

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST LIBERALISM IN THE TOTALITARIAN VIEW OF THE STATE. pdf

1: Totalitarianism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Marcuse, Herbert (). *"The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State."* In *Negations*, London: Free Association Books.

For politics, economics and life as if freedom mattered every day. Marcus Bachler George Orwell: Therefore it seems an apt time to review the life and ideas of the author whom I considered from the age of 16 onwards to be my favourite author of all time, and this just based upon the reading of his two most famous works. Their gloomy messages of state repression still manage to evoke public distrust in the motives of ideological revolutions, resentment against invasions of individual privacy by governments and the association of any invasion of privacy or restrictions on freedom of expression with totalitarian regimes. Not only that, but the language of the novels themselves, which illustrates so starkly the potential perversion of the English language by totalitarian regimes, has ironically become a part of it. There is no need to explain the meaning of many popular phrases and words from these books to the average man on the street as they have become permanently ingrained in the culture and politics of English-speaking western countries. In fact, the expression "Orwellian" is all that is needed to instantly evoke the dark images of totalitarian regimes depicted so well in his books. Since the publication of these books, they have been used as intellectual ammunition against Government intrusions of privacy and curtailment of freedoms by civil liberties groups, cold war warriors, libertarians and Objectivists. The family moved back to England in Orwell came from what he described as a "lower-upper-middle class" background. However, Orwell complained about constant bullying by both pupils and schoolmasters due to his poorer background and lower social status. Nevertheless, he managed to win a scholarship to an exclusive public school, Eton, which he entered in His political thoughts were influenced by the times. Everywhere there was a mood of rebellion against the old class system, which was inextricably linked in the minds of many with capitalism. Hence, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, I was both a snob and a revolutionary. I was against all authority But I had not much grasp of what Socialism meant, and no notion that the working class were human beings Looking back upon that period, I seem to have spent half the time in denouncing the capitalist system and the other half in raging over the insolence of bus-conductors. Only half a million people, the people in the country houses, definitely benefited from the existing system. Orwell felt that he had been part of an oppressive regime for the last five years and this left him with a bad conscience. I wanted to submerge myself, to get right down among the oppressed, to be one of them and on their side against their tyrants. During this time he developed his skills as a writer. In , his first book, *Down and Out in Paris and London*, an account of his time living in poverty, was published. After several rejections, the left-wing publishing house Victor Gollancz picked up this book because of its "social importance". This was the beginning of a fruitful relationship for Orwell that was to last 12 years. In , on assignment from Victor Gollancz, Orwell travelled through the industrial north to the small coal-mining town of Wigan Pier. Here he lived with a working class family and went down into the coal-mining pits in order to experience coal mining first hand. Again, he was struck by what he perceived as an unjust divide between the living standards of the different classes. He felt himself, as middle class, awkward amongst them. Here he developed a kind of new socialist utopian ideal that would mean the abolition of class differences. It is often difficult to believe that it is a love of anybody, especially of the working class, from whom he is of all people the furthest removed. The Socialist movement has not time to be a league of dialectical materialists. This experience was to shape more than anything else both his future political direction and who his sworn ideological enemies were to become. Orwell was now willing to sacrifice his life for his socialist ideals. This war was not only about what he saw as a social revolution of the working classes, but also an all-important fight against fascism. Before leaving for Spain he had declared that "The choice is not, as yet, between a human and an inhuman world. It is simply between Socialism and Fascism, which at its very best is Socialism with the virtues left out. Astonishingly, he survived his injury and was sent to a sanatorium to recuperate. It was during this time that he was diagnosed

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with TB, an illness that would eventually kill him in . Shortly after his release from the hospital, the communist-led Government in Spain under the influence of Moscow passed a law making POUM illegal and by implication all its members criminals. This experience left him with a deep mistrust and hatred of communism and fascism. He deeply resented how these ideological regimes had misrepresented the truth of the Spanish Civil War and how intellectuals of both the right and left had been a party to it. This also became a general hatred of the suppression of objective truth by totalitarian regimes. From the totalitarian point of view history is something to be created rather than learned. During this period and throughout the war, Orwell stepped before the British public to promote a fiercely pro-war and anti-fascist stance against the dissenting opinions of other intellectuals. He was disgusted over how many left-wing intellectuals had now become pacifists in harmony with the Russo-German Pact of . He was not at all surprised when many of these same left-wing pacifists suddenly changed sides and became pro-war following the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany. He equally despised those intellectuals of the right who prior to the War were actively sympathising with Hitler and fascism. Nevertheless, he never lost his faith in a socialist revolution against the class structure of society led by the working classes devoid of intellectual bullies, Marxists and Fascists. This war, unless we are defeated, will wipe out most of the existing class privileges. Orwell was to write his next book toward the end of the war, *Animal Farm*. It would be an open attack upon the misguided ideology of totalitarian regimes, with the USSR as his main target, which would alienate him not only from the left-wing intellectuals but also from the war-time political correctness of the British Government. Not only did Victor Gollancz refuse to publish this book in , but it was also rejected by most publishing houses on advice from the Government. Russia at this time was the ally of the UK and the "Ministry of Information" warned that the representation of the predominant castes as pigs would likely cause the Russian Government offence as they were "a bit touchy. At the last minute however, the book was picked up by a publishing house and released at the end of war. *Animal Farm* together with *1984* would transform the way the western world thought about totalitarian regimes and give intellectual ammunition for the ensuing cold war to follow. So what were the underlying motivation and themes of these two books? Orwell and Language George Orwell, explaining in an essay in why he became a writer, stated that when he was about sixteen he " His love of prose and the concrete world of objective truth reinforced this love. He treated the language of orthodox politicians and political parties with contempt. The stale political speakers who loved the use of pre-fabricated terms in their speeches were in his eyes less than human, almost brain-dead. They were the ones who were seeking to defend the indefensible. The mere prevalence of certain ideas can spread a kind of poison that makes one subject after another impossible for literary purposes A bad usage can be spread by tradition and imitation, even among people who should and do know better. In the controlling regime even goes as far as replacing the entire language with a new Big Brother-friendly one called "newspeak. Orwell knew that the suppression of language and ideas or concepts was one and the same, yet he also knew that it was the responsibility of political writers in free countries to keep alive the momentum of truly free uninhibited speech. This involved not only intellectual honesty and the ability to face the truth, but also clear communication through the good use of language. Orwell offered advice on how this is to be done. This last effort of mind cuts out all the stale or mixed images, all prefabricated phrases, needless repetitions, and humbug and vagueness generally. Here animals are used to symbolise different factions or groups of individuals in Russian society at that time. After an ideological revolution equivalent to Communism is begun on Manor Farm, called Animalism, the human occupiers are ousted by force and the pigs, representing the Bolsheviks, take over power. They are led by a brutal dictator called Napoleon who is a caricature of Stalin. Another pig called Snowball, a caricature of Trotsky, flees after a power struggle with Napoleon, and is forever afterwards portrayed as Enemy Number One, responsible for any failings of the regime. Ever increasingly the pigs under Napoleon betray the original ideology of the revolution until it comes full circle, restoring the same system as before with different rulers. This was an important point for Orwell - that the power structure of the former hierarchy is restored - because for him it is the ultimate form of betrayal of socialist revolution. A second important point was the criticism of

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the left-wing intelligentsia and regime propagandists, represented by the pig Squealer, for their support of such cruel regimes and their rewriting of history. The exact same themes are revisited in *1984*. Set in the future, during a contrived war, three Superpowers run by totalitarian regimes have carved the entire world up among themselves. Winston Smith, the last free man in Europe, desperately wants to hold onto the remnants of his memory of the truth about history before the party gained control and the nature of the controlling party regime. The party is systematically trying to control both the minds of its citizens and their ability to perceive truth, through propaganda, constant surveillance of its citizens, Thought Police and the invention of a new language. In the end they succeed in this. This book, as with *Animal Farm*, is another attack on the communist regime of Russia and the English left-wing intelligentsia that happily supported it. This was Orwell trying to make his point even more stark and relevant than *Animal Farm* by transferring the site of action from an allegorical Russia to England herself. The ideology of Ingsoc, English Socialism, has undergone a revolution in wartime and has now become perverted in the hands of the controlling powers. Here again Orwell is damning the use of left-wing ideology in the re-establishment of new hierarchical structures established in society to replace those in the past: In return he is cruelly exploited by the pigs in power and is eventually sent by them to the knackers when he can longer work. This is possible because he is not clever enough to realise that he is being duped and that he has the power to overthrow his leaders. In *1984*, Winston Smith as the voice of Orwell, constantly emphasises that the only hope for change lies with the proles working classes. The proles are however too stupid to realise this and can be easily distracted from their plight by the party with a constant supply of cheesy pornographic films and books. From his belief that he was a victim of them in the English public school system he attended, to his guilt at being a party to them in the guise of the Indian Imperial police force, to his sympathy with their perceived victims in the down-and-outs and working classes Orwell had experienced it all and reported it all with journalistic precision and intellectual honesty. Orwell never could conceive of any pure political ideology that would eliminate what he considered to be "class injustices. Orwell failed to ever adequately define Socialism "as he understood it" in a philosophical or political sense, but he did advocate a centrally-planned economy that could be combined with the tradition of English justice and decency. Ironically, what put him at odds with left-wing ideology, expressed in Marxism and Communism, was his intellectual honesty and his belief in objective truth, justice and decency. This led him quite rightly to criticise and despise left-wing ideologies and their intellectual perpetrators in *Animal Farm* and *1984*, but he was unable to adequately identify their root causes. Capitalism was for him merely the instrument of a corrupt upper class to keep in place the same old unfair power structures inherent in a hierarchical society. For Orwell, an ideal society was one of absolute equality of all people that included equality of social status, income, and living standards: He conceded that the type of utopian equality in society that he longed for may never be possible, but it was something to strive for. Sadly, he had ruled out any possible moral arguments in defence of capitalism already, years before, as these had inextricably become linked in his mind with the unfair class system of the old British Empire.

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A liberal state can easily be distinguished from an authoritarian or totalitarian state and this is because of certain unique features of such a state: 1. A liberal state always adopts a liberal attitude towards the rights of citizens.

Michael K Connors State ambivalence and the struggle between liberal and authoritarian regime framers Draft Michael K. The democratic struggle has largely been waged by non-state and non-regime actors who have sought substantive political, social and economic equality. At times a protean force, the democratic mass has risen to break authoritarian or liberal centres, or to temper anti-democratic agendas. This paper brackets that on-going struggle to focus on the struggle between liberal and authoritarian regime framers over the last thirty years. The struggle between framers is ongoing, overlapping, and involves the attempt to influence state institutions and to erect mechanisms of control over them. The struggle has witnessed many seemingly contradictory alliances and defections as each force has sought to advance, tactically retreat, or launch an offensive strike against the other. While institutional sites can be correlated to each force, these blur not so much at the edge but at their very core because the network nature of regime framers and political groupings extends into them. In what follows, I try to capture something of the complexity of these struggles and their blurred nature. The main argument advanced is that neither force has succeeded and the state remains in an ambivalent condition, able at times to counteract regime framer intentions, and at times to suspend the political order. That state, which remains solidly sovereign, comprises of the strategically relevant elements of the bureaucracy, military and palace. Anyone observing Thai politics since the s would perhaps accept that Thai regime forms have remained in a state of flux. No enduring pattern of decision-making, enforcement and sovereignty at the national level has been framed by a robust legitimacy, rendering the institutional apparatuses of the state subject to fundamentally antagonistic claims by their inhabitants and by social forces. The ground upon which a relatively autonomous state "a regulating public interest regime" might be established has been constantly eroded. The result and the immediate cause, in a circular process of reinforcement, is political insecurity and the neo-patrimonial nature of public institutions. In this context, whatever the emergent regime form, authoritarian exercise of power, or support thereof, has been a persistent habit of state actors, regime framers and those occupying political office. In the complex interplay between actors across the state, regime and government 1 the exercise of authoritarian power is directed not simply at the 1 In his review of the nature of state, regime and polity relations in Thailand Ockey notes: When regime form is unsettled, and when networks are fluid and cross-cutting, the flow of authoritarian power is never uni-directional or uni-logical, it exists as an inter-relational strategy for security of position and to advance forms of order. Absent any national regulator of power, actors exist in a field of insecurity. This failure to settle on a legitimating pattern of power requires an explanatory recourse to the structural conditions that set the parameters of regime possibility - that is, the use and reform of state institutions in a particular pattern - and upon which actors have sought to build. This paper is an attempt to think through the nature of authoritarianism in Thailand by arguing that the focus of analysis should be on the exercise of political power, rather than regime form, in the context of the failure to settle on forms of legitimate power at the state and regime level. It first offers a way of thinking about authoritarianism, markers of its existence and, importantly in the Thai context, its articulation to liberalism. It advances this argument by noting the synchronicity of liberal and authoritarian modes of power across a range of regime forms in Thailand since Liberal and authoritarian regime framers, those forces that on balance support liberal or authoritarian forms of social order, are not exclusively identifiable in specific institutions, they are trans-institutional and trans-social class, and manifest in political exigencies. The contest and co-existence between the two currents reflects competing agendas for social order that are formed around different and changing coalitions of social forces. Since the complex pattern of forces that have come to occupy each current has shifted, their realignment contingent on a range of factors that come to bear on the task of social order and capital accumulation. Indeed, the

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contemporary situation post is marked by a suspension of liberal modes of conduct at a national level, implicitly sanctioned by liberal regime framers, as different political forces compete to establish dominance in the Thai state, mobilising various resources and legitimating strategies. Authoritarianism of power, not of regime. Rather than viewing the coup its consequent politics as ushering in new forms of authoritarianism in Thailand, this paper will speak of continuities and repetitive pathologies strict a line between different actors is problematic, I concur. Contemporary Asia, 33, 4, , pp. It will argue that the failure to settle the pattern of domination that lies at the heart of state structure requires that we think less of distinct regime forms semi-democratic, democratic, authoritarian and more of an ambivalent state of power in which shifting and differential patterns of liberalism, electoralism and authoritarianism have momentarily congealed as regimes. This insight can often be lost as a consequence of giving too much credence to formal regime appellation. I have argued at length elsewhere that a significant force shaping the modern Thai state understood both as an institutional apparatus concerned with the making and enforcing of public decisions and as a relationship of power that reaches into society is liberalism, this despite the hold of the military and the bureaucracy over important state resources. And, conversely, within authoritarian regimes one will find liberal moments of pluralism, intra-regime opposition and tolerance that would belie a harsh exterior. No one definition of an authoritarian regime will suffice to make sense of the existence of authoritarianism in Thailand. Rather than offer a definition, I offer, drawing from Linz, four angles from which authoritarianism may be examined and diagnosed. For the purposes of understanding current Thai politics it seems to me that it is important to capture the spirit of authoritarianism as an approach to the exercise of power and the mechanisms to secure it, rather than as a specific type of regime. In this way, authoritarianism may be understood as present across many regime types. I have left these fairly explored in this paper. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Rienner, An authoritarian state may be defined as that which, through internally ill-defined institutional patterns, exercises arbitrary and unaccountable power over the spheres of human existence and association, and which, by dictate, restricts free movement in those spheres. That authority is often legitimated by democratic, authoritative and mythic claims to universal representation, or some combination of all. Those who exercise power at the centre are enabled by this legitimating claim to demobilize opposition through mechanisms of repression, cooption, and toleration, enduring strategies of depoliticisation, or even electoral mandates and parliamentary majorities. Authoritarian states that are not edging towards totalitarian control will be differentially marked by vertical and sectoral linkages between different levels of power, mediated by actors who react to and shape the institutional features of the regime, according to prevailing incentive and disincentive patterns and the domain of intervention health, education, industry policy etc. This provides room to move. Authoritarian state institutions can articulate to regimes of various colours: While political typologists will rightly characterise regimes according to the dominant impulse at work in the centre democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian etc most regimes are complex multi-level systems of considerable institutional overlap; different and even contradictory impulses may be found within and across their respective state levels. An authoritarian state, in any particular regime form, may be, in restricted domains, articulated to a liberal imperative. The deployment of coercive force is not unique to the authoritarian state, but it does have a marked propensity to coerce under the logic of exclusion by which it operates. They tend to work on the principle of a dual exclusion. At best, it is the power of bureaucratic and technical coercion that is used to frustrate the formation of oppositional blocs or agendas. At worse, violence is employed. Secondly, there is the exclusion of some social element by virtue of which the national citizenry may be formed over and over again. Authoritarian states - shaped as bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, as formally democratic regimes, as military regimes - are apt to communicate exclusion by public or hidden coercive measures extending from control to violence. In such a state, when resources, power or status are at stake the possibility of extra-legal coercion or violence is ever present, and shapes decisions. Authoritarianism gives free rein to a politics of fear. Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA: Universal Embodiment Security and Security and Weak claims to Performanc Claims of Thainess, development development rule of law norms, e and well mythic social

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claims; claims; though being contract with development development instruments claims for the people. Hierarchy of Sits at the top Works with Spilt Across the social Extensive Linkages of a national networks of allegiance to spectrum web of power bloc. In the former, regime structures are intentionally made to serve the coalition of interests embodied in the regime. In the latter the ambivalent nature of state power, its openness to different purpose, and its manipulation by authoritarian and liberal currents creates a political landscape of insecurity which reinforces authoritarian choice. The opportunity cost of following strict constitutional rule and the rule of law is so high as to be prohibitive; it would mean loss or giving advantageous ground to an adversary. The above elaboration of authoritarianism has been developed in order to account for a state that is conflicted, in which liberal and authoritarian elements are in contest and where the 6 dominant impulse has yet to be settled. On surface the dominant impulses of such a state can seem at once liberal and authoritarian depending on where one looks. The argument for ambivalence, of a see-sawing balance between liberalism and authoritarianism, does not entail a dissolution of their difference; but it is to say that in situations where no one form has come to predominate as the publicly lived style of politics with enduring consequences for the structuring of everyday life and process, their dual presence more adequately captures the insecurity of citizens living under the regime ambivalence of formal liberal democracy with authoritarian tendencies or bureaucratic authoritarianism with democratic pretensions. How that ambivalence expresses itself, and is structured in the constitutional structure of the state is the stuff of regime analysis at various levels and across different domains. The balance between authoritarian and liberal and the promiscuous variable of democracy that can attach to either is a matter of empirical investigation not categorical analysis and absolutism. The continuum between liberalism and authoritarianism, or more commonly between democracy and authoritarianism is a simplifying tool that obscures more than it illuminates. Structures, Institutions and Actions. If authoritarian moments in the Thai state are present across a range of regime forms, to what extent can these moments be related to structural conditions, institutions and actors? It is evidently possible to delineate broad structural features class structure, international order, and state formation that have given succour to authoritarianism. It is also possible to note institutional sites of authoritarianism military, bureaucracy, palace, capital, constitution. Forms of action and ideas can also be discerned which contribute to the persistence of authoritarian patterns nationalism, developmentalism, royalism, corruption, repression, propaganda, imposition and the existence of these actions and ideas can be related to the interaction of institutional sites and structural parameters that they, in turn, structure and transform. While a detailed accounting of their interaction is outside the scope of this paper, each of them may be provisionally conceived for this analysis. This exercise will provide the background necessary to move to the question of the sources of the authoritarian resurgence in contemporary Thailand. Adapting the structural approach presented in Capitalist Development and Democracy¹³ the following analysis of Thai authoritarianism takes as broad background the changing nature of key structural features of the Thai social formation over the modern period, including the hegemonic international order and counter-hegemonic moments, state formation, the nature of capitalist development, class formation, and cultural ways of being. A bureaucratic-authoritarian state with neo-patrimonial characteristics was birthed from the absolute monarchy of the late 19th Century and the attendant struggles over regime form ss. Oxford University Press, However, against the background of international counter-hegemonic victories Vietnam , in reactive forces in the Thai state, centred in the palace, military and bureaucracy, resorted to extraordinary repression to re-establish order. A significant element in the structuring of this state was the crushing of class organizations of farmers and workers, and the privileging of capital that occurred in the post reconstruction of social order. The relative weakness of redistributive coalitions also reduced liberal reliance on the authoritarian security arms of the state for the purposes of repression, making them more willing to compete for power, up to a point. As liberal regime framers moved into positions of influence in the s, the resulting settlement possessed an elemental authoritarianism premised on a development ethos that had long been ingrained in the ideological articulations and practises of state agencies in Thailand. Nevertheless, the liberal regime framers attempted to devise a national strategy of power

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deployment based on graduated liberal constellations of power, while in every day life the institutions of the state continued to work in their old manner over subject populations. In this period a constitutional legislative process was entrenched that enacted law in various policy spheres, but political power was not wholly patterned in a regulatory fashion; it was often instrumentally deployed to serve the interests of those who deployed it. Law was passed, but those who passed it were rarely subject to law. Liberalism requires a certain kind of self-regulating citizen that the state, liberal regime framers, and organic intellectuals of the project try and produce, leading to forms of democrasubjection. Developing episodically, it can be seen in the push to make ministers declare assets in the s, the successful struggle against constitutional amendments that attempted to further entrench military and bureaucratic rule in , and the successful constitutional amendment that made the House of Representatives the parliamentary president. This process of liberal constitutionalism gathered pace after the massacre of pro-democracy protestors in May, , with constitutional amendments requiring that the prime minister be an elected member of parliament. And while the liberal constitutional amendments struggle of the constitution was largely lost, it returned in expanded form with the passing of the constitution. Thus, the s liberal thrust went beyond constitutionalism. Liberals of various colours attempted to extend the liberal settlement into everyday life, promoting significant shifts in state-society power, and ideological conceptualisations of that relationship. As with all forms of universal claims to rule, the liberal and security settlement that expanded into the s had its share of self-interest, exceptional privilege the monarchy, military and capital , and personalistic structuration that compromised its attempt to establish a regime of law, representation and security. Notwithstanding these qualifications, it is possible to trace the embedding of a liberal-constitutionalist settlement and its uneven advance even into the early Thaksin period. Although formally democratic, the illiberal nature of the Thaksin government led to some of the worst human rights abuses in contemporary Thailand. Somewhat schematically, it is proposed here that the Thai state has been operationalised in four distinct regime forms in the post political landscape. Each of these forms has comprised a particular constellation of organization, institutions and ideological emphasis. And each has its liberal and authoritarian moments in different measure. Liberalising bureaucratic authoritarianism During the period of the liberalising bureaucratic authoritarianism , the historical role of the modern state as an organiser of internal order and in part as a client-state financed by the United States continued to be felt. The conservative-bureaucratic elements that had built strategies of counter "insurgency and order in the s and s continued to sit in ministries, actively resisting the liberal and pluralist imperatives of a more complex national and global order, evident in the growing liberal bridge-head in Thailand. Their interests were also represented in the appointed and military dominated Senate, which became a battleground throughout the s.

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3: Theory of Liberal State: Definition, Features and Development

Totalitarianism is a political concept that defines a mode of government, which prohibits opposition parties, restricts individual opposition to the state and its claims, and exercises an extremely high degree of control over public and private life.

References and Further Reading 1. It progressively came to be extended to include not just extreme utopian dictatorships of the far right, but also Communist regimes, especially that of the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. Although a distinctly modern problem, proto-totalitarian notions may be found in a variety of philosophical and political systems. In the seventeenth century, absolutists and royalists such as Thomas Hobbes and Jacques Bossuet advocated, in various ways, a strong centralized state as a guarantor against chaos in conformity with natural law and biblical precedent. However, it was only in the early twentieth century that totalitarianism, properly understood, became a conceptual and political reality. Thinkers as diverse as Carl Schmitt in Germany and Giovanni Gentile in Italy helped to lay the foundations of fascist ideology, stressing the defensive and unifying advantages of dictatorship. It has been a topic of interdisciplinary interest, with various typologies offered by political scientists see Friedrich and Brzezinski for the locus classicus of such approaches. This article will primarily examine some key models and criticisms of the problem of totalitarianism defended by preeminent philosophers, as well as the thoughts of some key and representative scholars in other disciplines whose work is of philosophical significance. Their perspectival range encompasses strongly liberal, intellectual historical, neo-Marxist and pragmatist approaches. All have wished to distinguish totalitarianism sharply from liberal democratic ideals and society. The American Pragmatists on the Values of Pluralism and Democratic Debate It is by no means surprising that American pragmatists should have responded to the challenge of totalitarianism in the mid-twentieth century. Not just Cold War realities, but philosophical method and values were key factors in this response. Given its strong emphasis on experimental method and the value of individual experience and fallibilism in epistemology, pragmatism would seem prima facie inimical to dictatorship. Dewey had been interested in the problems of democracy for some time when he wrote his democratic credo I Believe. The rapid expansion of fascism and the Soviet Great Purge of the mid to late s alerted Dewey to imminent threats to individual freedom from diverse quarters. In this short work, Dewey stated that he felt compelled to emphasize the fundamental value and importance of individuals over the state in the face of creeping totalitarianism. He here affirmed the pragmatist conviction that experience and institutions tempered by democratic problem solving ought to be primary in social philosophy. Dewey held that such problem solving, in order to be ethically compelling, must be respectful of the fundamental primacy of individual rights. It must furthermore involve an important element of negotiation and compromise over dogmatic assertion. Furthermore, Dewey held that the rise of modern dictatorships was in part a reaction to an excessive form of individualism that isolated human beings from each other, and that offered only modern capitalism in mass society as a choice: The negative and empty character of this individualism had consequences which produced a reaction toward an equally arbitrary and one-sided collectivism. This reaction is identical with the rise of the new form of political despotism. The decline of democracy and the rise of authoritarian states which claim they can do for individuals what the latter cannot by any possibility do for themselves are the two sides of one and the same indivisible picture. Political collectivism is now marked in all highly industrialized countries, even when it does not reach the extreme of the totalitarian state. In his highly controversial book, Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No, Hook incurred the allegation of McCarthyism due to his advocacy of a firm line against the American Communist Party, especially within academia and educational trade unions. Hook, who was social democratic for much of his career, distinguished between a genuinely progressive left that operates in a heretical and democratic matter, and the Stalinist American Communist Party and its fellow travellers. Heresy, for Hook, is an entirely legitimate expression of dissent on controversial matters. However, he held the Communist movement to be

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inherently conspiratorial and subversive of the very ground rules of democracy, and this led him to advocate restrictions against its carrying out policies and actions inimical to elected government. In effect, Hook affirmed the legitimacy of democracy protecting itself not just from external aggression, but from internal subversion in the interest of foreign aggressors, such as the USSR. He took this to be in keeping with the pragmatist emphasis on democratic consensus and open debate in the interest of solving social problems, a methodology diametrically opposed to Stalinism. Liberalism in the twentieth century must toughen its fibre, for it is engaged in a struggle on many fronts. Liberalism must defend the free market in ideas against the racists, the professional patrioteer, and those spokesmen of the status quo who would freeze the existing inequalities of opportunity and economic power by choking off criticism. Liberals must also defend freedom of ideas against those agents and apologists of Communist totalitarianism, who, instead of honestly defending their heresies, resort to conspiratorial methods of anonymity and other methods of fifth columnists. The usual objections to pragmatism are pertinent to its Deweyan anti-totalitarian strain. These revolve around the claims that pragmatism has an insufficiently robust and general conception of truth and evidence to serve as an adequate foundation for ethical and political principles. Ethical foundationalists in particular, have rejected pragmatism as possessing excessively relativistic implications, and for lacking a strong sense of moral tradition. Contemporary pragmatists have, in different ways, attempted to respond to such criticisms by stressing the great value of democratic society in upholding value pluralism and open-ended inquiry: Whether or not pragmatist anti-totalitarianism succeeds in its defence of democracy and individual rights is thus deeply linked to the coherence and adequacy of pragmatist defenses of a fallibilistic and at times flexible conception of truth in ethics and politics. If there is no need for traditional ethical foundationalism in upholding the value of democracy against tyranny, then the pragmatist case against totalitarianism may be seen to be a serious methodological option. The Israeli scholar, Jacob L. Talmon, was British trained, and is best seen as applying the British liberal tradition to the Enlightenment. There are clear affinities between their positions on this issue, which are best seen as continuations of the British liberal tradition well into the twentieth century, when it faced the challenge of the totalitarian state. The three representatives of British liberalism discussed here shared a commitment to individual liberty, wariness of state power, and an evident suspicion of what they took to be the collectivist and utopian excesses of various Continental thinkers. In his early work there is a particular emphasis on the unscientific and ultimately illogical character of all forms of historical determinism and collectivism. In keeping with his philosophy of natural science, Popper urges us to shun certainty and dogmatism in social science and history, in favour of a piecemeal approach characterised by attention to particulars and the trial and error methods of fallibilism. Such an approach is not only conducive to precise and clear social explanations; Popper defends it as a philosophical shield against tyranny as well. For it is precisely the immodesty of overgeneralising to alleged rigid laws in history that has led even great philosophers and other thinkers to commit the error of historicism, which is a key component of totalitarian and fanatical patterns of thought. He thus accuses purportedly scientific theorists of history, including Karl Marx, of misinterpreting trends as inexorable laws, thereby producing unscientific and potentially irrational schemes of historical development. When coupled with grandiose or holistic schemes of social engineering, such approaches, for Popper, combine bad social science with lethal utopianism. It is therefore best seen as an intellectual contribution to the Allied cause against fascism, which was subsequently readily adapted to the struggle against Soviet dictatorship during the Cold War. Both works are permeated by a sense that democracy was under fire and could potentially be annihilated by its totalitarian rivals. Here Popper broadens his critique of totalitarianism by indicting major figures of the Western philosophical tradition, notably Plato, Hegel and Marx. All three, he held, were guilty of collectivist and utopian social projects. This method ought to at all costs be substituted for historicist and utopian grand schemes of social science and philosophy of history that are characterised by a kind of oracular faith in their own future prophecies, dogmatism, and immunity to falsification. Popper explained the appeal of historicism as a product of a false conception of the power of social science and historiography, combined with alienation and dissatisfaction: Why do all these social

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philosophies support the revolt against civilization? And what is the secret of their popularity? Why do they attract and seduce so many intellectuals? I am inclined to think that the reason is that they give expression to a deep felt dissatisfaction with a world which does not, and cannot, live up to our moral ideals and to our dreams of perfection. The tendency of historicism and of related views to support the revolt against civilization may be due to the fact that historicism itself is, largely, a reaction against the strain of our civilization and its demand for personal responsibility. Kolakowski holds that the diverse ends of open societies can come into conflict with each other, thereby vitiating attempts to combine liberal values coherently. The open society is described less as a state constitution and more as a collection of values, among which tolerance, rationality, and a lack of commitment to tradition appear at the top of the list. It is assumed, naively so I think, that this set is wholly free of contradictions, meaning that the values that it comprises support each other in all circumstances or at least do not limit each other. This criticism points to the question of value pluralism as discussed by Isaiah Berlin: Isaiah Berlin on Liberty Throughout his career, Isaiah Berlin devoted a considerable amount of attention to the question of totalitarianism. He saw it as one of the most important features of twentieth century history, and as the logical outcome of an excessive devotion to what he took to be a dangerously paternalistic conception of liberty. In a key work on the subject, reprinted and expanded in , Berlin drew an important distinction between the negative and positive conceptions of liberty or freedom: He thus held that the former is the foundation of the pluralistic liberalism that he wished to defend, and that the latter is a very different notion, involving obligatory self-realisation through the perfection of the individual and society in accordance with natural or historical necessity. Long associated with despotic and dictatorial regimes, positive freedom had, by the mid-twentieth century, formed part of the justification for both communist and fascist dictatorships. By claiming deterministic justifications including a truly scientific conception of historical law, social Darwinism or the will of the people, totalitarian states of both the extreme left and the extreme right justified the murder of millions in the name of a unitary and static utopian future that they saw as set and predictable. For Berlin, this totalitarian development of positive liberty was not an aberration, but a logical conclusion. It emerged in a particularly lethal form in the twentieth century due to its central role in the justification of illiberal and non-humanistic ideologies, including communism, fascism, and the sort of extreme romantic nationalism and clericalism already present prototypically in the thought of nineteenth century figures such as Joseph de Maistre. Against this, Berlin urged humanity to seek a decent society with pluralistic values, thus eschewing utopian perfectionism. This he thought to be characterised by a fallibilistic conception of knowledge, peaceful trade-offs, and the rejection of nihilism and relativism in favour of common values across genuinely diverse ways of life. Such a society would, he held, resolve to maintain a pluralistic balance of values against any and all attempts to sacrifice entire groups of people in the name of a future that can never be fully predicted. A key criticism of a stark division between negative and positive liberty has been offered by Charles Taylor. He claims that the terms have been used in an excessively narrow way so as not to do justice to the complexity of human freedom. For Taylor, this conception of negative liberty stems from diverse and likely parallel sources in the Western philosophical tradition, such as Hobbes and Bentham. He claims that in order to do justice to freedom, even sophisticated liberals such as Mill have made significant use of concepts of self-development and improvement, and this implies some degree of positive liberty. So positive liberty is best understood as a part of individual freedom and flourishing, and not necessarily a component of totalitarianism. The extent to which the state should promote it remains an important question. Understood along the lines indicated by Taylor, it may be a value to be realized through self-development in a more democratic society. This is in keeping with what not only Taylor, but other thinkers, claim. Talmon published a liberal indictment of those views of eighteenth century thought that saw the French Enlightenment as manifesting overwhelmingly liberal tendencies. Talmon argued, in *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, that both liberal-empirical and totalitarian tendencies were significant and influential in European thought by the time of the French Revolution. Like Berlin, Talmon stresses the fundamental divergence between individualist and collectivist or statist conceptions of freedom. He divided

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early modern democratic thought into two broad categories: The former led, through a long process of parliamentary development across the nineteenth century, to the institutions regarded as democratic in the mid-twentieth century. The liberal democratic thought of Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville in France, as well as John Stuart Mill in England, were instrumental in developing this political tradition to a philosophical apogee. Totalitarian democracy, on the other hand, developed largely from radical French Enlightenment thought through Babeuf and the Jacobin stream of the French Revolution, and through nineteenth and early twentieth century Marxism. It advocates piecemeal reform and the application of rationality to arrive at optimal political remedies to social problems. Totalitarian democracy from Robespierre and the Jacobins through Karl Marx and into the twentieth century has been utopian, collectivist and statist. Talmon furthermore holds it to be characterised by historical determinism and a notion of a single comprehensible truth in political life. The two intellectual tendencies both claim to promote freedom to the highest degree, but differ greatly in their conceptions of legitimate freedom. Both schools affirm the supreme value of liberty, but whereas the one finds the essence of freedom in spontaneity and the absence of coercion, the other believes it to be realized only in the pursuit and attainment of an absolute collective purpose. Liberal democrats believe that, in the absence of coercion, men and society may one day reach through a process of trial and error a state of ideal harmony. In the case of totalitarian democracy, this state is precisely defined, and is treated as a matter of immediate urgency, a challenge for direct action, an imminent event: This ideal involves a notion of democracy as the constant and unanimous participation of the citizens of an ideal state in the acting out of the general will, thereby realising true democratic citizenship. The Canadian scholar C.

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4: Liberal Hawk Down | The Nation

The war against Islamic totalitarianism, on a fundamental level, is therefore a struggle between Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment forces. To overlook this first truth--as progressives are wont to do--is to misapprehend the nature of the entire conflict.

Theory of Liberal State: Definition, Features and Development Article shared by: Meaning and Definition of Liberal State: Whether the theory is liberal or conservative that is not our prime concern, concern is if the state is liberal –to what extent and in which fashion the state adopts liberal methods and processes for the administration and enactment of laws. How shall we explain the liberal state? The liberal state is, however, one that adopts liberal principles, policies and methods. The idea is still not clear. What are liberal and illiberal principles and policies? It means that to take or adopt a liberal attitude towards the rights, privileges, functions and various other things of the citizens. So, a liberal state denotes a limited government or limited state. It can also be called a theory of limited state introduced by a number of thinkers. The term limited state may be confusing. It exactly means limited functions and role of the state or non-intervention of state. The concept of liberal state can also be explained from another standpoint. It has been maintained by a recent critic that all strands of liberal era confer certain rights and privileges upon persons and these must be protected at any cost. So a liberal state is one which gives priority to the cause of the individuals. The liberal state is, thus, opposite to conservative, authoritarian and totalitarian state. The dictionary meaning of liberal is –respectful and accepting of behaviour or opinions, different from others. A state is liberal when it acknowledges the opinions, attitudes and behaviour of individuals and does not think these as a threat to the existence and administration of state. There are differences among the political philosophers and political scientists as to the functions of liberal state, but there is a common strand among them all –and it is that individuals must have maximum freedom so that their free development does not receive any setback due to state policy or action. Features of the Liberal State: A liberal state can easily be distinguished from an authoritarian or totalitarian state and this is because of certain unique features of such a state: A liberal state always adopts a liberal attitude towards the rights of citizens. If any inequality or discrimination is to be followed that must be for the general interest of the body politic and to the least disadvantage of anybody. By resorting to this system the authority of the liberal state will be in a position to ensure the progress of the individuals. In precise term liberalism implies what is granted in the forms of rights and privileges to one shall also be granted to others. Liberal state presupposes the existence of many groups and organisations and the characteristic feature of a liberal state is they are engaged in cooperation and conflict among themselves. There are also many interest groups. Under normal and peaceful conditions liberal state does not normally intend to impose restrictions upon their activities. In an authoritarian state the prevalence of such a situation cannot be imagined. Plurality of ideas and organisations is a forbidden fruit in such a state. The liberal state maintains a neutrality among all these groups. Since multiplicity of groups and organisations and coexistence among them are the characteristic features of a liberal state any conflict or clash of interests can also be regarded as inevitable consequence. Here the question is: What would be the exact role of the state in this situation? The liberal state maintains utmost neutrality. This is the claim of the votaries of a liberal state. The liberal state normally does not favour any particular class or elite group in the case of conflict. Though the state maintains neutrality the state is quite aware of clash of interests between classes and groups. As a provider of check and stability in the political system the state adopts reforms so that destabilization cannot occur. A liberal state can reasonably be called a reformist state. Through frequent reforms a liberal state brings about changes in the political system. In fact, liberalism or liberal state is closely linked with reforms and in that sense it is based on reformism. It adopts liberal attitude to reforms. The important feature of a liberal state is it is accountable to the citizenry which means that all its activities, decisions and policies are to be approved by the body politic. The consent and accountability is the twin ideas associated with the liberal state. It means that the decision of the state is not

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final even though it is for the general welfare of the community. It is because what is welfare and what is not, is to be decided for whom it is meant. There is no scope of imposing anything upon the individuals against their will. Liberal state is never a one-idea state; it embraces multiplicity of ideas, views and existence of numerous groups and parties. This finally indicates a competition among them. Competition involved seizure of political power through constitutional means, legal procedure and democratic ways, competition in views and ideas. It is believed that the truth will emerge only from this struggle of words and ideas. That is why in a liberal state such a competition is always encouraged. Mill strongly advocated for the competition among the different shades of views and ideas. A liberal state cannot be imagined without political parties; and this is not all. In any liberal state there are number of ideas number of political parties and they struggle to capture power. Here lies a major difference between a liberal state and authoritarian state. A liberal state is sometimes called a pluralist state because of the plurality of ideas and organisations. A competitive party system is a very important aspect of a liberal state. One party captures power, while the other party or parties sit in the opposition and in this way the change in power takes place which does not normally occur in dictatorial state. It has been maintained by a critic that modern parties are mass organisations with extra-parliamentary structure. Separation of power is generally regarded as a feature. A liberal state means limited state and it again implies the three organs of the state will discharge this function keeping themselves within the confinement decided by law and constitution. When this is implemented no organ of the government will interfere with the functions and jurisdiction of another organ. But the separation of powers need not be the only precondition of being liberal. For example, Britain is a liberal state but the separation of powers has failed to be an integral part of state machinery. But some forms of separation of power must exist in all liberal states. The separation of power of USA is different from that of U. A liberal state does not endorse the domination of a particular ideology, various opinions or ideologies work and exist side by side. It is a state of multiple ideas, ideals ideologies and views and all of them enjoy ample opportunities and atmosphere for work. In a non-liberal state such a situation is unimaginable. In authoritarian regimes the state-sponsored ideology dominates over all other ideologies. Both fascism and communism fall in this category. The citizens are free to select any one idea or ideology and application of force is non-existent. In all liberal states there are mainly two centres of power—“one is economic and the other is political. But the interesting fact is that economic power-centre controls the political power. Marx emphasizes this aspect of liberal state. From the study of history he came to know that the owners of the sources of production and the controllers of distribution in all possible means control the political power for the furtherance of the interest of the capitalist class. They control parties, pressure groups, send their own persons to represent people, the legislatures enact laws to safeguard the interests of the ruling class. There is no fixed form of liberal state. For example, we find in Britain a constitutional monarchy. There is clear incongruity between monarchism and liberalism. But the mere fact is that Britain is a liberal state. On the other hand, United States is also a liberal state with constitutional republic in character. The head of the state is President and if he exercises all his constitutional powers with a nefarious motive he can become a real dictator. France and Russia are also liberal states though the administrative machineries in these two states are different. With a different constitutional machinery, Switzerland is also a liberal state. Development of Liberal State: The concept of liberal state is an old one. The exact emergence of a liberal state cannot be ascertained which can satisfy one and all. However, scholars are of opinion that hints about the liberal state can be found in the writings of social contract theoretician Thomas Hobbes. In his two noted works *De due* and *Leviathan* he made certain statements and comments which lay the foundation of liberal thought or about the liberal state. Though the hints are not always explicit, the hints are undeniable. The basis of the state or civil society is the individuals who are free and equal. It implies that these free and equal individuals without being induced or forced by external authority or power decided to build up a civil society. The state imagined by Hobbes is liberal because it is based on the consent of all the individuals. Hobbes also conceived of a state which would be based on rules and law. That is his state is a legitimate one.

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5: First Principles - Totalitarianism

The liberal state is the 'concentrated force' of that order. The contribution argues that ordoliberalism is best characterized as an authoritarian liberalism and assesses its contemporary veracity in relation to the European Union.

Authoritarian Liberalism, Class and Rackets by Werner Bonefeld Understanding the critique of political economy as a critical social theory includes the critique of so-called neo-liberalism as the theoretical expression of capitalist social relations. In contrast to normative critics of neoliberalism, which reject it abstractly as a doctrine of narrow-minded economic interests, especially the interests of financial capital, neoliberalism did not corrupt capitalism. Rejection of neo-liberalism as the ideology of market fundamentalism fails to grasp its social validity. It denounces the contemporary mode of capitalist organisation as malign to the interests of workers without asking about the character of capitalist wealth and what it means to be a worker in capitalist society. Why indeed does this content, that is, human social reproduction, take the form of money as more money? Contemporary critical theory asks different questions. It asks about the ways and means of achieving the promises of the Enlightenment and proposes communicative actions to emancipate capitalism from uncivilised forms of profit making, class exploitation, gender oppression, war, and prevent ecological destruction. In this view, the working class struggle for subsistence is not innate to capitalist society. Rather, it manifests a social pathology. Society ought to be free from it. Who would object to that view? Yet, what really does this mean? It identifies state and economy as distinct forms of social organization and recognizes the state as the predominant power of that relationship. Seemingly, the relations of production manifest either democratic reason or neoliberal unreason. In contemporary critical theory, the critique of economic categories is a non-topic. Understanding neoliberalism as a theoretical expression of the capitalistically organised form of social reproduction entails its critique as a critique of capitalist society. Contemporary critical theory shies away from such critique. As a consequence, it really has nothing of note to say about the social conditions of poverty. It proposes various ways of overcoming poverty through the redistribution of wealth and the democratic regulation of the economy without asking about the constitution of the economic object. Humanisation of social relations is the purpose of the critique of political economy. However, the effort of humanising is confronted by the paradox that it presupposes inhuman conditions, which provoke the effort of humanisation in the first place. Inhuman conditions are not just an impediment to humanisation but a premise of its concept. In the meantime, Trump exploited the socio-economic blow back from the financial crisis of with populist distrust of those in power and an appeal to nativism. He promises a return to and for business by means of the state. His stance expresses a fundamental neoliberal insight that has largely been ignored by its well-meaning critics. Neoliberalism recognises the free economy and the strong state as interdependent categories for a thorough account, see Bonefeld Trump names the guilty parties and demands that they are locked up and kept out of the business of American labour. Nativism personalises the cause and effects of freedom as economic compulsion. It gives permission to express rage within the bounds of supreme order thinking. Instead of illusory assurances of a politically correct and better capitalism, authoritarians name the Other as undesirable elements to some illusory national harmony. Trump succeeded because he projected a nation divided by friends and enemies and offered action, for the sake of business and nativist pleasure. The second section expounds the neoliberal conception of class, presents its argument that the free economy amounts to a practice of government, and explores the meaning of an authoritarian liberalism. The term was coined by Hermann Heller in with further elaboration by Marcuse in Authoritarian liberalism recognises the state as indispensable for the free economy, a conception that is well understood by Trump. The final section bespeaks the time of Trump. What existing society thus promises is not freedom from want. The profitability of her labour is the fundamental condition of sustaining access to the means of subsistence. The profitable consumption of her labour power is the premise of maintaining access to the means of life. For the seller of labour power, competition is not some abstract

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economic law. Rather, it is an experienced concept. For the seller of labour power, then, the class relation does not just amount to the wage relation; rather, it subsists through the wage relation. That is, the line of class antagonism falls not merely between but, also and importantly, through the social individuals. For the sellers of labour power, the freedom of contract entails the common class experience of labour market competition. Competition is not a category of social unity. It is a category of disunity. Class society exists in the form of individualised commodity owners, each seeking to maintain themselves in competitive, gendered and racialized, and also nationalised labour markets where the term cutthroat competition is experienced in various forms, from arson attack to class solidarity, and from destitution to collective bargaining, from gangland thuggery to communal forms of organising subsistence-support, from strike-breaking to collective action, etc. What then are the dispossessed struggling for? They struggle for wages and conditions, and to defend wage levels and conditions. They struggle for respect, education, and recognition of human significance, and above all for food, shelter, clothing, warmth, love, affection, knowledge, time for enjoyment, and dignity. The working class struggles for making ends meet, for subsistence and comfort. It does all of this in conditions, in which the increase in material wealth that it has produced, pushes beyond the limits of its capitalist form. Every so-called trickle-down effect that capitalist accumulation might bring forth presupposes a prior and sustained trickle up in the capitalist accumulation of wealth. Whether this struggle turns concrete in the changing forms of repression as resistance to repression or whether it turns concrete in forms of repression, is a matter of experienced history. To be a productive labourer is not an ontological privilege. It is a great misfortune. At its best, the wage contract is governed by the rule of law. It treats the buyers of labour power and the producers of surplus value as equal legal subjects. In distinction to contemporary critical theory, the law in society does not contain a promise for general well-being. Critical theory is critical on the condition that it recognises its entanglement with the irrational rationality of bourgeois society. The Free Economy and the Strong State: The common feature of these accounts is the acceptance of the state as the essential institution of social peace in capitalist society. In relation to the economy, the state is the predominant power. Schmitt and the ordoliberalists conceive of the state as a security state and characterise it as the concentrated power of a continuously prevented civil war. For them, Weimar was a state of lamentable weakness "it allowed the governed to influence the conduct of government. For the sake of the free economy, the state had to be built like a fortress to safeguard it from becoming the prey of mass democratic demands for material security. Schmitt argued his case on the basis of Hobbes "the Leviathan always comes first" and through the tradition of conservative opposition to the egalitarian principles of the French Revolution. He rejected the idea of political equality and identified law making in mass democracy as mob rule. In the Wealth of Nations Smith b, thus defined political economy as a science of the statesman and legislator. It is not a category of social cohesion and integration. Market police are required to secure its orderly conduct on the basis of non-directive, abstract rules of law. Competition entails therefore the power of the state to secure the fundamental sociability of the unsocial interests. The competing individuals are mutually dependent upon each other and express their independence by means of contract. Their private interests are reconcilable on the basis of a common interest in the security and the freedom of contract and the guarantee of the rights of property. Law is the means of social peace. It is the category of individual freedom. Individuals are free if they only have to comply with the law. Nevertheless, law does not apply to disorder. The rule of law is premised on social order. Order is a political category. For authoritarian liberalism the rule of law thus entails the power of the state as the concentrated force of order and law. Should a situation arise in which a decision has to be made between law and order, law is to be sacrificed for the sake of order. However, for the founding neoliberal thinkers individualism is not the essential category of the state in its role as the concentrated power of social order. The essential category of social dis-order is the proletariat. In their argument the proletariat is a capitalist phenomenon. Capitalism entails a natural tendency towards proletarianisation. They understand that the working class has no direct access to the means of subsistence and that it therefore struggles to make ends meet. In this context proletarianisation characterises politicised market relations that are founded on

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entrenched class relations. In their argument proletarianised workers demand the satisfaction of their wants by means of welfare state guarantees and a politics of full employment. In this argument proletarianisation is a real menace. It denies the workers the social right and removes from them the moral permission to contribute to society as self-responsible entrepreneurs of labour power, as agents of human capital. They identify the proletarianised mass society as entirely irrational. In this context Schmitt and the German neoliberals reject laissez faire liberalism as a theology of freedom because it neglects the state as the predominant power of social order, of peace and tranquillity. The consequences of neglect are formidable. It abandons the state to social democracy, leading to big government. In the context of the crisis of the early s, the Germans were not alone in identifying the dangers of a proletarianised mass society. The crowd has seized the seat of government and is trying to seize the wealth. For Baruch, correctly, the dispossessed traders in labour power are the social majority. For the sake of the freedom of labour, their curtailment within the limits of private property is of vital importance. In fact, it is a condition of liberty.

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6: Fascism - Opposition to parliamentary democracy | www.enganchecubano.com

The basic assumption of modern liberalism is that freedom is involved in an ongoing, all encompassing struggle against a dangerous enemy, totalitarianism. The existence of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were and still are presented as the quintessential totalitarian formations. Liberal.

Enzo Traverso, via Marginalia. Thank you for accepting our invite to talk to Marginalia for our inaugural issue on the subject of totalitarianism. As a historian who has written extensively on the subject could you first provide us with an outline of the history of the concept? While rooted in the horrors of 20th century European history the term has been proven particularly enduring most recently being employed in the context of a new anti-communism and anti-Islamism. During its century-long life, the idea of totalitarianism has passed through different stages, which retrospectively depict a very contested trajectory. In the s, this word was coined by Italian antifascists to denounce the monolithic character of the political regime established by Mussolini. In the following decade, the term experienced a large diffusion, with the emergence of the Nazi power in Germany and the advent of Stalinism in the USSR. The concept of totalitarianism was codified in , after the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact that suddenly presented Hitler and Stalin as twin dictators. Strongly criticized by a scholarship that did not accept being submitted to such ideological imperatives, this concept was progressively dismissed in the s and s. It experienced a spectacular rebirth after the terrorist attacks of September 11, , when it was applied to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism. This inevitably implies a selective gaze on the violence of the past century: There have been significant national variations in the credence the term has received. Furthermore, is totalitarianism an explicitly occidental phenomenon or concept? In the light of its intellectual history, totalitarianism appears as an eminently Western concept, despite its global diffusion. In fact, it also has a geopolitical dimension. In some Mediterranean countries like Italy, Greece, or France, where the communist parties played a hegemonic role in the Resistance movements, the idea of totalitarianism aroused significant suspicion in the postwar years. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, they adopted a kind of Hegelian teleology whose outcome was the triumph of the absolute mind as totalitarianism: The critical potential of this approach is obvious-particularly when we remember that antifascism viewed National Socialism as a decline of civilization into barbarism and considered the Resistance movement as the revenge of Enlightenment-but it was similarly de-historicized. Furthermore, they viewed totalitarianism as an ineluctable destiny of modernity, adopting a posture of contemplative criticism that avoided any political commitment from this point of view, one should distinguish them from other Frankfurt School thinkers like Benjamin or Marcuse. While looking into Nazism and Stalinism, Arendt seeks to understand totalitarianism as a novel form of mobilization and genocidal dictatorship culminating in the system of concentration and death camps. Does her account remain useful in our effort to understand current political phenomena? When Arendt wrote her book, during and immediately after the Second World War, both National Socialism and Stalinism were political phenomena of the present, not yet historiographical objects. Arendt was not a historian and, from a historical point of view, her book is highly problematic: Nevertheless, she emphasizes the novelty of totalitarianism in history: In other words, totalitarianism is an attempt at building a monolithic, homogeneous community in which any form of pluralism and division of the social body is eliminated. According to Arendt, politics is not an ontological category; it is rather the realm of *infra*, a space of interaction between citizens, very different human beings sharing a common political sphere as equal actors. It seems to me that this definition of totalitarianism as an experience of the destruction of politics deserves to be saved and highlighted. Conceived in this way, totalitarianism, a system of total, overwhelming state power, is also antipodal to communism, a classless and stateless community of free and equal human beings. It is clear that historical specificity and socio-political contextualization is paramount in any effort to better understand totalitarianism. Would it be possible, however, or would you find it useful to identify some of its most important characteristics? Would, for research purposes at least, an ideal-type be of certain value?

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The advantage of this ideal-type lies in its capacity to include both fascism and Stalinism. A completely reified world, in which all human and social relationships take a commodity form, in which the market becomes a universal anthropological model and human beings are unable to conceive of their relationships outside of individualism and competition: Paradoxically, a new form of neoliberal totalitarianism is coming into being, dressed in anti-totalitarian clothes market and individualism as symbols of freedom against racial and class collectivism. How do you explain the resurgence of a new wave of conservatism and nationalism today alongside a rather militant anti-communism, in Europe and the US at least? Insofar as they reject neoliberal globalization, i. They are a conservative reaction to contemporary totalitarianism. We should be aware of this when we fight post-fascism, right-wing populism and other forms of radical rights. Just as we cannot struggle against contemporary totalitarianism in the name of nationalism or conservatism, we cannot struggle against post-fascism by building a united front with the defenders of neoliberalism. Anti-fascism, for a good part of the twentieth century, was identified with the struggle for peace. Increasingly, however, liberal anti-totalitarianism seems prone to portray movements and activism against the rising tide of right extremism as violent, nondialectical, and authoritarian. What is really at stake here? What is the historical value or the political relevance of anti-fascism today? After , antifascism was identified with the armed struggle against the Nazi occupation of Europe. It seems to me that the opposition to US and Western wars in the Middle East should not be carried on in the name of pacifism, rather in the name of freedom against neocolonial oppression and occupation. In along with the Berlin Wall an entire representation of the world fell. Western liberal democracy appeared to be of universal appeal. Rescuing the Russian Revolution means extracting its legacy from the deep layers of a century of anticommunism and Stalinism. This is a work of mourning the defeated revolutions of the twentieth century. These movements could not inscribe themselves into any historical continuity and did not claim the legacy of the October Revolution. They were compelled to reinvent themselves. Their freedom and creativity are refreshing, but their ephemeral character is a serious limit. A full list of her publications can be found at <https://>

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7: Authoritarian Liberalism, Class and Rackets Logos Journal

For liberalism to survive as an ideology, reality must be made to fit the concept, people need to "get with the program," and the doctrine must be preserved against all evidence to the contrary.

Quite quickly, however, the fascists embraced the word as a fitting description of the true goal and value of their regime. Totalitarianism therefore emerged as a term to describe a novel form of political regime in which a party or movement captured the apparatus of the state and "usually through means of terror" sought to mobilize every energy of society for the use of the party-state, leaving nothing alone. Insofar as liberal societies boast of providing a maximum of freedom to individuals and their associations, totalitarianism could be understood as existing at the opposite pole from liberalism. Following the Second World War, as political thinkers sought to understand the recent calamity, at least two broad narratives were available. The particular value of her work lay in its account of the origin of totalitarianism in the late-nineteenth-century transformation of the classes into the masses, with its immediate precondition being the alienation, isolation, and anomie of mass man. For conservatives, this meant that the defense of the free society against the totalitarian temptation would necessarily involve a critique of modern mass society with its atomizing popular culture and demotic rejection of traditional forms and institutions. Other writers who contributed to the early postwar literature on totalitarianism included Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich at Harvard. The liberal moralist foreign policy of the Carter administration sought to pressure right-wing dictatorships allied with America on human rights grounds while seeking rapprochement with revolutionary regimes in the Third World. They might therefore be open to an appeal, provided America could burnish its image as a progressive force in the world. Carter hoped to transcend the frozen divisions of the Cold War, at least in the Third World. Kirkpatrick argued that America should properly follow precisely the opposite policy "and not merely for the old reason given with respect to the right-wing dictators: Traditional authoritarians were nonideo-logical and did not presume to control all spheres of social life: Totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, operated from an ideological imperative to bring all social spheres under strict party control. The intact and independent social worlds within an authoritarian regime created a basis for opposition that might eventually displace the dictatorship and bring about a free society. But a totalitarian party, once in power, systematically eliminated, through terror and propaganda, any possibility of an internal challenge to its rule. Soviet totalitarianism did at last come to an end, though not without concerted American pressure during the culminating decade of the Cold War. And it is no accident that the communist collapse began in Poland, a country that, by historical accident, had retained a relatively independent church "in other words, a country that was not, quite, entirely totalitarian. Further Reading Abbott Gleason. *The Inner History of the Cold War. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.* Vetterli, Richard, and William E. *The Essence of Totalitarianism.* University Press of America,

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8: George Orwell: The Fight against Totalitarianism - The Free Radical Online

Liberals must also defend freedom of ideas against those agents and apologists of Communist totalitarianism, who, instead of honestly defending their heresies, resort to conspiratorial methods of anonymity and other methods of fifth columnists.

The War Against Islamic Totalitarianism: One of the more debilitating cognitive blind spots of progressives is their belief that pathological behavior is always the result of privation: If only people were rescued from poverty, or ignorance, or hopelessness, the progressive mind reasons, they would cease doing terrible things. But in the case of Islamic terrorism, which is a pathological behavior, such an analysis is off the mark. On the contrary, the psychic justifications for Islamic terrorism can be found in an intellectually accessible and, in its own way, profoundly moving philosophy that stands in direct opposition to the liberal democratic institutions and Enlightenment values of the West. It was the only way to ensure that they were living the way Allah intended. Either human beings were ruled by God, or else they were ruled by other human beings; there was no distinction, on this level, between an absolute dictatorship or a representative democracy. Both amounted to the rule of men over men--which, according to Qutb, was always a form of oppression. Only the rule of God provided people with freedom. Thus, Qutb rejected out of hand the entire Enlightenment project which sought to separate church from state. The only question is how far jihad is aimed. It is a totalitarian movement in the truest sense. The war against Islamic totalitarianism, on a fundamental level, is therefore a struggle between Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment forces. To overlook this first truth--as progressives are wont to do--is to misapprehend the nature of the entire conflict. To be sure, there are other elements involved. Regional and tribal loyalties. But at its bottom, beneath the claims and counter-claims, the war is between two irreconcilable visions for the future of mankind. The forces of liberal Enlightenment, committed to rational inquiry and religious tolerance, manifest in democratic rule, versus the forces of anti-Enlightenment, committed to faithful obedience to a divine will, manifest in sharia rule. It is Thomas Jefferson versus Sayyid Qutb. But our perspective is not the perspective of Osama and his ilk, who take a much longer view of history, a view in which even the most devastating setback is merely temporary and in which compromise is, literally, worse than death. Muslim radicals ask nothing of us save our submission to Islam or our extinction. If we take them at their words and what reason do we have to doubt them? Osama himself spelled this out in his November letter to the American people. After a pro forma rant about alleged wrongs perpetrated by the United States on Muslims worldwide, Osama outlined his demands: You separate religion from your policies, contradicting the pure nature which affirms Absolute Authority to the Lord and your Creator. You flee from the embarrassing question posed to you: How is it possible for Allah the Almighty to create His creation, grant them power over all the creatures and land, grant them all the amenities of life, and then deny them that which they are most in need of: Yet you build your economy and investments on Usury. As a result of this, in all its different forms and guises, the Jews have taken control of your economy, through which they have then taken control of your media, and now control all aspects of your life making you their servants and achieving their aims at your expense; precisely what Benjamin Franklin warned you against. You also permit drugs, and only forbid the trade of them, even though your nation is the largest consumer of them. You have continued to sink down this abyss from level to level until incest has spread amongst you, in the face of which neither your sense of honor nor your laws object. Is there a worse kind of event for which your name will go down in history and be remembered by nations? The companies practice this as well, resulting in the investments becoming active and the criminals becoming rich. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women. Giant corporations and establishments are established on this, under the name of art, entertainment, tourism and freedom, and other deceptive names you attribute to it. America, in the minds of Muslim radicals, is not merely the worst civilization in history but the most seductive because we are jahiliyya, unveiled. And we are up in their faces. Such ephemera are

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tolerated by us, the lowbrow excretions of our dedication to highbrow ideals like individual liberty, artistic expression and free enterprise. For Muslim radicals, they are the toxic images of a steady spiritual genocide being wrought upon them. The radicals were striking back at us, albeit with mosquito-like forays, since the era of disco music and leg warmers; on September 11th, they finally got our attention. From that morning on, our task in the war against Islamic totalitarianism became axiomatic: Kill or imprison-for-life every Muslim radical in the world. Prosecuting the war on terror is more like prosecuting hundreds of thousands of miniature wars in which our enemies are individual persons, determined to fight to the death. The radicals must be neutralized, one by one. The difficult question is how to neutralize them without creating more radicals to take their place. It is altogether legitimate, given the foregoing, to ask whether George W. The answer is a roundabout yes: But to make sense of it, we have to set aside the strong emotions that decision conjures up even now. For progressives, this means letting go, for a moment or two, their visceral distrust of the Bush Administration. For traditional conservatives, this means letting go their reflexive desire to support the prerogatives of the Commander in Chief during a time of war. Rational inquiry, rather than political passion, is required to draw the connection between the attacks of September 11th and the decision to oust Saddam. Step one in such an inquiry returns us that miserable Tuesday morning in , that miserable Tuesday morning of warm sunshine and perfect blue skies when the world changed. Beyond what the moment meant to the radicals, however, a perilous message went out to the rest of the world. That belief, it turned out, was false. Osama called our bluff. We investigated, determined who was behind the attack. Saddam Hussein seemed the most likely candidate to capitalize on that formula. Which is the reason President Bush sought and received Congressional authorization to use military force prior to the invasion of Iraq. Still, Saddam and Osama were both consumed by totalizing visions of the future of Islamic peoples, and both saw the United States as the chief impediment to the realization of their visions. More ominously, if a freelance thug like Osama managed to kill 3, Americans, what might a resolute sociopath like Saddam, with the financial resources of an oil-drenched country, accomplish? Here are the facts as you know them in the immediate aftermath of September 11th: You know the number is a grotesque exaggeration, based on data provided to the W. But even if the actual figure is one tenth of the W. Are there dissenting voices? Yes, to be sure. Hans Blix, Chief U. On August 31, , for example, just after he resigned his position as weapons inspector due to what he perceived as lack of support from the U. Security Council, he said: Iraq still has proscribed weapons capability. There needs to be a careful distinction here. Iraq today is challenging the special commission to come up with a weapon and say where is the weapon in Iraq, and yet part of their efforts to conceal their capabilities, I believe, have sic been to disassemble weapons into various components and to hide these components throughout Iraq. I think the danger right now is that without effective inspections, without effective monitoring, Iraq can in a very short period of time measured in months, reconstitute chemical biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear weaponization program. Yet almost a year after he had left Iraq, in June of , Ritter told an interviewer: It is a resounding NO. Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale? Can Iraq produce biological weapons on a meaningful scale? So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed. Are you willing to gamble the collective security of the American people on the erratic track records of Blix and Ritter? If only you had acted preemptively in August , if only you had taken out bin Laden. What do you do about Iraq? We know, of course, what the real George W. Saddam had to go. Given the strategic reality that we could no longer depend on the threat of a cataclysmic response to deter him, the decision seems altogether reasonable. But, at minimum, reasonable. Ousting Saddam, moreover, would present hostile regimes elsewhere with a show of American force, a signal that they might be next if they provoked us--as deterrents go, not exactly on par with the prospect of sudden annihilation, but in reality the best we could do. The fact that Saddam was in violation of the surrender terms which kept him in power in provided either a legitimate casus belli or a useful fig leaf, depending on your point of view, acquitting America of the charge of disregarding international law. In so doing, Bush retroactively undermined the rationale of the invasion when

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no stockpiles of WMDs turned up. His error in judgment here is especially egregious when we recall that the more compelling reason to go after Iraq was always the opportunity to stand up a liberal democratic government in the heart of Islam. The fact that Bush shifted emphasis only belatedly, after not finding WMDs, was an unforgivable blunder. The Islamic world will embrace the Enlightenment values of rational inquiry and religious tolerance. Such values are no longer optional, not in the twenty-first century. One hundred years ago, a dozen fanatics, armed with a death wish and the latest technology available, could perhaps have razed a village. But in the twenty-first century, a dozen fanatics, armed with a death wish and the latest technology available, could slaughter millions and set off an economic panic that might bring down the governments of powerful nations. Enlightenment values, again, are no longer optional. Rational inquiry and religious tolerance are the glue of modernity. The Islamic world will either embrace them or perish. Their predicament is sketched, with dire poetic flair, by the essayist and philosopher Lee Harris in book *Civilization and Its Enemies*: There is a sense of Greek tragedy, with its dialectic of hubris and nemesis, to what has been unfolding in the Islamic world.

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9: MARK GOLDBLATT: The War Against Islamic Totalitarianism: How We Got Here

1 Dictatorships: ideologies and totalitarianism Any comparative history of the three interwar dictatorships must involve looking at three main questions.

Fuller I am now a member of the Washington elite circles I scorned in my youth. My early hostility did not stem from partisan ideology, but rather from a tacit social understanding that lowly academics from state universities i. Both the following story and my burgeoning Beltway comeuppance contain a kernel of wisdom that informs a new way of thinking about the current populist moment. The course explored the varieties, strengths, and weaknesses of continuous and categorical measures of democracy—such as those employed by Freedom House, Polity, the Geddes typology, and others. It was substantively so full of dark material—repression, violence, assassinations, coups, poverty, and censorship—that I had become fond of making the final class an open conversation about the future. I began by drawing a long horizontal line with arrows at both ends. A zero was placed squarely in the middle. Then I spoke briefly of probability theory and the centripetal forces of technological integration. I drew some bell curves, some more lines, and more arrows. From one side of the room I explained that democracies, on average, are becoming more authoritarian. As evidence, I cited central banks, unelected judges, the swelling surveillance state, and concentrated power in the executive. I walked to the other side of the room and from there asserted that autocracies are, on average, becoming more liberal. I felt a tinge of unease as I turned to interpret meaning from the board I had covered with frantic scribbles. My words would command the undivided attention of all forty students. We talked about it for a full hour, ended the class, and then moved on with our everyday lives. This idea stayed in my head, but I did not bring it up in classes anymore. In the US there were police shootings, riots and reprisal killings of officers, and the Russians instrumentalized social media to interfere in an election characterized by unprecedented levels of populist rhetoric from both mainstream camps. Johns Hopkins published *Democracy in Decline?* A corpus of books with similar themes rained upon us. It was as if a reality based on my forecast was constructing itself. Not only did it have prima facie validity, it had predictive power. To this day, I receive emails from students in that class saying that conversation inspired their current work. The only certainties are that change is inevitable and no one knows the future until it is too late. Perhaps I am aging, and this is a Get Off My Lawn moment, but in the current technological and political atmosphere one cannot help but get the sense that the future knocked, entered, and is now wrecking the place. To understand the generalized aporia of the populist moment, a good place to start is by accepting that conceptions of democracy change over time. The Founding Fathers abhorred direct mob rule and created an elite republic. As representation expanded, the republic became known as a representative democracy. Then a republican democracy, or sometimes a democratic republic. Then a liberal democracy. Then—well, the concept is now a dumpster fire of emotionally charged nouns and adjectives. This evolution of meaning fits into a theory of authoritarian liberalism well. If regime types really are converging, it should be common to hear frequent, robust, and heated debates over exactly how to distinguish between historically loaded terms like democracy, republic, authoritarianism, and liberalism. Modern democracy is best understood as rules-based institutional checks and balances that allow participation and contestation among a large portion of society. It featured contestation among elites representing the 13 states, but participation was severely limited. But a more granular explanation would be that elites expanded participation in search for comparative advantages within contested elections. The reality is more like the opposite; elites have policy preferences that they signal to voters who, in turn, adopt them. Issues are far too complex for voters to think through every proposed policy. They look for shortcuts; things and people that sound, look, and feel familiar. There is just too much there to have an informed opinion on everything. At the end of the day you have to make a choice, click on a link, and vote for a representative or a policy if you want to participate. One may recall television coverage of the Vietnam War, but today there are so many interactive, immediate, and global technological outlets that conspiracy factions,

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hacker collectives, protest groups, journalists, contrarians, and others now compete with political elites on a more level technological footing. And indeed, like me, they often end up becoming the elite signalers they initially claimed to despise. This is a wholly unrecognized problem, and it midwives two further, related problems. Before the current era of mass global interconnectivity, the response of elites to increased technology-driven liberty telephones, trains, cars, etc. In autocracies, the impulse has historically been to restrict and repress. That time is long gone. Thanks to the internet, things are now complexly interconnected all the way down to the individual level of analysis. Social media unshackles individuals from the collective action problem in a way that does not acknowledge sovereign borders. The wide-ranging impacts of technological change always outpace incremental institutional change. Existing democratic institutions are just not fit, flexible, or strong enough to cope with the impulses of ideologues, unfiltered and low-cost information campaigns, or the seductive nature of conspiracy theories. The future did knock, it unchained the people, and now elites must figure out how to reimpose order. In dictatorships the vacuums are now filled with incremental liberalism. In autocracies there is already a monopoly on power, so all dictators have to do is build institutions that will grant and govern limited individual rightsâ€”liberalismâ€”yet conserve strict maintenance of their spread and activity. In democracies, elites have choices. They can kill the democratic republic in the name of orderâ€”as populists would doâ€”or unite to defend and modernize the system that created their collective power. The people do have some say, but understandably the choices have not been all that great as of late. Absent new institutional frameworks to manage the political assault of modern technology, it is likely that elites and identity groups in democracies will continue pushing their followers to use the rules-based system against itself by voting for increasingly idiosyncratic populist agendas. If elites choose to roll in the mud with populists and authoritarians, then God help us all. As a new maybe still aspiring?

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