

1: Reason's Dark Champions - VoegelinView

A plausible but fallacious argument, or deceptive argumentation in general.. In rhetorical studies, sophism refers to the argumentative strategies practiced and taught by the Sophists.

Who Were the Presocratic Philosophers? Our understanding of the Presocratics is complicated by the incomplete nature of our evidence. Instead, we are dependent on later philosophers, historians, and compilers of collections of ancient wisdom for disconnected quotations fragments and reports about their views testimonia. In some cases, these sources had direct access to the works of the Presocratics, but in many others, the line is indirect and often depends on the work of Hippias, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Simplicius, and other ancient philosophers who did have such access. The sources for the fragments and testimonia made selective use of the material available to them, in accordance with their own special, and varied, interests in the early thinkers. For analyses of the doxographic tradition, and the influence of Aristotle and Theophrastus on later sources, see Mansfeld , Runia , and Mansfeld and Runia , a, and b. Although any account of a Presocratic thinker has to be a reconstruction, we should not be overly pessimistic about the possibility of reaching a historically responsible understanding of these early Greek thinkers. The term, coined in the eighteenth century, was made current by Hermann Diels in the nineteenth, and was meant to mark a contrast between Socrates who was interested in moral problems, and his predecessors, who were supposed to be primarily concerned with cosmological and physical speculation. Moreover, several of the early Greek thinkers explored questions about ethics and the best way to live a human life. The term may also suggest that these thinkers are somehow inferior to Socrates and Plato, of interest only as their predecessors, and its suggestion of archaism may imply that philosophy only becomes interesting when we arrive at the classical period of Plato and Aristotle. Some scholars now deliberately avoid the term, but if we take it to refer to the early Greek thinkers who were not influenced by the views of Socrates, whether his predecessors or contemporaries, there is probably no harm in using it. A second problem lies in referring to these thinkers as philosophers. That is almost certainly not how they could have described themselves. As the fragment from Heraclitus shows, the early Greek philosophers thought of themselves as inquirers into many things, and the range of their inquiry was vast. They had views about the nature of the world, and these views encompass what we today call physics, chemistry, geology, meteorology, astronomy, embryology, and psychology and other areas of natural inquiry , as well as theology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In the earliest of the Presocratics, the Milesians, it can indeed be difficult to discern the strictly philosophical aspects of the views in the evidence available to us. Nevertheless, despite the danger of misunderstanding and thus underestimating these thinkers because of anachronism, there is an important sense in which it is quite reasonable to refer to them as philosophers. The questions that the early Greek philosophers asked, the sorts of answers that they gave, and the views that they had of their own inquiries were the foundation for the development of philosophy as it came to be defined in the work of Plato and Aristotle and their successors. Perhaps the fundamental characteristic is the commitment to explain the world in terms of its own inherent principles. Hesiod tells the traditional story of the Olympian gods, beginning with Chaos, a vague divine primordial entity or condition. From Chaos, a sequence of gods is generated, often by sexual congress, but sometimes no cause for their coming to be is given. The divine figures that thus arise are often connected with a part of the physical universe, or with some aspect of human experience, so his theogony is also a cosmogony an account of the generation of the world. The divinities and the associated parts of the world come to be and struggle violently among themselves; finally Zeus triumphs and establishes and maintains an order of power among the others. The earliest rulers of the universe are violently overthrown by their offspring Ouranos is overthrown by Cronos, Cronos by Zeus. Zeus insures his continued power by swallowing his first consort Metis counsel or wisdom ; by this he prevents the predicted birth of rivals and acquires her attribute of wisdom Theogony

In a second poem, Works and Days, Hesiod pays more attention to human beings, telling the story of earlier,

greater creatures who died out or were destroyed by themselves or Zeus. Humans were created by Zeus, are under his power, and are subject to his judgment and to divine intervention for either good or ill. A good discussion of the Hesiodic myths in relation to Presocratic philosophy can be found in McKirahan Burkert surveys influence from the east on the development of Presocratic philosophy, especially the myths, astronomy, and cosmogony of the Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians. The Presocratics reject this account, instead seeing the world as a kosmos, an ordered natural arrangement that is inherently intelligible and not subject to supra-natural intervention. A striking example is Xenophanes 21B Calling the Presocratics philosophers also suggests that they share a certain outlook with one another; an outlook that can be contrasted with that of other early Greeks. Although scholars disagree about the extent of the divergence between the early Greek philosophers and their non-philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, it is evident that Presocratic thought exhibits a difference not only in its understanding of the nature of the world, but also in its view of the sort of explanation of it that is possible. This is clear in Heraclitus. Although Heraclitus asserts that those who love wisdom must be inquirers into many things, inquiry alone is not sufficient. At 22B40 he rebukes four of his predecessors: For Heraclitus there is an underlying principle that unites and explains everything. It is this that others have failed to see and understand. According to Heraclitus, the four have amassed a great deal of information “Hesiod was a traditional source of information about the gods, Pythagoras was renowned for his learning and especially views about how one ought to live, Xenophanes taught about the proper view of the gods and the natural world, Hecataeus was an early historian” but because they have failed to grasp the deeper significance of the facts available to them, their unconnected bits of knowledge do not constitute understanding. Just as the world is a kosmos, an ordered arrangement, so human knowledge of that world must be ordered in a certain way. He seems to have lived around the beginning of the 6th c. Aristotle mentions that some people, before Thales, placed great importance on water, but he credits Thales with declaring water to be the first cause *Metaphysics* b27a33, and he then later raises the question of whether perhaps Hesiod was the first to look for a cause of motion and change b23ff. These suggestions are rhetorical: Aristotle does not seriously imply that those he mentions are engaged in the same sort of inquiry as he thinks Thales was. Two other Greek thinkers from this very early period, Anaximander and Anaximenes, were also from Miletus, and although the ancient tradition that the three were related as master and pupil may not be correct, there are enough fundamental similarities in their views to justify treating them together. The tradition claims that Thales predicted a solar eclipse in BC 11A5, introduced geometry into Greece from Egypt 11A11, and produced some engineering marvels. Anaximander is reported to have invented the gnomon the raised piece of a sundial whose shadow marks time; to have created a sphere of the heavens serving as an astronomical and cosmological model 12A1; and to have been the first to draw a map of the inhabited world 12A6. The assumptions and principles that we along with Aristotle see as constituting the philosophical foundations of their theories are, for the most part, implicit in the claims that they make. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to treat the Milesians as having philosophical views, even though no clear statements of these views or specific arguments for them can be found in the surviving fragments and testimonia. Yet there is something in what Aristotle says. He suggests that Thales chose water because of its fundamental role in coming-to-be, nutrition, and growth, and claims that water is the origin of the nature of moist things. Thus, on this view, when Thales says that the first principle is water, he should be understood as claiming both that the original state of things was water and that even now despite appearances, everything is really water in some state or another. The change from the original state to the present one involves changes in the material stuff such that although it may not now appear to be water everywhere but seems to be airier or earthier than water in its usual state, or its original one, there is no transformation of water into a different kind of stuff air or earth, for instance. Thales may well have thought that certain characteristics of the original water persisted: Aristotle surmises that Thales identified soul that which makes a thing alive and thus capable of motion with something in the whole universe, and so supposed that everything was full of gods 11A22 “water, or soul, being a divine natural principle. Certainly the claim that the lodestone has soul suggests this

account. Given that the analysis of change both qualitative and substantial in terms of a substratum that gains and loses properties is Aristotelian although perhaps foreshadowed in Plato, it is not surprising that the earlier views were unclear on this issue, and it is probable that the Milesian view did not clearly distinguish the notions of an original matter and an enduring underlying stuff. The reports about Thales show him employing a certain kind of explanation: In this, Thales marks a radical change from all other previous sorts of accounts of the world both Greek and non-Greek. Like the other Presocratics, Thales sees nature as a complete and self-ordering system, and sees no reason to call on divine intervention from outside the natural world to supplement his account—“water itself may be divine, but it is not something that intervenes in the natural world from outside.” Gregory, In the one fragment that can be securely attributed to Anaximander although the extent of the implied quotation is uncertain, he emphasizes the orderly nature of the universe, and indicates that the order is internal rather than imposed from outside. Simplicius, a 6th c. He says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other indefinite apeiron nature, from which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them; and those things, from which there is coming-to-be for the things that are, are also those into which is their passing-away, in accordance with what must be. It is clear that having seen the change of the four elements into each other, he did not think it fit to make some one of these underlying subject, but something else, apart from these. This claim probably means that the original state of the universe was an indefinitely large mass of stuff that was also indefinite in its character. The passage from Simplicius shows that Anaximander does not think that the eternal indefinite stuff gives rise directly to the cosmos as we know it. Rather, relying on a semi-biological model, Anaximander claims that the apeiron somehow generates the opposites hot and cold. The opposites act on, dominate, and contain each other, producing a regulated structure; thus things pass away into those things from which they came to be. It is this structured arrangement that Anaximander refers to when he speaks of justice and reparation. Over the course of time, the cycles of the seasons, the rotations of the heavens, and other sorts of cyclical change including coming-to-be and passing-away are regulated and thus form a system. This system, ruled by the justice of the ordering of time is in sharp contrast with the chaotic and capricious world of the personified Greek gods who interfere in the workings of the heavens and in the affairs of human beings Kahn a, Vlastos, Guthrie. The pattern that can be seen in Thales and Anaximander of an original stuff giving rise to the phenomena of the cosmos continues in the views of the third of the Milesians, Anaximenes. Air can apparently take on various properties of color, temperature, humidity, motion, taste, and smell. Moreover, according to Theophrastus, Anaximenes explicitly states the natural mechanism for change; it is the condensation and rarefaction of air that naturally determine the particular characters of the things produced from the originating stuff. Rarified, air becomes fire; more and more condensed, it becomes progressively wind, cloud, water, earth, and finally stones. Releasing air from the mouth with compressed lips produces cool air as in cooling soup by blowing on it, but relaxed lips produce warm air as when one blows on cold hands to warm them up. Does the originating stuff persist through the changes that it undergoes in the generating processes? Because the water does not cease to be water when it is cooled and becomes ice, it can return to a liquid when heated and then become a gas when more heat is applied. On this view, the Milesians were material monists, committed to the reality of a single material stuff that undergoes many alterations but persists through the changes Barnes, Guthrie, Sedley and. Yet there are reasons to doubt that this was actually the Milesian view. The earliest Greeks thought more in terms of powers Vlastos, Heidel, and the metaphysical problem of what it is to be a substance was yet to be formulated. Clearly the Milesians were interested in the originating stuff from which the world developed. Anaximander and Anaximenes are explicit about transformations of such an eternal originating stuff, but the view that this endured as a single substratum may not have been theirs. Anaximenes, for instance, may have thought that the change from air to water does not involve the persistence of air as any sort of substratum. There is no special role that air plays in the theory except that it is the originating stuff and so first in an analysis of the law-like cyclical changes that produce various stuffs as the cosmos develops. Graham, ch. Xenophanes of Colophon and Heraclitus of Ephesus Living in the last years of the 6th c. Both explore the possibility of human

understanding and question its limits. He has, to a great extent, been rescued from his traditional status as a minor traveling poet-sage who railed against the glorification of athletes and made some interesting comments about the relativity of human conceptions of the gods. Instead, he has come to be seen as an original thinker in his own right who influenced later philosophers trying to characterize the realms of the human and the divine, and exploring the possibility that human beings can gain genuine knowledge and wisdom, i. Xenophanes claims that all meteorological phenomena are clouds, colored, moving, incandescent: Clouds are fed by exhalations from the land and sea mixtures of earth and water. The motions of earth and water, and hence of clouds, account for all the things we find around us. His explanations of meteorological and heavenly phenomena lead to a naturalistic science: She whom they call Iris, this too is by nature pephuke cloud purple, and red, and greeny-yellow to behold. X is really Y, where Y reveals the true character of X. Xenophanes signals this by the use of pephuke in B32, and no doubt it or some word like it was there in the original of A39 as well. Xenophanes thus provides an account of a phenomenon often taken to be a sign from the divine—“Iris as the messenger; the Dioscuri St. That meteorological phenomena are not divine is not all that Xenophanes has to say about the gods. He notes anthropomorphic tendencies in conceptions of the gods B He also famously suggests that horses, oxen, and lions would have equine, bovine, and leonine gods B

2: Sophists | Catholic Answers

The chief philosophical conflict of the Greek classical period (5th-4th centuries BCE) was waged between, on the one hand, Socrates and those mainly influenced by him (including Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle) and, on the other hand, those we know as "Sophists." Nowadays the terms "sophist."

For example, a charioteer, a sculptor or a warrior could be described as *sophoi* in their occupations. Gradually, however, the word also came to denote general wisdom and especially wisdom about human affairs for example, in politics, ethics, or household management. This was the meaning ascribed to the Greek Seven Sages of 7th and 6th century BC like Solon and Thales, and it was the meaning that appeared in the histories of Herodotus. Richard Martin refers to the seven sages as "performers of political poetry". The word "sophist" could also be combined with other Greek words to form compounds. In 5th century BCE [edit] In the second half of the 5th century BCE, particularly at Athens, "sophist" came to denote a class of mostly itinerant intellectuals who taught courses in various subjects, speculated about the nature of language and culture and employed rhetoric to achieve their purposes, generally to persuade or convince others: It was good employment for those who were good at debate, which was the specialty of the first Sophists; they received the fame and fortune they were seeking. Protagoras is generally regarded as the first of these professional sophists. A few sophists claimed that they could find the answers to all questions. Most of these sophists are known today primarily through the writings of their opponents specifically Plato and Aristotle, which makes it difficult to assemble an unbiased view of their practices and beliefs. In some cases, such as Gorgias, there are original rhetorical works that are extant, allowing the author to be judged on his own terms. In most cases, however, knowledge about what individual sophists wrote or said comes from fragmentary quotations that lack context. Sophists could be described both as teachers and philosophers, having traveled about in Greece teaching their students various life skills, particularly rhetoric and public speaking. There were numerous differences among Sophist teachings, and they lectured on subjects that were as diverse as semantics and rhetoric, to ontology, epistemology. Before the fifth century B. He taught his students the necessary skills and knowledge for a successful life, particularly in politics, rather than philosophy. He trained his pupils to argue from both points of view because he believed that truth could not be limited to just one side of the argument. Protagoras wrote about a variety of subjects and some fragments of his work survived. Gorgias authored a lost work known as *On the Non-Existent*, which centers on the argument that nothing exists. In it, he attempts to persuade his readers that thought and existence are different. Plato studied philosophy under the guidance of Socrates. Due to his opposition, he is largely responsible for the modern view of the sophist as a stingy instructor who deceives. He depicts Socrates as refuting some sophists in several Dialogues. Another contemporary, the comic playwright Aristophanes, criticizes the sophists as hairsplitting wordsmiths. Aristophanes made no distinction between sophists and philosophers as Socrates did, and believed both would argue any position for the right fee. In the comedic play *The Clouds* by Aristophanes, Strepsiades seeks the help of Socrates a parody of the actual philosopher in an effort to avoid paying his debts. In most cases, however, knowledge of sophist thought comes from fragmentary quotations that lack context. Many of these quotations come from Aristotle, who seems to have held the sophists in slight regard. Due to the importance of such skills in the litigious social life of Athens, practitioners often commanded very high fees. The attacks of some of their followers against Socrates prompted a vigorous condemnation from his followers, including Plato and Xenophon, as there was a popular view of Socrates as a sophist. For example, the comic playwright Aristophanes criticizes the sophists as hairsplitting wordsmiths, and makes Socrates their representative. In comparison, Socrates accepted no fee, instead professed a self-effacing posture, which he exemplified by Socratic questioning. His attitude towards the Sophists was by no means oppositional; in one dialogue Socrates even stated that the Sophists were better educators than he was, [10] which he validated by sending one of his students to study under a sophist. Plato described Sophists as paid hunters after the young and

wealthy, as merchants of knowledge, as athletes in a contest of words, and purgers of souls. Plato sought to separate the Sophist from the Philosopher. Where a Sophist was a person who makes his living through deception, a philosopher was a lover of wisdom who sought truth. To give the Philosophers greater credence, the Sophists had to receive a negative connotation. Protagoras was the first sophist, whose theory said "Man is the measure of all things", meaning Man decides for himself what he is going to believe. In this view, the sophist is not concerned with truth and justice, but instead seeks power. Some scholars, such as Ugo Zilioli [15] argue that the sophists held a relativistic view on cognition and knowledge. However, this may involve the Greek word "doxa", which means "culturally shared belief" rather than "individual opinion". Their philosophy contains criticism of religion, law, and ethics. Though many sophists were apparently as religious as their contemporaries, some held atheistic or agnostic views for example, Protagoras and Diagoras of Melos.

Democracy[edit] The first sophists prepared Athenian males for public life in the polis by teaching them how to debate through the art of rhetoric. The art of persuasion was the most important thing to have a successful life in the fifth century Athens social commonplace when rhetoric was in its most important stage. The societal roles the Sophists filled had important ramifications for the Athenian political system at large. The historical context provides evidence for their considerable influence, as Athens became more and more democratic during the period in which the Sophists were most active. Sophists contributed to the new democracy in part by espousing expertise in public deliberation, the foundation of decision-making, which allowed—and perhaps required—a tolerance of the beliefs of others. This liberal attitude would naturally have made its way into the Athenian assembly as Sophists began acquiring increasingly high-powered clients. In addition, Sophists had great impact on the early development of law, as the sophists were the first lawyers in the world. Their status as lawyers was a result of their highly developed skills in argument. The Sophists were notorious for their claims to teach virtue and excellence, and particularly for accepting fees for teaching. The influence of this stance on education in general, and medical education in particular, have been described by Seamus Mac Suibhne.

Influence on Roman education[edit] During the Second Sophistic, the Greek discipline of rhetoric had heavy influence on Roman education. During this time Latin rhetorical studies were banned for the precedent of Greek rhetorical studies. In addition, the Greek history was preferred for the education of the Roman elites above that of their native Roman history. Cicero, a prominent rhetorician during this period in Roman history, is one such example of the influence of the Second Sophistic on Roman Education. His early life coincided with the suppression of Latin rhetoric in Roman education under the edicts of Crassus and Domitius. Cicero was instructed in Greek rhetoric throughout his youth, as well as in other subjects of the Roman rubric under Archias. Cicero benefited in his early education from favorable ties to Crassus. Despite his oratorical skill, Cicero pressed for a more liberal education in Roman instruction which focused more in the broad sciences including Roman history. He entitled this set of sciences as *politior humanitas* 2. Regardless of his efforts toward this end, Greek history was still preferred by the majority of aristocratic Romans during this time. A sophism is a specious argument for displaying ingenuity in reasoning or for deceiving someone.

3: Aristotle's Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

After Plato, Tindale turns his attention to Aristotle's engagement with the Sophists in chapter four, "The Sophists and Fallacious Argument: Aristotle's Legacy." Tindale traces the contrast between a sophistic and an acceptable refutation in the tradition of fallacy in western logic, with specific attention to Plato's Euthydemus and.

Since Homer at least, these terms had a wide range of application, extending from practical know-how and prudence in public affairs to poetic ability and theoretical knowledge. Notably, the term sophia could be used to describe disingenuous cleverness long before the rise of the sophistic movement. Theognis, for example, writing in the sixth century B. In the fifth century B. The Clouds depicts the tribulations of Strepsiades, an elderly Athenian citizen with significant debts. Deciding that the best way to discharge his debts is to defeat his creditors in court, he attends The Thinkery, an institute of higher education headed up by the sophist Socrates. When he fails to learn the art of speaking in The Thinkery, Strepsiades persuades his initially reluctant son, Pheidippides, to accompany him. Here they encounter two associates of Socrates, the Stronger and the Weaker Arguments, who represent lives of justice and self-discipline and injustice and self-indulgence respectively. On the basis of a popular vote, the Weaker Argument prevails and leads Pheidippides into The Thinkery for an education in how to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger. Strepsiades later revisits The Thinkery and finds that Socrates has turned his son into a pale and useless intellectual. In the first instance, it demonstrates that the distinction between Socrates and his sophistic counterparts was far from clear to their contemporaries. Although Socrates did not charge fees and frequently asserted that all he knew was that he was ignorant of most matters, his association with the sophists reflects both the indeterminacy of the term sophist and the difficulty, at least for the everyday Athenian citizen, of distinguishing his methods from theirs. Thirdly, the attribution to the sophists of intellectual deviousness and moral dubiousness predates Plato and Aristotle. He is depicted by Plato as suggesting that sophists are the ruin of all those who come into contact with them and as advocating their expulsion from the city Meno, 91cc. Hippocrates is so eager to meet Protagoras that he wakes Socrates in the early hours of the morning, yet later concedes that he himself would be ashamed to be known as a sophist by his fellow citizens. Plato depicts Protagoras as well aware of the hostility and resentment engendered by his profession Protagoras, c-e. It is not surprising, Protagoras suggests, that foreigners who profess to be wise and persuade the wealthy youth of powerful cities to forsake their family and friends and consort with them would arouse suspicion. Indeed, Protagoras claims that the sophistic art is an ancient one, but that sophists of old, including poets such as Homer, Hesiod and Simonides, prophets, seers and even physical trainers, deliberately did not adopt the name for fear of persecution. Protagoras says that while he has adopted a strategy of openly professing to be a sophist, he has taken other precautions "perhaps including his association with the Athenian general Pericles" in order to secure his safety. The low standing of the sophists in Athenian public opinion does not stem from a single source. No doubt suspicion of intellectuals among the many was a factor. New money and democratic decision-making, however, also constituted a threat to the conservative Athenian aristocratic establishment. In the context of Athenian political life of the late fifth century B. The development of democracy made mastery of the spoken word not only a precondition of political success but also indispensable as a form of self-defence in the event that one was subject to a lawsuit. The sophists accordingly answered a growing need among the young and ambitious. This is a long-standing ideal, but one best realised in democratic Athens through rhetoric. Rhetoric was thus the core of the sophistic education Protagoras, e , even if most sophists professed to teach a broader range of subjects. Suspicion towards the sophists was also informed by their departure from the aristocratic model of education paideia. Since Homeric Greece, paideia had been the preoccupation of the ruling nobles and was based around a set of moral precepts befitting an aristocratic warrior class. The sophists were thus a threat to the status quo because they made an indiscriminate promise "assuming capacity to pay fees" to provide the young and ambitious with the power to prevail in public life. This is only a starting point, however, and the

broad and significant intellectual achievement of the sophists, which we will consider in the following two sections, has led some to ask whether it is possible or desirable to attribute them with a unique method or outlook that would serve as a unifying characteristic while also differentiating them from philosophers. Scholarship in the nineteenth century and beyond has often fastened on method as a way of differentiating Socrates from the sophists. For Henry Sidgwick, for example, whereas Socrates employed a question-and-answer method in search of the truth, the sophists gave long epideictic or display speeches for the purposes of persuasion. It seems difficult to maintain a clear methodical differentiation on this basis, given that Gorgias and Protagoras both claimed proficiency in short speeches and that Socrates engages in long eloquent speeches – many in mythical form – throughout the Platonic dialogues. It is moreover simply misleading to say that the sophists were in all cases unconcerned with truth, as to assert the relativity of truth is itself to make a truth claim. Kerferd has proposed a more nuanced set of methodological criteria to differentiate Socrates from the sophists. According to Kerferd, the sophists employed eristic and antilogical methods of argument, whereas Socrates disdained the former and saw the latter as a necessary but incomplete step on the way towards dialectic. Plato uses the term eristic to denote the practice – it is not strictly speaking a method – of seeking victory in argument without regard for the truth. Antilogic is the method of proceeding from a given argument, usually that offered by an opponent, towards the establishment of a contrary or contradictory argument in such a way that the opponent must either abandon his first position or accept both positions. This method of argumentation was employed by most of the sophists, and examples are found in the works of Protagoras and Antiphon. As Nehamas has argued, while the elenchus is distinguishable from eristic because of its concern with the truth, it is harder to differentiate from antilogic because its success is always dependent upon the capacity of interlocutors to defend themselves against refutation in a particular case. More recent attempts to explain what differentiates philosophy from sophistry have accordingly tended to focus on a difference in moral purpose or in terms of choices for different ways of life, as Aristotle elegantly puts it *Metaphysics IV, 2, b* Section 4 will return to the question of whether this is the best way to think about the distinction between philosophy and sophistry. Before this, however, it is useful to sketch the biographies and interests of the most prominent sophists and also consider some common themes in their thought. Protagoras Protagoras of Abdera c. Despite his animus towards the sophists, Plato depicts Protagoras as quite a sympathetic and dignified figure. Pericles, who was the most influential statesman in Athens for more than 30 years, including the first two years of the Peloponnesian War, seems to have held a high regard for philosophers and sophists, and Protagoras in particular, entrusting him with the role of drafting laws for the Athenian foundation city of Thurii in B. The first topic will be discussed in section 3b. This seems to express a form of religious agnosticism not completely foreign to educated Athenian opinion. Despite this, according to tradition, Protagoras was convicted of impiety towards the end of his life. As a consequence, so the story goes, his books were burnt and he drowned at sea while departing Athens. Apart from his works *Truth* and *On the Gods*, which deal with his relativistic account of truth and agnosticism respectively, Diogenes Laertius says that Protagoras wrote the following books: *Gorgias* Gorgias of Leontini c. The major focus of Gorgias was rhetoric and given the importance of persuasive speaking to the sophistic education, and his acceptance of fees, it is appropriate to consider him alongside other famous sophists for present purposes. Gorgias visited Athens in B. He travelled extensively around Greece, earning large sums of money by giving lessons in rhetoric and epideictic speeches. Gorgias is also credited with other orations and encomia and a technical treatise on rhetoric titled *At the Right Moment in Time*. Antiphon The biographical details surrounding Antiphon the sophist c. However, since the publication of fragments from his *On Truth* in the early twentieth century he has been regarded as a major representative of the sophistic movement. *On Truth*, which features a range of positions and counterpositions on the relationship between nature and convention see section 3a below, is sometimes considered an important text in the history of political thought because of its alleged advocacy of egalitarianism: Those born of illustrious fathers we respect and honour, whereas those who come from an undistinguished house we neither respect nor honour. In this we behave like

barbarians towards one another. For by nature we all equally, both barbarians and Greeks, have an entirely similar origin: Whether this statement should be taken as expressing the actual views of Antiphon, or rather as part of an antilogical presentation of opposing views on justice remains an open question, as does whether such a position rules out the identification of Antiphon the sophist with the oligarchical Antiphon of Rhamnus.

Hippias The exact dates for Hippias of Elis are unknown, but scholars generally assume that he lived during the same period as Protagoras. Hippias is best known for his polymathy DK 86A His areas of expertise seem to have included astronomy, grammar, history, mathematics, music, poetry, prose, rhetoric, painting and sculpture. Like Gorgias and Prodicus, he served as an ambassador for his home city. His work as a historian, which included compiling lists of Olympic victors, was invaluable to Thucydides and subsequent historians as it allowed for a more precise dating of past events. In mathematics he is attributed with the discovery of a curve “the quadratrix” used to trisect an angle. It is hard to make much sense of this alleged doctrine on the basis of available evidence. As suggested above, Plato depicts Hippias as philosophically shallow and unable to keep up with Socrates in dialectical discussion.

Prodicus Prodicus of Ceos, who lived during roughly the same period as Protagoras and Hippias, is best known for his subtle distinctions between the meanings of words. He is thought to have written a treatise titled *On the Correctness of Names*. Prodicus spoke up next: There is a distinction here. We ought to listen impartially but not divide our attention equally: More should go to the wiser speaker and less to the more unlearned. In this way our meeting would take a most attractive turn, for you, the speakers, would then most surely earn the respect, rather than the praise, of those listening to you. For respect is guilelessly inherent in the souls of listeners, but praise is all too often merely a deceitful verbal expression. Socrates, although perhaps with some degree of irony, was fond of calling himself a pupil of Prodicus Protagoras, a; Meno, 96d. Thrasymachus Thrasymachus was a well-known rhetorician in Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B. He is depicted as brash and aggressive, with views on the nature of justice that will be examined in section 3a.

Major Themes of Sophistic Thought

a. Nature and Convention The distinction between *physis* nature and *nomos* custom, law, convention was a central theme in Greek thought in the second half of the fifth century B. Before turning to sophistic considerations of these concepts and the distinction between them, it is worth sketching the meaning of the Greek terms. Some of the Ionian thinkers now referred to as presocratics, including Thales and Heraclitus, used the term *physis* for reality as a whole, or at least its underlying material constituents, referring to the investigation of nature in this context as *historia* inquiry rather than philosophy. The term *nomos* refers to a wide range of normative concepts extending from customs and conventions to positive law. Nonetheless, increased travel, as exemplified by the histories of Herodotus, led to a greater understanding of the wide array of customs, conventions and laws among communities in the ancient world. This recognition sets up the possibility of a dichotomy between what is unchanging and according to nature and what is merely a product of arbitrary human convention. The dichotomy between *physis* and *nomos* seems to have been something of a commonplace of sophistic thought and was appealed to by Protagoras and Hippias among others. Antiphon applies the distinction to notions of justice and injustice, arguing that the majority of things which are considered just according to *nomos* are in direct conflict with nature and hence not truly or naturally just DK 87 A His account of the relation between *physis* and *nomos* nonetheless owes a debt to sophistic thought. Callicles argues that conventional justice is a kind of slave morality imposed by the many to constrain the desires of the superior few. What is just according to nature, by contrast, is seen by observing animals in nature and relations between political communities where it can be seen that the strong prevail over the weak. Callicles himself takes this argument in the direction of a vulgar sensual hedonism motivated by the desire to have more than others *pleonexia*, but sensual hedonism as such does not seem to be a necessary consequence of his account of natural justice. Like Callicles, Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of deliberate deception in his arguments, particularly in the claim the art of justice consists in a ruler looking after their subjects. Justice in conventional terms is simply a naive concern for the advantage of another. Our condition improved when Zeus bestowed us with shame and justice; these enabled us to develop the skill of politics and hence civilized

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communal relations and virtue. Protagoras measure thesis is as follows:

4: Sophists | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

A sophist (Greek: σοφιστής, sophistes) was a specific kind of teacher in ancient Greece, in the fifth and fourth centuries www.enganchecubano.com sophists specialized in using the tools of philosophy and rhetoric, though other sophists taught subjects such as music, athletics, and mathematics.

No deduction has two negative premises No deduction has two particular premises A deduction with an affirmative conclusion must have two affirmative premises A deduction with a negative conclusion must have one negative premise. A deduction with a universal conclusion must have two universal premises He also proves the following metatheorem: All deductions can be reduced to the two universal deductions in the first figure. His proof of this is elegant. First, he shows that the two particular deductions of the first figure can be reduced, by proof through impossibility, to the universal deductions in the second figure: This proof is strikingly similar both in structure and in subject to modern proofs of the redundancy of axioms in a system. Many more metatheoretical results, some of them quite sophisticated, are proved in Prior Analytics I. In contrast to the syllogistic itself or, as commentators like to call it, the assertoric syllogistic, this modal syllogistic appears to be much less satisfactory and is certainly far more difficult to interpret. Aristotle gives these same equivalences in On Interpretation. However, in Prior Analytics, he makes a distinction between two notions of possibility. He then acknowledges an alternative definition of possibility according to the modern equivalence, but this plays only a secondary role in his system. Most often, then, the questions he explores have the form: A premise can have one of three modalities: Aristotle works through the combinations of these in order: Two necessary premises One necessary and one assertoric premise Two possible premises One assertoric and one possible premise One necessary and one possible premise Though he generally considers only premise combinations which syllogize in their assertoric forms, he does sometimes extend this; similarly, he sometimes considers conclusions in addition to those which would follow from purely assertoric premises. Since this is his procedure, it is convenient to describe modal syllogisms in terms of the corresponding non-modal syllogism plus a triplet of letters indicating the modalities of premises and conclusion: The conversion rules for necessary premises are exactly analogous to those for assertoric premises: Aristotle generalizes this to the case of categorical sentences as follows: This leads to a further complication. Such propositions do occur in his system, but only in exactly this way, i. Such propositions appear only as premises, never as conclusions. He does not treat this as a trivial consequence but instead offers proofs; in all but two cases, these are parallel to those offered for the assertoric case. The exceptions are Baroco and Bocardo, which he proved in the assertoric case through impossibility: A very wide range of reconstructions has been proposed: Malink, however, offers a reconstruction that reproduces everything Aristotle says, although the resulting model introduces a high degree of complexity. This subject quickly becomes too complex for summarizing in this brief article. From a modern perspective, we might think that this subject moves outside of logic to epistemology. However, readers should not be misled by the use of that word. We have scientific knowledge, according to Aristotle, when we know: The remainder of Posterior Analytics I is largely concerned with two tasks: Aristotle first tells us that a demonstration is a deduction in which the premises are: Aristotle clearly thinks that science is knowledge of causes and that in a demonstration, knowledge of the premises is what brings about knowledge of the conclusion. The fourth condition shows that the knower of a demonstration must be in some better epistemic condition towards them, and so modern interpreters often suppose that Aristotle has defined a kind of epistemic justification here. However, as noted above, Aristotle is defining a special variety of knowledge. Comparisons with discussions of justification in modern epistemology may therefore be misleading. In Posterior Analytics I. Whatever is scientifically known must be demonstrated. The premises of a demonstration must be scientifically known. They then argued that demonstration is impossible with the following dilemma: If the premises of a demonstration are scientifically known, then they must be demonstrated. The premises from which each

premise are demonstrated must be scientifically known. Either this process continues forever, creating an infinite regress of premises, or it comes to a stop at some point. If it continues forever, then there are no first premises from which the subsequent ones are demonstrated, and so nothing is demonstrated. On the other hand, if it comes to a stop at some point, then the premises at which it comes to a stop are undemonstrated and therefore not scientifically known; consequently, neither are any of the others deduced from them. Therefore, nothing can be demonstrated. Aristotle does not give us much information about how circular demonstration was supposed to work, but the most plausible interpretation would be supposing that at least for some set of fundamental principles, each principle could be deduced from the others. Some modern interpreters have compared this position to a coherence theory of knowledge. However, he thinks both the agnostics and the circular demonstrators are wrong in maintaining that scientific knowledge is only possible by demonstration from premises scientifically known: To solve this problem, Aristotle needs to do something quite specific. It will not be enough for him to establish that we can have knowledge of some propositions without demonstrating them: Moreover and obviously, it is no solution to this problem for Aristotle simply to assert that we have knowledge without demonstration of some appropriate starting points. He does indeed say that it is his position that we have such knowledge. There is wide disagreement among commentators about the interpretation of his account of how this state is reached; I will offer one possible interpretation. What he is presenting, then, is not a method of discovery but a process of becoming wise. The kind of knowledge in question turns out to be a capacity or power *dunamis* which Aristotle compares to the capacity for sense-perception: Likewise, Aristotle holds, our minds have by nature the capacity to recognize the starting points of the sciences. In the case of sensation, the capacity for perception in the sense organ is actualized by the operation on it of the perceptible object. Similarly, Aristotle holds that coming to know first premises is a matter of a potentiality in the mind being actualized by experience of its proper objects: So, although we cannot come to know the first premises without the necessary experience, just as we cannot see colors without the presence of colored objects, our minds are already so constituted as to be able to recognize the right objects, just as our eyes are already so constituted as to be able to perceive the colors that exist. It is considerably less clear what these objects are and how it is that experience actualizes the relevant potentialities in the soul. Aristotle describes a series of stages of cognition. First is what is common to all animals: Next is memory, which he regards as a retention of a sensation: Even fewer have the next capacity, the capacity to form a single experience *empeiria* from many repetitions of the same memory. Finally, many experiences repeated give rise to knowledge of a single universal *katholou*. This last capacity is present only in humans.

Definitions The definition *horos*, *horismos* was an important matter for Plato and for the Early Academy. External sources sometimes the satirical remarks of comedians also reflect this Academic concern with definitions. Aristotle himself traces the quest for definitions back to Socrates. What has an essence, then? In general, however, it is not individuals but rather species *eidos*: A species is defined by giving its genus *genos* and its differentia *diaphora*: As an example, human might be defined as animal the genus having the capacity to reason the differentia. However, not everything essentially predicated is a definition. Such a predicate non-essential but counterpredicating is a peculiar property or *proprium idion*. Aristotle sometimes treats genus, peculiar property, definition, and accident as including all possible predications. Later commentators listed these four and the differentia as the five predicables, and as such they were of great importance to late ancient and to medieval philosophy. Just what that doctrine was, and indeed just what a category is, are considerably more vexing questions. They also quickly take us outside his logic and into his metaphysics. Here are two passages containing such lists: These are ten in number: An accident, a genus, a peculiar property and a definition will always be in one of these categories. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: Categories 4, 1b25a–2a4, tr. Ackrill, slightly modified These two passages give ten-item lists, identical except for their first members. Here are three ways they might be interpreted: First, the categories may be kinds of predicate: On this interpretation, the categories arise out of considering the most general types of question that can be asked about something: Thus, the categories may

rule out certain kinds of question as ill-formed or confused. Second, the categories may be seen as classifications of predications, that is, kinds of relation that may hold between the predicate and the subject of a predication. For Aristotle, the relation of predicate to subject in these two sentences is quite different in this respect he differs both from Plato and from modern logicians. The categories may be interpreted as ten different ways in which a predicate may be related to its subject. Third, the categories may be seen as kinds of entity, as highest genera or kinds of thing that are. A given thing can be classified under a series of progressively wider genera: Socrates is a human, a mammal, an animal, a living being. The categories are the highest such genera. Each falls under no other genus, and each is completely separate from the others. Which of these interpretations fits best with the two passages above? The answer appears to be different in the two cases.

5: Aristotle's Triple Threat Legacy by Professor Julia Evergreen Keefer

He also considers the nature of the "sophistical refutation" and its place in the tradition of fallacy. Tindale then turns to textual examples of specific argumentative practices, mapping how Sophists employed the argument from likelihood, reversal arguments, arguments on each side of a position, and commonplace reasoning.

Ecological fallacy[edit] An ecological fallacy is committed when one draws an inference from data based on the premise that qualities observed for groups necessarily hold for individuals; for example, "if countries with more Protestants tend to have higher suicide rates, then Protestants must be more likely to commit suicide. For a given fallacy, one must either characterize it by means of a deductive argumentation schema, which rarely applies the first prong of the fork or one must relax definitions and add nuance to take the actual intent and context of the argument into account the other prong of the fork. Nevertheless, informal fallacies apply to both deductive and non-deductive arguments. Though the form of the argument may be relevant, fallacies of this type are the "types of mistakes in reasoning that arise from the mishandling of the content of the propositions constituting the argument". Here the most important issue concerns inductive strength or methodology for example, statistical inference. In the absence of sufficient evidence, drawing conclusions based on induction is unwarranted and fallacious. With the backing of empirical evidence , however, the conclusions may become warranted and convincing at which point the arguments are no longer considered fallacious. Hasty generalisation often follows a pattern such as: X is true for A. X is true for B. Therefore, X is true for C, D, etc. While never a valid logical deduction, if such an inference can be made on statistical grounds, it may nonetheless be convincing. This is because with enough empirical evidence, the generalization is no longer a hasty one. Relevance fallacy[edit] The fallacies of relevance are a broad class of informal fallacies see the navbox below , generically represented by missing the point: Presenting an argument, which may be sound , but fails to address the issue in question. Argumentum ex silentio[edit] An argument from silence features an unwarranted conclusion advanced based on the absence of data. Examples of informal fallacies[edit] Main article: Assuming that because B comes after A, A caused B. Slippery slope[edit] Definition: The arguer claims that a sort of chain reaction, usually ending in some dire consequence, will take place, but in fact there is not enough evidence for that assumption. Where mathematical fallacies are subtle mistakes in reasoning leading to invalid mathematical proofs, measurement fallacies are unwarranted inferential leaps involved in the extrapolation of raw data to a measurement-based value claim. The ancient Greek Sophist Protagoras was one of the first thinkers to propose that humans can generate reliable measurements through his "human-measure" principle and the practice of dissoi logoi arguing multiple sides of an issue. Knowledge value measurement fallacy[edit] Increasing availability and circulation of big data are driving proliferation of new metrics for scholarly authority, [29] [30] and there is lively discussion regarding the relative usefulness of such metrics for measuring the value of knowledge production in the context of an "information tsunami". For example, limitations of the journal impact factor JIF are well documented, [32] and even JIF pioneer Eugene Garfield notes, "while citation data create new tools for analyses of research performance, it should be stressed that they supplement rather than replace other quantitative-and qualitative-indicators. A naturalistic fallacy can occur for example in the case of sheer quantity metrics based on the premise "more is better" [31] or, in the case of developmental assessment in the field of psychology, "higher is better. For example, the Scopus and Web of Science bibliographic databases have difficulty distinguishing between citations of scholarly work that are arms-length endorsements, ceremonial citations, or negative citations indicating the citing author withholds endorsement of the cited work. This creates a possibility that low productivity measurements using the tool may constitute argument from silence fallacies, to the extent that such measurements are supported by the absence of book citation data. Ecological fallacies can be committed when one measures scholarly productivity of a sub-group of individuals e. In any context, including academic debate, a conversation among friends, political discourse, advertising, or for comedic purposes, the arguer may use fallacious reasoning to

try to persuade the listener or reader, by means other than offering relevant evidence, that the conclusion is true. Examples of this include the speaker or writer: Groucho Marx used fallacies of amphiboly, for instance, to make ironic statements; Gary Larson and Scott Adams employed fallacious reasoning in many of their cartoons. Wes Boyer and Samuel Stoddard have written a humorous essay teaching students how to be persuasive by means of a whole host of informal and formal fallacies. However, even more worryingly, in other instances it is a tactic or ploy used inappropriately in argumentation to try to get the best of a speech part unfairly. The dialogue framework required to support the pragmatic theory of fallacy is built on the presumption that argumentative dialogue has both an adversarial component and a collaborative component. A dialogue has individual goals for each participant, but also collective shared goals that apply to all participants. A fallacy of the second kind is seen as more than simply violation of a rule of reasonable dialogue. It is also a deceptive tactic of argumentation, based on sleight-of-hand. Aristotle explicitly compared contentious reasoning to unfair fighting in athletic contest. But the roots of the pragmatic theory go back even further in history to the Sophists. The pragmatic theory finds its roots in the Aristotelian conception of a fallacy as a sophistical refutation, but also supports the view that many of the types of arguments traditionally labelled as fallacies are in fact reasonable techniques of argumentation that can be used, in many cases, to support legitimate goals of dialogue. Hence on the pragmatic approach, each case needs to be analyzed individually, to determine by the textual evidence whether the argument is fallacious or reasonable.

6: MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The Argument from Likelihood 69 The Meaning of Likelihood 69 Examples from Antiphon 71 The Range of Eikos Arguments 75 Evaluating Eikos Arguments 78 Contemporary Appearances: Walton and the Plausibility Argument 80 6 Turning Tables: Roots and Varieties of the Peritrope 83 What Trope Is the Peritrope? 83 Defining the Peritrope 87 Reversal Arguments.

The resulting nonsense that something "is true" and "is not true" at the same time in the same place escaped him, i. That "nonsense" did not escape Plato in his Dialogues nor Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, both of whom saw Sophists for what they are. What seems to be so to me is true for me and what seems to be so to you is true for you. But Plato and Aristotle realized a seminal truth. Unless it could be shown that the assumption of Protagoras was not right, that it was incoherent, Sophistry would be equated with philosophy. If the philosopher did not refute Protagoras, his own activity would be seen as being diminished - nothing more than an idiosyncrasy. Thus, the very nature and future of philosophy depended on confronting the Sophist and refuting him. Plato did this succinctly in the *Theaetetus*. Simply put, if the dictum of Protagoras is practically applied to the doctrine of Protagoras, it loses any significance. If Protagoras holds that what seems to be true for him is true, and similarly, what seems to be true for anyone else, is true, Protagoras must allow for a rather embarrassing position, i. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates attacks the dictum of Protagoras that all thinking is relative to a particular thinker in a dialog dealing with sense perception being real in the context of man being the measure of all things. The problem is one of dreams, which pose a threat to the infallibility of sensation or perception and awareness, since in dreams, one is aware of things which are said to be not as they appeared. This difficulty is handed by a thorough-going relativism: Thus, things are as they seem to be only insofar as we are careful to let the one sensing them be the judge of what they are. We pick up the dialog with Socrates offering an observation on the consequences of relativistic thinking. His main point is that, if the individual is the only judge of what he perceives, Protagoras might just as well say that the baboon is the measure of all things since the baboon too has sensations of which he is the only adequate judge. In general, I am delighted with his Protagoras statement that what seems to anyone also is, but I am surprised that he did not begin his Truth with the words, The measure of all things is the pig, or the baboon, or some sentient creature still more uncouth. There would have been something magnificent in so disdainful an opening, telling us that all the time, while we were admiring him for a wisdom more than mortal, he was in fact no wiser than a tadpole, to say nothing of any other human being. If what every man believes as a result of perception is indeed to be true for him; if, just as no one is to be a better judge of what another experiences, so no one is better entitled to consider whether what another thinks is true or false, and, as we have said more than once, every man is to have his own beliefs for himself alone and they are all right and true "then, my friend, where is the wisdom of Protagoras, to justify his setting up to teach others and to be handsomely paid for it, and where is our comparative ignorance or the need for us to go and sit at his feet, when each of us is himself the measure of his own wisdom? Again, if all contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, and a man, if it is equally possible to affirm and to deny anything of anything, - and this premise must be accepted by those who share the views of Protagoras. For if anyone thinks that the man is not a trireme, evidently he is not a trireme; so that he also is a trireme, if, as they say, the contradictory is true. For if it is true that a thing is man and not-man, evidently also it will be neither man nor not-man. For to the two assertions there answer two negations. And if the former is treated as a single proposition compounded out of two, the latter is a single proposition opposite to the former. Further, it follows that all would be right and all would be in error, and our opponent confesses himself to be in error. And if he makes no judgment but thinks and does not think, indifferently, what difference will there be between him and the plants? For on the one hand, if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs in which they conflict

with one another, and all think those mistaken who have not the same opinions as themselves; so that the same thing must be and not be. And on the other hand, if this is so, all opinions must be true: But the same method of discussion must not be used with all opponents; for some need persuasion, and others compulsion. Those who have been driven to this position by difficulties in their thinking can easily be cured of their ignorance; for it is not their expressed argument but their thought that one has to meet. But those who argue for the sake of argument can be convinced only by emending the argument expressed in words. The saying of Protagoras is like the views we have mentioned; he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that that which seems to each man assuredly is. If this is so, it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good, and that the contents of all other opposite statements are true, because often a particular thing appears beautiful to some and ugly to others, and that which appears to each man is the measure. This difficulty may be solved by considering the source of the opinion. It seems to have arisen in some cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others from the fact that all men have not the same views about the same things, but a particular thing appears pleasant to some and the contrary of pleasant to others. That nothing comes to be out of that which is not, but everything out of that which is, is a doctrine common to nearly all the natural philosophers. Since, then, a thing can become not-white, having been perfectly white and in no respect not-white, that which becomes white must come from that which is not-white; so that a thing must come to be out of that which is not so they argue, unless the same thing was at the beginning both not-white and white. But it is not hard to solve this difficulty; for we have said in the *Physics* I 8 in what sense things that come to be come to be from that which is not, and in what sense from that which is. The punch line for Aristotle follows. But to lend oneself equally to the opinions and the fancies of disputing parties is foolish; for clearly one of them must be mistaken. This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic. Language is composed of nouns and verbs. Nouns are of the various kinds considered in the treatise on poetry. Strange words, compound words, and invented words must be used sparingly and on few occasions. The reason for this restriction has been already indicated: In the language of prose, besides the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper or regular and the metaphorical “these and not others” are used by everybody in conversation. We can now see that a good writer can produce a style that is distinguished without being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear, thus satisfying our definition of good oratorical prose. Words of ambiguous meaning are chiefly useful to enable the Sophist to mislead his hearers. For the art of the Sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the Sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom; for them, then, it is clearly necessary to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it. Plato and Aristotle did not mince words when it came to dealing with someone who would poison the very wells of discourse and knowledge, the correct procedure being to show that such a position is incoherent, i. Therefore, it is not a possible option to doing philosophy. Sophistry is anti-philosophy because it is anti-reason and it is anti-reason because it is nonsense. People need to be continually reminded, especially our youth, what Sophistry is, in particular, its current manifestation in the bastardization of reason as a function of the worship of the god of political correctness. Recall that said bastardization was never a concern of the Sophists. That is why their intellectual plasticity must be exposed for all to see, else more Clintons will appear on the horizon, eagerly waiting to take advantage of the stupidity of the masses. It should come as no surprise to Christians that faith enables reason, and reason reinforces faith. Faith and reason are married, not divorced as the modern Sophists contend. The God Who gave us faith also gave us reason. Therefore, faith and reason are incapable of contradicting each other. We will now look at some examples of modern Sophists. The modern Sophists are no longer interested in winning arguments for arguments sake. A primary tool of the modern Sophists is the manipulation of words so that their commonly understood meanings are skewed beyond recognition. A characteristic of these Sophistic families is that no

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consideration whatsoever is given to the consequences of violating the Natural Law. It is to be noted, however, that mankind must have a fear of sin if civilization is to survive, else anarchy reigns supreme.

7: The Internet Classics Archive | On Sophistical Refutations by Aristotle

Arguments appear to be logical, but are in fact false. Plato attacks because he is critical of the sophists for accepting payment for their services, and for teaching how to win arguments regardless of the truth.

Constructive Strategies of Sophistic Argument. University of South Carolina Press, Instead, Tindale argues, the Sophists develop argumentative methods to weigh probabilities and likelihoods in a world where probability and not absolute truth is the best one can hope for. By examining their actual modes of argumentation in their own words, in those they have influenced, and in the reports of others about their argumentation, Tindale contends that the Sophists play a critical role in the development of rhetoric by acknowledging the importance of the audience as equal partners in the constructive process of improving reason. The book is divided into two parts: Sophistic Argument and the Early Tradition, with four chapters and an introduction; and Sophistic Strategies of Argumentation, with six chapters and an introduction. Part one focuses on sophistic arguments generally and their particular associations with eristics and false refutations. Part two builds a contrasting picture of sophistic arguments by looking at strategies that can be recovered from their works, from reports concerning them, and from the work of their contemporaries and students. The first is a negative portrayal and reflects the views of people such as Aristophanes and Richard Whatley through contemporary argumentation theorists. The second portrayal is more positive and drawn from the perspectives of Euripides, Thucydides, Hegel, and modern thinkers like Eduard Zeller. Tindale argues that the charge arises from a disagreement over the nature of reality, its relation to human experience, and the capacity of language to articulate this relationship. Although Plato and Aristotle have a reasonable position of assuming an absolute truth undergirds reality, the Sophists also have a justifiable view that experience with reality can be understood in a different way. What emerges is the claim that fallacies are ultimately theory-bound, arising in relation to a set of beliefs about what constitutes the standard for truth. Although both sorts of refutation are considered by Tindale to be valid, the traditional discussions of fallacy has privileged one that of Aristotle and marginalized the other that of the Sophists. While part one looked at the surviving works of specific Sophists, part two explores the strategies of argumentation used by different Sophists in a variety of texts. In each chapter, specific attention is given to the structure of the text, evaluation of the text, and its context, with particular emphasis on how audiences experience these arguments. Tindale also makes connections between classical and contemporary rhetorical argumentation, showing how many of these strategies are still effective today. The Argument from Likelihood? Given that juries were not present when events transpired, jurors had to form pictures of what happened depending on what is likely according to human experience. Although direct evidence is preferable, sometimes eikos is the only resource available. What makes eikos so persuasive in court settings is its appeal to what was customary in the experience of people generally. This in turn requires that the speaker know the cognitive environment of his or her audience and construct an argument accordingly. Roots and Varieties of the Peritrope. Drawing from Myles F. Burnyeat, Tindale identifies its two varieties of the peritrope – the self-contradiction charge and the general gambit – and illustrates contemporary examples of it. What he concludes is that attention must be directed first at whether a person has made statements or performed actions that are relevant to the reversal and then on the credibility of the person. In either case, the relevance of the circumstance and context matters when someone is attempting to be persuasive. This strategy was attributed to Protagoras and is explored thoroughly in the examination of such texts like *Dissoi Logoi*. Tindale also looks at the relationship between opposing arguments and early examples of counterfactual reasoning as well as the contemporary value of such an approach in social debates. Given the contextual nature of signs and allusion, these strategies have lost their appeal in argumentation. However, there are some contemporary thinkers, like Walton, Perelman, and Olbrechts-Tyteca, who are exploring whether arguments from signs and allusion can be understood more systematically. Witness Testimony and Appeal to Character. Of all these arguments, testimony has become the

most importance as a central source of information today in both the legal system and respect to information about the world itself. Contrary to Plato and Aristotle, the Sophists understood justice in humanist terms: Tindale concludes that there may be two types of Sophists – one that makes man the measure of all things and the other who are purely destructive – and shows the connection between classical sophistic arguments and contemporary rhetorical argumentation, especially the work of Chaim Perelman. Tindale also makes a significant contribution in clarifying the fundamental nature of the disagreement between critics of the Sophists, like Plato and Aristotle, and the Sophists themselves. The disagreement between the two parties is not rhetorical but ultimately metaphysical and epistemological in nature. It would be worthwhile to see a sequel to this book that addresses these issues.

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8: Presocratic Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The Sophists represent a phase of Greek thought which, while it had no constructive value, and is, indeed, a step backward and not forward, in the course of Greek speculation is nevertheless of great importance historically, because it was the evil influence of the Sophists that inspired Socrates with the idea of refuting them by showing the conditions of true knowledge.

Sophist, any of certain Greek lecturers, writers, and teachers in the 5th and 4th centuries bce, most of whom traveled about the Greek-speaking world giving instruction in a wide range of subjects in return for fees. History of the name The term sophist Greek sophistes had earlier applications. This would explain the subsequent application of the term to the Seven Wise Men 7th-6th century bce, who typified the highest early practical wisdom, and to pre-Socratic philosophers generally. Plato and Aristotle altered the meaning again, however, when they claimed that professional teachers such as Protagoras were not seeking the truth but only victory in debate and were prepared to use dishonest means to achieve it. Finally, under the Roman Empire the term was applied to professors of rhetoric, to orators, and to prose writers generally, all of whom are sometimes regarded as constituting what is now called the Second Sophistic movement see below The Second Sophistic movement. The 5th-century Sophists The names survive of nearly 30 Sophists properly so called, of whom the most important were Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus. Plato protested strongly that Socrates was in no sense a Sophist—he took no fees, and his devotion to the truth was beyond question. But from many points of view he is rightly regarded as a rather special member of the movement. The actual number of Sophists was clearly much larger than 30, and for about 70 years, until c. Thereafter, at least at Athens, they were largely replaced by the new philosophical schools, such as those of Plato and Isocrates. Most of the major Sophists were not Athenians, but they made Athens the centre of their activities, although travelling continuously. The importance of Athens was doubtless due in part to the greater freedom of speech prevailing there, in part to the patronage of wealthy men like Callias, and even to the positive encouragement of Pericles, who was said to have held long discussions with Sophists in his house. Athens was a democracy, and although its limits were such that Thucydides could say it was governed by one man, Pericles, it nonetheless gave opportunities for a successful political career to citizens of the most diverse backgrounds, provided they could impress their audiences sufficiently in the council and the assembly. A Sophistic education was increasingly sought after both by members of the oldest families and by aspiring newcomers without family backing. The changing pattern of Athenian society made merely traditional attitudes in many cases no longer adequate. Criticizing such attitudes and replacing them by rational arguments held special attraction for the young, and it explains the violent distaste which they aroused in traditionalists. Plato thought that much of the Sophistic attack upon traditional values was unfair and unjustified. But even he learned at least one thing from the Sophists—if the older values were to be defended, it must be by reasoned argument, not by appeals to tradition and unreflecting faith. Seen from this point of view, the Sophistic movement performed a valuable function within Athenian democracy in the 5th century bce. It offered an education designed to facilitate and promote success in public life. All of the Sophists appear to have provided a training in rhetoric and in the art of speaking, and the Sophistic movement, responsible for large advances in rhetorical theory, contributed greatly to the development of style in oratory. Naturally the balance and emphasis differed from Sophist to Sophist, and some offered wider curricula than others. But this was an individual matter, and attempts by earlier historians of philosophy to divide the Sophistic movement into periods in which the nature of the instruction was altered are now seen to fail for lack of evidence. The 5th-century Sophists inaugurated a method of higher education that in range and method anticipated the modern humanistic approach inaugurated or revived during the European Renaissance. La Hire, Laurent de: Rhetoric, oil on canvas by Laurent de La Hire, In a private collection Nature of Sophistic thought A question still discussed is whether the Sophists in general had any real regard for truth or whether they taught

their pupils that truth was unimportant compared with success in argument. Eristic, for Plato, consists in arguments aimed at victory rather than at truth. Antilogic involves the assignment to any argument of a counterargument that negates it, with the implication that both argument and counterargument are equally true. Antilogic in this sense was especially associated with Protagoras; but Plato, no doubt correctly, attributes its use to other Sophists as well. He regards the use of antilogic as essentially eristic, whether it be used to silence an opponent by making his position seem self-contradictory, or whether it be used mechanically to negate any proposition put forward in debate. He concludes that the widespread use of antilogic is evidence that Sophists had no real regard for the truth, which must itself be free from antilogic. Plato conversing with his pupils Plato conversing with his pupils, mosaic from Pompeii, 1st century bce; in the National Archaeological Museum, Naples. For example, if a person is tall in relation to one object, he will be short in relation to another object. In so characterizing the phenomenal world, Plato certainly did not wish to be called eristic—he regarded the application of antilogic to the description of the phenomenal world as an essential preliminary to the search for the truth residing in the Platonic forms, which are themselves free from antilogic. Seen in this perspective, the Sophistic use of antilogic must be judged less harshly. To the extent that it was used irresponsibly to secure success in debate it was eristic, and the temptation so to use it must often have arisen. But where it was invoked in the sincere belief that antilogic elements were indeed involved, or where it was used for analyzing a complex situation in order to reveal its complexity, then antilogic was in no way inconsistent with devotion to truth. This raises the question to what extent the Sophists possessed any general view of the world or gave expression to any genuine philosophical views, whether original or derived. Ancient writers, influenced by Plato and Aristotle, seem to have excluded the Sophists, apart from Protagoras, from their schematized accounts of early Greek thinkers. Modern writers have frequently maintained that, whatever else they were, the Sophists were in no sense philosophers. Even those who acknowledge the philosophical interest of certain particular doctrines attributed to individual Sophists often tend to regard these as exceptions and claim that, inasmuch as the Sophists were not a school but only independent teachers and writers, as a class they were not philosophers. Two questions are involved: Among moderns, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the first to reinsert the Sophists into the history of Greek philosophy. He did so within the framework of his own dialectic, in which every thesis invokes its own opposite, or antithesis; thus, he treated the Sophists as representing the antithesis to the thesis of the group of philosophers known collectively as the pre-Socratics. Pre-Socratics such as Thales, Heracleitus, and Parmenides sought the truth about the external world with a bold enthusiasm that produced a series of explanations, each claiming to be correct. None of these explanations of the physical world paid attention to the observer and each was driven to reject more and more of the phenomenal world itself as unreal. Finally, with the Eleatics, a 5th-century school at Elea in Italy that held that reality is a static one, of which Parmenides and Zeno are representatives, little or nothing of the phenomenal world was left as real. This trend in turn produced a growing distrust of the power of human beings to attain knowledge of the ultimate basis of natural phenomena. Philosophy had reached an impasse, and there was a danger of complete skepticism. To Hegel, the Sophists were subjective idealists, holding that reality is only minds and their contents, and so philosophy could move forward by turning its attention to the subjective element in knowing. Whether any of the Sophists actually were subjective idealists may be doubted. The conclusion depends in part on whether Protagoras held that phenomena had subjective existence only, or whether he thought that all things perceived had objective existence but were perceived differently according to the nature of the percipient and their relation to him. It is fairly clear, however, that the Sophists did concentrate very largely upon human beings and human society, upon questions of words in their relations to things, upon issues in the theory of knowledge, and upon the importance of the observer and the subjective element in reality and in the correct understanding of reality. This emphasis helps to explain the philosophical hostility of Plato and Aristotle. Particularly in the eyes of Plato, anyone who looks for the truth in phenomena alone, whether he interprets it subjectively or relativistically, cannot hope to find it there; and his persistence in turning away from the right direction virtually amounts to a rejection of philosophy and of

the search for truth. Many a subsequent thinker for whom metaphysics, or the investigation of the deepest nature of reality, was the crowning achievement of philosophy has felt with Plato that the Sophists were so antimetaphysical that they have no claim to rank as philosophers. But since the middle century there has been growing appreciation of a number of problems and doctrines recurring in the discussions of the Sophists in the 5th and 4th centuries bce. In the 18th and early 19th centuries the Sophists were considered charlatans. Their intellectual honesty was impugned, and their doctrines were blamed for weakening the moral fibre of Greece. The charge was based on two contentions, both correct: Much less weight is now attached to these charges. First, many of the attacks on the traditional morality were in the name of a new morality that claimed to be of greater validity. Attacks upon particular doctrines often claimed that accepted views should be abandoned as morally defective. Furthermore, even when socially disfavoured action seemed to be commended, this was frequently done to introduce a principle necessary in any satisfactory moral theory. Finally, there is no evidence that any of the Sophists were personally immoral or that any of their pupils were induced to immoral actions by Sophistic teaching. The serious discussion of moral problems and the theory of morality tends to improve behaviour, not to corrupt it. It has usually been supposed that the writings themselves hardly survived beyond the period of Plato and Aristotle, but this view requires modification in the light of papyrus finds, admittedly few, that were copied from Sophistic writings in the early Common Era. It also has been possible to identify in the works of later writers certain imitations or summaries of 5th-century Sophistic writers, whose names are unknown. This evidence suggests that while most later writers took their accounts of the Sophists from earlier writers, especially from Plato, the original writings did in many cases survive and were consulted. Particular doctrines As part of his defense of the Sophists against the charge of immoral teachings, the English historian George Grote " maintained that they had nothing in common with each other except their profession, as paid teachers qualifying young men to think, speak, and act with credit to themselves as citizens. This denial of common doctrines cannot be sustained"the evidence is against it. While the Sophists were not a sect, with a set of obligatory beliefs or doctrines, they had a common interest in a whole series of questions to which they sought to apply solutions along certain clearly defined lines. No complete writings survive from any of the Sophists to check the accounts found in Plato, and later writers were often, but not always, dependent upon what they found in Plato. Consequently, almost everything that is said about particular Sophistic doctrines is subject to controversy. Theoretical issues Relativism and skepticism have often been regarded as common features of the Sophistic movement as a whole. But it was early pointed out that only in Protagoras and Gorgias is there any suggestion of a radical skepticism about the possibility of knowledge; and even in their case Sextus Empiricus, in his discussion of skepticism, is probably right when he declares that neither was really a skeptic. Protagoras does seem to have restricted knowledge to sense experience, but he believed emphatically that whatever was perceived by the senses was certainly true. This led him to assert that the tangent does not touch the circle at a point only but along a definite length of the circumference; clearly he was referring to human perception of drawn tangents and circles. Gorgias, who claimed that nothing exists, or if it does exist it cannot be known, or if it exists and is knowable it cannot be communicated to another, has often been accused of denying all reality and all knowledge. Yet he also seems to have appealed in his very discussion of these themes to the certainty of perceived facts about the physical world; e. Others dismiss his whole thesis as a satire or joke against philosophers. Probably neither view is correct. There is evidence that other Sophists e. The Sophists, in fact, were attempting to explain the phenomenal world without appealing to any principles outside phenomena. They believed that this could be done by including the observer within the phenomenal world. Their refusal to go beyond phenomena was, for Plato, the great weakness in their thinking. A second common generalization about the Sophists has been that they represent a revolt against science and the study of the physical world. The evidence is against this, inasmuch as for Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and Protagoras there are records of a definite interest in questions of this kind. One of the most famous doctrines associated with the Sophistic movement was the opposition between nature and custom or convention in morals. It is probable that the antithesis did not originate in

Sophistic circles but was rather earlier; but it was clearly very popular and figured largely in Sophistic discussions. The commonest form of the doctrine involved an appeal from conventional laws to supposedly higher laws based on nature. Sometimes these higher laws were invoked to remedy defects in actual laws and to impose more stringent obligations; but usually it was in order to free the individual from restrictions unjustifiably imposed by human laws that the appeal to nature was made. In its extreme form the appeal involved the throwing off of all restraints upon self-interest and the desires of the individual e. On other occasions the terms of the antithesis were reversed and human laws were explicitly acclaimed as superior to the laws of nature and as representing progress achieved by human endeavour. In all cases the laws of nature were regarded not as generalized descriptions of what actually happens in the natural world and so not like the laws of physics to which no exceptions are possible but rather as norms that people ought to follow but are free to ignore. Thus, the appeal to nature tended to mean an appeal to human nature treated as a source for norms of conduct. See also natural law. To Greeks this appeal was not very novel.

9: Sophism - By Movement / School - The Basics of Philosophy

The truth of the conclusions of an argument does not determine whether the argument is a fallacy - it is the argument which is fallacious. The Greek thinker Aristotle held the view that if a body is moving, some external force is required to keep it moving.

Part 1 Let us now discuss sophistic refutations, i. We will begin in the natural order with the first. That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. For physically some people are in a vigorous condition, while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty, while others seem to be so, by dint of embellishing themselves. So it is, too, with inanimate things; for of these, too, some are really silver and others gold, while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense; e. In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine, sometimes not, though inexperience may make them appear so: For reasoning rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated: Now some of them do not really achieve this, though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these the most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names only. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: But the two cases names and things are not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a single name, have a number of meanings. Accordingly just as, in counting, those who are not clever in manipulating their counters are taken in by the experts, in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For this reason, then, and for others to be mentioned later, there exists both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real. Now for some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom ; for them, then, it is clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. To reduce it to a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a thing, himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer, and the other upon the securing of one. Those, then, who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: Clearly, then, there exists a class of arguments of this kind, and it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists. Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of sophistic arguments, and how many in number are the elements of which this faculty is composed, and how many branches there happen to be of this inquiry, and the other factors that contribute to this art. Part 2 Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes: Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments, and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer for the learner should take things on trust: The subject, then, of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics, while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has been discussed elsewhere: Part 3 First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals to the death. These are five in number, refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling-i. For they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party, or as the second best to show that he is committing some fallacy, or as a third best to lead him into paradox, or fourthly to reduce him to solecism, i. Part 4 There are two styles of refutation: Those ways of producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language are six in number: Of this we may assure ourselves both by induction, and by syllogistic proof based on this-and it may be on other assumptions as well-that this is the number of ways in which we

might fall to mean the same thing by the same names or expressions. Arguments such as the following depend upon ambiguity. Of course, the man who was recovering was the sick man, who really was sick at the time: Examples such as the following depend upon amphiboly: There are three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies: Amphiboly and ambiguity, then, depend on these modes of speech. Upon the combination of words there depend instances such as the following: Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3, and odd, and that the greater is equal: For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same meaning when divided and when combined, e. An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in unwritten discussion; in written discussions and in poetry it is easier. For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent, pronouncing the ou with an acuter accent. Instances such as these, then, turn upon the accentuation. Others come about owing to the form of expression used, when what is really different is expressed in the same form, e. For it is possible to use an expression to denote what does not belong to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong. In the same manner also in the other instances. Refutations, then, that depend upon language are drawn from these common-place rules. Of fallacies, on the other hand, that are independent of language there are seven kinds: Part 5 Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its accident. Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or in a certain respect and not strictly, occur whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely, e. Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely. This kind of thing is in some cases easily seen by any one, e. But in some cases it often passes undetected, viz. A situation of this kind arises, where both the opposite attributes belong alike: For to refute is to contradict one and the same attribute-not merely the name, but the reality-and a name that is not merely synonymous but the same name-and to confute it from the propositions granted, necessarily, without including in the reckoning the original point to be proved, in the same respect and relation and manner and time in which it was asserted. Some people, however, omit some one of the said conditions and give a merely apparent refutation, showing e. Or, it may be, they show that it is both double and not double of the same thing, but not that it is so in the same respect: Or, it may be, they show it to be both double and not double of the same thing and in the same respect and manner, but not that it is so at the same time: One might, with some violence, bring this fallacy into the group of fallacies dependent on language as well. Those that depend on the assumption of the original point to be proved, occur in the same way, and in as many ways, as it is possible to beg the original point; they appear to refute because men lack the power to keep their eyes at once upon what is the same and what is different. The refutation which depends upon the consequent arises because people suppose that the relation of consequence is convertible. For whenever, suppose A is, B necessarily is, they then suppose also that if B is, A necessarily is. This is also the source of the deceptions that attend opinions based on sense-perception. For people often suppose bile to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow colour: In rhetoric proofs from signs are based on consequences. For when rhetoricians wish to show that a man is an adulterer, they take hold of some consequence of an adulterous life, viz. There are, however, many people of whom these things are true, while the charge in question is untrue. It happens like this also in real reasoning; e. If, therefore, the universe has not come to be, it has no first beginning, and is therefore eternal. But this does not necessarily follow: The refutation which depends upon treating as cause what is not a cause, occurs whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument, as though the refutation depended upon it. This kind of thing happens in arguments that reason ad impossible: If, then, the false cause be reckoned in among the questions that are necessary to establish the resulting impossibility, it will often be thought that the refutation depends upon it, e. But this is impossible: Now this is not proved: Arguments of that kind, then, though not inconclusive absolutely, are inconclusive in relation to the proposed conclusion. Also even the questioners themselves often fail quite as much to see a point of that kind. Such, then, are the arguments that depend upon the consequent and upon false cause. Those that depend upon the making of two questions into one occur whenever the plurality is undetected and a single answer is returned as if to a single question. Now, in some cases, it is easy

to see that there is more than one, and that an answer is not to be given, e. Sometimes, however, additional premisses may actually give rise to a genuine refutation; e. Whenever, then, one thing can see while another cannot, they will either both be able to see or else both be blind; which is impossible. In the first place, we may see if they are inconclusive: Next we should also take the definition bit by bit, and try the fallacy thereby. For of the fallacies that consist in language, some depend upon a double meaning, e. Even this, however, should be the same, just as the thing signified should be as well, if a refutation or proof is to be effected; e. If, then, there is no proof as regards an accident of anything, there is no refutation. For supposing, when A and B are, C must necessarily be, and C is white, there is no necessity for it to be white on account of the syllogism. So, if the triangle has its angles equal to two right-angles, and it happens to be a figure, or the simplest element or starting point, it is not because it is a figure or a starting point or simplest element that it has this character. For the demonstration proves the point about it not qua figure or qua simplest element, but qua triangle. Likewise also in other cases. If, then, refutation is a proof, an argument which argued per accidens could not be a refutation. It is, however, just in this that the experts and men of science generally suffer refutation at the hand of the unscientific: Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certain respect only or said absolutely, are clear cases of *ignoratio elenchi* because the affirmation and the denial are not concerned with the same point. Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be cases of *ignoratio elenchi* through the definition thereof. Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident: It is, however, not always true, e. For because what has been generated has a beginning, he claims also that what has a beginning has been generated, and argues as though both what has been generated and what is finite were the same because each has a beginning. Likewise also in the case of things that are made equal he assumes that if things that assume one and the same magnitude become equal, then also things that become equal assume one magnitude: Inasmuch, then, as a refutation depending on accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is, clearly so also does a refutation depending on the consequent. We shall have further to examine this in another way as well.

THE SOPHISTS AND FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT: ARISTOTLES LEGACY

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