proceed von Fall zu Fall. Wittgenstein strongly attacks attempts to look for mistakes in the customs of communities. If an entire community uses a concept in a certain way, the only thing that can be said is that this is the way things stand within that community; to talk of mistakes in absolute terms is impossible. In this view uncertainty about the use of words is not a shortcoming exclusively of social work or of the social sciences. It reminds us that there may be communities with completely different languages from our own, and that there is no absolute standard with which to compare among languages. Of course this is of particular relevance to the social work profession, which is very often "if not always" involved in connecting people from different segments of society, different social classes, different cultures. It helps us make sense of the clash in perspective and power struggle between practitioners and clients, which has been the subject of so much debate Margolin. Accordingly, within the social work community, certain terms and concepts are likely to be used by practitioners in ways which academics fail to recognize. Some research has explicitly treated this as a problem Stevenson and Parsloe ; Marsh and Triseliotis ; Osmond et al. Differences between formal academic definitions and concepts as defined by practitioners simply highlight the differences between the academic and practitioner communities and their respective languages. Differences though cannot be looked at as casual. Since language is conceived as self-referential, it could be regarded as the outcome of creative processes within specific communities. Language games cannot be explained by an external worldly reality, nor by the intrinsic authority of concepts, nor by their nature as collective habits and routines we change our habits, in fact, and these changes are among the facts that call for explanation. Rather, categorisation as conceptualisation must be explained as determined by the interplay of interests within a community: In the case of theory and practice, we may start by considering how the different interests at work within the social work community can explain different definitions of these terms.

## 4: Occupy Hegemony: Gramsci, Ideology and Common Sense | The Genealogy of Consent

*This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) – which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many.*

By Giulio Amerigo Caperchi Why do we consent to the status quo of the neoliberal hegemony? It is simply baffling that citizens in both Europe and the US continue to tolerate the neo-liberal agenda. After the unrestrained greed of financial institutions brought the world to its knees, and after tax-payers bailed out those same institutions responsible for the crisis, the rules of the game appear more or less unchanged. Moreover and even more baffling, the culprits of the crisis seem to be no longer the unaccountable financial institutions but the citizens responsible for sovereign debt. And the vast majority of citizens consents. We tolerate unelected technical governments Greece, Italy and we elect conservative administrations Spain, England whose main objective is that of not arousing the ire of financial markets with talks of progressive taxation, labor rights or welfare services of any kind. The only cure for the crisis, we are told, is the well-rehearsed neoliberal mantra of deregulation, liberalization and privatization. Why, may I ask, are we accepting the preposterous idea that the sole cure to a failed free market is more free market theory? The answer, I believe, lies in the particular way in which the neoliberal hegemony has been able to saturate contemporary political discourse. The way neoliberalism has positioned itself within the field of political theory has effectively displaced alternative political paradigms capable of challenging its hegemony. And it is specifically the alleged lack of political alternatives which functions as a primary generator of consent to an imposed status quo. An important issue that any movement committed to structural change should consider is to challenge the stranglehold that the neoliberal hegemony exerts on political discourse, for it is precisely there that consent to its worldview is produced. A brief look into the ideas of the great theorist of hegemony Antonio Gramsci, will reveal the dynamic relationship between the power of hegemony and the consent of the governed. According to Gramsci, hegemony is a disposition of power which does not merely coerce its subjects into submission through top-down impositions. In doing so, it shapes and moulds consciousness, conceptions of common sense and world-views. Writing between the two World Wars, Gramsci, a communist, could not understand why the peasant masses of southern Italy were unable to organize and join the militant communists of the industrialized north. The peasant masses of the south lacked their own intellectuals, and relied only on their notions of common sense and folklore to conceive of their every-day travails. Common sense was also heavily influenced by the dominant ideology. In fact, the ability of the hegemonic ideology to mould common sense was of particular concern to Gramsci. In sum, a fragmented world-view coupled with the lack of an alternative language with which to vent political contention generated consent to the status quo. A similar scenario presents itself to us today. If the Occupy and Indignados movements wish to win the hearts and minds of US and EU citizens they must break this mass consent by demonstrating that neoliberalism is not in fact our only option and that mainstream political discourse must be pluralized. In the same way as the occupation of public squares opens up a new space for democratic participation, occupying hegemony must open up political discourse to a plurality of alternative political ideas. Neoliberalism is not inevitable nor is it the last game in town. In truth, it has failed in both of its privileged sites of intervention: The first step in breaking its hegemony is therefore to demonstrate that alternatives to a world-view founded on the myths of rugged individualism and rational free markets do in fact exist. We are in desperate need of a radical pluralization of the ideological terrain, so that new ideas may emerge and contest the neoliberal hegemony over political discourse. As Gramsci put it: London Share the post:

## 5: Common sense - Wikipedia

*Common Sense and Science Abstract This discussion provides dissimilarity between common sense and science; the relationship of common sense and beliefs; and a reflection of how a scholarly-practitioner can relate all of these to the field of critical thinking.*

Preliminaries Aristotle wrote two ethical treatises: In any case, these two works cover more or less the same ground: Both treatises examine the conditions in which praise or blame are appropriate, and the nature of pleasure and friendship; near the end of each work, we find a brief discussion of the proper relationship between human beings and the divine. Though the general point of view expressed in each work is the same, there are many subtle differences in organization and content as well. Clearly, one is a re-working of the other, and although no single piece of evidence shows conclusively what their order is, it is widely assumed that the Nicomachean Ethics is a later and improved version of the Eudemian Ethics. Not all of the Eudemian Ethics was revised: Perhaps the most telling indication of this ordering is that in several instances the Nicomachean Ethics develops a theme about which its Eudemian cousin is silent. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on this work. Page and line numbers shall henceforth refer to this treatise. It ranges over topics discussed more fully in the other two works and its point of view is similar to theirs. Why, being briefer, is it named the Magna Moralia? Because each of the two papyrus rolls into which it is divided is unusually long. Just as a big mouse can be a small animal, two big chapters can make a small book. A few authors in antiquity refer to a work with this name and attribute it to Aristotle, but it is not mentioned by several authorities, such as Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, whom we would expect to have known of it. No one had written ethical treatises before Aristotle. The Human Good and the Function Argument The principal idea with which Aristotle begins is that there are differences of opinion about what is best for human beings, and that to profit from ethical inquiry we must resolve this disagreement. He insists that ethics is not a theoretical discipline: In raising this questionâ€”what is the good? He assumes that such a list can be compiled rather easily; most would agree, for example, that it is good to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honored, and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The difficult and controversial question arises when we ask whether certain of these goods are more desirable than others. To be eudaimon is therefore to be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology in his ethical writings, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. No one tries to live well for the sake of some further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the highest end, and all subordinate goalsâ€”health, wealth, and other such resourcesâ€”are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in. But unless we can determine which good or goods happiness consists in, it is of little use to acknowledge that it is the highest end. One important component of this argument is expressed in terms of distinctions he makes in his psychological and biological works. The soul is analyzed into a connected series of capacities: The biological fact Aristotle makes use of is that human beings are the only species that has not only these lower capacities but a rational soul as well. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence. No other writer or thinker had said precisely what he says about what it is to live well. But at the same time his view is not too distant from a common idea. As he himself points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with virtue b30â€”1. He says, not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity. Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul. At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as wellâ€”such goods as friends, wealth, and power. Someone who is friendless, childless, powerless, weak, and ugly will simply not be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can

accomplish will not be of great merit. To some extent, then, living well requires good fortune; happenstance can rob even the most excellent human beings of happiness. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists, the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues. Suppose we grant, at least for the sake of argument, that doing anything well, including living well, consists in exercising certain skills; and let us call these skills, whatever they turn out to be, virtues. Even so, that point does not by itself allow us to infer that such qualities as temperance, justice, courage, as they are normally understood, are virtues. They should be counted as virtues only if it can be shown that actualizing precisely these skills is what happiness consists in. What Aristotle owes us, then, is an account of these traditional qualities that explains why they must play a central role in any well-lived life. But perhaps Aristotle disagrees, and refuses to accept this argumentative burden. In one of several important methodological remarks he makes near the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he says that in order to profit from the sort of study he is undertaking, one must already have been brought up in good habits (1095a26-31). The audience he is addressing, in other words, consists of people who are already just, courageous, and generous; or, at any rate, they are well on their way to possessing these virtues. Why such a restricted audience? Why does he not address those who have serious doubts about the value of these traditional qualities, and who therefore have not yet decided to cultivate and embrace them? Addressing the moral skeptic, after all, is the project Plato undertook in the *Republic*: He does not appear to be addressing someone who has genuine doubts about the value of justice or kindred qualities. Perhaps, then, he realizes how little can be accomplished, in the study of ethics, to provide it with a rational foundation. Perhaps he thinks that no reason can be given for being just, generous, and courageous. These are qualities one learns to love when one is a child, and having been properly habituated, one no longer looks for or needs a reason to exercise them. One can show, as a general point, that happiness consists in exercising some skills or other, but that the moral skills of a virtuous person are what one needs is not a proposition that can be established on the basis of argument. This is not the only way of reading the *Ethics*, however. For surely we cannot expect Aristotle to show what it is about the traditional virtues that makes them so worthwhile until he has fully discussed the nature of those virtues. He himself warns us that his initial statement of what happiness is should be treated as a rough outline whose details are to be filled in later (1095a26-31). His intention in Book I of the *Ethics* is to indicate in a general way why the virtues are important; why particular virtues—courage, justice, and the like—are components of happiness is something we should be able to better understand only at a later point. His point, rather, may be that in ethics, as in any other study, we cannot make progress towards understanding why things are as they are unless we begin with certain assumptions about what is the case. Neither theoretical nor practical inquiry starts from scratch. Someone who has made no observations of astronomical or biological phenomena is not yet equipped with sufficient data to develop an understanding of these sciences. The parallel point in ethics is that to make progress in this sphere we must already have come to enjoy doing what is just, courageous, generous and the like. We must experience these activities not as burdensome constraints, but as noble, worthwhile, and enjoyable in themselves. Then, when we engage in ethical inquiry, we can ask what it is about these activities that makes them worthwhile. We can also compare these goods with other things that are desirable in themselves—pleasure, friendship, honor, and so on—and ask whether any of them is more desirable than the others. We approach ethical theory with a disorganized bundle of likes and dislikes based on habit and experience; such disorder is an inevitable feature of childhood. But what is not inevitable is that our early experience will be rich enough to provide an adequate basis for worthwhile ethical reflection; that is why we need to have been brought up well. Yet such an upbringing can take us only so far. We seek a deeper understanding of the objects of our childhood enthusiasms, and we must systematize our goals so that as adults we have a coherent plan of life. We need to engage in ethical theory, and to reason well in this field, if we are to move beyond the low-grade form of virtue we acquired as children. His project is to make ethics an autonomous field, and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other field. There is another contrast with Plato that should be emphasized: In Book II of the *Republic*, we are told that the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself and for the sake of its results (357a). Plato

argues that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally agreed that it is desirable for its consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B, then B is better than A<sup>14</sup>; therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one must show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote A in some way or other. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and friendship in order to show how these goods, properly understood, can be seen as resources that serve the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. That is why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part<sup>11</sup>. Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and therefore to happiness, although there may be special circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit of virtue over the course of a lifetime. Virtues and Deficiencies, Contenance and Incontinence Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue<sup>1</sup>. Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues temperance, courage, and so on, and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc. All free males are born with the potential to become ethically virtuous and practically wise, but to achieve these goals they must go through two stages: This does not mean that first we fully acquire the ethical virtues, and then, at a later stage, add on practical wisdom. Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom<sup>14</sup>. A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected. Like anyone who has developed a skill in performing a complex and difficult activity, the virtuous person takes pleasure in exercising his intellectual skills. Furthermore, when he has decided what to do, he does not have to contend with internal pressures to act otherwise. He does not long to do something that he regards as shameful; and he is not greatly distressed at having to give up a pleasure that he realizes he should forego. Aristotle places those who suffer from such internal disorders into one of three categories: 1. Some agents, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or some other emotion; and this countervailing influence is not completely under the control of reason. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous person does. 2. Others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. The explanation of *akrasia* is a topic to which we will return in section 7.

## 6: The Relationship Between Value Maximization and Stakeholder Theory | Pocket Sense

*conceptual overlap between implicit personality theory and 'scientific' theories of personality is developed. This is tested in the case of the common-sense conception.*

Ashley Kannan Certified Educator One distinct difference between common sense understandings and social psychological theories is the presence of scholarly rigor. Common sense understandings fit social expectation. There is a sense of the elemental in the common sense understanding of social psychology. It is accepted widely and something that is shared amongst the people of a common social setting. Social psychology is different because it is less "folksy. One distinct difference between common sense understandings and social psychological theories is the presence of scholarly rigor. These theories are rooted in scientific analysis, complete with hypotheses, adhere to the rigor of data collection with conclusions and implications generated from these trials. Social psychological theories have the scientific method attached to them. The community that discusses them does so with the rigor of scientific analysis in mind. The rigor attached to social psychology makes it fundamentally distinct from common sense understanding. Another major difference between common sense and social psychology is the challenging to accepted social norms. By definition, common sense accepts what is standard thinking within the social context. Common sense is seen as an affirmation of individual temperament shared by society. Social psychology is not afraid to challenge the way in which individuals and society views themselves. In contrast to common sense, social psychology is led by what the data says. Social psychology uses data collection and scientific evidence and, in doing so, occasionally, "upsets the order. This is one example of how social psychology. Social psychologists seek to delve into some of the most basic and yet challenging aspects of individual identity and its connection to larger notions of the good. The psychological frame of reference between the individual and the larger, external connective bonds that exist are intricate and nuanced. Intuition and common sense understandings are, by definition, simplistic and reductive. Applying such tendencies to a complex and nuanced entity can translate into bad or difficult realities. It is in this light where there might exist a fundamental danger in trying to reduce social psychology to something of common sense and intuition. In failing to acknowledge the varied and intricate landscape of the human mind and its connection to social notions of the good, important and essential concepts within both are missed. This helps to explain why sole reliance on common sense and intuition might inhibit efforts to fully understand the nature of the individual and society.

## 7: Social Psychology: Is It Just Common Sense? - Mibba

*Explain the limitations of common sense when it comes to achieving a detailed and accurate understanding of human behaviour. Give several examples of common sense or folk psychology that are incorrect. Define skepticism and its role in scientific psychology.*

References and Further Reading 1. Two Kinds of Natural Law Theory At the outset, it is important to distinguish two kinds of theory that go by the name of natural law. The first is a theory of morality that is roughly characterized by the following theses. First, moral propositions have what is sometimes called objective standing in the sense that such propositions are the bearers of objective truth-value; that is, moral propositions can be objectively true or false. Though moral objectivism is sometimes equated with moral realism see, e. Strictly speaking, then, natural law moral theory is committed only to the objectivity of moral norms. The second thesis constituting the core of natural law moral theory is the claim that standards of morality are in some sense derived from, or entailed by, the nature of the world and the nature of human beings. Thomas Aquinas, for example, identifies the rational nature of human beings as that which defines moral law: On this common view, since human beings are by nature rational beings, it is morally appropriate that they should behave in a way that conforms to their rational nature. Thus, Aquinas derives the moral law from the nature of human beings thus, "natural law". But there is another kind of natural law theory having to do with the relationship of morality to law. According to natural law theory of law, there is no clean division between the notion of law and the notion of morality. Though there are different versions of natural law theory, all subscribe to the thesis that there are at least some laws that depend for their "authority" not on some pre-existing human convention, but on the logical relationship in which they stand to moral standards. Otherwise put, some norms are authoritative in virtue of their moral content, even when there is no convention that makes moral merit a criterion of legal validity. The idea that the concepts of law and morality intersect in some way is called the Overlap Thesis. As an empirical matter, many natural law moral theorists are also natural law legal theorists, but the two theories, strictly speaking, are logically independent. One can deny natural law theory of law but hold a natural law theory of morality. John Austin, the most influential of the early legal positivists, for example, denied the Overlap Thesis but held something that resembles a natural law ethical theory. Indeed, Austin explicitly endorsed the view that it is not necessarily true that the legal validity of a norm depends on whether its content conforms to morality. But while Austin thus denied the Overlap Thesis, he accepted an objectivist moral theory; indeed, Austin inherited his utilitarianism almost wholesale from J. Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Here it is worth noting that utilitarians sometimes seem to suggest that they derive their utilitarianism from certain facts about human nature; as Bentham once wrote, "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne" Bentham , 1. Thus, a commitment to natural law theory of morality is consistent with the denial of natural law theory of law. Conversely, one could, though this would be unusual, accept a natural law theory of law without holding a natural law theory of morality. One could, for example, hold that the conceptual point of law is, in part, to reproduce the demands of morality, but also hold a form of ethical subjectivism or relativism. On this peculiar view, the conceptual point of law would be to enforce those standards that are morally valid in virtue of cultural consensus. For this reason, natural law theory of law is logically independent of natural law theory of morality. The remainder of this essay will be exclusively concerned with natural law theories of law. The Project of Conceptual Jurisprudence The principal objective of conceptual or analytic jurisprudence has traditionally been to provide an account of what distinguishes law as a system of norms from other systems of norms, such as ethical norms. As John Austin describes the project, conceptual jurisprudence seeks "the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are properly so called" Austin , Accordingly, the task of conceptual jurisprudence is to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world. While this task is usually interpreted as an attempt to

analyze the concepts of law and legal system, there is some confusion as to both the value and character of conceptual analysis in philosophy of law. As Brian Leiter points out, philosophy of law is one of the few philosophical disciplines that takes conceptual analysis as its principal concern; most other areas in philosophy have taken a naturalistic turn, incorporating the tools and methods of the sciences. To clarify the role of conceptual analysis in law, Brian Bix distinguishes a number of different purposes that can be served by conceptual claims: Bix takes conceptual analysis in law to be primarily concerned with 3 and 4. In any event, conceptual analysis of law remains an important, if controversial, project in contemporary legal theory. Conceptual theories of law have traditionally been characterized in terms of their posture towards the Overlap Thesis. Thus, conceptual theories of law have traditionally been divided into two main categories: Classical Natural Law Theory All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which asserts that there is some kind of non-conventional relation between law and morality. According to this view, then, the notion of law cannot be fully articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may seem unambiguous, there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted. The strongest construction of the Overlap Thesis forms the foundation for the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone. Aquinas distinguishes four kinds of law: Eternal law is comprised of those laws that govern the nature of an eternal universe; as Susan Dimock , 22 puts it, one can "think of eternal law as comprising all those scientific physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc. One cannot discover divine law by natural reason alone; the precepts of divine law are disclosed only through divine revelation. The natural law is comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that govern the behavior of beings possessing reason and free will. The first precept of the natural law, according to Aquinas, is the somewhat vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it is worth noting that Aquinas holds a natural law theory of morality: Good and evil are thus both objective and universal. But Aquinas is also a natural law legal theorist. On his view, a human law that is, that which is promulgated by human beings is valid only insofar as its content conforms to the content of the natural law; as Aquinas puts the point: The idea that a norm that does not conform to the natural law cannot be legally valid is the defining thesis of conceptual naturalism. As William Blackstone describes the thesis, "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of conceptual naturalism: It should be noted that classical naturalism is consistent with allowing a substantial role to human beings in the manufacture of law. While the classical naturalist seems committed to the claim that the law necessarily incorporates all moral principles, this claim does not imply that the law is exhausted by the set of moral principles. There will still be coordination problems e. Thus, the classical naturalist does not deny that human beings have considerable discretion in creating natural law. Rather she claims only that such discretion is necessarily limited by moral norms: Critics of conceptual naturalism have raised a number of objections to this view. First, it has often been pointed out that, contra Augustine, unjust laws are all-too- frequently enforced against persons. As Austin petulantly put the point: Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity Austin , Another frequently expressed worry is that conceptual naturalism undermines the possibility of moral criticism of the law; inasmuch as conformity with natural law is a necessary condition for legal validity, all valid law is, by definition, morally just. Thus, on this line of reasoning, the legal validity of a norm necessarily entails its moral justice. As Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Murphy , 18 put the point: The important things [conceptual naturalism] supposedly allows us to do e. If we really want to think about the law from the moral point of view, it may obscure the task if we see law and morality as essentially linked in some way. Moral criticism and reform of law may be

aided by an initial moral skepticism about the law. There are a couple of problems with this line of objection. First, conceptual naturalism does not foreclose criticism of those norms that are being enforced by a society as law. Insofar as it can plausibly be claimed that the content of a norm being enforced by society as law does not conform to the natural law, this is a legitimate ground of moral criticism: Thus, the state commits wrong by enforcing that norm against private citizens. Conceptual jurisprudence assumes the existence of a core of social practices constituting law that requires a conceptual explanation. The project motivating conceptual jurisprudence, then, is to articulate the concept of law in a way that accounts for these pre-existing social practices. A conceptual theory of law can legitimately be criticized for its failure to adequately account for the pre-existing data, as it were; but it cannot legitimately be criticized for either its normative quality or its practical implications. A more interesting line of argument has recently been taken up by Brian Bix. Following John Finnis, Bix rejects the interpretation of Aquinas and Blackstone as conceptual naturalists, arguing instead that the claim that an unjust law is not a law should not be taken literally: A more reasonable interpretation of statements like "an unjust law is no law at all" is that unjust laws are not laws "in the fullest sense. Similarly, to say that an unjust law is "not really law" may only be to point out that it does not carry the same moral force or offer the same reasons for action as laws consistent with "higher law" Bix. Like Bix, Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis, the classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law. Finnis distinguishes a number of equally valuable basic goods: Each of these goods, according to Finnis, has intrinsic value in the sense that it should, given human nature, be valued for its own sake and not merely for the sake of some other good it can assist in bringing about. Moreover, each of these goods is universal in the sense that it governs all human cultures at all times. The point of moral principles, on this view, is to give ethical structure to the pursuit of these basic goods; moral principles enable us to select among competing goods and to define what a human being can permissibly do in pursuit of a basic good. Thus, Finnis sums up his theory of law as follows: Again, it bears emphasizing that Finnis takes care to deny that there is any necessary moral test for legal validity: Nevertheless, Finnis believes that to the extent that a norm fails to satisfy these conditions, it likewise fails to fully manifest the nature of law and thereby fails to fully obligate the citizen-subject of the law. The Procedural Naturalism of Lon L. Fuller Like Finnis, Lon Fuller rejects the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary substantive moral constraints on the content of law. But Fuller, unlike Finnis, believes that law is necessarily subject to a procedural morality.

## 8: Sense and reference - Wikipedia

*Social Psychology and Common Sense may seem relatively similar or even the same thing: often, scientific studies into what are perceived as 'common sense notions' are mocked in the mass media as 'unnecessary' and 'pointless'.*

Phosphorus Frege introduced the notion of "sense" German: Sinn to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value. If the evening star has the same reference as the morning star, it follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun. But it is possible for someone to think that the first sentence is true while also thinking that the second is false. Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its sense. Second, sentences that contain proper names with no reference cannot have a truth value at all. Nor can a thought about Etna contain lumps of solidified lava. John McDowell supplies cognitive and reference-determining roles. Sense and description[ edit ] In his theory of descriptions , Bertrand Russell held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact disguised definite descriptions. This is known as the descriptivist theory of names. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. However, Saul Kripke argued compellingly against the descriptivist theory. According to Kripke, [15] proper names are rigid designators which designate the same object in every possible world. For example, someone other than Richard Nixon , e. Hubert Humphrey , might have been the President in Hence a description or cluster of descriptions cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot mean the same as a description. Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction does have i. Translation of Bedeutung[ edit ] As noted above, translators of Frege have rendered the German Bedeutung in various ways. But according to Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract Concept Begriff.

## 9: SparkNotes: Common Sense: Summary

*In Common Sense, Thomas Paine argues for American independence. His argument begins with more general, theoretical reflections about government and religion, then progresses onto the specifics of the colonial situation.*

Submit an article Social Psychology: Is It Just Common Sense? Social Psychology and Common Sense may seem relatively similar or even the same thing: Naturally, there are some similarities with one another - this does not mean, however, that they are the same thing. In order to fully examine these similarities and differences, we need to define what is going to be analysed. Common Sense, by definition, is non-existent. Semantically, it seems unwise to call common sense as such. In the related subject Sociology, CW Mills described common sense as: As such, if this was true, then it would be somewhat redundant to spout what is already known. On the other hand, Social Psychology is the empirical study of human behaviour in relation to a social aspect. Social Psychology has often come under fire - both directly and indirectly - for, in the minds of society, being too much like common sense to be considered a worthwhile venture. Directly, it has been criticised by many people: Day after day social scientists go out into the world. As quoted by Meyers, D, Similarly, the Psychology professor was rated higher on general knowledge, emphasising that Psychology - on the whole - was largely common sense. However, as previously discussed, social psychology has similarities and differences with common sense. A similarity, as mentioned previously, is that both try to explain human behaviour. One such example of this is empathy. If we consider the argument put out by Batson et al, altruism can only be considered as such if they give help irrespective of if they will be emotionally troubled later. Empathic concern then becomes a point within the sphere of pro-social behaviour: Common Sense is largely taken as subjective - subjective to cultural or internal aspects, whereas social psychology aims to be as objective as possible. The study entailed a participant taking a "teacher" role and a confederate taking a "student" role. The confederate would act as appropriate to the voltage applied, from crying out to pretending to be unconscious. What was actually found was that a vast majority continued far beyond this point. Milgram stated this as the participants falling into an "agentic" state. This "agentic" state contradicted the previous theories about such obedience in "authoritarian personalities" which was used to explain such acts as the Holocaust in World War Two. As such, it has been looked upon as an example of a fundamental attribution error: As such, previously set attitudes interfere with hypotheses in common sense and social psychology but in social psychology, this is not the case. Another aspect is the possibility of agendas being set in common sense. Pre-set notions and ideals about how society is run can be traced in common sense, usually raising themselves in the ideas about ethnicity, gender and so on. The participants were given an IQ test. The class teacher was given a list of "bloomers" and "non-bloomers" - pupils who it was seen to have a higher IQ. The lists were actually populated by a random selection of pupils, regardless of IQ. They were tested again at the end of their first year and the start and end of their second year. It was found that the "bloomers" gained more IQ points than the "non-bloomers". This theory was supported by a meta-analysis of follow-up studies on a similar vein and the results were the same all around. As such, it is hypothesised that the teachers gave unconscious "extra" help to the "bloomers" rather than the "non-bloomers". This could be used to explain how certain minority groups could have a lower IQ than others if there is underlying prejudices held and "proven" by common sense. A quote that sums this up is as thus: The problem related back to the objectivity of social psychology: Again, this can be seen in treatment of social problems such as marital issues. These issues can be treated with negotiation and introspection as required by counselling, Psychodynamic and humanistic therapies. This is also shown in the treatment of depression: This is where some piece of social psychology research is dismissed as common sense or already known. They asked half the participant group to predict the results of the election of a controversial Supreme Court nominee, Clarence Thomas, a week before the election; the other half to say what they would have predicted if they were asked a week ago. A problem, however, that is a problem in social psychology is reductionism - when the answer to a question in social psychology is either reduced to terms that do not satisfactorily answer the question in hand. Specifically, this is used against research in social psychology that relies on individual psychology, missing the point of social

psychology. This is shown in the explanation of drug addiction. Washburn proposed that social problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction and crime as well as many others is primarily - if not entirely - genetic. Both conditions were given only a morphine solution to drink for 53 days, then a choice of water and the morphine solution intermittently thereafter. It was found that the isolated rats drank far more of the morphine solution, to the extent that there was virtually no overlap in the results. This shows that addiction, like so many things in social psychology, is dependent on social and environmental factors, not solely biological or individual factors. This is closely connected to another problem with common sense. This was explored in the study by Teigan about common sayings and proverbs. In conclusion, social psychology is the empirical study of human behaviour. This is similar to common sense in the sense that they both try to explain human behaviour in a social context. Common sense however, is inaccurate and is subject to bias and life-experiences as well as a hindsight bias. Social psychology is given to be more accurate but can be subject to positivism and reductionism. October 24th, at

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