

## 1: Russell's Moral Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Bertrand Russell's professional philosophical reputation rests mainly on his mathematical logic and theory of knowledge. In this study, first published in , however, Kenneth Blackwell considers Russell's writings on ethics and metaethics and uncovers the conceptual unity in Russell's normative ethic.*

The Open Question Argument and its Aftermath: Before , Russell devoted some of the energy that he could spare from German Social Democracy, the foundations of mathematics and the philosophy of Leibniz to working out a meta-ethic of his own. After , he became an enthusiastic but critical convert to the doctrines of Principia Ethica though there is some evidence that the conversion process may have begun as early as . Russell subscribed to this thesis "with certain important reservations" until . Thereafter he continued to believe that if judgments about good and bad are to be objectively true, non-natural properties of goodness and badness are required to make them true. It is just that he ceased to believe that there are any such properties. Does this mean that judgments about good and evil are all false? Not necessarily though Russell did subscribe to that view for a brief period during . An alternative theory is that moral judgments are neither true nor false, since their role is not to state facts or to describe the way the world is, but to express emotions, desires or even commands. He came to think that, despite their indicative appearance, moral judgments "at least judgments about what is good or bad in itself" are really in the optative mood. A sentence is in the optative mood if it expresses a wish or a desire. But I am not stating that I desire to be in England, since I am not stating anything at all except perhaps that April is here. But one of them seems to have proceeded from a Moorean premise. Russell took Moore to have refuted naturalism, the view that although there are moral truths, nothing metaphysically out of the ordinary is required to make them true. In the supposed absence of such properties, he was driven to the conclusion that moral judgments at least judgments about goodness and badness were either all false or neither true nor false. Thus Russell remained a renegade Moorean even after he had ceased to believe in the Moorean good. But if Moore was a decisive influence on Russell, it seems that Russell was an important influence on Moore. He had a pretty good draft in , but he did not publish it until . Why the long delay? One reason, I suspect, was that he had to deal with a problem posed perhaps unwittingly by Russell. The first, which is derived from Sidgwick, and has a long philosophical pedigree, goes something like this: To put the point another way: This argument crops up at PE: They are all so anxious to persuade us that what they call the good is what we really ought to do. However Moore did not invent this argument. Prior, in his *Logic and the Basis of Ethics* IX , traces it back to Cudworth in the 17th Century, though it doubtful whether Moore was aware of this. He does not seem to have been particularly well read. But it certainly occurs in Sidgwick, which is presumably where Moore got it from. This occurs at PE: It can be stated thus: Thus if two predicates or property words have distinct meanings, they name distinct properties. Where did Moore get this definition? He does not say, crediting it, in effect, to Mr Nobody. But in fact the inventor of this plausible but fallacious definition was none other than the Hon. This is not a very convincing argument since I can desire something "and hence act" without thinking it good, as non-human animals presumably do. The precondition of action is desire, not desire tricked out in the vocabulary of good and evil. Thus Russell has set himself a rather difficult problem, since it is not at all clear that there can be any true propositions that are not, in some sense, propositions about what is, has been or will be. Perhaps what he has in mind is a set of self-evident axioms about what ought to be or what we ought to do which do not admit of any further analysis. It seems that a maxim cannot count as self-evident unless it is evident to every qualified self. He seems to think that it is a conceptual truth that moral judgments are liable to error. This allows for the possibility of error, for though we usually know what we want, we can be wrong about whether we will like it when we get it. Russell hastens to explain that this definition is not as sordid as it sounds. For propositions about what will satisfy desire are propositions about what will satisfy desire "that is, propositions about what will be. The theory must help explain the fact that we often do what we believe to be our duty and usually pursue and promote what we believe to be good. And this is confirmed by common experience, which informs us that men are often governed by their duties, and are deterred from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and

impelled to others by that of obligation. For we usually desire that our desires be satisfied, and hence have a reason to pursue and promote the good. This last point is distinctly dubious. This theory maintains the link between moral belief and action naturally we pursue and promote the things that we want! The theory as stated is a little too crude for Russell however, since it precludes the possibility of moral error. After all, it is difficult to be wrong about what we want. The theory has the further unhappy consequence that we cannot desire what we believe to be bad, let alone what is bad, since from the very fact that I desire something, it follows that for me, at least, it is good. All desires are equally moral since they are all desires for the good. The good for each person is what he desires for its own sake and generally speaking he cannot be mistaken about this. But he can be mistaken about whether a given object is the means to what he ultimately desires. Furthermore, if he is mistaken, his secondary desires may be immoral. But an agent can both desire the bad and have bad desires, since his secondary desires may be inimical to his ultimate ends. Unfortunately this amendment cannot save the theory. Finally, the theory, even in its amended form, reduces moral judgments to statements of a psychological state. What about the desire-to-desire theory? I will pursue and promote what I believe to be good in so far as I desire what I desire to desire. I might be persuaded, especially under moral pressure, that I desire to desire something when in fact I do not. But it is possible both to desire the bad to desire what I desire not to desire and to have bad desires to have desires which I desire to desire not to desire. Self-conscious depravity is thus a real possibility and the Socratic paradox is dismissed. For like an unhappy junkie, I can act on desires which I desire not to desire. But it is not possible to desire to desire the bad since what we desire to desire is automatically good. Furthermore, moral judgments are reduced to statements of a psychological state, so much so that ethics becomes a branch of empirical psychology. The axioms of ethics, in so far as there are such things, are concerned with what is, since our desires, including our second-order desires are original existents. Thus Russell was trying in the end to devise a theory that would meet six constraints: Thus morality might not hang from the skyhook of intuited axioms if moral judgments meant the same as natural judgments of some kind. But he goes on to argue against this possibility, that is, to argue that what Moore was to call naturalism is false. Nor is it odd that he should have anticipated Moore, since Sidgwick, who was their teacher, anticipated them both. However this provides Russell with a sextet of constraints that cannot be jointly met. For example, it is hard to see how conditions 2. Yet to do so violates conditions 2. Thus it comes as no surprise that the theories which Russell managed to come up with all fail to meet his constraints. It also meets condition 2. It meets condition 2. Interestingly if Russell abandoned 2. This meets condition 2. The theory meets condition 2. For much the same reason it meets condition 2. But of course the standard objection to non-cognitivist theories is precisely that they violate conditions 2. They treat utterances which are commonly regarded as true or false as lacking in truth-value at least with respect to their primary meanings and they immunize moral judgments from error by depriving them of the possibility of falsehood. But I do say that the constraints are plausible and that it is a desideratum in a meta-ethical theory that it meet as many as possible. Russell demonstrates his philosophical acumen by making the attempt. In , Russell decided in effect, to sacrifice conditions 2. Are moral judgments liable to error? Only in so far as we can be mistaken about what we desire to desire, which is, perhaps, not very far. On the plus side, moral judgments will be true or false, and will have a conceptual connection albeit an iffy one to our actions and passions. Assuming that at least sometimes I actually desire what I desire to desire, the fact that for me X is good means that at least sometimes I will have a desire to pursue or promote X. Now why should this theory pose a problem for Moore? Because the time-honored Barren Tautology argument does not work against it. Remember, the conclusion of the Barren Tautology Argument is this: By substitution this gives us: Russell is not advocating the pursuit of what we desire to desire: We do it because to be good just is to be something which we desire to desire, and hence something which, sometimes at any rate, we will actually desire. It does not provide and is not intended to provide a reason for action. But in that case, the antecedent of 1.

## 2: Bertrand Russell - Wikipedia

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Writings on Ethics Bertrand Russell was a prolific writer. He wrote on different branches of philosophy, including logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of religion and philosophy of mathematics. In "The Elements" Russell expounds an ethics largely based on G. Russell had originally intended to include the discussion on ethics in his Human Knowledge, but he decided not to do so because he was uncertain as to the sense in which ethics can be regarded as "knowledge. Moore, Russell was consistently an ethical non-cognitivist. That is to say, he did not believe that there is any such thing as objective ethical facts: In both cases, Russell thinks Ethics fails to qualify. In his An Outline of Philosophy, Russell begins his discussion of ethics with the following words: I hardly think myself that it ought to be included in the domain of philosophy, but to prove this would take as long as to discuss the subject itself, and would be less interesting. Because of his non-cognitivism, Russell thinks that questions as to "values" that is to say, as to what is good or bad on its own account, independently of its effects lie outside the domain of science. From this, Russell draws the further conclusion that questions about "values" lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. And this in turn has implications for the place of Ethics in philosophy. Russell regarded philosophy as a kind of incomplete science, a search for certainty in the sphere where certain knowledge is not yet achieved but remains possible. However, since Russell rejects the existence of ethics facts, ethical knowledge certain or otherwise is not even possible. Therefore, while Russell regarded the argument proving the impossibility of ethical knowledge as part of philosophy, normative theory the traditional business of philosophical ethics was excluded from philosophy proper. Thus, although Russell originally intended to include his Human Society in Ethics and Politics in his book Human Knowledge, as he says in the preface to the former, he decided not to do so because he was uncertain as to the sense in which ethics can be regarded as "knowledge. Adolescent View In his youth, Russell took the utilitarian view that the "happiness of mankind should be the aim of all actions" Russell , 39 to be so obviously true that he was surprised to find, upon entering Cambridge, that there were alternative ethical theories. At this stage, he took "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" as his ideal. Russell moved away from his youthful utilitarianism because of what he calls "moral experience. In a letter written to Gilbert Murray in , Russell says, "what first turned me away from utilitarianism was the persuasion that I myself ought to pursue philosophy, although I had and have still no doubt that by doing economics and the theory of politics I could add more to human happiness. As he says, "it gives moments of delight, but these are outweighed by years of effort and depression. He believed that 1 "good" is the most fundamental ethical concept and 2 that "good" is indefinable. He further maintained that we know a priori certain propositions about the kind of things that are good on their own account. In addition, that when we make a statement such as "X is good", we make a statement like "this table is round", which is either true or false, and whose truth or falsity is independent of our opinions and emotions. So, at the time of writing "The Elements" Russell was, like Moore, a cognitivist in ethics. According to Moore, the pleasure of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects are the most valuable things we know or imagine. Russell, on the other hand, gives no such list of things which are good in themselves, since he holds that his readers are competent to judge what things are good and what bad. Irrespective of details, both Moore and Russell regard consequences or results as of vital importance for judging an action as right or wrong. In other words both are teleologists or consequentialists , like the utilitarians. An action is called "objectively right" by Russell when "of all that are possible it is the one which will probably have the best results. Soon he started moving from ethical cognitivism to ethical non-cognitivism. As he says, "For the human system whiskey is truly more intoxicating than coffee, and the contrary opinion would be an error; but what a strange way of vindicating this real, though relative distinction to insist that whiskey is more intoxicating in itself, without reference to any animal; that it is pervaded, as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and stands dead drunk in its bottle! The war

forced him to think afresh on a number of fundamental questions. For instance, Russell was forced to revise his views on human nature. As he says in his Autobiography, in his endeavour to understand popular feelings about war, he arrived at a view of human passions similar to that of psychoanalysts. Russell started believing that fundamental facts "in all ethical questions are feelings", Russell, 19 and that impulse has more effect in moulding human lives than conscious purpose. In this small book, included in *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell*, Russell clearly says that ethical disagreements about the good life are amenable to argument only when men differ as to the means to achieve a given end. But when there is a real difference as to ends, no argument is possible. According to Russell, neither love without knowledge nor knowledge without love can produce a good life; but love is in a sense more fundamental, since it will lead intelligent people to seek knowledge in order to find out how to benefit those whom they love. Russell clarifies that by "knowledge" he does not mean "ethical knowledge. By "knowledge" Russell means "scientific knowledge and knowledge of particular facts. All moral rules must be tested by examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. He says emphatically "outside human desires there is no moral standard. Moore, which he was led to abandon "partly by Mr. However, in these two books we find only a rough outline of a new theory that is emerging. Russell retains his view from "The Elements" that defining "good" is the fundamental problem of ethics. According to him, once "good" is defined, the rest of ethics follows: In other words, once we define "good", framing of moral rules is a matter for science. However, Russell argues that when we try to be definite as to what we mean by "good", we land ourselves in great difficulties, because "unlike with scientific questions" there is no factual evidence about value. Disputants can only appeal to their own emotions, and employ rhetorical devices to rouse similar emotions in others. According to Russell, when we assert that this or that has value, we are giving expression to our emotions, not to a fact which would still be true if our personal feelings were different. When a person says "this is good in itself," he seems to be making a statement like "this is square" or "this is sweet. The second sentence which does belong to ethics, expresses a desire for something, but asserts nothing; and since it asserts nothing it is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsehood. First, ethical statements are not fact-stating though they seem to be so when expressed in indicative mood. Second, they are instead optative, or desire-expressing. Prima facie, according to Russell, anything we all desire is good and anything we all dread is bad. If we all agreed in our desires, says Russell, the matter could be left there, but in fact, desires of human beings conflict. In this conflict each tries to enlist allies by showing that his own desires harmonize with those of other people. Therefore, ethics, according to Russell, is closely related to politics: In this way, according to Russell, ethics contains no statement whether true or false, but consists of desires of a certain general kind, namely, such as are concerned with desires of humankind in general. As he says in the preface of the *Human Society*, he originally intended to include the discussion of ethics in his book *Human Knowledge*, but he decided not to do so, because he was uncertain as to the sense in which ethics can be regarded as "knowledge. Reason is not a cause of action but only a regulator. Such a world would include love and friendship and the pursuit of art and knowledge. As in *Religion and Science*, Russell is also at pains to emphasize that our desires are not "irrational" just because we cannot give any reason for them. According to Russell, a desire cannot, in itself, be either rational or irrational. We may desire A because it is a means to B, but in the end, when we have done with mere means we must come to something, which we desire for no reasons. Nevertheless, the desire cannot be called irrational merely because no reasons can be given for feeling it. In an important passage he says: He admits that different societies in different ages have given approval to a wide diversity of acts; but, argues Russell, the difference between ourselves and other ages in these respects is attributable to a difference between our beliefs and theirs as to the effects of actions. Thus, Russell is led to the conclusion that there is more agreement among humankind as to the effects that we should aim than as to the kinds of acts that are approved. We may say, according to Russell, that it is "wrong" to approve of such exceptional acts, meaning that such approval does not have the effects which mark the great majority of approved acts. Although on the above theory, ethics contains statements, which are true or false, and not merely optative or imperative, Russell points out that its basis is still one of emotion and feeling. The emotion of approval is involved in the definition of "right" and "wrong" and the feeling of enjoyment or satisfaction is

involved in the definition of "good" or "intrinsic value. There is, according to Russell, one approximately rational approach to ethics, which he calls "the doctrine of compossibility. According to the doctrine of compossibility, the person who wishes to be happy should try to guide his life by the largest possible set of compossible desires. Similarly, a world in which the aims of different individuals or groups is compossible is likely to be happier than one in which they are conflicting. Therefore, says Russell, it should be part of a wise social system to encourage compossible purposes and discourage conflicting ones, by means of education and social systems designed to this end. However, Russell feels that from a theoretical point of view this doctrine affords no ultimate solution, because it assumes that happiness is better than unhappiness, which, according to him, is an ethical principle incapable of proof. Russell shares this non-cognitivist perspective with ethical thinkers such as A. M Hare and P. The common core of non-cognitivism is the denial that ethical claims have factual contents and corresponding truth-values. However, when non-cognitivists turn from telling us what ethical statements are not to telling us what they are, they frequently differ from one another in many of the details. Therefore, his analysis of ethical terms is more appropriately described as optative than, for example, emotive Ayer, Stevenson or prescriptive Hare. As far as the analysis of "right" is concerned, Russell was a consequentialist throughout his philosophical career. Third, Russell shows a greater awareness than many non-cognitivists of his era of the social importance or social function of ethical concepts. For example, he clearly says in *An Outline of Philosophy* that "good" is mainly a social concept "designed to find an issue" [that is, an outcome, a resolution] from conflict of desires between desires of different persons, and incompatible desires of the same person. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources Egner, Robert E. Unwin Paperbacks, b. Secondary Sources Ayer, A. George Allen and Unwin, Moore, G. Vantage Press, Pigden, Charles R. Routledge, Potter, Michael K. Continuum, Santayana, G. The Library of Living Philosophers Inc.

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One of the more famous comes from the Oxford philosopher A. Another telling comment comes from the Harvard philosopher W. He wrote a spectrum of books for a graduated public, layman to specialist. As Russell tells us, Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: These passions, like great winds, have blown me hither and thither, in a wayward course, over a great ocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair. I have sought love, first, because it brings ecstasy – ecstasy so great that I would often have sacrificed all the rest of life for a few hours of this joy. I have sought it, next, because it relieves loneliness – that terrible loneliness in which one shivering consciousness looks over the rim of the world into the cold unfathomable lifeless abyss. I have sought it finally, because in the union of love I have seen, in a mystic miniature, the prefiguring vision of the heaven that saints and poets have imagined. This is what I sought, and though it might seem too good for human life, this is what – at last – I have found. With equal passion I have sought knowledge. I have wished to understand the hearts of men. I have wished to know why the stars shine. And I have tried to apprehend the Pythagorean power by which number holds sway above the flux. A little of this, but not much, I have achieved. Love and knowledge, so far as they were possible, led upward toward the heavens. But always pity brought me back to earth. Echoes of cries of pain reverberate in my heart. Children in famine, victims tortured by oppressors, helpless old people a hated burden to their sons, and the whole world of loneliness, poverty, and pain make a mockery of what human life should be. I long to alleviate this evil, but I cannot, and I too suffer. This has been my life. I have found it worth living, and would gladly live it again if the chance were offered me. In addition to his ground-breaking intellectual work in logic and analytic philosophy, he involved himself for much of his life in politics. As early as he spoke out frequently in favour of internationalism and in he ran unsuccessfully for Parliament. Although he stood as an independent, he endorsed the full Liberal platform. He also advocated extending the franchise to women, provided that such a radical political change would be introduced only through constitutionally recognized means Wood , Three years later he published his *Anti-Suffragist Anxieties* With the outbreak of World War I, Russell became involved in anti-war activities and in he was fined pounds for authoring an anti-war pamphlet. Because of his conviction, he was dismissed from his post at Trinity College, Cambridge Hardy Two years later, he was convicted a second time, this time for suggesting that American troops might be used to intimidate strikers in Britain Clark , – The result was five months in Brixton Prison as prisoner No. In and Russell ran twice more for Parliament, again unsuccessfully, and together with his second wife, Dora, he founded an experimental school that they operated during the late s and early s Russell and Park The appointment was revoked following a series of protests and a judicial decision which found him morally unfit to teach at the College Dewey and Kallen , Irvine , Weidlich A year later, together with Albert Einstein, he released the *Russell-Einstein Manifesto* calling for the curtailment of nuclear weapons. In he became a prime organizer of the first Pugwash Conference, which brought together a large number of scientists concerned about the nuclear issue. He became the founding president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in and Honorary President of the Committee of in In , Russell was once again imprisoned, this time for a week in connection with anti-nuclear protests. Beginning in , he began work on a variety of additional issues, including lobbying on behalf of political prisoners under the auspices of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Upon being awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in , Russell used his acceptance speech to emphasize themes relating to his social activism. Over the years, Russell has served as the subject of numerous creative works, including T. *An Epic Search for Truth* *The Spirit of Solitude* and *Bertrand Russell: For a detailed bibliography of the secondary literature surrounding Russell up to the close of the twentieth century, see Andrew Irvine, Bertrand Russell: For a list of new and forthcoming books relating to Russell, see the Forthcoming Books page at the Bertrand Russell Archives. Russell discovered the paradox that bears his name*

in , while working on his *Principles of Mathematics* The paradox arises in connection with the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Such a set, if it exists, will be a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. In his draft of the *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell summarizes the problem as follows: The axiom that all referents with respect to a given relation form a class seems, however, to require some limitation, and that for the following reason. We saw that some predicates can be predicated of themselves. Consider now those  $\hat{x}$  of which this is not the case. For this predicate will either be predicable or not predicable of itself. If it is predicable of itself, it is one of those referents by relation to which it was defined, and therefore, in virtue of their definition, it is not predicable of itself. Conversely, if it is not predicable of itself, then again it is one of the said referents, of all of which by hypothesis it is predicable, and therefore again it is predicable of itself. This is a contradiction. Both versions of the theory came under attack: For some, it was important that any proposed solution be comprehensive enough to resolve all known paradoxes at once. For others, it was important that any proposed solution not disallow those parts of classical mathematics that remained consistent, even though they appeared to violate the vicious circle principle. For discussion of related paradoxes, see Chapter 2 of the *Introduction to Whitehead and Russell* , as well as the entry on paradoxes and contemporary logic in this encyclopedia. Russell himself had recognized several of these same concerns as early as , noting that it was unlikely that any single solution would resolve all of the known paradoxes. Even so, critics claimed that the axiom was simply too ad hoc to be justified philosophically. For additional discussion see Linsky , Linsky and Wahl The first was that all mathematical truths can be translated into logical truths or, in other words, that the vocabulary of mathematics constitutes a proper subset of the vocabulary of logic. The second was that all mathematical proofs can be recast as logical proofs or, in other words, that the theorems of mathematics constitute a proper subset of the theorems of logic. Thus the number 1 is to be identified with the class of all unit classes, the number 2 with the class of all two-membered classes, and so on. In *Principia Mathematica*, Whitehead and Russell were able to provide many detailed derivations of major theorems in set theory, finite and transfinite arithmetic, and elementary measure theory. They were also able to develop a sophisticated theory of logical relations and a unique method of founding the real numbers. Even so, the issue of whether set theory itself can be said to have been successfully reduced to logic remained controversial. A fourth volume on geometry was planned but never completed. As one of the founders of analytic philosophy, Russell made significant contributions to a wide variety of areas, including metaphysics , epistemology, ethics and political theory. His advances in logic and metaphysics also had significant influence on Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle. Famously, he vacillated on whether negative facts are also required. The reason Russell believes many ordinarily accepted statements are open to doubt is that they appear to refer to entities that may be known only through inference. Motivating this question was the traditional problem of the external world. If our knowledge of the external world comes through inferences to the best explanation, and if such inferences are always fallible, what guarantee do we have that our beliefs are reliable? Together these atoms and their properties form the atomic facts which, in turn, combine to form logically complex objects. What we normally take to be inferred entities for example, enduring physical objects are then understood as logical constructions formed from the immediately given entities of sensation, viz. For example, on this view, an ordinary physical object that normally might be thought to be known only through inference may be defined instead as a certain series of appearances, connected with each other by continuity and by certain causal laws. To say that a certain aspect is an aspect of a certain thing will merely mean that it is one of those which, taken serially, are the thing. There are things that we know without asking the opinion of men of science. If you are too hot or too cold, you can be perfectly aware of this fact without asking the physicist what heat and cold consist of. Similarly, numbers may be reduced to collections of classes; points and instants may be reduced to ordered classes of volumes and events; and classes themselves may be reduced to propositional functions. Anything that resists construction in this sense may be said to be an ontological atom. Such objects are atomic, both in the sense that they fail to be composed of individual, substantial parts, and in the sense that they exist independently of one another. Their corresponding propositions are also atomic, both in the sense that they contain no other propositions as parts, and in the sense that the members of any pair of true atomic propositions will be logically independent of one another. Russell

believes that formal logic, if carefully developed, will mirror precisely, not only the various relations between all such propositions, but their various internal structures as well. It is in this context that Russell also introduces his famous distinction between two kinds of knowledge of truths: To be justified, every indirect knowledge claim must be capable of being derived from more fundamental, direct or intuitive knowledge claims. The kinds of truths that are capable of being known directly include both truths about immediate facts of sensation and truths of logic. Eventually, Russell supplemented this distinction between direct and indirect knowledge of truths with his equally famous distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Later, he clarifies this point by adding that acquaintance involves, not knowledge of truths, but knowledge of things a, Thus, while intuitive knowledge and derivative knowledge both involve knowledge of propositions or truths , knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description both involve knowledge of things or objects. This distinction is slightly complicated by the fact that, even though knowledge by description is in part based upon knowledge of truths, it is still knowledge of things, and not of truths. I am grateful to Russell Wahl for reminding me of this point. Since it is things with which we have direct acquaintance that are the least questionable members of our ontology, it is these objects upon which Russell ultimately bases his epistemology. As Russell puts it, even in logic and mathematics We tend to believe the premises because we can see that their consequences are true, instead of believing the consequences because we know the premises to be true. But the inferring of premises from consequences is the essence of induction; thus the method in investigating the principles of mathematics is really an inductive method, and is substantially the same as the method of discovering general laws in any other science. In fact, Russell often claims that he has more confidence in his methodology than in any particular philosophical conclusion. This is so, even though Russell tells us that his one, true revolution in philosophy came as a result of his break from idealism. Russell saw that the idealist doctrine of internal relations led to a series of contradictions regarding asymmetrical and other relations necessary for mathematics.

### 4: BRS Annual Book Award Winners - The Bertrand Russell Society

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No "proper names" in ethical rules where? You must recognise that Rawls towards the end of his life realized that it was necessary to take account of particular circumstances of particular peoples under unique conditions. Of course, he thought this could be surmounted, but I regret saying I believe he was wrong. Northrop is so neglected. Reprinted in , Ox Bow Press I somehow own both of these publications. Not only this, but Northrop and George Kline, better known for his writings on Russian philosophy, makes as much sense of the late Whitehead as can be made in my view. The Macmillan Company, Reprinted in , Ox Bow Press the version I own. Asians and Latinos tend to reject Northrop, however. Northrop has other relevant works, but this must suffice for the nonce. Notice that Chomsky is closely associated with Porter Sargent Publishers. However, I find Sorokin much too conservative and even pious for my taste. It will be recalled that the idiotic Dubya Bush Bush II stupidly uttered a belief that is sacrosanct to many Americans. This is ignorant balderdash and sheer nonsense. This figure lived and studied in the USA, especially in Colorado, and loathed it. Consider at least the following seminal work: Sayyid Qutb [there are several different transliterations], Social Justice in Islam, revised edition, translated by John C. He got into deep trouble because he was on the conservative academic list of academics to be watched and got into a dispute with Armenian-American students at UC-Berkeley I hope it is known that California, especially in Fresno, has one of the greatest concentrations of Armenians in the world outside of Armenia and a few other places. In any event, I have found the following work to be very valuable even though I worry about the influence of some elements of contemporary French thought on the work in understanding Qutb and those he so radically influenced, viz. I no longer believe in the possibility of a world political organization. It is a practical impossibility. BR was hopelessly utopian in this respect even though I bitterly regret that he was. I shared this belief for many years. It is impossible to bridge the vast gaps and this is based on many years living abroad as an expatriate American. I am also influenced by how horribly inept and corrupt is the UN in my direct personal experience in Thailand and indirect experience in the Philippines. I have actually worked with these fools and despair of the utility of the UN. Their people tend to be incompetent, greedy and ignorant. They are paid enormous salaries for shoddy work. I am very sad to say this, but I know from experience that what I say is accurate. On paper India is a democracy, but this is basically nonsense. On paper, the PRC is not a democracy. If one examines vital statistics, the literacy rate, life expectancy, infant mortality, average income, available medical care, etc. Moreover, now the Indians have elected a radical Hindu nationalist prime minister who was indirectly involved in burning to death scores of Muslims in trains and destroying ancient Muslim mosques. There is massive corruption in India and massive corruption in the PRC, but the latter is slightly better in dealing with it because the leadership knows that the CP is in danger because of this very fact. However, the Indians are not even directly facing the issue in spite of its being a campaign issue in the recent elections. The less democratic country is better governed than the more democratic country even though the PRC is a massive bully in Southeast Asia and is very repressive domestically. In any event, the Chinese believe they are vastly superior to the rest of the world and would never condescend to being partners in a world government. The truth is that the Chinese as a whole are as racist as any redneck in the American south if not more so! July 16, ,

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*The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell [Kenneth Blackwell] on www.enganchecubano.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. ix, pages.*

Early life and background[ edit ] Russell as a four-year-old Childhood home, Pembroke Lodge Bertrand Russell was born on 18 May at Ravenscroft, Trellech , Monmouthshire , into an influential and liberal family of the British aristocracy. Both were early advocates of birth control at a time when this was considered scandalous. His paternal grandfather, the Earl Russell , had been asked twice by Queen Victoria to form a government, serving her as Prime Minister in the s and s. They established themselves as one of the leading British Whig families, and participated in every great political event from the Dissolution of the Monasteries in 1534 to the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the Great Reform Act in 1832. In January 1802, his father died of bronchitis following a long period of depression. Frank and Bertrand were placed in the care of their staunchly Victorian paternal grandparents, who lived at Pembroke Lodge in Richmond Park. His grandfather, former Prime Minister Earl Russell , died in 1827, and was remembered by Russell as a kindly old man in a wheelchair. One could challenge the view that Bertrand stood up for his principles, based on his own well-known quotation: Her favourite Bible verse, "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil" Exodus The atmosphere at Pembroke Lodge was one of frequent prayer, emotional repression, and formality; Frank reacted to this with open rebellion, but the young Bertrand learned to hide his feelings. He remarked in his autobiography that his keenest interests were in religion and mathematics, and that only his wish to know more mathematics kept him from suicide. In his autobiography, he writes: He became acquainted with the younger George Edward Moore and came under the influence of Alfred North Whitehead , who recommended him to the Cambridge Apostles. He quickly distinguished himself in mathematics and philosophy, graduating as seventh Wrangler in the former in 1903 and becoming a Fellow in the latter in 1905. Their marriage began to fall apart in 1918 when it occurred to Russell, while he was cycling, that he no longer loved her. It was to be a hollow shell of a marriage. In 1918 he taught German social democracy at the London School of Economics. The Italians had responded to Georg Cantor , making a science of set theory ; they gave Russell their literature including the *Formulario mathematico*. In 1903 he published *The Principles of Mathematics* , a work on foundations of mathematics. It advanced a thesis of logicism , that mathematics and logic are one and the same. This, along with the earlier *The Principles of Mathematics*, soon made Russell world-famous in his field. In 1918 he became a University of Cambridge lecturer at Trinity College where he studied. He was considered for a Fellowship, which would give him a vote in the college government and protect him from being fired for his opinions, but was passed over because he was "anti-clerical", essentially because he was agnostic. He was approached by the Austrian engineering student Ludwig Wittgenstein , who became his PhD student. Russell viewed Wittgenstein as a genius and a successor who would continue his work on logic. Wittgenstein was, at that time, serving in the Austrian Army and subsequently spent nine months in an Italian prisoner of war camp at the end of the conflict. First World War[ edit ] During World War I, Russell was one of the few people to engage in active pacifist activities and in 1918, because of his lack of a Fellowship, he was dismissed from Trinity College following his conviction under the Defence of the Realm Act Russell played a significant part in the Leeds Convention in June 1915, a historic event which saw well over a thousand "anti-war socialists" gather; many being delegates from the Independent Labour Party and the Socialist Party, united in their pacifist beliefs and advocating a peace settlement. After the event, Russell told Lady Ottoline Morrell that, "to my surprise, when I got up to speak, I was given the greatest ovation that was possible to give anybody". The books were bought by friends; he later treasured his copy of the King James Bible that was stamped "Confiscated by Cambridge Police". I found prison in many ways quite agreeable. I had no engagements, no difficult decisions to make, no fear of callers, no interruptions to my work. I read enormously; I wrote a book, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" Hardy wrote a page pamphlet titled *Bertrand Russell and Trinity* published later as a book by Cambridge University Press with a foreword by C. The ensuing pressure from the Fellows induced the Council to reinstate Russell. In January 1919, it was announced that Russell had accepted the reinstatement offer

from Trinity and would begin lecturing from October. In July, Russell applied for a one year leave of absence; this was approved. He spent the year giving lectures in China and Japan. In January, it was announced by Trinity that Russell had resigned and his resignation had been accepted. This resignation, Hardy explains, was completely voluntary and was not the result of another altercation. The reason for the resignation, according to Hardy, was that Russell was going through a tumultuous time in his personal life with a divorce and subsequent remarriage. Russell contemplated asking Trinity for another one-year leave of absence but decided against it, since this would have been an "unusual application" and the situation had the potential to snowball into another controversy. The Analysis of Matter, published in 1918, I wish to make it plain that Russell himself is not responsible, directly or indirectly, for the writing of the pamphlet I wrote it without his knowledge and, when I sent him the typescript and asked for his permission to print it, I suggested that, unless it contained misstatement of fact, he should make no comment on it. He agreed to this. Between the wars [edit] In August, Russell travelled to Russia as part of an official delegation sent by the British government to investigate the effects of the Russian Revolution. In his autobiography, he mentions that he found Lenin disappointing, sensing an "impish cruelty" in him and comparing him to "an opinionated professor". He cruised down the Volga on a steamship. His experiences destroyed his previous tentative support for the revolution. For example, he told them that he heard shots fired in the middle of the night and was sure these were clandestine executions, but the others maintained that it was only cars backfiring. Bertrand Russell, having died according to the Japanese press, is unable to give interviews to Japanese journalists". Russell arranged a hasty divorce from Alys, marrying Dora six days after the divorce was finalised, on 27 September. Russell supported his family during this time by writing popular books explaining matters of physics, ethics, and education to the layman. From 1919 to the 1930s the Russells divided their time between London and Cornwall, spending summers in Porthcurno. On 8 July Dora gave birth to her third child Harriet Ruth. After he left the school in 1919, Dora continued it until 1921. Russell and Peter had one son, Conrad Sebastian Robert Russell, 5th Earl Russell, who became a prominent historian and one of the leading figures in the Liberal Democrat party. In 1940 he wrote in a personal letter: He concluded that Adolf Hitler taking over all of Europe would be a permanent threat to democracy. In 1940, he adopted a stance toward large-scale warfare: He was appointed professor at the City College of New York CCNY in 1940, but after a public outcry the appointment was annulled by a court judgment that pronounced him "morally unfit" to teach at the college due to his opinions, especially those relating to sexual morality, detailed in Marriage and Morals. The matter was however taken to the New York Supreme Court by Jean Kay who was afraid that her daughter would be harmed by the appointment, though her daughter was not a student at CCNY. Russell soon joined the Barnes Foundation, lecturing to a varied audience on the history of philosophy; these lectures formed the basis of A History of Western Philosophy. His relationship with the eccentric Albert C. Barnes soon soured, and he returned to the UK in 1940 to rejoin the faculty of Trinity College. By this time Russell was world-famous outside academic circles, frequently the subject or author of magazine and newspaper articles, and was called upon to offer opinions on a wide variety of subjects, even mundane ones. En route to one of his lectures in Trondheim, Russell was one of 24 survivors among a total of 43 passengers of an aeroplane crash in Hommelvik in October. He said he owed his life to smoking since the people who drowned were in the non-smoking part of the plane. This does not mean that I am opposed to socialism. His series of six broadcasts, titled Authority and the Individual, [1940] explored themes such as the role of individual initiative in the development of a community and the role of state control in a progressive society. Russell continued to write about philosophy. He wrote a foreword to Words and Things by Ernest Gellner, which was highly critical of the later thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein and of ordinary language philosophy. Gilbert Ryle refused to have the book reviewed in the philosophical journal Mind, which caused Russell to respond via The Times. The result was a month-long correspondence in The Times between the supporters and detractors of ordinary language philosophy, which was only ended when the paper published an editorial critical of both sides but agreeing with the opponents of ordinary language philosophy. In 1941 Russell was divorced by Spence, with whom he had been very unhappy. Russell was one of the best known patrons of the Congress, until he resigned in [1941] Russell married his fourth wife, Edith Finch, soon after the divorce, on 15 December. Edith remained with him until his death, and, by all accounts, their

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marriage was a happy, close, and loving one. In September, at the age of 89, Russell was jailed for seven days in Brixton Prison for "breach of peace" after taking part in an anti-nuclear demonstration in London. The magistrate offered to exempt him from jail if he pledged himself to "good behaviour", to which Russell replied:

### 6: Kenneth Blackwell (Author of A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell)

*Editions for The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell: (ebook published in ), (), X (Paperback published in ), 1.*

### 7: BRS Annual Book Award Winners – The Bertrand Russell Society

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### 8: Editions of The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell by Kenneth Blackwell

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### 9: The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell : Kenneth Blackwell :

*Bertrand Russell: Ethics. This article confines itself to Bertrand Russell's conversion from ethical cognitivism (similar to G. E. Moore) to ethical non-cognitivism (similar to Ayer). Russell's conversion is not only historically important, as it contributes to the rise of metaethics, but it also clarifies the central issues between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.*

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