

1: Naturalism in American Literature

Auto Suggestions are available once you type at least 3 letters. Use up arrow (for mozilla firefox browser alt+up arrow) and down arrow (for mozilla firefox browser alt+down arrow) to review and enter to select.

CXI, July-Sept To philosophers, the person with the best arguments wins the contest of ideas. This means that even an argument that is very technical and contains little or no rhetorical devices, is very exciting because arguments are at the center of action. Also, in a broadly democratic culture, or one that aspires thereto, engaging in reasoned debate rather than violence to persuade others to adopt a policy or course of action is essential. So it is important to be familiar with the reasons and arguments both for and against naturalism. This is not an exhaustive treatment of all the arguments for and against naturalism, but I think there are enough to show what philosophers take to be the strengths and weaknesses of naturalism. While there is some overlap between arguments for and against naturalism and arguments supporting theism, we will not be reviewing arguments that attempt to prove the existence of God and objections to these. This is apologetics and there are very helpful books one can consult regarding this. The reason for this practice is that when professional philosophers write for one another, their arguments are frequently complex and very carefully worded so as to avoid becoming easy prey to objections. This makes summarization not only difficult, but can also lead to inaccuracies and misunderstanding. Arguments For Naturalism We will begin with arguments from Sidney Hook ¹⁸⁹, a professor of philosophy at New York University, student of John Dewey, and an advocate of pragmatism, naturalism, and socialism. For the sciences themselves do not demand complete or exact confirmation of an hypothesis to begin with, but only enough to institute further inquiries; and the history of science is sufficient evidence that the discipline of its method, far from being a bar against the discovery of new truths, is a positive aid in acquiring them. As for decreeing what does or can exist, there is nothing in scientific method that forbids anything to exist. It concerns itself only with the responsibility of the assertions that proclaim the existence of anything. Scientific method does not entail any metaphysical theory of existence and certainly not metaphysical materialism. The existence of God, immortality, disembodied spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have been customarily interpreted by the great institutional religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they deny the existence of fairies, elves, and leprechauns. There are other conceptions of God, to be sure, and provided they are not self-contradictory in meaning, the naturalist is prepared in principle to consider their claims to validity. All he asks is that the conception be sufficiently definite to make possible specific inferences of the determinate conditionsâ€”the how, when, and where of His operation. So long as no self-contradictory notions are advanced, he will not rule out the abstract logical possibility that angelic creatures push the planets any more than that there exists a gingerbread castle on the other side of the moon. All he demands is the presence of sufficient precision of meaning to make it possible to test, let us sayâ€”the existence of extrasensory perception. The possibility of extrasensory perception cannot be ruled out a priori. Here, as elsewhere, the naturalist must follow the preponderance of scientific evidence. He therefore welcomes those who talk about the experiential evidence for religious beliefs as distinct from those who begin with mystery and end in mystery. He only asks to be given an opportunity to examine the evidence and to evaluate it by the same general canons which have led to the great triumphs of knowledge in the past. It is natural in this case, as in the case of extrasensory perception, that he should scrutinize with great care reports which if true would lead him radically to modify some of his earlier generalizations. The unusual must clear a higher hurdle of credibility than the usual. But only on its first jump. Unfortunately, for all their talk of appeal to experience, direct or indirect, religious experientialists dare not appeal to any experience of sufficiently determinate character to permit of definite tests. There is a certain wisdom in this reluctance. For if experience can confirm a belief, it can also invalidate it. But to most supernaturalists this is an inadmissible possibility. We therefore find that the kind of experience to which reference is made is not only unique but also uniquely self-authenticating. Those who are not blessed by the experiences are regarded as blind or deaf or worse! But science is not a metaphysically neutral method or set of methods. Scientists prefer to work with things that can be physically observed, counted, measured,

controlled in some manner, and duplicated. Not all phenomena occur under these conditions. By claiming that science is its only method, naturalism does, contrary to Hook, rule out a priori various entities and our belief in them. Hook is like a man who, having discovered how helpful a microscope is when seeking knowledge of various entities, declares that microscopy is the only method that can be trusted to give us knowledge of reality tout court. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, we have become increasingly aware that scientists are subject to the same sorts of cognitive, affective, economic, etc. Granted, the scientific method dampens bias significantly, but bias remains nonetheless and the entire enterprise is shot through with values and value judgments. This is powerfully illustrated in the various fields of medicine. People everywhere seek natural explanations. But a non-natural explanation merely underscores the fact that something cannot be explained "at the moment" it does not provide an alternative kind of explanation or intelligibility. When will we know that it has been paid? What are the criteria for success? Naturalists alone hold theories consonant with their practice. Instead, the farmer blames the storm on the atmospheric conditions that brought it about, and this is a naturalistic explanation. To blame God for the hail storm is a non-natural explanation or attribution. Since we do not indulge in this practice in our daily lives, the naturalistic theory alone is the one that reflects this and is congruent with it. So theists and supernaturalists hold theories that are inconsistent with the way they live; their worldviews are not congruent. Most scientists are naturalists, therefore, it is the naturalists who are most helpful to others in this life. If one counts donations of time and money to charitable causes as being helpful toward others, it is not the case that naturalists are most helpful. Social research shows that theists are most helpful, even when donations to ecclesiastical bodies are removed from the data. All natural objects are equally real, and the descriptive vocabulary of the sciences does not exhaust the reality of nature. It too is made in response to an objection that charges naturalism with impoverishing our experience of nature, or elevating the scientific description of nature above all others, say, the poetic description of nature. It thus gives rise to a particularly strong form of ontological naturalism, namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical effects must itself be physical. The same seems to apply to physicalism. Also, linking the acceptance of that doctrine to the findings of science does not do away with its contingency, for the findings of science are themselves contingent, as other naturalists have asserted. But he raises a very important philosophical point, namely, how are we to understand causality? The Heavenly Doctrines take a position directly opposite to the naturalists when they claim that all causes are spiritual, or are in the spiritual world DLW The New Church view of reality is also shot-through with purpose; it is a highly teleological view of nature DLW , , , There is much work to be done in explaining exactly what this means and how it relates to our understanding of science and the natural world. This is another opportunity to conduct some very important research in the future. This does not mean that there are no critics of naturalism. Even though naturalism is the position to hold, and has been for most of the twentieth century, during the past twenty-five years a number of arguments have been advanced against it. These arguments have been produced by both theistic and secular philosophers. What follows are quotations from both sets of philosophers along with my summarizing statements. Let us first consider one of the arguments made by a Christian philosopher. As we have seen, according to the naturalists we should believe in naturalism because of science. Since this is the most frequent reason given for naturalism and typically the most powerful today, the truth or falsity of this claim is crucial to the debate between naturalists and spiritualists. Koons attempts to drive a wedge between a certain understanding of science and ontological naturalism. Science construed as mere instrument for manipulating experience, or merely as an autonomous construction of our society, without reference to our reality, tells us nothing about what kinds of things really exist and act. Ontological naturalism the world of space and time is causally closed 3. There exists a correct naturalist account of knowledge and intentionality representational naturalism 49 By scientific realism, I intend a thesis that includes both a semantic and an epistemological component. Roughly speaking, scientific realism is the conjunction of the following two claims: Our scientific theories and models are theories and models of the real world, including its laws, as it is objectively, independent of our preferences and practices. Scientific methods tend, in the long run, to increase our stock of real knowledge. I will argue that nature is comprehensible scientifically only if nature is not a causally closed system "only if nature is shaped by supernatural forces. My argument requires two critical

assumptions: A preference for simplicity elegance, symmetries, invariances is a pervasive feature of scientific practice. Reliability is an essential component of knowledge and intentionality, on any naturalistic account of these. Proof of the incompatibility. Scientific realism, representational naturalism, and epistemic reliability entail that scientific methods are reliable sources of truth about the world. From practices of science it follows that simplicity is a reliable indicator of the truth about natural laws. Mere correlation between simplicity and the laws of nature is not good enough: Since the laws of nature pervade space and time, any such causal mechanism must exist outside spacetime. By definition, the laws and fundamental structure of nature pervade nature. Anything that causes these laws to be simple, anything that imposes a consistent aesthetic upon them, must be supernatural. Consequently, ontological naturalism is false. Hence one cannot consistently embrace naturalism and scientific realism

55” Koons then tests his position in the following manner: David Papineau and Ruth Garrett Millikan are two thoroughgoing naturalists who have explicitly embraced scientific realism. If the preceding argument is correct, this inconsistency should show itself somehow in their analyses of science. This expectation is indeed fulfilled. Pragmatism, by eschewing any commitment to the objective reliability of scientific methods, cannot be combined with a naturalistic version of scientific realism. Philosophical naturalism, then, can draw no legitimate support from the deliverances of natural science, realistically construed, since scientific realism entails the falsity of naturalism. If scientific theories are construed non-realistically, it seems that the status of ontology cannot be affected by the successes of natural science, nor by the form that successful theories in the natural sciences happen to take. Instead, that image is merely a useful fiction, and metaphysics is left exactly as it was before the advent of science. On the one hand, if natural science is accurately telling us about the nature of reality, then naturalism is false.

2: American Realism

The book applies playwright John Guare's statement that, "the war against naturalism," is the history of the American theatre in the Twentieth-Century to selected plays by important contemporary American playwrights.

I reckon there have been around 40 peer reviewed articles on EAAN and about 12 have been answered by Plantinga. And among them were also philosophers of science and biology like Ramsey to whom Plantinga responded. I think we could replace him with Tooley to get a more recent and better known article. Also Tooleys answer is a lot more penetrating and more to the point which could be interesting for the readers. Can you give any source for this? If it is for his competence in philosophy of science, then I think there are more prominent and challenging answers available. Right now it seems like his answer is more notable than Fodors, Alstons, Tooleys which is not mentioned at all and Merricks which is misleading. You have made the accusation of WP: UNDUE weight, so it is up to you to support that accusation. Once that burden has been met, the burden is on the accuser to prove that the material is in violation of some other policy, if they want the material removed thereafter. Hrafn Talk Stalk P Else everybody could just add anything and then claim that the burden of proof is now on the one who wants to remove it. The burden under that policy is to ensure that "All quotations and any material challenged or likely to be challenged must be attributed to a reliable, published source using an inline citation. The burden is now upon you to provide evidence of violation of WP: Put up or shut up! Given your bad-faith, transparently tendentious claims, you have abraded away all assumption of good faith. By adding a passage to the article that is as long as all the essays in the central publication on EAAN together, you make an important claim. Namely the claim that Ruse is more important than any of those essays individually. You failed to provide a source for that important claim. Thus you failed to meet that burden. My undue tag was just a kind way to call this to your attention. Please do not modify it. Anyone who has to deal with your tendentious nonsense is going to get frustrated sooner or later. And Hrafn is right, the onus is on you to make the case that your tag is warranted. Ruse appears to be calling "bullshit" on the whole game, which certainly has more real-world value than many of the other arguments. Why one and not the others is the case to be made. Or better yet, do something to improve the article. For someone who claims to be an expert, it should be far easier to improve the article than it would be to add tens of thousand bytes of tendentious arguments. I work from the materials I have to hand. EAAN is an interesting argument. But someone needs to tell people that they should stop playing the fool and get back to work. Those are the two passages: This means a text ist needed. Is it the case that evolution necessarily cannot function, or it is merely false and in another God-created world it might have held in some way " and if so, in what way? Plantinga has certainly not shown that theist must be a creationist, even though his own form of theism is creationism" It seems that this passage is out of context. The argument is explicitly not directed to deny evolution or support creationism, so Ruse must be arguing about some other argument. Is he talking about Plantingas essay on methodological naturalism? Ruses passage is completely out of context. This section is therefore nothing more than tendentious WP: Here is your answer to this issue: Thanks for making this claim, but could you back it up with a source and more information? No source for this claim was given and if one has a look at the general claim of EAAN, then this is clearly false as this short passage from the above discussion considered off topic by Guettarda shows: Lewis was using it and he adopted theistic evolution. Victor Reppert is using it. As shown several times theistic evolutionists even have an advantage in using the argument since evolution is assumed in the argument. He is widely discussed e. Theistic one makes acceptance of some form of antinaturalism e. This, taken in conjunction with EAAN, would appear to lead to some rather odd conclusions: Do you understand creationism as every theory that involves god at some point? How is it then to be distinguished from theism? I think antinaturalism without ID or creationism is quite popular and becoming more and more so. With my understanding of antinaturalism EAAN leads to plausible conclusions: Fales for example interprets Plantingas epistemology as a naturalistic epistemology relying on a theistic ontology see his essay in Beilby. Could you give me an example for his writings against evolution? Second, I want to ask how we Christians should in fact think about evolution; how probable is it, all things

considered, that the Grand Evolutionary Hypothesis is true? And third, I want to make a remark about how, as I see it, our intellectuals and academics should serve us, the Christian community, in this area. The theory of evolution has implications for theology without any doubt. It seems you understand this sentence as "the theory of evolution is anti-religion" or something along these lines. If personal explanations are logically possible, then we need a broader inquiry than science restricted by methodological naturalism to find out whether personal explanations for the universe or life are true. Or is there anything else directed against evolution by Plantinga? I will read the essay you linked later, thanks for the link. Which is no doubt the sort of thing that Ruse noticed. So Plantinga's conclusion seems to match his professional career in philosophy of religion. Did he suggest that this new inquiry should be labeled science again and be taught at school in biology or anything along these lines? The way I see it his statements are uncontroversial and any atheist who has seriously considered a personal cause for the universe has engaged in the broader inquiry than science. I can see why this might be interesting for adherents of intelligent design who wish to replace science with this broader inquiry but it seems in itself pretty neutral. Is this really enough to call Plantinga an "advocate of intelligent design"? It seems very far-fetched in my opinion. The problem is that there have been several cases where the ID label has been abused to disqualify someone and with him his work. So even the loosest contact to anything ID related is a risk for a scientist or especially philosopher see for example David Chalmers or Henry Stapp. This kind of behavior is clearly deeply opposed to rationality or science and has to be avoided. This is why in my opinion someone should only be labeled an advocate of intelligent design if he openly embraces ideas exclusive to the ID-movement and not just theism or the idea that naturalism is self-defeating. Maybe Plantinga's endorsement see Hrafn's text could shed some light on the matter. As for your claim about Ruse: This is exactly what I suspect. It seems there are good reasons for why Ruse remained the only one explicitly labeling Plantinga "one of the more sophisticated proponents of ID". They were reprinted in *Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics* -- and all the articles are linked to from that wikilink. The 6 points I made in *Talk: Moreland in Intelligent Design*: If you were not a real person I would find this comical. Your "evidence" is of this sort: What did he say? Participating at a conference hardly makes anyone a supporter of the committee that organized it. Or else Hitchens were an enthusiastic Christian. And of course EAAN and its conclusion is interesting for anybody rejecting naturalism. So obviously those people might be interested in EAAN. EAAN is an interesting argument for anybody opposed to naturalism. It seems the only chance you have left is the following sources: In *The Creationists* p, Extended Ed. Anything else is OR and fails WP: Ignores the fact that "ID advocates I find that I am no longer in position to be WP: Nothing in this withdrawal should be considered to be in any way acceptance of the validity of their premises, of the soundness of their logic or of their conclusions -- all of which I can be assumed to reject unless I state to the contrary. Prima facie this seems obviously wrong because Plantinga and others stated several times that EAAN is perfectly compatible with theistic evolution and is not directed against the theory of evolution. This has been challenged by Ruse, but it seems without argument and he is the only one to challenge this. Hrafn was never able to provide any argument for why EAAN was related to ID without engaging in irrelevant ad hominem arguments of the following sort: V requires a text as a source. The context alone is not enough, especially because there was also a chapter on theistic evolution in the book. Therefore this source also failed.

3: Naturalism by Lisa Cook on Prezi

la The war in the total play and in setting: Ludlam and Eno; Johnson, Lindsay-Abaire, Lucas, and Groff -- The war in language and in character: Wellman, Maxwell, and Gibson; Foreman and Groff -- The war in character behavior: Albee, Greenberg, and Donaghy -- Naturalism defended and three extraordinary plays: The working theatre, Corthron.

My fourth grader was on to something that more educated types seemed to have missed: Lots of things are real that cannot be detected by science. How did she know that? Innocence often sees the obvious. Entire cultures have been subtly indoctrinated with this physicalistic view. Reality is actually on our side. If Christianity is true, he noted, then the worldview it presents is accurate—it describes reality the way it actually is even for naturalists who deny it. Consequently, anyone who denies some significant feature of the world is headed for a collision. They are at odds with reality. Their claims about the world dictated by their competing worldview are going to conflict in important ways with the actual world they experience every day. On the one hand, the naturalist speaks from his own worldview. On the other hand, the way he lives affirms things that have no place in his view of reality, but makes complete sense in ours. Atheist Richard Dawkins is a prime example. On the one hand, his naturalism dictates that morality is just a relativistic trick of evolution to get our selfish genes into the next generation. On the other hand, he rails against the God of the Old Testament as a vindictive, bloodthirsty, homophobic, racist, genocidal, sadomasochistic, malevolent bully. Clearly, Dawkins is not coming to this conclusion based on his naturalism. His protest makes no sense in his worldview, but is perfectly consistent with ours. Dawkins is bumping into reality. Important details of the Christian worldview fit nicely with the way we actually discover the world to be. They resonate with our deepest intuitions about reality. My goal is to be shrewd and creative—to catch him by surprise, if I can—maneuvering with questions wherever possible. Rather, my aim with people who are deeply committed to a false worldview is to try to plant a seed of doubt or uncertainty in their mind, or to get them thinking in a productive way about Christianity. The naturalist cannot easily deny the existence of the material world. Why is there stuff? Why is there something rather than nothing? Where did everything come from? What caused the universe to come into existence? Is the material universe real? Has the stuff of the universe always existed. Is the universe eternal? Now the final question: What caused the universe to come into being? What do you think? Do you think something outside the natural universe caused it to come into being, or do you think it just simply popped into existence with no cause, for no reason? To admit something outside of the natural, physical, time-bound universe is its cause would be to contradict naturalism. Yet, who is in his rational rights to opt for the alternative? It just popped into existence. That kind of thing happens all the time. Reason dictates we opt for the most reasonable alternative. Indeed, the nothing-caused-the-universe option is worse than magic. In magic, a magician pulls a rabbit out of a hat. You might recognize this line of thinking as the Kalam cosmological argument, an ancient defense of theism recently revitalized by philosopher William Lane Craig. A Big Bang needs a big Banger. I think that pretty much covers it. Every effect requires a cause adequate to explain it. Ironically, the night I was working out the particular details of this point in the lobby of a large hotel in Poland, there was a huge bang in the reception area. The gabby crowd in the lounge was immediately struck silent, everyone wondering the same thing: Of course, they knew what it was. It was a big bang. Did a firecracker go off? Did someone get shot? No one in that hotel—regardless of religious or philosophic conviction—thought the explosion was uncaused. It never occurred to anyone that the bang banged itself. Naturalists know this, too. Once at a dinner party a young man sitting across from me announced—somewhat belligerently—that he no longer believed in God. Startled, he lifted his head in surprise. His next move, though, was telling: He got up and answered the door. That night this young, naive atheist had bumped into reality. He knew a simple knock could not have knocked itself, yet seemed completely willing to accept as reasonable an entire universe popping into existence without cause or purpose. The Bump of Bad Let me introduce this next maneuver with a question. What is the most frequently raised objection to the existence of God, the most durable, the most challenging objection to theism? Evil is a part of reality that naturalists bump into all the time and then make a philosophical fuss with us about. I want you to see, though, how the problem

of evil can be used to your advantage. Mention Auschwitz, or some recent killing reported in the news, or any striking inhumanity to man. They think the evil is objective, thus the problem for theists. The problem of evil is only a problem if morality is objective. How does naturalism account for the kind of objective morality needed to ground the problem of evil? Of course, this is the moral argument for God: At very best, the naturalist might be able to account for mind-dependent morality—relativism, in other words. What, then, has the naturalist been bumping into all this time when he cites evil against God? The naturalist has one of two choices here, it seems to me. One, he can cling to his relativism and drop his objection about evil in the world. Surrendering that complaint, though, is going to be hard for him to do because he knows too much. Two, he can salvage his complaint about evil at the expense of his naturalism, since no materialistic scheme can account for immaterial moral obligations. My atheism was eating into my heart like acid! My worldview was entirely negative. I could not have explained the source of my own rationality, nor of my conviction that there were such things as truth, beauty, and goodness. My worldview remained satisfying to me only insofar as I refrained from asking the really tough questions. Every time the atheist bumps into bad, point this out. Not only was her naturalism incapable of making sense of her morality. It was also corrupting her soul. This denial creates huge difficulties for the naturalistic, materialistic view of reality. Playing completely against type, Nagel argues that naturalistic approaches are utterly incapable of accounting for the central feature of human experience—human consciousness. Think, for a moment, about exactly what an illusion is. Illusions happen when your conscious mind is being appeared to in a false way. Things that are not conscious rocks come to mind do not have illusions. Is the illusion having an illusion? No, consciousness—your direct, subjective experience of your own soul—is real. Naturalism denies the obvious, reducing human beings to physical parts stuck together without reason or purpose—biological accidents, cosmic junk. No wonder they call it nihilism—nothing-ism. And when you start really believing nothing-ism about human beings, bad things begin to happen. Most of us know better, though. Reality informs us there is something wonderfully unique about humans—qualitatively, not just quantitatively. Humans are special, wonderful, valuable. We know something else, though. We are not physically sick; we are morally corrupted. And we know it. Years back I lectured to a sold out crowd at the University of California at Berkeley. I made the case against moral relativism simply by pointing out how frequently we bump into—and ultimately violate—objective morality in our daily lives.

4: Talk:Evolutionary argument against naturalism/Archive 2 - Wikipedia

Robert J. Andreach begins his study of anti-mimetic drama, The War Against Naturalism in the Contemporary American Theatre, by quoting John Guare's well-known preface to The War Against the Kitchen Sink, which sets up the kitchen sink as the "icon of naturalism" in the twentieth-century theatre.

Both arguments hinge on the idea that naturalistic evolution cannot account for the reliability of human cognitive faculties. Fitelson and Sober conclude that neither theism or naturalism has an answer to hyperbolic doubt, as neither can construct a non-question-begging argument that refutes global skepticism. Parsons This thesis examines various attempts to construe theism as an explanatory hypothesis and to defend it with arguments similar to those employed in the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. It is the aim of this work to show that such a construal fails to confirm theism and in actuality leads to its disconfirmation. The Presumption of Naturalism and the Probability of Miracles: A Reply to Keith Parsons by Don McIntosh In Chapter Four of Science, Confirmation, and the Theistic Hypothesis, Keith Parsons defends the dictum that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence as part of a general critique of miracle claims which aims to defend naturalism as a rational operating philosophy against potential defeaters. In this defense of miracle claims Don McIntosh argues, first, that for any unknown the burden of proof falls equally upon naturalists and supernaturalists; second, to repudiate all miracle claims in one fell swoop with a mere presumption of naturalism renders naturalism unfalsifiable and unscientific; and third, estimating the prior probability of miracles introduces an element of subjectivity that makes any general probabilistic argument against them suspect. These points leave open the possibility of confirming specific miracle claims on the basis of historical evidence and eyewitness testimony. Though a lay exposition geared at a general audience, the essay appeals to a variety of atheistic arguments, including the argument from religious confusion, an evidential argument from evil, divine hiddenness, the argument from biological evolution, and the argument from physical minds. In an interesting twist on the argument from design, Carrier turns the fine-tuning argument on its head, noting that several features of our universe--features predicted by naturalism--are highly improbable if Christian theism is true. Why I Am Not a Christian by Graham Oppy Graham Oppy explains the ways in which his reasons for rejecting Christianity differ from those offered by Bertrand Russell in his famous paper of the same title. In section I, Oppy considers how Christianity should be characterized, the best way to build a case against theism, and the nonrational reasons why people believe in God, among other things. In section II, he offers an account of his journey to unbelief and the philosophy of religion. By section III, Oppy explains why he is not a Christian, as well as some of the things that he does believe. Here he pines in on appeals to contingency and causality in theistic arguments, the problem of evil, free will, the mind-body problem, the history of the universe, human history, and the historicity of the Gospels--outlining his "supervenient naturalism" along the way. Oppy wraps up by considering the meaning of life and whether virtuous behavior relates to Christian belief. Methodological Naturalism Enterprising Science Needs Naturalism Off Site by Wesley Elsberry Elsberry argues that scientific method excludes appeals to supernatural causation because naturalism is a corollary to the scientific presumption that the universe is comprehensible. Even if supernatural causation occurs, the presumption of naturalism is valuable because naturalistic explanations are often correct and "are the only known variety [of explanations] that produce an increase in scientific comprehension. Pennock faults the new creationists for failing to realize that science is committed--not to ontological naturalism the view that only natural processes or events exist --but rather to methodological naturalism a position which, although it does not deny the possibility of the existence of the supernatural, assumes for the sake of inquiry that it does not exist. Martin considers how one can reject ontological naturalism while justifying methodological naturalism as an appropriate stance in the context of science. Methodological Naturalism and the Supernatural by Mark I. Vuletic Paper rejecting the claims that methodological naturalism leaves no room for appeals to the supernatural in science and that scientists must be methodological naturalists to fulfill the aims of science, as well as the claim that scientists should abandon methodological naturalism. Naturalism is an Essential Part of Science and Critical Inquiry by Steven Schafersman Off Site Our modern civilization depends totally for its

existence and future survival on the methods and fruits of science, naturalism is the philosophy that science created and that science now follows with such success, yet the great majority of humans believe in the antithesis of naturalism--supernaturalism. This paper proposes to show that naturalism is essential to the success of scientific understanding, and it examines and criticizes the claims of pseudoscientists and theistic philosophers that science should employ supernatural explanations as part of its normal practice. The Evidence Against the New Creationism. Review of Reason for the Hope Within by Graham Oppy The anthology Reason for the Hope Within aims to mount a broad defense of the Christian faith, in part by explaining how it can be reasonable for Christians to accept puzzling or paradoxical Christian doctrines, and in part by persuading nonbelievers that all of the core claims of Christianity are true. Oppy explains why he thinks that the book utterly fails to accomplish one of these aims, and thus fails to do much to advance the standing of Christian apologetics. Along the way, Oppy argues that science adopts methodological naturalism because metaphysical naturalism is probably true.

5: Realism, Naturalism, and the Harlem Renaissance Example For Students | ArtsColumbia

The War Against Naturalism covers several important plays that have not been covered extensively in theatre theory and criticism, and so Andreach's readings will be fresh and interesting to both.

Steel with ELbert H. The total worth of US Steel at its inception was million dollars, and eventually grew to 1. HQ was set up in the Empire Building, This event is important to Literary Naturalism because it set the stage as the first billion dollar company of the times, and became the target of many anti-trust litigation attempts. It was important to the era of industrialization and capitalism at the turn of the century. The Mann act also known as the white slave traffic act, was a law passed in that made it illegal to transport any woman or girl across state lines for any immoral purpose. Why was this event significant? The law was in place until it was amended in 78 and again in The 86 amendment is of importance because it changed "any immoral purpose", with "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. How is it related to literary naturalism? Putting an end to white slavery is, in itself, a naturalistic act. The fire lasted for 24 hours resulting in destruction within the heart of Chicago and deaths. Ninety thousand people to be exact were left homeless. This catastrophe was named "The Great Chicago Fire". Although the fire was believed to have started in a barn the true cause is still a mystery. The fire had burned an area of 4 miles long and 1 mile wide. The fire destroyed 17, buildings and 73 miles of street. Looking at this event from a naturalistic view, the fire pushed the Chicago government to evolve and adapt to harsher environments. The Great Rebuilding lead to fireproof building materials and new architecture. Limestone, brick, and marble replaces wood in constructing the new buildings. Fireproof materials were too expensive for the poorer Chicagoans which lead to thousands of people and small businesses leaving Chicago. Many justified this imperialism as a form of survival of the fittest, viewing the United States as a power justified in its expansion because of its power. San Francisco earthquake and fire h2. The earthquake left , San Francisco residents homeless, 3, people dead, and ignited fires that lasted for three days. This earthquake having caused damage of momentous proportions did not discriminate based on class or race, unifying a city of unequals. How is it related to Literary Naturalism? This tragedy inspired a great deal of art that took a naturalist stance in depicting exactly what the artist saw and not what they had interpreted.

6: Naturalism: Bumping Into Reality | www.enganchecubano.com

The War Against Naturalism In The Contemporary American Theatre Pdf american literature - ÆfÅjvodnÅfÅ-strÅfÅjnkã - american literature 1. the colonial period (Åæâ,-") native americans, the first inhabitants of the continent, did not develop anything we can callfrom.

Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property, for example, someone who infers that drinking beer is good from the premise that drinking beer is pleasant is supposed to have committed the naturalistic fallacy. The intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions. Moore himself focused on goodness, but if the argument works for goodness then it seems likely to generalize to other moral properties. Somewhat surprisingly, Moore in effect also argues that most forms of non-naturalism are also guilty of what he calls the naturalistic fallacy. So, for example, a view according to which goodness is the property of being commanded by God where God is understood as existing outside of Nature is also charged with having committed the naturalistic fallacy. This suggests that the naturalistic fallacy is not well named in that it is not specifically a problem for naturalists, and Moore admits as much. If the point were purely terminological then it would be trifling but an important philosophical point is at stake here. Admittedly, if Moore is right then at least reductionist forms of naturalism fall prey to the naturalistic fallacy and it is therefore still relevant to the debate over naturalism and non-naturalism. However, the non-naturalist will need a separate argument against those naturalists who hold that moral properties natural but irreducible. As noted in the Introduction, Moore seems to have ignored the distinction between naturalism and reductionism and this is one important case in which that mistake seems important. The naturalistic fallacy is very poorly named indeed a point also made by Bernard Williams; see Williams For not only is it not especially a problem for naturalists, it is also not really a fallacy even if Moore is right that it embodies a mistake of some kind. For it is highly uncharitable to charge anyone who advances the sorts of arguments to which Moore alludes as having committed a logical fallacy. Rather, charity demands that we interpret such arguments as enthymematic, and usually this is easy enough. Nor must the non-naturalist even quarrel with such a suppressed premise. One can allow that goodness is itself a non-natural property but grant that all pleasant things necessarily have that non-natural property. What the non-naturalist must reject is the thesis that such suppressed premises are true in virtue of the identity of goodness with the natural property in question being pleasant, in this case. So the so-called naturalistic fallacy is no fallacy at all. This point was made very clearly by W. Frankena in a landmark article published in Mind Frankena Finally, as Frankena also nicely pointed out, it cannot be assumed at the outset that what Moore calls the naturalistic fallacy really is a mistake of any kind. For certain naturalists could then reasonably complain that the central question has been begged. The naturalist proposes a certain kind of definition of some moral term and the non-naturalist then simply asserts that anyone who thinks such definitions are possible is mistaken. Consider any proposed naturalistic analysis N of a moral predicate M. The Open Question Argument maintains that it will always be possible for someone competent with moral discourse without conceptual confusion to grant that something is N but still wonder whether it is really M. Whether goodness is co-instantiated with any natural property or set of natural properties is in this sense always a conceptually open question. Moore himself used the Open Question Argument to defend a non-naturalist account of goodness but held that rightness was reducible to goodness. Moore held that it was true by definition that right actions maximize goodness, though he later came to the conclusion that this definition of rightness was also vulnerable to an Open Question Argument. A very similar argument was used by Sidgwick to establish that certain moral notions are irreducible see Sidgwick More recently, some philosophers have argued that naturalism cannot capture the normativity of moral properties, and these arguments also seem to be very similar to the Open Question Argument. The idea seems to be that for any naturalistic reduction one offers of some seemingly normative notion one can, without betraying any conceptual incompetence, admit that something has the property specified by the reductive account but hold that this lacks normativity—does not provide any reasons for action see Dancy On its face, the Open

Question Argument seems to beg the question against the naturalist just as much as the charge of a naturalistic fallacy. However, the Open Question Argument can be given a non-question-begging interpretation. The crucial move is to understand the argument as an argument to the best explanation. On this interpretation, the main premise of the argument is not that the relevant questions are conceptually open, but the much more modest premise that they at least seem conceptually open to competent users of moral terms. The argument then proceeds to claim that the best explanation of its seeming to competent users of the terms that these questions are open is that they really are open. That is, after all, a relatively simple and direct explanation of the phenomenon and the sort of explanation that we seem to accept by default when considering conceptual questions in general. This argument does not beg the question insofar as the opponent of non-naturalism can grant that the relevant questions do seem open without thereby contradicting their position—the main premise of this argument does not directly entail non-naturalism. Once again, however, the scope of the argument is not as great as Moore supposed. Still, if the argument were to defeat all reductionist forms of naturalism that would be of substantial interest and might well be part of larger argument for non-naturalism when combined with an independent argument against anti-reductionist forms of naturalism for further discussion, see Ball, Ball and Baldwin. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Open Question Argument so understood still faces an impressive battery of objections. Perhaps the meaning of a predicate is not as transparent to competent users of the predicate as Moore implicitly assumes. Jackson and Pettit. A correct definition of the term might then be understood as one that best explains those platitudes. On this sort of account a competent user of moral terms might respect the platitudes but not recognize the theory that best explicates those platitudes even if presented with it. An analogy with grammar illustrates the point. Let us suppose that competent speakers are ones who are disposed for the most part to follow certain grammatical rules but they might not recognize those rules as valid when presented with them. The same might be true in the moral case. The analogy with grammar might seem to break down at just this point. For there seems to be much more room for intelligible moral disagreement amongst competent judges in spite of agreement about everything else than there is for grammatical disagreement amongst competent judges in spite of agreement about everything else. For it might be held that moral predicates do purport to refer to non-natural properties but fail to refer precisely because those properties would have to be so queer. This would be to defend a kind of error theory, as defended by John Mackie see Mackie and Joyce. In effect, this would be to grant that the non-naturalist is right about the semantics moral predicates do purport to refer to non-natural properties but wrong about the metaphysics the non-naturalist is wrong to suppose moral predicates refer to anything. Even more radically, it might be maintained that moral predicates do not even purport to refer to properties and that this explains why the relevant questions seem open. In particular, it has been argued that a non-cognitivist analysis of moral discourse can explain why the relevant questions seem open. It is easy enough to see why this would also block the inference to non-naturalism. Hence, the non-cognitivist concludes, moral predicates do not refer to properties at all, much less non-natural ones see, e. In fact, it is fair to say that non-cognitivists eventually gained at least as much mileage from the Open Question Argument as non-naturalists. Finally, more sophisticated forms of reductionist naturalism hold that while moral predicates do refer to natural properties, they do not so refer in virtue of any sort of analytic equivalence between moral predicates and non-moral predicates. The analogy here is with certain theories of reference borrowed from the discussion of proper names and natural kinds see, e. If this is a plausible semantic theory and if a similar theory is true of moral predicates a thesis that requires further argument then the Open Question Argument is in trouble. Whether this sort of causal theory of reference is plausible in the case of moral vocabulary is more controversial, but the defender of the Open Question Argument needs some reason to reject the analogy. Intuitionism How can we come to know anything about non-natural properties? The question is a reasonable one on any of the myriad ways in which non-natural properties have been conceived. On many characterizations, non-natural properties by definition elude scientific investigation which many take to be the most reliable form of knowledge available to us. On other characterizations, non-natural properties are causally inert which makes it hard to see how we could reliably detect them. At least two kinds of questions are relevant here. First, once we have a particular property in mind how can we know it is a moral one?

Second, how do we come to know anything about moral properties apart from knowing they are moral? The first question might seem more difficult for the naturalist than for some non-naturalists; if goodness really is a sui generis non-natural property then perhaps being directly acquainted with it is sufficient for recognizing it as moral. The second question, though, is easier for the naturalist than the non-naturalist. Since the naturalist holds that moral properties are either identical to or reducible to some subset of natural properties there need be no mystery about how we come to have some knowledge of those properties even if there is some residual mystery as to how we discover that they are the moral ones. Or, at least, a commitment to naturalism in meta-ethics introduces no new problems about how we come to know anything about these properties. For given naturalism, the moral properties might well be identical to or reducible to familiar properties like the property of promoting happiness or the property of being truthful. We learn, for example, what kinds of upbringing promote honesty through empirical observation and theorizing. Non-naturalism can be understood in many different ways, but none seems to make the task of explaining the possibility of moral knowledge as straightforward as it seems to be for the naturalist. Just as we can learn that cat is on the mat through direct observation we can also learn that kicking the cat on the mat is wrong through direct observation. If we have the appropriate moral sensibilities and just look carefully enough at a given situation then we should be able to discern the relevant moral properties as such quite directly. It is worth noting that this move is in principle available to naturalists as well as non-naturalists. In some cases this will be easy; if you watch a bully beat up a defenseless child for fun then it should be easy enough to see the cruelty and wrongness of his action. In other cases, discerning the moral facts will be much more difficult. However, the difficulty of such cases is compatible with intuitionism. Familiarity with aesthetes makes it clear that perceiving certain properties can be very subtle and require considerable training and attention. Plausibly, an intuitionist epistemology fits better with some versions of non-naturalism than others. If, for example, we understand non-natural properties as properties we can know only a priori then the idea that we come to know them through perception seems problematic. In any event, if intuitionism is defensible then it provides the non-naturalist with an answer to both of the questions raised above. Plausibly, if we directly perceive moral properties at least partly answering the second question then we also directly perceive that they are moral answering the first question. The idea is that moral knowledge is not literally perceptual in the first instance but is somehow very much like perceptual knowledge. This approach has its advantages. In trying to make sense of the idea of moral perception of non-natural properties, some intuitionists have maintained that our ability to have veridical experiences of the moral properties is in virtue of our having a special faculty of mind whose function is to detect such properties. This raises a number of questions about the origin and functioning of such a faculty. An account that claims only that moral knowledge is somehow like perceptual knowledge need not face these difficulties. Of course, such accounts run the risk of being too vague to be helpful unless some less metaphorical account of moral knowledge is forthcoming. Even those who take the idea of perceptual moral knowledge literally are not thereby committed to belief in such special faculties. Perhaps moral perception is continuous with other ordinary forms of perception even if it is literally the perception of a non-natural property. If non-natural properties are by definition causally inert then this position seems problematic. On other ways of understanding non-natural properties, though, whether there is a problem will depend on further controversial philosophical questions. For example, if non-natural properties are understood as properties that would not figure in the best scientific account of reality then the issue obviously concerns the authority of science to determine the answers to all ontological questions. The force of the worry derives from the fact that non-natural properties, on some construals, are causally inert, whereas our intuitions are psychological states and hence part of the natural world.

7: Naturalism - Literature Periods & Movements

Encuentra The War Against Naturalism: In the Contemporary American Theatre de Robert J. Andreach (ISBN:) en Amazon. Env -os gratis a partir de 19 ,-.

This literary movement, like its predecessor, found expression almost exclusively within the novel. Naturalism also found its greatest number of practitioners in America shortly before and after the turn of the twentieth century. A poor immigrant could not escape their life of poverty because their preconditions were the only formative aspects in his or her existence that mattered. The theories of Charles Darwin are often identified as playing a role in the development of literary Naturalism; however, such a relationship does not stand up to investigative rigor. Darwin never applied his theories to human social behavior, and in doing so many authors seriously abused the actual science. There was in the late nineteenth century a fashion in sociology to apply evolutionary theory to human social woes. This line of thinking came to be known as Social Darwinism, and today is recognized as the systematized, scientific racism that it is. More than a few atrocities in world history were perpetrated by those who misguidedly applied Darwinism to the social realm. Naturalism, for better or worse, is in some respects a form of Social Darwinism played out in fiction. One could make the case that Naturalism merely a specialized variety of Realism. In fact, many authors of the period are identified as both Naturalist and Realist. Edith Wharton for one is frequently identified as perfectly representative of both aesthetic frameworks. However, Naturalism displayed some very specific characteristics that delimit it from the contemporary literature that was merely realistic. The environment, especially the social environment, played a large part in how the narrative developed. The locale essentially becomes its own character, guiding the human characters in ways they do not fully realize. Plot structure as such was secondary to the inner workings of character, which superficially resembles how the Realists approached characterization. The work of Emile Zola provided inspiration for many of the Naturalist authors, as well as the work of many Russian novelists. It would be fairer to assert that all Naturalist fiction is Realist, but not all Realist fiction is Naturalist. The dominant theme of Naturalist literature is that persons are fated to whatever station in life their heredity, environment, and social conditions prepare them for. The power of primitive emotions to negate human reason was also a recurring element. Writers like Zola and Frank Norris conceived of their work as experiments in which characters were subjected to various stimuli in order to gauge reactions. Adverse social conditions are taken as a matter of fact. The documentary style of narrative makes no comment on the situation, and there is no sense of advocating for change. The Naturalist simply takes the world as it is, for good or ill. The Naturalist novel is then a sort of laboratory of fiction, with studies underway that ethically could not be performed in the real world. The work of French novelist and playwright Emile Zola is often pinpointed as the genesis of the Naturalist movement proper. His most famous contribution to Naturalism was *Les Rougon-Macquart*, a sweeping collection of 20 novels that follow two families over the course of five generations. One of the families is privileged, the other impoverished, but they each stumble into decay and failure. The action takes place during the rule of Napoleon III, a time of great uncertainty for the French people. The atmosphere in Paris, as well as in the novels, was one of dread and uncertainty. Zola crafts over characters for his epic, yet on the whole they are rather thinly drawn. His concern is not with character as such, but how characters react to circumstances. Often, an inanimate object or place is given as much potency as a human character. There is a clinical aspect to his craft that is echoed in his descriptions of novel-writing as a form of science. Later writers would concur, citing Zola as their major inspiration in pursuing the Naturalist aesthetic in literature. *A Girl of the Streets*. Crane spent a great deal of time in the Bowery of lower Manhattan gathering material for his first novel. Like a research scientist accumulating data, Crane wanted to learn as much as he could about life for the impoverished, mostly immigrant residents. *Maggie* was unusual for the time in that it perfectly reproduced the ostensibly vulgar dialect of the persons portrayed. An earlier novel treating the same subject may have romanticized the immigrant life, but Crane portrayed abject poverty exactly as it was. The book was not a great seller, and he lost a hefty sum of money on the venture, but those who did read it saw the promise of a new talent in American literature. Like many of his fellow American novelists, Crane began his career as a

journalist, and he continued to travel and report on international stories for the remainder of his career. His total contributions to the body of literature were relatively small, as he died before his thirtieth birthday. This was not fully realized until many years after his death. Modernists like Ernest Hemingway worked hard to rehabilitate the critical reputation of Crane, and today that reputation is resoundingly positive. His descriptions and scenery were inspired by war and history magazines, which he found dry and too matter-of-fact. He saw an opportunity to craft the first novel that explored warfare from the point of view of the psyche. Characters speak in realistic dialects. The story is not rooted in a specific locale. The soldiers cannot see the big picture of the war, and neither can the reader. The glory of warfare is replaced by ignorance, pain, and fear. Crane offers no sentimentality or mythology. He reports the events in fine detail, but makes no authorial commentary. The Red Badge of Courage is frequently required reading for high school English classes, yet the irony of the text is often lost. Crane abhorred the mythmaking that surrounded armed combat, and his greatest novel is an attempt to show that humans were not designed to commit such atrocities on each other. Though she is frequently lumped together with the Realists, Edith Wharton often produced novels that just as rightly belong in the category of Naturalism. Though she herself descended from enormous wealth, Wharton was able to step outside her own experience and take an objective view of privilege and class. Her agenda was to show the unforgiving nature of life at the top of the class structure. Her characters often fall from grace through their own mistakes, miscalculation, and sometimes for no apparent reason at all. Interestingly, Wharton also had a successful career as a designer of homes and landscapes. This attention to environmental details certainly found expression with her literary productions. More so than most Naturalist writers, Wharton displayed a real sympathy for her characters. In that sense, her particular brand of Naturalism was less cold and clinical than many of her contemporaries. Still, one cannot escape the sense that Wharton subscribed to the notion of determinism – a world devoid of free will. In *Ethan Frome*, Wharton departs from her typical subject matter and attempts a thoroughly provincial narrative. The setting is rural Massachusetts, and the characters are poverty-stricken and hopeless. There is the faintest hint of romance, but all hopes of a happy resolution are dashed, quite literally. The poverty of the characters is presented as a roadblock to even the slimmest chance of fulfillment. The lead characters are not even permitted to end their suffering through suicide – their fateful sledding accident only adding to the tragedy of their existence. There is no epic sweep to the tragedy either. The sense of irrevocable fate is overpowering, as is the unforgiving, elemental nature of the harsh Massachusetts winter. In Frank Norris, American literature found its most potent expression of Naturalism. His novels are Darwinian struggles played out in fiction, and he was sometimes criticized for making literature that was too scientific and lacking in sympathy. Like many Naturalists, Norris was interested in the trials of life of the poor and destitute. In *McTeague*, his most famous novel, he studies how ambition and greed derail the life of a moderately successful dentist. Characters are frequently referred to in animalistic terms, and there is an undercurrent of unhealthy sexuality that permeates the first sections of the novel. The title character is small-minded, almost childlike in his view of the world. Because of this, his well-meaning efforts to improve his economic situation go hopeless awry. In the final scene, one gets the impression that the protagonist, if one can call him that, could not have ended up anywhere else. Despite the resounding pessimism of their literary output, the Naturalists for the most part were genuinely concerned with improving the situation of the poor in America and the world. There would seem to be a disconnect between the opinions of the authors and the statements made in the contexts of their novels. However, closer study reveals this not to be the case. Norris intended his novels to be warnings about the capacity for mankind to sink to its lowest common denominator. Critics, both contemporary and modern, sometimes accuse the Naturalists of ethnocentricity. True, the images presented of immigrant and ethnic groups are unflattering. However, given their backgrounds in journalism, the Naturalist writers would probably argue that they simply presented life as it appeared. If the life they saw was ugly or depraved, they were not to be held responsible. Naturalism was a relatively short-lived philosophical approach to crafting novels. Few writers of the period experienced real success in the style, but those that did became titans of the art form. One wonders at the profound literature that might have been produced had Stephen Crane not died before his thirtieth birthday. Frank Norris likewise died before his time, an irony that should not escape modern readers. It is difficult to gauge the total effects of Naturalism on the

path of American literature. The fact that Social Darwinism eventually came to be seen for the disguised racism that it is probably marred the reputation of Naturalist writing. However, the sheer art and craft of the literature that the greatest novelists of the period generated overcomes such handicaps. This article is copyrighted by Jalic Inc. Do not reprint it without permission. Written by Josh Rahn.

8: Moral Non-Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Naturalism. As defined by philosopher Paul Draper, naturalism is "the hypothesis that the natural world is a closed system" in the sense that "nothing that is not a part of the natural world affects it."

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committed to the rejection of naturalism (because the only way to evade premise 2 in the core argument involves appealing to mysterious, non-natural properties of the mind and/or world). 7 Second, these more detailed arguments should be viewed as extensions of the core argument.

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