

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKISH IDENTITY Download Turkish Foreign Policy And Turkish Identity ebook PDF or Read Online books in PDF, EPUB, and Mobi Format. Click Download or Read Online button to TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKISH IDENTITY book pdf for free now.

Apart has followed a Western-oriented foreign policy. The last section also analyzes the foreign policy preferences of the current Justice and Development Party AKP from the perspective of Turkish identity, and makes some predictions as to the direction of Turkish foreign policy in the future. The Tanzimat, or reform of the Ottoman Empire, began shortly thereafter. The first examples of the new, secular system were the establishment of a military medical school in , a military school in , and later a faculty of administrative sciences in . Although the purpose of these institutions was to adopt only the material aspects of Western civilization, the positivist ideas and cultural values of the West soon began to spread, especially among the new social classes created by the secular educational system in the Empire. Foreign instructors played a very critical role in all of these new schools, and knowledge of a Western language was a prerequisite for entrance. Although the modernization project started out as a short-term measure intended to save the Empire, it had vastly exceeded its projected purposes and by the second half of the nineteenth century, many Western laws and practices had been adopted. By the close of the s, however, it had become clear that the reforms had not produced the expected results: One group in particular called attention to this predicament. The close of the nineteenth century coincided with the emergence of a new political opposition, called the Young Ottomans, whose members were critical of the way the reforms had been undertaken. According to the Young Ottomans, the modernizing reforms were superficial imitations of Europe that disregarded traditional Ottoman and Islamic values. The Young Ottomans argued that the reforms had not been able to save the Empire; on the contrary, they had made the Ottoman Empire submissive to European interests. A second opposition movement whose effects would be felt in the long run was also emerging in the Ottoman Empire: Members of this new group believed that with the introduction of the Tanzimat, the Ottomans had started to lose their cultural identity. During the reign of Abdulhamit II, Pan-Islamism of European science and became an official ideology and grew materialism considerably in importance. The spread of European ideologies through the secular educational system in the Empire also created a new generation of westernized elite who opposed the rule of Abdulhamit II. In their view, the relations initiated with the West in the nineteenth century marked the beginning of the enlightenment era in the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks were deeply influenced by their learning of European science and materialism. The debates mainly centered institutions while retaining the on the relative merits of three competing old ones, the Kemalist reforms ideologies: Ottomanism, Pan Islamism, sought to completely abolish and Pan Turkism. The other ideological the old institutions current, Westernism, was a constant in the middle of these ideologies that could be differentiated by their approach to the degree of Westernization. While proponents of Ottomanism and Islamism did not oppose the idea of borrowing Western science and technology, they sought to incorporate those forms of knowledge within the rubric of Islamic principles in order to protect Ottoman society from the harmful effects of Western culture. Westerners on the other hand thought that civilization was a whole and could not be reduced to pieces. For them, if the Ottomans were to adopt European civilization, they should do so in its entirety, i. As should be obvious, the fundamental question in these debates revolved around the issue of identity for both the state and society. During the Young Turk era, another component, Turkism, was added to the debate. The CUP understood Turkification as the purification of Turkish culture from mixed culture and traditions. When the Independence War ended with a Turkish victory, the arguments regarding Oriental and Western civilizations resurfaced. Claims again centered on the degree of Westernization to be adopted. The main question to be settled involved the form and the structure of the new Turkish state. Some advocated the selective adoption of appropriate aspects of Western civilization, while others encouraged the complete adoption of Western ways. From the beginning, Ataturk was the leader of the second camp. According to him, culture and civilization were not separable. However, the Kemalist reforms differed from previous attempts at modernization in that

whereas the Ottoman reforms had aimed at creating new institutions while retaining the old ones, the Kemalist reforms sought to completely abolish the old institutions. The sweeping Kemalist changes were not confined to science and technology; they aimed at creating a new state, a new society, and a new individual similar to those found in the West. If Turkish society were to modernize, it would need to do so in every aspect of social, political, and cultural life. The most important implication of this thinking was the exclusion of Islam from the definition of the state. Islam had been the basis of state legitimacy and the source of individual identification in the Ottoman Empire. The Republican elite, however, emphasized the secularization of both state and individual, and endeavored to create a new identity to replace the old one that had been based on Islam. For the Republican modernizers, Western civilization was that of modern, Western Europe. In order to achieve secularization and autonomy for the individual, simply increasing rationality, bureaucratization and organizational efficiency were not enough; a complete social and cultural transformation was needed. The reforms throughout the Republican era served to realize this purpose. In order to provide Turkish citizens with a new view of the world that would replace that of religion and religious culture, and with it the traditional basis of individual identification, Atatürk embarked on a movement of cultural Westernization, which he equated with civilization. The only way to realize this was to make a clean start by cutting attachments to recent history. The most important aim of the new Turkey formulated was to join with all civilized nations in pursuit of peace and friendship. Our object now is to strengthen the ties that bind us to other nations. There may be a great many countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a nation is to achieve progress, she must be a part of this civilization. The Ottoman Empire began to decline the day when, proud of her successes against the West, she cut ties that bound her to the European nations. We will not repeat this mistake. As a result, Turkey fully and unreservedly identified herself with the West. This policy resulted in the gradual exclusion of Islam from political and social life. However, when the Kemalist regime abruptly removed the traditions of centuries, they were not able to replace it immediately with a new culture and identity. This had to do partly with the fact that only a small group of urban intellectuals benefited from the new system economically and socially. The rural population, on the other hand, remained largely untouched by economic, social and cultural development. This search created a strong anti-Western bloc and led to the polarization of society. For Islamists, Kemalist modernization was not compatible with Muslim culture, of which the people of Turkey are an integral part. The debate concerning national identity between Kemalist Turkey created a society, Westerners and Islamists extended to neither old nor new, that began the formulation of Turkish foreign policy to search for a definite cultural identity. As mentioned before, Republican Turkey was designed to be a Western mainly European state; with this identity came a desire for affiliation. Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the EU in September of 1963, thereby gaining associate-member status. In the local elections in March 1970, the WP won. Even though the victory of the WP was a result of a complex set of factors, secular political leaders often blamed the EU for its negative attitude toward Turkey. The EU is an integration model based on a Christian-Western culture; it is a political integration; it is an effort to create a European State. It is a Catholic European Union established according to a Christian ideology. Turkey is a Muslim country. With the aim of increasing [the] material welfare of the Turkish people, to try to have a place in the European Union means to abandon our political, social, and cultural values. The decision to be a member in the EU was made against the will of our nation and the application should be withdrawn for the future of our nation. The implications of this duality for Turkish foreign policy were to be felt in the following months. While Ciller toured Western capitals, Erbakan was heading to such Islamic countries as Iran and Libya, implying that Turkey is essentially a Muslim country. As a part of his ambition to reorient Turkey eastward, Erbakan initiated projects such as the D-8 Developing Eight, an association of Muslim countries, and the Economic Cooperation Organization, both of which signaled his Pan-Islamic ideology. However, what Erbakan ignored while making promises and attempting to establish a close ties with other Muslim countries, was the power of the military. The increasing influence of political Islam put the military on alert. In the second half of the 1980s, the military began to describe Islamic fundamentalism, along with the terrorism of the outlawed PKK Kurdish Workers Party, as the number one enemy of the state. The opposite identity conceptions and foreign policy preferences held by the military and

the WP made a clash between the two almost inevitable. The top military officers, for example, sued their enemies in Turkish courts and boycotted firms that were believed to support the Islamic cause and the WP. Through the NSC, the military pressured the government to curb Islamic radicalism and purged some military officers from the army for activities that violated secular principles. A meeting of the National Security Council that began on February 28, , at which military government officials criticized the government and demanded strict measures against religious fundamentalism, marked the beginning of the fall of the coalition government. As a result, Erbakan resigned in June and the WP was shut down by the Constitutional Court for having violated the secular principles of the Republic. For the WP, the opposite is true. They rejected both Western civilization and its local adoption through Kemalism. In sum, the identity framework held by each of the participants in the foreign policy decision-making process informed their understandings of who is friend and who is enemy, and led to conflicting views about the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy. Tayyip Erdogan, won One of the most important reasons for this was the fact that key figures in the party such as Prime Minister Erdogan, current President Abdullah Gul, and the former President of the National Assembly, Bulent Arinc, had started their political careers in the WP and were all previously affiliated with the National Outlook Movement the NOM under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Erdogan, in the past, had introduced two proposals to remove the ban, but failed. The majority of the MPs voted for the passage of the motion concerning the mentioned constitutional change in February The turban issue again brought the Islamic-secularist divide to the fore, however, and led to a surge of allegations accusing the AKP of having a hidden Islamic agenda. The results of the debate on the turban for Turkish politics, however, remain to be seen in the following months, as the debate continues to unfold. After the motion, Turkish- American relations hit the lowest level since the beginning of the Cold War. Turkey also expressed affinity toward Islamic countries in the region and showed solidarity with their causes. Additionally, the AKP showed strong affinity with the Palestinian cause. The foreign policy discourse sympathetic to the Muslim cause was eventually transformed into anti-West and anti-Semitic mood in the country. The modernization project created a Western identity for the state, which determined the course of Turkish foreign policy in the following years. The natural result of this thinking was to cut off relations with Middle Eastern countries and develop ties with the West. During his short stint in office, Turkish foreign policy was in disarray and showed the signs of identity crisis. However, this shift has been and remains an uneasy task for Islamists because, when states construct their identities, they formulate them at both domestic and international levels. They also develop myths and institutions to protect their identities. These institutions carry considerable weight in the resolution of political issues, and together constitute the most important obstacles to the Islamists. Therefore, it can be argued that Turkish domestic and foreign policy in the future will depend on the distribution of power among these groups. A Constructivist Approach Routledge: New York, London, , p. Tauris, , p.

2: The Ankara Axis of Turkish Foreign Policy

Even though there is a massive amount of research on Turkish foreign policy, only has a small portion of it dealt with the effects of the Turkish identity on foreign policy. Furthermore, those who studied Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of identity lacked a solid theoretical foundation and analytical framework, which significantly.

Bahar Rumelili 1 The version of record of this manuscript is Rumelili, B. Finally, I analyze the diffusion of the norms of European international society to Turkey in the post period, in particular, focusing on the critical role played by domestic political actors. In fact, the EU remains the only institution in European international society, which has not granted Turkey the membership that it has sought with varying degrees of determination since While not a member of the organization, Turkey occupies a critical position in the extended political, economic, legal, and security orders that have developed around the EU. In fact, the case of Turkey clearly elucidates the close interlinkages between the key inter-governmental organisations in the European international society often overlooked by EU-centred analyses. As a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, and by virtue of having accepted the right of individual litigation in the European Court of Human Rights ECtHR, Turkey actively shapes the European human rights order, with the high number of cases brought by Turkish citizens acting as precedents for other 4 cases. Certainly, the conclusion of the enlargement is an apt moment to take stock of the state of European international society; however, assumptions about a post- enlargement Europe cannot solely be derived from the short-term prospects of the EU and NATO. If what is meant by post-enlargement is a Europe where institutions have attained their ultimate borders, such a transformation would also necessitate critical changes in European identity discourse and the self-conceptions and practices of states excluded from some institutions for various reasons. Therefore, one aim of this analysis is to investigate whether trends toward such critical changes can be observed in EU- Turkey relations. Since , Turkey, along with Croatia, has officially been a candidate country conducting accession negotiations with the EU. However, in the context of a growing wariness of enlargement, the opposition of conservative governments in key member states, opposing public opinion, and the challenges posed by the Cyprus conflict, the process is rapidly approaching a stand-still Muftuler-Bac Although prospects for Turkish membership in the EU, at least in the short to medium term, are not bright, from the perspective of identity construction, it appears highly unlikely that Turkey-EU relations will enter a post-enlargement situation. As a liminal other, Turkey will remain constitutive of European identity. The first section below considers post debates in the European Parliament to identify patterns of continuity and change in European discourses on Turkey. Turkey generally contests its exclusion from the EU by emphasizing its shared European history and geography, its long-standing membership of other institutions of European international society, and its willingness to adopt EU norms and policies. As will be discussed in the second section below, this new identity discourse has recently been translated into a controversial Turkish foreign policy activism in the Middle East. Co-leadership with Spain of the UN sponsored Alliance of Civilizations and mediation efforts between Israel and Syria, between Hamas and Al- Fatah, and with Iran on uranium exchange, indicate that Turkey is involved in a number of high profile efforts to form a bridge between the West and the Islamic world writ large Oguzlu ; Aras and Gorener ; Aras and Polat Turkey does not seek to contest the constitutive norms of European international society, particularly on democracy and human rights Morozov and Rumelili In addition to state socialization, this is primarily a result of a relatively high level of societal enmeshment with the EU Diez, Stetter, and Albert Although overall public support for the EU in Turkey is declining, key political actors in issue areas directly affected by the EU-induced political reform process Kurds, non-Muslims, and women 7 remain committed to EU accession. These political actors engage in political advocacy both in Europe and in Turkey, simultaneously lobbying the EU to pay closer attention to their concerns, and pressuring the Turkish government to fulfil EU requirements. As a result of this activism, the political reform process in Turkey has acquired its own domestic dynamics, and, thanks to this, the slow-down in the accession process has not translated into an equivalent suspension of political reform. In the case of Turkey, the EU accession process has thus provided the crucial push to commit Turkey to the norms of

the CoE in a more convincing manner. In particular, through the links they establish between the ECHR and the EU in their rights struggles, Turkish political actors are able to negotiate the boundaries between different institutions in European international society. In many ways, they practice European citizenship although they do not possess it as a formal status Rumelili, Keyman, and Isyar forthcoming. This type of political practice, taking advantage of already existing political opportunity structures, also constitutes adaptation to a post-enlargement Europe. The ongoing debates on EU-Turkey relations are not simply debates over the inclusion of another member of European regional international society ERIS into its core organisation based on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Historically, and at present, relations with the Turk constitute a primary site for the representation, validation, and performance of European identity. European discourses that situate Turkey in a liminal position thus represent a telling historical continuity. Although ERIS includes a number of interstate institutions with varying degrees of inclusivity, the EU discourse currently constitutes the EU not as one among several institutions that make up the broader European international society, but as the defining institution of European identity, norms, and values. Consequently, debates on EU-Turkey relations are fundamentally constitutive of the norms and identity of European international society writ large. The polarized positions on EU-Turkey relations do not reflect an inherent idiosyncrasy on the part of Turkey, but instead are the outgrowth of the rather uncomfortable positioning of European identity between universalism and particularism that manifests itself in many realms of EU policy Borg ; Antonisch ; Sassatelli The conclusion of the enlargement does not set in place the conditions for Europe to move beyond or resolve the tension between these two contending impulses. The continuing tension between universalism and particularism in the post period is well-illustrated by European Parliament debates on Turkey. Of note in the comments of all three speakers is the construction of Turkey as a non-European country despite its long-standing membership in institutions of European international society, indicating the equation of European identity with certain particularistic traits that EU members possess. Hence, the context of EU-Turkey relations moves the focus of the debate quickly away from the condition of women in Turkey to the nature of European values and identity. Even when the constitutive implications of EU-Turkey are not explicitly debated, discussions on Turkey cannot escape the tension between universalism and particularism. In this sense, it is not a surprising finding that in a European Parliament debate on the Enlargement strategy, where the progress made by multiple candidate countries was evaluated, Turkey was the candidate treated with most scepticism. Having identified the prevailing patterns in the EU discourse on Turkey, the next section of the paper considers patterns of change in Turkish foreign policy. Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-Enlargement Europe Following the Turkish-Brazilian deal with Iran on uranium exchange and the subsequent negative votes of the two countries on the imposition of new sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council, Turkish foreign policy grabbed international headlines Friedman ; Larrabee In response to critics who have interpreted these initiatives as an axis shift in Turkish foreign policy, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has stressed their compatibility with the requirements of EU membership, particularly the promotion of a stable neighbourhood and the resolution of border conflicts Owen This foreign policy activism, as such, is not a principled divergence from the Europeanization of Turkish policy; rather with these initiatives, Ankara is exploring ways to exert its weight in European international society in the absence of the institutional power of EU membership. This is regarded as an asset that orientates Turkey simultaneously towards the West and towards the Middle East and Asia. In fact, it was not the conservative AKP government in power since 2002, but Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister of the Ecevit-led coalition government of the late 1990s, who formulated this role and frequently articulated it in the context of EU-Turkey relations. In the early years of the AKP government, it was put to use in initiatives oriented toward civilisational dialogue. In addition, Turkish foreign policy has proceeded by giving a greater sense of importance to economic interdependence, diplomacy, and soft power Kirisci Turkey thus played a mediatory role during the so-called caricature crisis of 2005. Yet, Turkey continued to pursue the matter. It issued a joint statement with Spain as co-chairs of the Alliance of Civilizations project, and it sought to convene a special summit meeting of the EU and the Organisation for Islamic Conference OIC. As the caricature crisis unfolded, Turkey, in fact, took almost every opportunity to underscore the uniqueness of its identity and its capacity to assume a mediatory position, a role

facilitated by the fact that since , the Secretary-General of the OIC had been Ekmelleddin Ihsanoglu, a Turkish national. In contrast to the generally positive reception given to these efforts by Turkey, when Ankara opposed the nomination of Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General due to his record during the caricature crisis, it was perceived as a deviation from European norms and values. Although Rasmussen had gained the support of all other NATO members, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan continued to express the reservation that Rasmussen was not fit to contribute to global security. To the extent that close collaboration with regional countries served the latter imperative i. This dual identity foreign policy role conception is compatible with Turkish membership of ERIS to the extent that policy initiatives fit within an overall process of Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy. Even if Turkey were a member of the EU, it would be exercising its institutional power in order to shape the European foreign policy in the direction of closer engagement with the region. Following the failed siege of Vienna in , a fundamental change occurred in the Ottoman outlook toward Europeans. Thereafter, the Ottomans implemented Europeanizing reforms in the military, in education, administration, dress, as well as political and civil rights, partly as a survival strategy to withstand European imperial ambitions, and partly to compensate for what they had begun to perceive as their shortcomings in civilization Ulusoy With the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the reforms of the Ataturk period Turks shed away 18 many practices that marked their difference from Europe, including the alphabet, dress, calendar, measurement system, and holidays. Specifically, it has induced Turkey to move toward EU standards on sensitive issues of democratisation and human and minority rights - standards which act as among the most rigorous markers of ERIS Muftuler-Bac In this respect, there have been considerable advances in the freedom of expression and of association, prevention of torture, expansion of cultural rights, and the reduction of the role of the military in Turkish political life. For example, on the Kurdish question, the Criminal Code was amended in to allow for freedom of expression in languages other than Turkish. In , changes made to broadcasting law opened the path to the establishment of Kurdish radio and TV stations. That same year, the State of Emergency in effect in south-eastern Turkey was removed entirely. Progress in reducing the role of the military, meanwhile, has involved a series of changes made in to the composition and role of the National Security Council, transforming it into an advisory body dominated by civilians. In the judicial 19 system, the State Security Courts, which contained a military judge and prosecuted crimes directed at the state, were abolished in Further, following a constitutional amendment ratified by the Turkish parliament, the supremacy of international and European human rights treaties over domestic legislation has been recognized. Finally, a new penal code was adopted in , which strengthened sanctions against certain human rights violations, and abolished or amended several articles, such as those criminalizing incitement to class-based, ethnic, religious, or racial hatred which were previously interpreted in a way to limit freedom of expression. The partial suspension of EU-Turkey accession negotiations in , coupled with the anti-Turkey rhetoric of prominent EU leaders, considerably slowed the reform process in Turkey. The momentum of the period had resulted from a coalition of political elites united by the attractive prospect of EU membership. Those who were sceptical of political reform were induced by the carrot of EU membership while those who were already supportive of political reform were further empowered Rumelili a. Yet while support for EU accession has certainly diminished and official opinion has become much more questioning of EU conditions, there is a certain durability to political reform process in Turkey. It is worth emphasizing in this context one usually neglected dimension: As a result of the advocacy of key political actors in issue areas directly affected by EU-induced political reforms, the reform process in Turkey has acquired its own domestic dynamics. Up until 1 January , a total of 27, complaints had been lodged against Turkey in Strasbourg. Turkey, in fact, is a major preoccupation of the Court. Judgements on Turkey constitute 18 per cent of its total judgements and as of January , 11, applications from Turkey were pending, corresponding to 11 per cent of the total European Court of Human Rights Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens of Turkey are among the most frequent litigants at the Court. Among the cases brought by Kurdish citizens, most have concerned violations committed by Turkish security forces during the State of Emergency Rule Turkey was found to have violated the European Convention in 43 cases , the dissolution of Kurdish political parties violations found in nine cases , and the prosecution of individuals who advocate a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem

violations found in 58 cases. The cases brought by non-Muslim citizens of Turkey have mostly been cases of property rights violations and discrimination of non-Muslim foundations. Currently, there are 31 pending cases at the Court opened against Turkey by non-Muslim foundations Kurban The Progress Report makes reference to the high number of applications to the ECtHR concerning violations of the right to a fair trial, right to liberty and security, prohibition of torture, and freedom of expression European Commission , The Progress Report, while commending the progress made by Turkey, notes the relatively high number of violations by Turkey compared to the larger member states of the EU European Commission , The Progress report, however, while commending the improvement in the execution of judgements, still notes the considerable number awaiting enforcement European Commission , These domestic dynamics are likely to be self-sustaining in the short term in the absence of a strong membership perspective. In the medium to long-term, however, the Turkish political reform process is likely to lose momentum. The critical question, then, is whether the Turkish government and citizens can find in a post-enlargement Europe a context conducive to continue to target the highest standards of democracy and human rights. Although the focus on only three areas has compromised the depth of the analysis, it has proved useful in highlighting the tension between ongoing dynamics of adaptation and contestation. From the perspective of identity construction, it appears highly unlikely that Turkey-EU relations will enter a post-enlargement situation. Foreign policy, on the other hand, is showing signs of adaptation. This will, and in fact, has already begun to create new opportunities for regional actors such as Turkey, to expand their regional influence. Concerning European norm diffusion and political reform in Turkey, it is possible to discern signs of adaptation as well as contestation. In other words, their political strategies are showing signs of adaptation to a post-enlargement Europe. At the same time, however, the weakening of membership prospects could undermine domestic reform-minded coalitions. In the period, these broad-based coalitions brought together Turkish political actors already socialized into European norms and principles, with the more sceptical actors induced by the carrot of membership. Although this will not reverse the progress that has already been made, Turkey will nonetheless appear increasingly reluctant to comply with EU norms and values. National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: From conflict to cooperation: Europeanization through EU conditionality: The desire for Europe:

3: www.enganchecubano.com | Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy | | Umut Uzer | Boeken

Turkish Foreign Policy And Turkish Identity A Constructivist Approach has 2 ratings and 0 reviews. By using the core insights of the constructivist appro.

I would especially like to thank my dissertation advisor, Prof. Stuart Kaufman, who supported me throughout my study at the University of Kentucky. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee members, Prof. Charles Davis, and Prof. My special thanks go to my parents and my brother, Mehmet Bozdaglioglu, who provided the necessary documents, which made the completion of this work possible. I dedicate this book to them. This tradition became more prominent especially in the post-World War II era due in most part to the emergence and persistence of the Cold War. They suggest that collective identity could emerge endogenously at the systemic level and such a process would generate cooperation. Does the existence of cooperation or conflict depend upon the rational calculation of the costs and benefits of states or are cooperation and conflict better understood as a question of the social identities of the relevant actors? Turkey, in this regard, constitutes a unique case study to assess the validity of the constructivist perspective as an alternative explanation of how foreign policy preferences, and consequently interests, are formulated. The Westernization movement in Turkey goes back to the period when the Ottoman Empire started to decline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even though they were trying to adopt only the material aspects of Western civilization, they could not prevent the spread of positivist ideas and cultural values of the West among the new classes created by the secular educational system. Although it started out as short-term practical measures to save the Empire, the pace and the scope of the Westernization movement increased in the second half of the nineteenth century and by the end of the century, many Western laws and practices had been adopted and a basically secular educational system had been established. The Kemalist revolution that began in the s was the radical and inevitable result of these modernization and westernization efforts that the Ottoman Empire had been undergoing for almost a century. It was not confined to only science and technology; it aimed at creating a new state, a new society, and an individual in line with those of the West. For the Kemalist elite there existed only one civilization, and it meant European civilization. If Turkish society was to modernize, it would do so in every aspect of social, political and cultural life. The most important implication of this thinking was the exclusion of Islam from the definition of the state. In the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the basis of state legitimacy and the source of individual identification. The republican elite, in their efforts to create a national and secular state, sought to cut the ties linking the society and individual to the Ottoman past and the Islamic Eastern civilization by completely discarding Islam from the public sphere. There was only one civilization, which was superior to Eastern civilization, and Turkey had to be a part of it in order to survive. This policy in turn led to the suppression of other identities, mainly ethnic and religious, and exclusion of them from the political process. The reforms throughout the republican era served to realize this purpose. Another characteristic of the modernization process was its being a top-down process carried out by bureaucratic-authoritarian political and military elites, who were the products of the Ottoman reforms. The process began when Turkey signed the tripartite agreement with Britain and France in and gained further impetus when Turkey joined NATO, the Council of Europe, and other Western political and economic organizations. It was in the context of the Cold War that Turkey was able to establish close relations with the West. At the same time, Turkey stayed aloof from Middle Eastern politics, a brief period of the Baghdad Pact in being the only exception. To be a part of the West in every aspect and gain recognition as a Western state thenceforth has come to occupy the center of Turkish foreign policy. Even though economic and political difficulties prevented Turkey from implementing the terms of Ankara Agreement and resulted in the deterioration of Turkish-EU relations, Turkey finally decided to apply for full membership on 14 April At that time, Islam as a political force was not strong enough to challenge the identity of the state and the westernization project. The s and s, however, witnessed a gradual rise of Islamic sentiment in Turkey that resulted in the electoral success of the Islamic Welfare Party WP in the national elections. The s and the s also witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Turkic republics in Central Asia,

creating an enthusiasm for a leadership role for Turkey in the region. Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. According to the Kemalist elite, Turkey should stay with the West and try to gain recognition as a European state. For Islamists, Turkey cannot be a part of Europe because it belongs to a different civilization. Instead, Turkey should ally with other Muslim countries in the Middle East. Nationalists, on the other hand, argue that Turkey, without a radical departure from its West-oriented foreign policy, should pay more attention to the Turkic republics and play a leadership role in the region. During this time, there was no Soviet threat to be balanced against. Furthermore, Turkey received financial and emotional help from the Soviet Union during the Independence War. The Soviet threat emerged after Turkey began to ally itself fully with the West. Turkey farther deepened its relations with the West even when there was no serious threat from the Soviet Union after the s. As a middle power with a unique geographical position, Turkey could have played off the superpowers against each other to maximize its gains during the Cold War. However, Turkish political leaders bluntly stated that neutrality was not an option and Turkey would continue to fully ally with the West. Even though the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War gave many opportunities to Turkey to formulate more flexible regional policies, Turkey continued its full identification with the West. For example, a realist would expect that Turkey would try to get support from its neighbors, especially from Iraq and Iran, for its long-lasting Kurdish problem since they also have a substantial Kurdish population. As the above examples show, even though Turkey had ample opportunities during and after the Cold War to formulate its foreign policy to maximize its material gains, it chose to stay with the West, sometimes at its own cost. Chapter 2 reviews realist and constructivists arguments and gives a critique of both. Chapter 3 is an analysis of the impact of the West during the Ottoman Empire and the construction of official Turkish identity in the years following the Independence War in It argues that since Turkish politics was dominated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürkâ€”the founder of the modern Turkish Republicâ€”I look at his definition of western identity and his ideas on both western and eastern civilizations. It shows that the lack of a clearly defined role after the Cold War and its deteriorating relations with Europe coupled with the increasing strength of Islamic and nationalist sentiments in the country further intensified the identity crisis. I also argue in chapter VI that as Turkey increased its ties with the Middle East it also opened to Islamic influences that threatened the secular character of the Turkish state. This was evident in the rise of Muslim sentiment and the growing electoral support for the Islamic Welfare Party, which became the major party in the general elections. Chapter 7 illustrates how the presence of a shared identity with Israel based on Westernization and secularization contributed to good relations between the two countries. In this case again, identity provided a better conceptual link to the construction of threat and informed Turkish decisionmakers as to who is deemed an attractive ally to contain that threat. Finally, chapter 8 examines the implications of the arguments presented in the book for international relation theories in general and Turkish foreign policy in particular. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole. Political structure is defined on three dimensions: Therefore, anarchy is the ordering principle of the system. The assumption that follows is that the desire of the units is to survive. In order to survive in this anarchic world, states should take care of themselves. The second component of international political structure is the functional similarity of the units. For the sake of his structural theory, Waltz excludes motives, attributes or any particular qualities of states except their capabilities from his analysis. Thus, structure becomes a cause producing a similarity in processes and performance. The structure of the international system, once formed, becomes a force that the units cannot control. It constrains and puts limits on the behavior of the units. The interests and identities of states are constructed by the structure of the system exogenous to them. Under the conditions of anarchy, it is logical to assume that states must acquire egoistic identities and take care of themselves or they will risk being crushed. The implication of the above argument is that since states have egoistic identities and consequently egoistic interests imposed upon them by the anarchic structure they all will be concerning about cheating and relative gains in their relations with others. They argue that there are other variables that may be more important than anarchy and power for explaining

state behavior. According to constructivists, structure is a medium of activity that in principle can be altered through that activity. Any given action will reproduce or transform some part of the social structure; the structural product itself may be intended or unintended. In general, social action is both a product an intended action and a byproduct the reproduction of rules and resources implicated in the intended action. Structure, defined in terms of anarchy and distribution of power, cannot alone lead to behavior. Meaningful behavior is possible only within an intersubjective social context: Actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. For neorealist, norms do not have any causal force in international politics. For neoliberals, norms play important roles only in certain issue areas and help actors with given interests maximize utility. Their effects are deeper; they constitute actor identities and interests and do not simply regulate behavior. For constructivists, agents states and structures global norms are interacting; they are mutually constituted. The implication of this argument for the role of international institutions in international politics is that institutions can constitute the identities of actors and thus shape their interests. Defined, social structures include three essential elements: A security community, by contrast, is a different social structure, composed of shared knowledge in which states trust each other to resolve disputes without war. In this sense, ideas are social. Social structure exists only in process. As Ted Hopf notes: Others observing the United States not only inferred US identity from its actions in Vietnam, but also reproduced the intersubjective web of meaning about what precisely constituted that identity. To the extent, for example, that a group of countries attributed an imperialist identity to the United States, the meaning of being an imperialist state was reproduced by the US military intervention. In this way, social practices not only reproduce actors through identity, but also reproduce an intersubjective social structure through social practice. Actors acquire identities by participating in collective meanings. States may have multiple identities and which identity will be more salient depends on the specific social context. In these cases, actors assign meanings to these kinds of situations through institutionally defined roles. How would they define self and other? In order to explain identity construction, Wendt makes a distinction between the corporate and social identities of states. As explained above, social identities vary in salience depending on the social context. In this respect, they are a key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure, embodying the terms of individuality through which agents relate to each other. Instead, he is more interested in showing how, through systemic interaction, states construct social identities and how self and collective interests are produced. By excluding the domestic roots of state identities from his analysis, he aims to prove that state identities are endogenous, not exogenous, to the system.

4: Download [PDF] Turkish Foreign Policy And Turkish Identity Free Online | New Books in Politics

By using the core insights of the constructivist approach in International Relations, this book analyzes the foreign policy behavior of Turkey.

5: Democracy, identity and foreign policy in Turkey

Bozdaglioglu explicate the roles of shifting political/national identity and aspirations in reorientation of Turkey's new foreign policy outlook. Thanks Yucel for covering an important gap in Turkish literature.

6: Turkish Foreign Policy And Turkish Identity A Constructivist Approach by Yucel Bozdağlıoğlu

©Kobo Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach by Yucel Bozdaglioglu. By using the core insights of the constructivist approach in International Relations, this book analyzes the foreign pol.

U2022 His birth was attended by angels, 126 wise men¹²⁷ and shepherds, 128 and he was presented with gift Also known as Rowan Pahi Step into the past Nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands Spiritual slumber in the church Plan 12-a act Brasseys Defence Yearbook 1998 (Brasseys Defence Yearbook) A Short account of the emigration from the highlands of Scotland to North America Livingston and the tomato My Very Own Fairy Tales Treasury (Twelve Volume Set) James rollins books Ahfs Drug Information 2006 (Ahfs Drug Information) Encyclopedia of American crime Arms control agreements Atomic absorption. GATHERED LEAVES De Million Christine feehan wild rain China (Silver Burdett Countries) Mans Question, Gods Answer Isoperimetry and Gaussian analysis Michel Ledoux. The Culture of Prison Violence Essays in bioinformatics Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages The emergence and development of sport policy Sweet dawn of desire An Encyclopedia Of Occultism Separate from the world Christian faith personally given in a system of doctrine The Alfred Hitchcock quote book A tour round the globe The Messiah in Jerusalem : 11:1-13:37 Interviews. Christo, 1977 ; Christo, 1982 ; Christo and Jeanne-Claude, 1983 ; Christo and Jeanne-Claude, Nirvana in a Nutshell Turning page sheet music The maze runner 3 No Law Against Mercy Plymouth 1946-1959 (Motorbooks International American Classics) Howard Andrew Knox Mottisfont Abbey Hampshire): Garden, House and Estate (National Trust Guidebooks Ser.) Inquiry teaching in the sciences