

## 1: CSP - Major Episodes of Political Violence,

*Fact Sheets* *Gun Violence Trends* *February 5, Gun Violence by the Numbers* Everytown is committed to using the most comprehensive, up-to-date sources of data to measure America's unprecedented levels of gun violence.

Public health studies show that youth violence is an ongoing, startlingly pervasive problem. This chapter describes the magnitude of and trends in violent crime by young people, focusing on homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, and forcible rape see Box for definitions. A later chapter Chapter 4 seeks to explain why young people become involved in violence in the first place. Definitions of the four violent crimes considered in this report. Measuring Youth Violence Surveillance is the backbone of the public health approach to youth violence or any other public health problem. It reveals the magnitude of a problem, tracks the magnitude over time, and uses the information gained from such monitoring to help shape actions to prevent or combat the problem. Two approaches to measuring the magnitude of youth violence are commonly used. The first relies on official crime statistics compiled by law enforcement agencies, typically arrest reports. These statistics cannot answer questions about how many young people commit violent crimes or how many violent crimes were committed, but they can answer questions about the number of crimes reported to the police, the volume and types of arrests, and how the volume changes over time. The second approach surveys young people and asks them in confidence about violent acts they have committed or have been victims of during a given period of time. Such reports can be obtained from the same group of people over a long period of time a longitudinal survey or from different groups of people at the same point in time a cross-sectional survey. A prominent example of a repeated cross-sectional survey cited in this chapter is Monitoring the Future, a survey of high school seniors that has been conducted annually since Reports from young people themselves offer the best way to measure violent behavior that never reaches the attention of the justice system. In fact, evidence in this chapter makes it unmistakably clear that most crimes by young people do not reach the attention of the justice system. Self-reports are well suited to answering such questions as: What proportion of youths are violent? What types of violent acts do they commit? Has the volume of violence changed over time? When during development does violence arise, and what forms does it take? These questions relate to the magnitude of violent behavior and to its developmental pathways, and they are addressed in this chapter and the next. Both arrest reports and self-reports are reasonably valid and reliable ways of measuring the particular aspects of violence they were designed to measure for general reviews see Blumstein et al. Arrests appear to be more objective, but they are not a good general measure of violent behavior, for several reasons. Thus, arrests seriously underestimate the volume of violent crime and fail to distinguish accurately between those who are and are not involved in violence. Self-reports were designed specifically to overcome the limitations of violence measures based on official records of criminal behavior. They provide a more direct measure of criminal behavior, but they too have their limitations. Youths may fail to report their violent behavior accurately, either deliberately or because of memory problems, and they may exaggerate their involvement, reporting rather trivial events in response to questions about serious forms of violence. The advantages of self-reports are that they capture not only unreported offenses but also details not found in arrest records. In addition, this measure of violent offending is not subject to any of the biases that might be involved in arrest processes. Both types of measures contribute to our understanding of violence. The key to using them is to understand their relative strengths and limitations, determine where they reinforce each other and where they diverge or conflict, and then interpret the differences in findings, if possible Brener et al. The Violence Epidemic Arrest rates of young people for homicide and other violent crimes skyrocketed from to In response to the dramatic increase in the number of murders committed by young people, Congress and many state legislatures passed new gun control laws, established boot camps, and began waiving children as young as 10 out of the juvenile justice system and into adult criminal courts. Then, starting in the mids, overall arrest rates began to decline, returning by to rates only slightly higher than those in Several important indicators were used to track youth violence during these years, but their findings did not always agree. Several other indicators of violence furnish similar, but not as robust evidence of a violence epidemic that later subsided.

However, the decline in arrest rates is not uniform for all types of violent crime. Moreover, another key indicator -- the volume of violent behavior, which is based on self-reports -- does not show a decline in youth violence after 1990. As explained later, that indicator remained high and essentially level from 1990 to 2000. This chapter answers the questions raised by these disparate findings -- namely, whether the epidemic of violence is really over and why leading indicators of youth violence do not agree. A rise and subsequent decline in the use of firearms and other weapons by young people provides one potential explanation for the different trends in arrest records and self-reports. The violence epidemic was accompanied by an increase in weapons carrying and use. During this era, instant access to weapons, especially firearms, often turned an angry encounter into a seriously violent or lethal one, which, in turn, drew attention from the police in the form of an arrest. As weapons carrying declined, so too did arrest rates, perhaps because the violence was less injurious or lethal. But the amount of underlying violent behavior on the basis of self-reports did not change much -- if anything, it appears to have increased in recent years. That undercurrent of violent behavior could reignite into a new epidemic if weapons carrying rises again. From a public health perspective, a resurgence of weapons carrying -- and hence the potential for another epidemic of violence -- poses a grave threat. Since the 1990s, this program has compiled annual arrest information submitted voluntarily by thousands of city, county, and state police agencies. This information currently comes from police jurisdictions that represent only 68 percent of the population, so FBI figures represent projections of these data to the entire U.S. The UCR tabulates the number, rate, and certain features of arrests made by law enforcement agencies. Because some people are arrested more than once a year, the UCR cannot provide an accurate count of the number of people arrested or the proportion of the total population arrested. Nor can the UCR provide an accurate count of the number of crimes committed. A single arrest may account for a series of crimes, or a single crime may involve the arrest of more than one person. As noted earlier, arrest rates are also prone to certain types of error. Unless indicated otherwise, the figures on arrests were assembled by the FBI. Rates then declined until 1990, the most recent year for which figures are available. Arrest rates of youths age 15 to 19 for serious violent crime, Figure 1 shows arrest rates for each of the four violent crimes considered in this report. In 1990, arrests of young people for all crimes totaled 2. Arrests for aggravated assault 69, and robbery 28, were the most frequent, with arrests for forcible rape 5, and murder 1, trailing significantly behind. In 2000, youths accounted for one out of six arrests for all violent crimes, a share that has decreased slightly 16 percent in recent years Snyder, unpublished. Although the arrest rate for violent crimes was the lowest in this decade, it is still 15 percent higher than the rate Snyder, unpublished. As seen in Figure 1, the rates for homicide, robbery, and rape are below the rates; however, arrests for aggravated assault are still nearly 70 percent higher than rates. Arrest rates of youths age 15 to 19 for serious violent crime, by type of crime, Overall, arrest rates of youths for violent offenses grew by about 70 percent. The increase in homicides committed by young people was particularly alarming. The Role of Firearms The decade-long upsurge in homicides was tied to an increased use of firearms in the commission of crimes Cherry et al. Likewise, the downward trend in homicide arrests from 1990 to 2000 can be traced largely to a decline in firearm usage. The critical role of firearms in homicide and other violent crimes is supported by arrest, victimization, hospitalization, and self-report data. Analysis of arrest data Figure 2 shows an unequivocal upsurge in firearm usage by young people who committed homicide. In 1990, youths were equally likely to use firearms and other weapons, such as a knife or club, to kill someone. Firearm- and nonfirearm-related homicides by youths, Analysis of Supplementary Homicide Report data on young victims of homicide 2 reinforces this pattern of firearm use. A large increase in the number of young people killed by firearms between 1990 and 2000 was followed by a decrease. The use of firearms in violent crimes other than homicide cannot readily be tracked in youth arrest statistics, but for Americans of all ages, firearm use in violent crimes increased from 1990 to 2000 and then declined from 2000 to 2008. Firearm use can also be tracked indirectly, through victims treated in hospital emergency departments. Since 1990, injuries related to firearms have been monitored through an emergency department surveillance system. Figure 3 presents a special analysis of emergency department surveillance data on youths age 10 to 19. It shows that the rate of firearms-related injuries among young people treated in hospital emergency departments dropped by almost 50 percent from 1990 to 2000. Data on male youths alone reveal a similarly dramatic drop. Nonfatal firearm-related injuries of youths age 10 to 19 treated in hospital emergency departments, In the early 1990s, high school

students began to report that they were increasingly less likely to carry guns anywhere and specifically less likely to carry them to school. Adapted from Brener et al. Thus, there has been an upsurge and then a decline in the use of firearms and weapons over the past two decades. It also resulted from changes in the types of guns manufactured, with cheaper, larger caliber guns flooding the gun markets Wintemute, The explanations most often given are a decline in youth involvement in the crack market and in gang involvement in crack distribution, police crackdowns on gun carrying and illegal gun purchases, longer sentences for violent crimes involving a gun, a strong economy, and expanded crime and violence prevention programs. After reviewing these and other potential explanations for the drop in violence, Blumstein and Wallman concluded that no single factor was responsible; rather, the decrease in violence resulted from the combination of many factors.

Comparing Arrests to Other Trends As noted above, the steep rise and fall in arrest rates over the past two decades has been matched to some extent by changes in leading indicators of violence. Figure tracks the trends in four indicators: Trends in youth violence since Arrest rate for serious violent crimes: Arrest rate for homicide and non-negligent manslaughter: Self-reported incident rate of serious assault and robbery: The incident rate is a measure of the volume of violence. It refers to the number of self-reported violent acts within a given-sized population -- in this case, the number of violent acts per 1, young people. In contrast, the prevalence rate indicates what proportion of that population is involved in one or more violent behaviors. Figure compares arrest rates with self-reported incident rates rather than with prevalence rates because both measure the volume of violent events. Even though arrest and incident rates measure different events and have different absolute magnitudes, the degree of change in these rates over time can be compared. Homicide arrest rates were roughly percent higher in than in , and arrest rates for all serious violent crimes were 70 percent higher. The incident rates of serious violent crimes reported by victims and the rates of serious assault and robbery reported by offenders increased to a lesser extent, by about 50 percent.

## 2: Domestic violence in the United States - Wikipedia

*Trends in the incident rate of serious violence are shown again in Figure , this time graphed according to magnitude rather than percentage of change. 5 Figure Trends in incident rates of serious violence among 12th graders, assault with injury and robbery with a weapon combined,*

These definitions of VAW as being gender-based are seen by some to be unsatisfactory and problematic. These definitions are conceptualized in an understanding of society as patriarchal, signifying unequal relations between men and women. Other critics argue that employing the term gender in this particular way may introduce notions of inferiority and subordination for femininity and superiority for masculinity. A man beating a woman is shown in the back. Burning witches, with others held in Stocks Sati a Hindu practice whereby a widow immolates herself on the funeral pyre of her husband ceremony. X-ray of bound feet , China The history of violence against women remains vague in scientific literature. This is in part because many kinds of violence against women specifically rape, sexual assault, and domestic violence are under-reported, often due to societal norms, taboos, stigma, and the sensitive nature of the subject. For example, dowry violence and bride burning is associated with India , Bangladesh , Sri Lanka , and Nepal. Acid throwing is also associated with these countries, as well as in Southeast Asia , including Cambodia. Honor killing is associated with the Middle East and South Asia. Female genital mutilation is found mostly in Africa , and to a lesser extent in the Middle East and some other parts of Asia. Marriage by abduction is found in Ethiopia , Central Asia and the Caucasus. Abuse related to payment of bride price such as violence, trafficking and forced marriage is linked to parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania. There is also debate and controversy about the ways in which cultural traditions, local customs and social expectations, as well as various interpretations of religion, interact with abusive practices. These justifications are questionable precisely because the defenses are generally voiced by political leaders or traditional authorities, not by those actually affected. There has also been a history of recognizing the harmful effects of this violence. In the s, courts in the United States stopped recognizing the common-law principle that a husband had the right to "physically chastise an errant wife". A study in estimated that at least one in five women in the world had been physically or sexually abused by a man sometime in their lives, and "gender-based violence accounts for as much death and ill-health in women aged 15â€”44 years as cancer, and is a greater cause of ill-health than malaria and traffic accidents combined. For example, acts of violence against women are often not unique episodes, but are ongoing over time. More often than not, the violence is perpetrated by someone the woman knows, not by a stranger. This document specifically refers to the historically forever-present nature of gender inequalities in understanding violence against women. This Declaration, as well as the World Conference of the same year, is often viewed as a "turning point" at which the consideration of violence against women by the international community began to be taken much more seriously, and after which more countries mobilized around this problem. This was followed by a WHO report in see below. The report specifically noted the sharp rise in civil society organizations and activities directed at responding to gender-based violence against women from the s to the s. As a particular case study, here are some developments since the s in the United States to oppose and treat violence against women: Two national coalitions, the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault and the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence , were formed, to raise awareness of these two forms of violence against women. Attorney General created the Department of Justice Task Force on Family Violence, to address ways in which the criminal justice system and community response to domestic violence should be improved. Passage of the Violence Against Women Act or VAWA, legislation included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of , sponsored by then-Senator Joseph Biden, which required a strengthened community response to crimes of domestic violence and sexual assault, strengthened federal penalties for repeat sex offenders and strengthened legislative protection of victims, among many other provisions. President Clinton signed into law the VAWA of , further strengthening federal laws, and emphasizing assistance of immigrant victims, elderly victims, victims with disabilities, and victims of dating violence. President Bush signed into law the VAWA of , with an emphasis on programs to address violence

against youth victims, and establishing programs for Engaging Men and Youth, and Culturally and Linguistically Specific Services. President Obama signed into law the VAWA of , which granted Native American tribes the ability to prosecute non-Native offenders, and regulated reports of sexual assault on college campuses. Experts in the international community generally believe, however, that solely enacting punitive legislation for prevention and punishment of violence against women is not sufficient to address the problem. For example, although much stricter laws on violence against women have been passed in Bangladesh, violence against women is still rising. Violence against women often keeps women from wholly contributing to social, economic, and political development of their communities. Apart from that, the causes that trigger VAW or gender-based violence can go beyond just the issue of gender and into the issues of age, class, culture, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and specific geographical area of their origins. Importantly, other than the issue of social divisions, violence can also extend into the realm of health issues and become a direct concern of the public health sector. These studies show that one of the best predictors of inter- and intranational violence is the maltreatment of women in the society.

## 3: Crime Information and Statistics

*Understand the magnitude of youth violence. Explain how to measure youth violence and the violence epidemic. Describe the arrests for violent behavior, prevalence of violent behavior, and the different types of violence between race and ethnicity.*

The effects of gun violence extend far beyond these casualties—gun violence shapes the lives of millions of Americans who witness it, know someone who was shot, or live in fear of the next shooting. In order to illustrate the magnitude of everyday gun violence, Everytown has gathered the most comprehensive, publicly available data. Still, significant data gaps remain—a result of underfunded, incomplete data collection at the state and federal level. Filling these gaps is necessary to truly understand the full impact of gun violence in the United States. Data reflect a 5 year average of gun deaths by intent. While it is broadly considered to be the most comprehensive firearm fatal injury source, two of the intent categories—Shootings by law enforcement and Unintentional Deaths—are estimated to be greatly underreported. This underreporting is largely due to missing information on death certificates, which may result in misclassification of intent. Multiple media sources and nonprofit groups have tracked shootings by law enforcement but no reliable public database captures unintentional shootings. This intent category is believed to be underreported and is likely being misclassified as homicide. Underreporting of justifiable homicides committed by police officers in the United States, American Journal of Public Health. Data reflects a 3 year average of gun deaths by intent. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Grinshteyn E, Hemenway D. The American Journal of Medicine. Access to a gun increases the risk of death by suicide by three times. The accessibility of firearms and risk for suicide and homicide victimization among household members: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Annals of Internal Medicine. Gun suicides are concentrated in states with high rates of gun ownership. Explaining geographic patterns of suicide in the U. The role of firearms and antidepressants. Most people who attempt suicide do not die—unless they use a gun. Across all suicide attempts not involving a firearm, less than five percent will result in death. Suicide mortality in the United States: The importance of attending to method in understanding population-level disparities in the burden of suicide. Annual Review of Public Health. But for gun suicides, those statistics are flipped: White men represent 75 percent of firearm suicide victims in America. White men defined as non-Hispanic white. Data reflect a 5 year average of gun deaths by homicide, including legal intervention. Access to a gun increases the risk of death by homicide by two times. Gun homicides are concentrated in cities—half of all gun homicides took place in just cities, which represented nearly a quarter of the U. Want to fix gun violence in America? Within these cities, gun homicides are most prevalent in racially segregated neighborhoods with high rates of poverty. Black Americans represent the majority of gun homicide victims. Data reflect a 5 year average of gun deaths by race. In fact, Black Americans are 10 times more likely than white Americans to die by gun homicide. Black males are 16 times more likely than white males to be shot and injured in assaults involving guns. Children and teenagers aged , Black defined as non-Hispanic, number of deaths by known intent homicide, suicide, unintentional deaths. Age calculated separately by the CDC because leading causes of death for newborns and infants are specific to the age group. Leading causes for National Center for Health Statistics. Nearly 1, children and teens die by gun homicide every year. Data reflect a 5 year average: For children under the age of 13, these gun homicides most frequently occur in the home and are often connected to domestic or family violence. Childhood firearm injuries in the United States. American Academy of Pediatrics. Black children and teens are 15 times more likely than white children and teens of the same age to die by gun homicide. In an average month, 50 American women are shot to death by an intimate partner, Uniform Crime Reporting Program: Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nearly one million women alive today have been shot or shot at by an intimate partner. Nonfatal gun use in intimate partner violence: A systematic review of the literature. Tjaden P, Thoennes T. Full report of the prevalence, incidence, and consequences of violence against women: Access to a gun in a domestic violence situation makes it five times more likely that a woman will be killed. Risk factors for femicide in abusive relationships: Results from a multisite case control study. Black women

## TYPES, MAGNITUDE TRENDS OF VIOLENCE pdf

are twice as likely to be fatally shot by an intimate partner compared to white women. Uniform Crime Reporting Program: Analysis includes homicides involving an intimate partner and a firearm, and compares the crude death rates for Black women 0. An in-depth look at the attitudes and experiences of U. Approximately three million American children witness gun violence every year. Prevalence of childhood exposure to violence, crime, and abuse: Everytown analysis derives the 3 million number by multiplying the share of children ages who are exposed to shootings per year 4.

### 4: Chapter 2 -- the Magnitude of Youth Violence - Youth Violence - NCBI Bookshelf

*ing the magnitude and claiming that girls and women have gone "wild" and are more violent than ever before (e.g., Leach, ; Scelfo, ). Unfortunately, popular press and even textbook accounts of trends in.*

Ellison found that "religious involvement, specifically church attendance, protects against domestic violence, and this protective effect is stronger for African American men and women and for Hispanic men, groups that, for a variety of reasons, experience elevated risk for this type of violence. The first known use of the expression "domestic violence" in a modern context, meaning "spouse abuse, violence in the home" was in Attention to violence against men began in the late s. Laws[ edit ] Victims of domestic violence are offered legal remedies that are both civil and criminal in nature. Civil law remedies include the possibility of obtaining a protection order. These remedies are not exclusive, meaning that a victim may seek both the criminal prosecution of the offender and also petition for civil remedies. People who perpetrate acts of domestic violence are subject to criminal prosecution. Prosecution most often occurs under assault and battery laws. Perpetrators of domestic violence can be charged under general statutes, [91] [92] [93] but most states have also enacted specific statutes that specifically criminalize acts of domestic violence. For example, under the South Carolina code, the crime of "Criminal domestic violence" states that "it is unlawful to: Acts of domestic violence can have a significant impact on Child custody laws in the United States litigation, most notably when an act of domestic violence is committed in the presence of the minor child. A parent with a history of domestic violence may be at a significant disadvantage in a custody case, even if the domestic violence was not directed at the other parent. Certain laws indirectly impact domestic abuse survivors. This poster was issued by various branches of the United States Military to educate and prevent domestic abuse. The law helped victim advocates and government agencies to work together, created prevention and victim support programs, and resulted in new punishments for certain violent crimes, which by resulted in: Family Violence Prevention and Services Act The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act FVPSA provides federal funding to help victims of domestic violence and their dependent children by providing shelter and related help, offering violence prevention programs, and improving how service agencies work together in communities. This money helps states, territories, and tribes create and support programs that work to help victims and prevent family violence. The amount of money is determined by a formula based partly on population. The states, territories, and tribes distribute the money to thousands of domestic violence shelters and programs. The hour, confidential, toll-free National Domestic Violence Hotline provides support, information, referrals, safety planning, and crisis intervention in more than languages to hundreds of thousands of domestic violence victims each year. The way that the DELTA program works towards prevention is by understanding factors that influence violence and then focusing on how to prevent these factors. This is done by using a social ecological model which illustrates the connection between Individual, Relationship, Community, and Societal factors that influence violence. Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban The Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban, also known as the Lautenberg Amendment, is a United States federal law enacted in to ban firearms and ammunitions to individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence , or who are under a restraining protection order for domestic abuse in all 50 states. United States federal probation and supervised release The United States federal probation and supervised release law: Makes probation mandatory for first-time domestic violence offenders not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. This belief was based on FBI statistics which turned out to be flawed, in that they grouped all types of disturbances together with domestic disturbances, such as brawls at a bar. Subsequent statistics and analysis have shown this belief to be false. Sherman , to evaluate the effectiveness of various police responses to domestic violence calls in Minneapolis, Minnesota , including sending the abuser away for eight hours, giving advice and mediation for disputes, and making an arrest. Arrest was found to be the most effective police response. The study found that arrest reduced the rate by half of re-offending against the same victim within the following six months. Generally, it has been accepted that if the understood victim has visible and recent marks of abuse, the suspect is arrested and charged with the appropriate crime. However, that is a

guideline and not a rule. Like any other call, domestic abuse lies in a gray area. Law enforcement officers have several things to consider when making a warrantless arrest: Are there signs of physical abuse? Was the victim assaulted by the alleged suspect? Who is the primary aggressor? Could the victim be lying? Could the suspect be lying? Many times in cases of mutual combatants, it is departmental policy that both parties be arrested and the court system can establish truth at a later date. In some areas of the nation, this mutual combatant philosophy is being replaced by the primary abuser philosophy in which case if both parties have physical injuries, the law enforcement officer determines who the primary aggressor is and only arrests that one. It was found that when both parties are arrested, it had an adverse effect on the victim. The victims were less likely to call or trust law enforcement during the next incident of domestic abuse.

### 5: 5 facts about crime in the U.S. | Pew Research Center

*How Prevalent is Gun Violence in America? According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, , persons were victims of a crime committed with a firearm in [1] In the same year, data collected by the FBI show that firearms were used in 68 percent of murders, 41 percent of robbery.*

See also, chapter six in *Third World War. Global Trends in Armed Conflict*, The red-line charts the trend in general level of interstate war in the global system; that measure includes all wars of independence from the Colonial System and has remained fairly constant at a low level through the Cold War period. We can see from the graph that the UN System, that was designed to regulate inter-state war, has been reasonably effective in providing inter-state security. However, the UN System has not been effective in regulating societal or civil warfare. The level of societal warfare increased dramatically and continuously through the Cold War period. Separate research indicates that the increasing level of societal war results from the protractedness of societal wars during this period and not from a substantial increase in the numbers of new wars. Click here for a brief description of the methodology used to create the trend graph. *Global Trends in Armed Conflict*, The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in , had an equally dramatic effect on the general level of armed conflict in the global system. The trend appears to have changed in the mids back to an increasing trajectory. The global trend in interstate warfare appears to be diminishing across the contemporary period with no interstate wars recorded for the first time in This positive trend needs to be considered in the context of changing technologies: To review the complete listing, "Major Episodes of Political Violence, ," used to construct the warfare trends, click here. Figure 4 charts three different metrics but the trends that emerge remain consistent with those charted in Figure 3. At the peak in , nearly thirty percent of the countries in the world were experiencing some form of major political violence *Global Trends in Armed Conflict Onsets*, A third perspective on the global trend in armed conflict focuses on the annual numbers of onsets of new wars in the global system to examine their frequency and regularity and whether there have been marked changes in those factors over time. Figure 5 charts three additional metrics: The number of new war onsets fluctuates between zero and thirteen per year and the number of new societal wars is generally higher than new interstate wars. There is a peak in new societal war onsets that coincides with the end of the Cold War and , however, the average frequency of societal war onsets does not appear to have changed much across the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War periods. The average rate of onset for societal wars changes slightly: On the other hand, the average rate of onset for interstate wars seems to have fallen to almost a third of the rate during the Cold War period from 1. There have been no interstate war onsets for the past eight years. *Global Trends in Armed Conflict Events*, Whereas Figure 4 looks at the annual number of states directly affected by any number of armed conflicts, Figure 6 charts the annual number of ongoing armed conflicts in the global system overlaid on the onset trend data from Figure 5. This perspective on global trends in armed conflict largely parallels the charted trends in war magnitude and number of states affected, however, this measure shows evidence that the downward global trend in armed conflicts has leveled off in the early years of the 21st Century, indicating that recent wars are increasing in intensity driving summed magnitude scores upward, see figure 3. In early , there are 28 states directly affected by ongoing wars 36 wars total, up from 27 at the end of Of these 28 states, nearly half 13 are affected by protracted wars, that is, armed conflicts persisting for more than ten years. These protracted societal conflicts include Afghanistan 36 years , Colombia 39 , D. Congo 22 , India 62 , Iraq 34 , Israel 49 , Myanmar 66 , Nigeria 17 , Pakistan 17 , Philippines 42 , Somalia 26 , Sudan 31 , and Turkey 30 ; Sri Lanka ended its protracted war with ethnic-Tamil separatists in and Colombia has recently signed a peace treaty in hopes of ending its civil war. The remaining protracted wars continue to defy concerted efforts to gain settlement or resolution. On average, during the contemporary period, interstate wars lasted about 3 years; civil wars lasted just over 5 years; and ethnic wars lasted nearly 10 years. *Estimated Annual Deaths from Political Violence*, Figure 7 takes a step back in time to add perspective to the contemporary period and what we have termed the "Third World War" by comparing it to the almost inconceivable magnitude of devastation that occurred during the Second World War. We know of no

systematic estimates of the numbers of "informal combatants" killed during the war so we assume that these deaths are included with the noncombatant estimates. The efforts of "partisan" fighters to target authorities and weaken and disrupt war support activities behind enemy lines were significant and may account for up to ten percent of the noncombatant death figures but we can only speculate of the real numbers of fighters killed as a result of local rebellions. On the Eastern European and Eastern Asian fronts, informal fighters fought alongside formal military units and are probably included in the "formal combatant" death estimates as these areas were the least "formally developed" regions involved in the warfare and experienced the highest total numbers of deaths.

e. Estimated Annual Deaths from Political Violence, Figure 8 removes the Second World War period from the global trend graph so we can focus on changes that have occurred during the contemporary period. Contemporary warfare trends certainly display evidence that "formal" or classic warfare between states is no longer the dominant form of political violence and may even be "managed" by the conventions and institutions that have come to characterize the "United Nations System. A second adage warning us that "war is most seductive to those with no experience of it" should serve to as a reminder to maintain vigilance. Indeed, many of the regions most affected by warfare during the contemporary period are those which were not directly affected by the earlier World Wars. It appears that ever smaller numbers of combatants are losing their lives while the societal-system devastation of warfare remains a continual problem.

Estimated Annual Deaths from Political Violence, Rate per million population Figure 9 adds a slightly more encouraging perspective to the global trend graph of deaths from political violence by examining the trend as a "death rate" rather than simply charting annual numbers of deaths over time. Once we control for global population growth (red dashed line), we can see that the annual "death rate per million population" from political violence is diminishing over the contemporary period (red solid line), from about 100 per million in 1945 to about 35 per million in 2015. The spikes of violence also appear to be happening less frequently or this is an illusion and the pattern simply indicates that we are due for another spike. In any case, we can not discount the importance of global development and the due diligence of conflict management and prevention efforts; they are our best hope for a better future.

The reasons explaining the enormous increase in the global refugee population beginning in the mid-1970s is difficult to ascertain, although this increase coincides with the long and steady increase in global warfare during the Cold War period (see figure 3, above). There are surely some reporting issues involved but it appears that the magnitude of the increase may be best explained by a confluence of at least four factors: The decline in the global refugee trend immediately following the end of the Cold War also parallels the decline in global warfare after 1990. Since about 2000, the numbers of refugees has increased dramatically once again. The poorer countries account for a disproportionate share of the global warfare totals across the period. Warfare totals for the bottom three quintiles of states increase steadily through the contemporary period, reaching their peaks in the 1980s and early 1990s. The poorest quintiles each show distinctive profiles and high levels of armed conflict that increase during the Cold War period and drop sharply around the end of the Cold War marked by the vertical line. At the peak, over half of the poorer countries are consumed by societal warfare. What distinguishes the lowest quintile is the persistence of high levels of warfare through the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. This may be explained simply by pointing out that they have more fragile societal-systems, more vulnerable populations, and lower capacities for properly managing conflicts than countries in the higher quintiles. This helps to explain the perceived dramatic increase in serious humanitarian crises in the 1970s and, now, again in the 1990s. Pervasive violence and societal system breakdowns in poorly developed countries inevitably lead to humanitarian crises and disasters without substantial and sustained, constructive assistance from external sources and the poorest countries have trouble attracting such assistance, particularly over the long periods of time needed for stabilization and rejuvenation. Comparing these trends with similar plots based on state economic capacity in the early years of the study period our prior method shows evidence of the degrading effects of pervasive warfare on economic capacity: Societal Capacity and Warfare, - The Richer Countries Figure 12 displays the warfare totals for the top three quintiles of state capacity (the third quintile is included to facilitate comparison with the bottom quintiles presented in Figure 8). Readily apparent are the much lower levels of warfare in the upper quintiles. Especially fortunate are the states in the upper quintile where little or no serious political violence takes place for the entire time span; their involvement in armed conflicts are mainly in the role of

"police action" in foreign wars, particularly in "internationalized civil wars. Trends by Conflict Type, Ethnic warfare became the hot topic in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War as a virtual cornucopia of these seemingly intractable and previously "invisible" social identity conflicts exploded onto the world scene and captured public and policy eyes. In order to more fully assess the impact and importance of ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War period it is helpful to place that particular type of societal conflict into its global systemic context. Figure 13 compares trends for three distinct types of warfare, ethnic, revolutionary, and inter-state including "extra-systemic" or anti-colonial wars. The perceived "sudden rise" in ethnic wars in the s appears to be a curious outcropping of more general, systemic changes. After a substantial drop in the s, the global trend in ethnic wars leveled off in the s and has begun to increase somewhat in the s. Revolutionary wars have also increased in the past ten years. As the Cold War ideologies wax and wane in the late s, the support they lend to both inter-state and revolutionary intra-state wars is eroded and those types of warfare greatly diminish. The ethnic war trend, which had previously paralleled the trend of revolutionary war, continues to rise through the late s and early s as separatists and other political entrepreneurs attempt to take advantage of the vast changes in political arrangements that accompanied the transformation of the post-Cold War world system. Also, notice that the long-term trend in ethnic warfare increases relatively smoothly as compared to the other warfare trends. Also, notice that the sharply decreasing trend in ethnic warfare of the s has leveled off since the turn of the century. Global Democracy and Autocracy, Figure 14 simply sums Polity IV scores of institutional authority for democracy and autocracy for each independent state for each year; Polity IV special codes , , are treated as missing data here. In the Polity IV data each country is given annual scores point scales on each of two basic types of regime authority. Although the two types of authority are opposing, many countries exhibit mixed authority traits i. The graph in Figure 14 shows global changes in total "units of democracy" in contrast to total "units of autocracy" in the global system. Global Trends in Governance, Figure 15 provides a long-term assessment of global trends in the qualities of governance, covering the period from to We can see that the independent countries of the world during the 19th century numbered only 22 in and grew to 55 by ; regimes by the middle of the 19th century were about evenly split between fully institutionalized monarchies i. The numbers of democratic regimes can be seen to increase very slowly during the latter half of the 19th century through the end of First World War, when there was a relatively rapid increase in their number. This increase in the number of democracies following the First World War was reversed during the Great Depression and undone by the onset of the Second World War; this time period marks the only reversal in the steady increase of democratic governance since The end of the Second World War is characterized by an enormous increase in the number of newly independent countries brought about by the collapse of the European Colonial System; these newly emerging countries, although initially split among autocratic, anocratic, and democratic regimes, quickly adopted mainly autocratic forms of governance. The end of the Cold War period in the late s marks the collapse of the "new autocratic regimes" and a transformation of old autocratic regimes to more democratic forms. Global Trends in Governance, Figure 16 provides a second perspective on the global trend in governance. It uses Polity IV data on institutional authority for all independent states in the world from The trend lines denote the annual number of states with each of three general authority patterns: Anocracies are a middling category of states with incoherent or inconsistent authority patterns: The Anocracy category also includes countries with any of the three special Polity codes: Figure 17, then, plots the likelihood of the onset of an instability event for each value along the point Polity scale; it further demarcates the three categories of regime type on the scale. The magenta line plots the annual likelihood for an onset from any of the full, five categories described above including democratic transitions ; the dark blue line plots the annual likelihood of onset for any of the four PITF categories. The teal line plots the annual likelihood of the onset of a period of political instability i. By discounting political instability "triggered" by democratic transitions in autocratic regimes, one can get the impression that autocracies are similarly, or even more, stable when compared with democracies. Regime Type by Income Quartiles - Comparing the s and s Whereas Figures , above, clearly show the evidence of a "third wave" of democratization that coincides with the end of the Cold War and the general decline in global armed conflict Figure 3 , Figure 16 also shows a nearly three-fold increase in the numbers of "anocratic"

hybrid authority regimes. Our research and, particularly, the PITF research have shown that anocratic regimes have the highest risk of political instability Figure The simultaneous and dramatic increase in anocratic regimes in the global system and decrease in global armed conflict, especially in light of the unchanged rate of onset for armed conflict events, appears to present a paradox, or at least a conundrum. Anocracies seem to have a lower, or slower, risk of instability in the post-Cold War world. Figure 18, here, reveals another piece in the puzzle by comparing the general relationship between per capita income and regime type for the two decades just prior to and after the end of the Cold War i. Premature democratization in poorer countries poses unique challenges for the global system. Armed Conflict in Muslim Countries, With the global "War on Terrorism" transforming the Muslim World to a battle against a network of forces comprising an "Islamic State," the increasing extremist violence of the "Arab Fall" succeeds the budding aspirations of the "Arab Spring. The Non-Muslim countries include most of the Advanced Industrial Countries of Western Europe, North America, and Oceania except France, which has a large Muslim minority ; these countries experienced very little armed conflict on their territory during the contemporary period but were involved in several, major military interventions such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Vietnam, and Iraq. The Non-Muslim Countries subset accounts for nearly half the world population in The Muslim-Minority Countries account for about one-third of the world population When the global shares of global armed conflict for each of these three subsets is controlled for their relative share of the world population, a fairly stark reality is revealed that helps to account for the perception we, as observers, have of the extreme social conflict and intense political violence that has engulfed the Muslim-Majority Countries since the s. Each of the three groupings demonstrates similar trajectories until the mids, then the Muslim-Majority Countries experience a steep increase and far surpass the armed conflict levels of other two subsets of countries.

### 6: Gun Violence Trends - [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*household larceny) and types of violence (rape and sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault). Trends in other forms of violence, including intimate partner.*

State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System Place cursor on the icons on the map for a brief description of the Warfare Events Click here for a complete list of State Fragility Scores The following table lists episodes of armed conflict including 36 ongoing cases that comprise a comprehensive accounting of all forms of major armed conflicts in the world over the contemporary period: Episodes may be of any general type: Episodes are coded on a scale of one to ten according to an assessment of the full impact of their violence on the societies that directly experience their effects. The effects of political violence and warfare include fatalities and casualties, resource depletion, destruction of infrastructure, and population dislocations, among other things such as the psychological trauma to individuals and adverse changes to the social psychology and political culture of affected social identity groups. The resulting categories represent standardized event magnitudes based on levels of societal affect i. Global and regional trends in warfare are visualized graphically by aggregating the coded scores for all ongoing episodes of major armed conflict in a given year; see the CSP Conflict Trends page. For a more detailed explanation of the coding methodology, click here. Cases highlighted in red were ongoing 1n early 24 cases ; ongoing cases highlighted in orange have diminished substantially in magnitude during the six months immediately prior to the most recent update and may be ending 12 cases. All episodes that are denoted as having ended within the past five years i. Note that several revisions were made to the list in regard to episodes in Africa. Note also that several revisions were made to the list in regard to cases that previously had been included with unknown "estimates of directly-related deaths" denoted "na". As new sources of information have become available in recent years, and particularly with the expansion of Keesings Online news archives, all episodes listed as "unknown" were investigated in early to confirm or disconfirm their listing. As a result, several episodes have been delisted and some others were refined. All episodes listed now include an estimate of directly-related deaths Death. For a detailed accounting of these changes, please contact the Center for Systemic Peace. The variables listed in the "Major Episodes of Political Violence" table are as follows: Inclusive years Begin and End: The beginnings and endings of most political violence episodes are difficult to determine exactly; various researchers "pinpoint" and denote various dates. The "begin" and "end" years listed for each episode below are those considered by the author to be those most likely to capture the transformative "moments" beginning and ending of the episodes, according to a comparison of the varying claims of the sources noted. No "end" year is listed for episodes that began and ended in the same year. Episode type is listed according to two character codes. The first character denotes either a C ivil-intrastate involving rival political groups; E thnic-intrastate involving the state agent and a distinct ethnic group; or I nternational event-interstate, usually two or more states, but may denote a distinct polity resisting foreign domination colonialism. The second character connotes either an episode of V iolence-the use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals; W ar-violence between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral result to the contention; or i N dependence-an attempt to forcibly remove an existing foreign domination. Magnitude of societal-systemic impact Mag: The rationale and methodology for assessing the societal and systemic impact of warfare episodes is discussed and described in detail in the accompanying text. The number listed represents a scaled indicator of the destructive impact, or magnitude, of the violent episode on the directly-affected society or societies on a scale of 1 smallest to 10 greatest. Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity means and goals , area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. Scores are considered to be consistently assigned i. For a more detailed explanation of the coding scheme used, click here. Episode location States Directly Involved: Countries listed are only those upon whose territory the political violence episode actually takes place, that is, those state-societies directly affected by the warfare. Countries intervening in the episodes are not listed as the violence does not take place on their territory and, so, these intervening actors are considered to be indirectly,

or remotely, affected by the violence. Estimates of "directly-related" deaths Deaths: Accountings of the number of deaths resulting directly from an episode of political violence are difficult to determine and estimates often vary widely. This difficulty is especially problematic as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has grown increasingly obscure as "less formal" civil conflict interactions in less institutionalized societal systems predominate in the contemporary era. As argued in the text, such estimates of "battle-related deaths" should be regarded simply as estimates of the general magnitude of the violence. The numbers listed here reflect the median or mean of often widely disparate estimates listed in the various sources and are provided solely as a referent point. Casualties among non-combatants directly related to the violent conflict are inconsistently estimated if at all in the various source estimates. Far more problematic than "battle-related deaths" for societal systems are the much larger numbers of persons directly and indirectly, physically and psychologically, distorted and disturbed by violence during episodes of armed conflict for this we have no estimation procedure.

### 7: Gun Violence in America - [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*In order to illustrate the magnitude of everyday gun violence, Everytown has gathered the most comprehensive, publicly available data. Still, significant data gaps remain—a result of underfunded, incomplete data collection at the state and federal level.*

### 8: Violence - UNICEF DATA

*Domestic violence, as defined for this Digest, includes violence perpetrated by intimate partners and other family members, and manifested through: Physical abuse such as slapping, beating, arm twisting, stabbing, strangling, burning.*

### 9: Violence against women - Wikipedia

*Donald Trump made crime fighting an important focus of his campaign for president, and he cited it again during his January inaugural [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com) the administration takes steps to address violence in American communities, here are five facts about crime in the United States.*

*The academic draft of the CFR and the EC contract law Reiner Schulze Your smart business plan Heart of the hydra Gay Marshall Muslim communities: the pitfalls of decision-making in Canadian foreign policy Sami Aoun Bodie kane marcus investments solutions Day 22: let God rewrite the list Michelle McKinney Hammond Scrap iron destroyers 2008 National Renovation Insurance Repair Estimator (National Renovation and Insurance Repair Estimator) Automatisierung Der Justage Von Drehankerrelais (Ipa-lao Forschung Und Praxis, Band 183) The Changing face of communism in Eastern Europe. Tales of the peculiar . Cub scout meeting guide Chemical risk assessment a manual for reach Fashioning our Lermontov : canonization and conflict in the Stalinist 1930s David Powelstock Latin American Broadcasting La dama del alba The Brass Bed and Other Stories City Slicker San Diego Basket economics and political realities Generalized adaptive model and hans selye Rock glaciers and their formation as part of a glacier debris-transport system Foundations of neurobiology Section III: Contexts and variations ; 5. Creative language and social context ; 6. Creativity, discourse Loan agreement contract Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature) Hearse of a different color Curriculum development for adult learners in the global community Ohio Courts (Pearson Prentice Hall Legal) Wetlands : guarding the soul for everyones sake Chinese prison system, / Shirin Ebadi (Modern Peacemakers) Descargar the illusion of life Rhode Island day at the worlds Columbian exposition, Chicago, Illinois, October the fifth, eighteen hundr World in a Garden (Gardens by Design) U00a7 8. The Nicene Creed 24 Discharge of indebtedness Sharing sovereignty : new institutions for collapsed and failing states V. 2. Everyday chemistry Stedmans Abbreviations, Acronymns Symbols (Stedmans Word Book Series) Sermons and discourses, 1723-1729*