

1: Anna Boynton Thompson (Author of The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge)

Download link for The Unity Of Fichtes Doctrine Of Knowledge, Read File Online for The Unity Of Fichtes Doctrine Of Knowledge pdf live, Library link download The.

He was the eldest son in a family of poor and pious ribbon weavers. His extraordinary intellectual talent soon brought him to the attention of a local baron, who sponsored his education, first in the home of a local pastor, then at the famous Pforta boarding school, and finally at the universities of Jena and Leipzig. With the death of his patron, Fichte was forced to discontinue his studies and seek his livelihood as a private tutor, a profession he quickly came to detest. Following a lengthy sojourn in Zurich, where he met his future wife, Johanna Rahn, Fichte returned to Leipzig with the intention of pursuing a literary career. When his projects failed, he was again forced to survive as a tutor. It was in this capacity that he began giving lessons on the Kantian philosophy in the summer of 1794. In a few weeks Fichte composed a remarkable manuscript in which he concluded that the only revelation consistent with the Critical philosophy is the moral law itself. When the true identity of its author was revealed, Fichte was immediately catapulted from total obscurity to philosophical celebrity. Meanwhile, Fichte was once again employed as a private tutor, this time on an estate near Danzig, where he wrote several, anonymously published political tracts. The first of these was published in 1796 with the provocative title *Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the Princes of Europe, who have hitherto Suppressed it*. In this work he not only defended the principles if not all the practices of the French revolutionaries, but also attempted to outline his own democratic view of legitimate state authority and insisted on the right of revolution. While maintaining his allegiance to the new Critical or Kantian philosophy, Fichte was powerfully impressed by the efforts of K. Solomon Maimon and G. Hegel. In February and March of 1797 he gave a series of private lectures on his conception of philosophy before a small circle of influential clerics and intellectuals in Zurich. It was at this moment that he received an invitation to assume the recently vacated chair of Critical Philosophy at the University of Jena, which was rapidly emerging as the capital of the new German philosophy. Fichte arrived in Jena in May of 1797, and enjoyed tremendous popular success there for the next six years, during which time he laid the foundations and developed the first systematic articulations of his new system. Even as he was engaged in this immense theoretical labor, he also tried to address a larger, popular audience and also threw himself into various practical efforts to reform university life. Fichte wants to employ his philosophy to guide the spirit of his age. Though Fichte has already hinted at his new philosophical position in his review of G. Hegel's *Manifesto, Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre*, articulated some of the basic ideas of the new philosophy, but it mainly focused upon questions of systematic form and the relationship between philosophy and its proper object the necessary actions of the human mind. In fact, Fichte had not originally intended to publish this work at all, which was written less than a year after his first tentative efforts to articulate for himself his new conception of transcendental philosophy. The *Foundation* was originally intended to be distributed, in fascicles, to students attending his private lectures during his first two semesters at Jena, where the printed sheets could be subjected to analysis and questions and supplemented with oral explanations. In 1797 he also published a substantial supplement to the *Foundation*, under the title *Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty*. Even as he was thoroughly revising his presentation of the foundational portion of his system, Fichte was simultaneously engaged in elaborating the various subdivisions or systematic branches of the same. As was his custom, he did this first in his private lectures and then in published texts based upon the same. The first such extension was into the realm of philosophy of law and social philosophy, which resulted in the publication *Foundations of Natural Right in accordance with the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre* published in two volumes in 1797 and 1798. The second extension was into the realm of moral philosophy, which resulted in the publication of the *System of Ethics in accordance with the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre*. Fichte then planned to extend his system into the realm of philosophy of religion. The matter quickly escalated into a major public controversy which eventually led to the official suppression of the offending issue of the journal and to public threats by various German princes to prevent their students from enrolling at the University of Jena. At this point, the

Prussian capital had no university of its own, and Fichte was forced to support himself by giving private tutorials and lectures on the *Wissenschaftslehre* and by a new flurry of literary production, increasingly aimed at a large, popular audience. That same year also saw the publication of a typically bold foray into political economy, *The Closed Commercial State*, in which Fichte propounds a curious blend of socialist political ideas and autarkic economic principles. An Attempt to Force the Reader to Understand Be that as it may, Fichte never stopped trying to refine his philosophical insights and to revise his systematic presentation of the same. Thus there are more than a dozen different full-scale presentations or versions of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, most of which were written after his departure from Jena. In Fichte spend a semester as a professor at the University of Erlangen, but returned to Berlin in the fall of that year. The next year, , he published in rapid succession three popular and well-received books, all of which were based upon earlier series of public lectures that he had delivered in Berlin: Though these lectures later obtained a place of dubious honor as founding documents in the history of German nationalism, they are mainly concerned with the issue of national identity and particularly with the relationship between language and nationality and the question of national education which is the main topic of the work "both of which are understood by Fichte as means toward a larger, cosmopolitan end. Fichte had always had a lively interest in pedagogical issues and assumed a leading role in planning the new Prussian university to be established in Berlin though his own detailed plans for the same were eventually rejected in favor of those put forward by Wilhelm von Humboldt. When the new university finally opened in , Fichte was the first head of the philosophical faculty as well as the first elected rector of the university. His final years saw no diminishment in the pace either of his public activity or of his philosophical efforts. From his wife, who was serving as a volunteer nurse in a Berlin military hospital, he contracted a fatal infection of which he died on January 29, He thus insisted that there is no conflict between transcendental idealism and the commonsense realism of everyday life. On the contrary, the whole point of the former is to demonstrate the necessity and unavailability of the latter. Taking to heart the criticisms of such contemporaries as F. Jacobi, Salomon Maimon, and G. Schulze, Fichte propounded a radically revised version of the Critical philosophy. His study of the writings of K. Not only would such a strategy guarantee the systematic unity of philosophy itself, but, more importantly, it would also display what Kant hinted at but never demonstrated: To the extent that any proposed first principle of philosophy is supposed to be the first principle of all knowledge and hence of all argument, it clearly cannot be derived from any higher principle and hence cannot be established by any sort of reasoning. Though Fichte conceded that neither dogmatism nor idealism could directly refute its opposite and thus recognized that the choice between philosophical starting points could never be resolved on purely theoretical grounds, he nevertheless denied that any dogmatic system, that is to say, any system that commences with the concept of sheer objectivity, could ever succeed in accomplishing what was required of all philosophy. To be sure, one cannot decide in advance whether or not any such deduction of experience from the mere concept of free self-consciousness is actually possible. This, Fichte conceded, is something that can be decided only after the construction of the system in question. Until then, it remains a mere hypothesis that the principle of human freedom, for all of its practical certainty, is also the proper starting point for a transcendental account of objective experience. Systematic Overview of the Jena *Wissenschaftslehre* 4. The principle in question simply states that the essence of I-hood lies in the assertion of ones own self-identity, i. The occurrence of such an original intellectual intuition is itself inferred, not intuited. Thus the problematic unity of theoretical and practical reason is guaranteed from the start, inasmuch as this very unity is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. Furthermore, though we must, due to the discursive character of reflection itself, distinguish each of these acts from the others that it is conditioned by and that are, in turn, conditioned by it, none of these individual acts actually occurs in isolation from all of the others. Transcendental philosophy is thus an effort to analyze what is in fact the single, synthetic act through which the I posits for itself both itself and its world, thereby becoming aware in a single moment of both its freedom and its limitations, its infinity and its finitude. Despite widespread misunderstanding of this point, the *Wissenschaftslehre* is not a theory of the absolute I. Moreover, it cannot even posit for itself its own limitations, in the sense of producing or creating these limits. The finite I the intellect cannot be the ground of its own passivity. Such an original limitation of the I is, however, a limit for the I only insofar as the I posits it

as such. Accordingly, there are strict limits to what can be expected from any a priori deduction of experience. According to Fichte, transcendental philosophy can explain, for example, why the world has a spatio-temporal character and a causal structure, but it can never explain why objects have the particular sensible properties they happen to have or why I am this determinate individual rather than another. This is something that the I simply has to discover at the same time that it discovers its own freedom, and indeed, as a condition for the latter. This however is certainly not the case. Despite this important stricture on the scope of transcendental philosophy, there remains much that can be demonstrated within the foundational portion of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. For example, it can be shown that the I could not become conscious of its own limits in the manner required for the possibility of any self-consciousness unless it also possessed an original and spontaneous ability to synthesize the finite and the infinite. In this sense, the *Wissenschaftslehre* deduces the power of productive imagination as an original power of the mind. The foundational portion of the *Wissenschaftslehre* thus also includes a deduction of the categorical imperative albeit in a particularly abstract and morally empty form and of the practical power of the I. On the contrary, a finite free self must constantly strive to transform both the natural and the human worlds in accordance with its own freely-positing goals. The sheer unity of the self, which was posited as the starting point of the Foundations, is thereby transformed into an idea of reason in the Kantian sense: The closest he ever came to developing a philosophy of nature according to transcendental principles is the compressed account of space, time, and matter presented in the *Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty* and the lectures on *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*. Whereas theoretical philosophy explains how the world necessarily is, practical philosophy explains how the world ought to be, which is to say, how it ought to be altered by rational beings. Ethics thus considers the object of consciousness not as something given or even as something constructed by necessary laws of consciousness, but rather as something to be produced by a freely acting subject, consciously striving to establish and to accomplish its own goals and guided only by its own self-legislated laws. From this starting point Fichte then proceeds to a deduction of the principle of morality: On the other hand, this is not the only way the world can be viewed, and, more specifically, it is not the only way in which it is construed by transcendental philosophy. In this portion of the system the world is considered neither as it simply is nor as it simply ought to be; instead, either the practical realm of freedom is viewed from the theoretical perspective of the natural world in which case one considers the postulates that theoretical reason addresses to practical reason or else, alternatively, the natural world is viewed from the perspective of practical reason or the moral law in which case one considers the postulates that practical reason addresses to theoretical reason. The same condition applies, of course, to the other; hence, mutual recognition of rational individuals turns out to be condition necessary for the possibility of I-hood in general. The theory of right examines how the freedom of each individual must be externally limited if a free society of free and equal individuals is to be possible. Unlike Kant, Fichte does not treat political philosophy merely as a subdivision of moral theory. On the contrary, it is an independent philosophical discipline with a topic and a priori principles of its own. Whereas ethics analyzes the concept of what is demanded of a freely willing subject, the theory of right describes what such a subject is permitted to do as well as what he can rightfully be coerced to do. Whereas ethics is concerned with the inner world of conscience, the theory of right is concerned only with the external, public realm, though only insofar as the latter can be viewed as an embodiment of freedom. On purely a priori grounds, therefore, Fichte purports to be able to determine the general requirements of such a community and the sole justification for legitimate political coercion and obligation. Fichte presents an a priori argument for the fundamentally social character of human beings, an argument grounded upon an analysis of the very structure of self-consciousness and the requirements for self-positing. The latter is the domain of the transcendental philosophy of religion, which is concerned solely with the question of the extent to which the realm of nature can be said to accommodate itself to the aims of morality. The questions dealt with within such a philosophy of religion are those concerning the nature, limits, and legitimacy of our belief in divine providence. The philosophy of religion, as conceived by Fichte, has nothing to do with the historical claims of revealed religion or with particular religious traditions and practices. But this is about as far as it can go. Neglected as the *Wissenschaftslehre* may have been during this period, Fichte

was not entirely forgotten, but remained influential as the author of the Addresses to the German Nation and was alternately hailed and vilified as one of the founders of modern pan-German nationalism. Particularly during the long periods preceding, during, and following the two World Wars, Fichte was discussed almost exclusively in the context of German politics and national identity, and his technical philosophy tended to be dismissed as a monstrous or comical speculative aberration of no relevance whatsoever to contemporary philosophy. But the real boom in Fichte studies has come only in the past four decades, during which the Wissenschaftslehre has once again become the object of intense philosophical scrutiny and lively, world-wide discussion—as is evidenced by the establishment of large and active professional societies devoted to Fichte in Europe, Japan, and North America. Much of the best recent work on Fichte, particularly in Germany, Italy, and Japan, has been devoted exclusively to his later thought. But it is also a reflection of the relatively anemic tradition of Fichte scholarship in England and North America, where even the early Wissenschaftslehre has long been neglected and under-appreciated. This situation, however, has fundamentally altered, and some of the most insightful and original current work on Fichte is being done in English. Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Frommann, 42 volumes.

2: The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge

The unity of Fichte's doctrine of knowledge and millions of other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Learn more Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App.

Although Fichte admits such dualism in our cognition, he insists that we can and must rise above it. He thinks that human thought is essentially unitary and that the great task of philosophy is to achieve this unity. Taber ; Pippin As such it includes a number of recognizable features of Kantian project: In this sense, his starting point is Kantian because he seeks to find out the necessary conditions making experience possible. The organization of the Wissenschaftslehre clearly signifies that his attempt to fashion a scientific philosophy is not taken into account as a mere attempt which is based upon theoretical interest. The scientific philosophy Fichte seeks consists of the systematic connection between theoretical and practical moral philosophy. Like Kant, Fichte gives the primacy to practical reason and regards philosophy, or Wissenschaftslehre, as a moral project, not finally, as a mere theoretical discipline alone Breazeale, Fichte thinks that human thought is essentially unitary and that the great task of philosophy is to achieve this unity. By introducing the I as a fundamental ground of experience Fichte tries to reconcile the unity of the dualism s in question. Idealism and Dogmatism Now the problem for Fichte is to provide a scientific explanation of the possibility of experience on the ground of the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy Breazeale, How can a rational being inquire into grounds of experience? Thanks to philosophical reflections we can see the two aspects of experience, the objective and the subjective, the thing that is known and the intelligence that knows: The philosopher can leave one of the two out of consideration, and he has then abstracted from experience and raised himself above it. If he leaves out the former, he retains an intelligence in itself, that is, abstracted from its relation to experience, as a basis for explaining experience; if he leaves out the latter, he retains a thing-in-itself, that is, abstracted from the fact that it occurs in experience, as a similar basis of explanation. The first method of procedure is called idealism, the second dogmatism Fichte, Given the way Fichte sets up the argument, there are only two possible ways of abstracting and thus two possible philosophical systems. A philosopher abstracts either from the thing-in-itself or from the intelligence-in-itself the self-in-itself Fichte, The philosopher abstracting from the thing-in- itself is called dogmatist, while the philosopher abstracting from the self-in- itself is called idealist. Every consistent philosophy, Fichte says, is either idealism or dogmatism. In either case the task of a consistent philosophy is the same: That is to say, each of these philosophical systems deals with one of these two aspects of experience, the intelligence-in-itself and the thing-in-itself, and seeks to deduce life and consciousness from it. While idealism takes the intelligence- in- itself, or the I, as its single self evident principle, dogmatism takes the thing- in-itself as its supposed principle. By taking the thing-in-itself as its starting point dogmatism seeks to explain the existence and nature of consciousness. In so doing, dogmatism is attempting the impossible: Dogmatism, Fichte says, explains experience as the product, or effect of the thing-in-itself Fichte, He could refute only on the basis of the postulate of freedom and independence of the self; but it is precisely this that he denies Fichte, Briefly, since dogmatism explains experience as the product, or effect of the thing-in-itself, Fichte claims, a consistent dogmatist is both a fatalist and materialist because he denies the independent reality of consciousness and thus the reality of human freedom. What it must explain is experience, or the system of presentations accompanied by the feeling of necessity. That is to say, a dogmatist cannot show how presentations and our consciousness thereof can be produced by the causal interaction of things. The dogmatist, giving primacy to the thing-in-itself, has experience as the thing affects the passive intellect. In other words, Fichte claims that dogmatism is utterly unable to bridge the gulf between presentations and things. The dogmatist is required to call the principle of causality in order to explain how the things affect the passive intellect and lead to presentations. Fichte says that in dogmatism the thing and intellect are radically distinct, and that causality is unable to operate from thing to intellect Fichte, Rather, his objection to dogmatism is that the dogmatic account is unintelligible because, for the dogmatist, presentation comes through causation. But Fichte insists upon the existence upon freedom of the mind and the will Fichte, Dogmatic account of presentation is unintelligible because

dogmatists have no sense of independence or freedom of mind and that of will. Briefly stated, Fichte sees dogmatism as the real ground of the insurmountable dualisms of philosophy. After arguing that the dogmatic account of experience is unintelligible, Fichte claims that dogmatism is not a philosophy, but only a feeble affirmation and assertion and thus that idealism remains as the only possible philosophy. Unlike dogmatism, idealism begins with an active intellect or intellectual intuition. The presupposition of idealism will, therefore, be as follows: If we think of this necessary way of action itself, we shall call it, most appropriately, the law of action: As opposed to the starting point of dogmatism, namely, the thing-in-itself, the starting point of idealism is not something outside of the intellect. Rather, it is the action of the intellect itself. Through this action the active intellect posits freely its own laws: Transcendental idealism starts with the I, not experience because the activity of the I, or the intellect, posits experience. Consciousness is nothing but this experience. The whole aim of the Wissenschaftslehre therefore is to identify the first principle of the Science of Knowledge with the unity of subject and object in consciousness. According to Fichte, the first principle, or the I is an Act. It expresses what Fichte believes to be the supreme act of the mind in which the I is simultaneously subject and object. As we have seen, Fichte argues that every consciousness involves an awareness of the I. This awareness can be discovered by a philosophical analysis of consciousness. With the analysis of this universally affirmative judgment Fichte aims at showing the fundamental principle of all consciousness: By his discussion of the law of identity Fichte claims that all affirmative judgments imply the self-positing of the I. The thought that every act of judgment involves the assertion of the I is not original to Fichte. In his deduction of the categories from the transcendental unity of apperception Kant stated the same thought. But Kant, as Fichte says, was not the first who stated the truth of this thought. By this claim Fichte means that the category of reality is given by this self-affirmation of the I. Since reality of things is given in self-affirmation of the I, self-consciousness must be our starting point. But in consciousness judgment has not only an affirmative aspect but also a negative aspect. This is primary act of the I. It is clear that 1 and 2 are in opposition to each other. The Doctrine of the Check Now the problem for Fichte is to show how the I and the Non-I are to be harmonized in the unity of consciousness. To say that the thing before me is not computer is to exclude one possibility but it leaves many others open. The thing before me may be a book, or be a pencil, be a cup, or be a table etc. But to say that it is red and long thing is to destroy many possibilities. This effectiveness of affirmative judgments leads Fichte to assert that the fundamental characteristic of thought is affirmation, not negation. The I posits itself as determined by the Non-I. This proposition is problematic because it seems to involve both activity and passivity of the I at the same time. When we say that the I posits itself we refer to activity of the I. But when we say that the I posits itself as determined by the Non-I we refer to passivity of the I. In his reconciling these two I's Fichte seems not only to fail but also to meet a new kind of opposition by representing both the I as active and the I as passive. Fichte tries to solve this problem by his doctrine of check. He says [A]ll that is required, if I may so put it, is the presence of a check on the self, that is, for some reason that lies merely outside the self activity, the subjective must be extendable no further. Such an impossibility of further would then delimit it; it would not set bounds to the activity of the self, but would give it the task of setting bounds to itself. But all delimitation occurs through an opposite, hence the self simply to do justice to this task, would have to oppose something objective to the subjective that calls for limitation, and then synthetically them both. It will at once be apparent that this mode of explanation is a realistic one; for it presupposes neither a not-self present apart from the self, nor even a determination present within the self, but merely the requirement for a determination to be undertaken within it by the self as such, or the mere determinability of the self. We must take the check as a limitation because check refers to nothing but to the activity of the I which is unable to extend further. But this limitation is not an external limitation. Rather, it is a limitation which is posited by the I itself. The role of check as a limitation has a crucial implication concerning the meaning of freedom in the Wissenschaftslehre. The I can posit itself insofar as it posits itself as limited and divided against itself. So, in the Wissenschaftslehre, only limited freedom of the I is possible when it posits itself. The other role Fichte ascribes to check is the role of stimulus. We must take the check as a stimulus because it is the possibility of the further activity of the I. Fichte explains this role more clearly when he says, The check occurs to the self

insofar as it is active, and is thus only a check insofar as there is activity in the self. Moreover, no self-determination, no objective, etc. The moral of the story is that the Non-I is recognized by the I as its own product. Thus Fichte overcomes the difficulty of reconciling the I and Non-I by stating the Non-I as a product of the self-determination of the I itself. According to him, there is two fold activity of the I – one centrifugal or outward-going and the other centripetal. Such a twofold activity can be stated as follows: In the practical part of the *Wissenschaftslehre* the opposition between the I and the Non-I appears as an opposition between the I as intelligence the finite I and the I as absolute the infinite I Fichte, The I as intellectual intuition is only for the philosopher, while the I as Idea is present for the I itself, which the philosopher studies. The I as Idea hereafter, the Ideal I is the rational being, partly insofar as it has exhibited universal reason perfectly within itself, is indeed rational throughout, and nothing else but rational: The world in this Idea remains a world in general, a substrate governed by these particular mechanical and organic laws: The Ideal I is rational and an infinite being. Now the problem for Fichte is to explain how to reconcile the infinite I and the finite I in the unity of the I. Since the Ideal I is an infinite being, Fichte says, it can never be realized by any finite being, or by any system of finite beings. Though Fichte believes that the Ideal I can never be realized, he insists on the possibility of progress; that is to say, we can approximate to the Ideal I, even though we can never reach it.

3: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

Outline of the Doctrine of Knowledge The whole of this essay is reproduced. THE Doctrine of Knowledge, apart from all special and definite knowing, proceeds immediately upon Knowledge itself, in the essential unity in which it recognises Knowledge as existing; and it raises this question in the first place - How this Knowledge can come into being, and what it is in its inward and essential Nature? The following must be apparent: He can neither change nor determine himself in aught within himself, nor become any other Being; for his Being contains within it all his Being and all possible Being, and neither within him nor out of him can any new Being arise. But such a Manifestation is a picture or Schema. If there be such a Schema - and this can only become evident through its immediate being, seeing that it is immediate - it can only be because God is; and, so surely as God is, it cannot but be. It is, however, by no means to be conceived of as a work of God, effected by some particular act, whereby a change is wrought in himself; but it is to be conceived of as an immediate consequence of his Being. It is absolutely, according to the Form of his Being, just as he himself is absolutely; although it is not he himself, but his Schema. It is of course understood that this ground is not to be derived from any outward source, but must be shown to be contained in the essential Nature of Knowledge itself as such; - and that therefore this problem, although apparently two-fold, is yet but one and the same, - namely, to set forth the essential Nature of Knowledge. This Being out of God cannot, by any means, be a limited, completed, and inert Being, since God himself is not such a dead Being, but, on the contrary, is Life; - but it can only be a Power, since only a Power is the true formal picture or Schema of Life. And indeed it can only be the Power of realising that which is contained in itself - a Schema. Since this Power is the expression of a determinate Being - the Schema of the Divine Life - it is itself determined; but only in the way in which an absolute Power may be determined, - by laws, and indeed by determinate laws. If this or that is to become actual, the Power must operate in this way or that, subject to that determination. Thus in the first place - There can be an Actual Being out of God only through the self-realisation of this absolute Power: Thus, whatever exists out of God, exists only by means of absolutely free Power, as the Knowledge belonging to this Power, and in its Knowledge; - and any other Being but this out of the true Being which lies hidden in God is altogether impossible. Again, as to the determination of this Power by laws: But it is essential to Actual Knowledge that some particular Schema should be realised through this Power; and then that through the same identical Power, in the same identical position, this Schema should be recognised as a Schema, and as a Schema not in itself independent, but demanding, as a condition of its Existence, a Being out of itself The immediate and concrete expression of this recognition, - which in Actual Knowledge never attains to consciousness, but which is elevated into consciousness only by means of the Doctrine of Knowledge, is Actual Knowledge itself in its Form; and, in consequence of this latter recognition, there is, of necessity, assumed an Objective Reality, wholly transcending the Schema and independent of Knowledge. Since in this knowledge of the Objective Reality, even the Schema itself is concealed, much more is the Power which creates it concealed and unseen. This is the fundamental law of the Form of Knowledge. So surely therefore as the Power develops itself in this particular way, it develops itself as we have described; not merely schematising, but also schematising the Schema as a Schema, and recognising it in its dependent nature; - not that it must unconditionally do this, but that only by means of this process can it attain to Actual Knowledge. In consequence of this there is much that remains invisible in Actual Knowledge, but which, nevertheless, really is as the manifestation of this Power. If therefore this, and all other manifestation of this Power, were to be imported into Knowledge, then could this only occur in a Knowledge other than that first mentioned; and thus would the unity of Knowledge necessarily be broken up into separate parts, by the opposition of the law of the form of visibility to that law by which Knowledge perceives itself as a perfect and indivisible whole. It shall recognise itself as the Schema of the Divine Life, which it is originally, and through which alone it has

Existence; - consequent]y this is its absolute vocation, in which its efficiency as a Power is completely exhausted. It shall recognise itself as the Schema of the Divine Life, - but it is originally nothing more than a Power, although most assuredly it is this determinate Power of the Schema of God: The recognition of itself as a Power to which an unconditional Imperative is addressed, and which is able to fulfil that Imperative, and the actual realisation of this Power, should the latter come to pass, are distinct from each other; and the possibility of the latter is dependent on the previous accomplishment of the former. It shall recognise itself as the Divine Schema, not by means of any Being inherent in itself, for there is no such Being, but by means of the realisation of the Power. It must therefore previously possess the knowledge that it is such a Power, and also by what marks it may recognise itself in its self-realisation, in order that it may direct its attention to these characteristic marks, and so be enabled to judge of the realisation which they denote. Or it may be regarded thus - By means of the realisation of the Power there arises a Schema, and a consciousness of that which is contained in the Schema, and not more than this. The formal addition, which lies beyond the immediate contents of the Schema, - ie. The characteristic mark is this - that the Power realize itself, with absolute Freedom, in accordance with the recognised universal Imperative. If it shall recognise itself as a Power to which an unconditional Imperative is addressed, it must, previous to this definite recognition, have also recognised itself generally as a Principle; - and since it can only recognise itself by means of its own self-development, it must necessarily develop itself before being able to recognise itself immediately as the Principle in this development. The necessity for this is contained in the intuition that the Imperative shall become visible to it; and it may therefore be named a necessity of the Imperative - a shall of the shall - namely, a necessity of its visibility: Since, when it does not recognise itself generally as a Principle, it cannot, in the same position and at the same time, recognise itself in any more definite form, it is clear that these two modes of Knowledge are separate and distinct from each other. We call Knowledge by means of an immediate invisible principle - Intuition. Since neither the Power itself as such, nor the Divine Life, is schematised in Intuition, by which indeed there is first introduced the practical possibility of such schematising, it is clear that there is nothing left remaining in Intuition but the mere Form of Power as given in its immediate expression. It therefore schematises itself as contemplating an infinity in one glance: In order to schematise itself as such in Intuition, it must antecedent to its actual activity, perceive a possible form of activity which - thus it must seem to it - it either might or might not be able to realize. This possible form of activity cannot be perceived by it in the Absolute Imperative, which to this point of view is invisible; hence it can only be perceived in a likewise blindly schematised Causality, which indeed is not an immediate Causality but only appears to become so through the apparent realisation of the Power. But such a Causality is an Instinct. It was necessary that the Power should feel itself impelled to this or that form of activity, but without the source of the impulse being immediately perceived, since such an immediate recognition would deprive it of the appearance of Freedom, which is here an indispensable characteristic. This activity demanded by Instinct can only be an activity exercised on the Material World. Hence the Instinct to activity comes into view in immediate relation to material existences; these are consequently recognised in this immediate relation, and acquire, through this relation, not merely extension in Space, but, even more, their internal qualities: Should the Power, by means of this Instinct and the consequent appearance of self-determination, perceive itself as in a state of real activity, then, in the perception of this activity, it would be associated with the Material World in the same undivided Form of Intuition; and hence in this Intuition, thus uniting it with the Material World, it would perceive itself as a material existence in a double relation to the Material World: In this activity it now beholds itself as the same identical Power in a state of self-determination; but as not exhausted in any form of its activity, and as thus remaining a Power ad infinitum. In this perception of its unlimited Power there arises before it an Infinity; not in one glance, like that first mentioned, but an Infinity in which it may behold its own infinite activity; - an infinite series of successive links: Since this activity can be exercised ad infinitum only on the Material World, Time is likewise transferred to that world in the unity of Intuition, although that world already possesses its own peculiar expression of Infinitude in the infinite divisibility of SPACE and of all its parts. It is obvious that the position in which the Power gives itself up wholly to the contemplation of the Material World and is exhausted therein, is distinct from that in which it becomes cognisant of its Instinct towards activity in

this previously recognised World, - that nevertheless there remains, even in the latter position, a Schema of present and necessary Existence, in order that it may be possible for the Instinct to enter into relations with such Existence: This whole domain of Intuition is, as we said, the expression and Schema of mere Power. Since Power, without the Schema of the Divine Life, is nothing, while here it is nevertheless schematised in this its nothingness, - this whole domain is consequently nothing in itself, and only in its relation to Actual Being does it acquire significance, the practical possibility of the latter being dependent upon it. There is further contained in the Power an original determination to raise itself to the perception of the Imperative, the practical realisation of which is now rendered immediately possible by the recognised Existence of the whole domain of Intuition. But how and in what way can this elevation be accomplished? That which abides firmly in Intuition, and is indeed the very root of it, is Instinct; - by its means the Power itself is made dependent on Intuition, and is imprisoned within it. The condition and the only means for the now possible realisation of the Power, is therefore the liberation of itself from Instinct, and the abolition of the latter as the invisible and blind impulse of schematising, - and in the abolition of the principle, the consequence of it - imprisonment in Intuition - is likewise abolished. Knowledge would then stand forth in its primitive unity, as it is perceived at first by the Doctrine of Knowledge; - in this its essential unity it would manifest itself as dependent, and as requiring a substratum - a unity which shall exist absolutely through itself. Knowledge in this form is no longer Intuition, but Thought; - and indeed Pure Thought, or Intelligising. Before proceeding further, we must from this central point indicate a distinction hitherto unnoticed in the sphere of Intuition. Only through blind Instinct, in which the only possible guidance of the Imperative is wanting, does the Power in Intuition remain undetermined; where it is schematised as absolute it becomes infinite; and where it is presented in a determinate form, as a principle, it becomes at least manifold. By the above-mentioned act of Intelligising, the Power liberates itself from Instinct, to direct itself towards Unity. But so surely as it requires a special act for the production of this Unity, - in the first place indeed inwardly and immediately within the Power itself, because only under this condition could it be outwardly perceived in the Schema, - so surely was the Power not viewed as One in the sphere of Intuition, but as Manifold; - this Power, which now through perception and recognition of itself has become an Ego - an Individual, - was, in this sphere, not one Individual, but necessarily broken up into a world of Individuals. This indeed does not occur in the Form of Intuition itself. The original schematising principle, and the principle which recognises this Schema immediately and in the very act of its production as a Schema, are of necessity numerically one, not two; and thus also, in the domain of Intuition, that which immediately contemplates its Intuition is a single, self-inclosed, separate principle, in this respect inaccessible to any other: But this separation of Individuals must certainly take place in that Form in which alone unity also is produced, - namely, in that of Thought; - hence the individuality we have described, however isolated it may appear in the immediate Intuition of itself, yet, when it comprehends itself in Thought, perceives itself, in this Thought, as an Individual in a world of Individuals like itself; which latter, since it cannot behold them as free principles like itself in immediate Intuition, can only be recognised by it as such, by an inference from the mode of their activity in the World of Sense. From this farther definition of the sphere of Intuition - that in it the Principle, which through its Being in God is One, is broken up into Many - there follows yet another. This division, even in the One Thought, and the mutual recognition, which nevertheless is necessarily found in connection with it, would not be possible were not the Object of the Intuition and of the Activity of all, one and the same, - a like World to them all. The Intuition of a World of Sense existed only in order that through this World the Ego might become visible to itself as standing under the Law of an Absolute Imperative. For this nothing more was necessary than that the Intuition of such a World should simply be; - the manner of its being is absolutely of no importance, since for this purpose any form of it is sufficient. But the Ego must besides recognise itself as One in a given Multiplicity of Individuals; - and to this end it is necessary, besides the general determinations of the World of Sense already mentioned, that this World should be the same to each beholder: By it Knowledge is perceived as its only possible Schema of the Divine Life. In this Thought I do not possess knowledge immediately, but only in a Schema; still less do I possess in it the Divine Life immediately, but only in a Schema of the Schema, - in a doubly ineffectual conception. I reflect, - and a power of so reflecting must, for the reason to be given presently, be

contained in the general Power, - I reflect that I perceive this Knowledge; that therefore I can perceive it; that since, according to the insight thus obtained, Knowledge is the expression of God, this Power itself is likewise his expression; that the Power exists only that it may be realised; and that consequently, in virtue of my Being from God, I shall perceive it. Only by means of this reflection do I arrive at the insight that I shall, absolutely: The whole sphere which we have now described thus reveals itself as an Imperative of perception- - that I, - the Principle already perceived in the sphere of Intuition, - that I shall. In it, the Ego, which through. This Knowledge, by means of a Principle which is immediately visible as a Principle, is Pure Thought, as we said; - in contradistinction to that by means of an immediate invisible Principle - Intuition. These two, Pure Thought and Intuition, are thus distinguished from each other in this, - that the latter, even in its very principle, is abolished and annihilated by the former. Their connection, on the other hand, consists in this, - that the latter is a condition of the practical possibility of the former, - also that the Ego which appears in the latter, still remains in the former in its mere Schema, and is there taken into account, although in its Actuality it is abolished along with Instinct. In the thought thus described I merely conceive of Knowledge as that which may be the Schema of divine Life, and, - since this possibility is the expression of God and is thus founded in Being, - as that which shall be the Schema of the Divine Life; - but I myself by no means am this. To be this actually no outward power can compel me; as before no outward power could compel me even to realise the Intuition of the true Material World, or to elevate myself to Pure Thought, and therefore to an actual although empty insight into the absolutely formal Imperative. This remains in my own power; but now, since all the practical conditions are fulfilled, it stands immediately in power. If, setting aside on the one hand mere void Intuition, and on the other empty Intelligising, I should now, with absolute freedom and independence of these, realise my Power, what would ensue? A Schema; - a Knowledge therefore which, through Intelligising, I already know as the Schema of God; but which, in the knowledge thus realised, immediately appears to me as that which I absolutely shall; - a Knowledge, the substance of which proceeds neither from the World of Sense, for this is abolished, - nor from contemplation of the mere empty Form of Knowledge, for this too I have cast aside; - but which exists through absolutely as it is, just as the Divine Life, whose Schema it is, is through itself absolutely as it is. I know now that I shall. But all Actual Knowledge brings with it, by its formal nature, its schematised apposition; - although I now know of the Schema of God, yet I am not yet immediately this Schema, but I am only a Schema of the Schema. The required Being is not yet realised. Who is this I? Evidently that which is, - the Ego given in Intuition, the Individual. What does its Being signify? It is given as a Principle in the World of Sense. Blind Instinct is indeed annihilated, and in its place there now stands the clearly perceived Shall. But the Power that at first set this Instinct in motion remains, in order that the Shall may now set it the Power in motion, and become its higher determining Principle. By means of this Power, I shall therefore, within its sphere, - the World of Sense, - produce and make manifest that which I recognise as my true Being in the Supersensuous World. The Power is given as an Infinite; - hence that which in the World of Thought is absolutely One - that which I shall - becomes in the World of Intuition an infinite problem for my Power, which I have to solve in all Eternity. This Infinitude, which is properly a mere indefiniteness, can have place only in Intuition, but by means in my true Essential Being, which, as the Schema of God, is as simple and unchangeable as himself. How then can this simplicity and unchangeableness be produced within the yet continuing Infinitude, which is expressly consecrated by the absolute Shall addressed to me as an Individual? If, in the onflow of Time, the Ego, in every successive moment, had to determine itself by a particular act, through the conception of what it shall, - then in its original Unity, it was assuredly indeterminate, and only continuously determinable in an Infinite Time. But such an act of determination could only become possible in Time, in opposition to some resisting power. This resisting power, which was thus to be conquered by the act of determination, could be nothing else than the Sensuous Instinct; and hence the necessity of such a continuous self-determination in Time would be the sure proof that the Instinct was not yet thoroughly abolished; which abolition we have made a condition of entering upon the Life in God. Through the actual and complete annihilation of the Instinct, that infinite determinability is itself annihilated and absorbed in a single, absolute determination.

4: Johann Gottlieb Fichte - Wikipedia

Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge upon which the writer is at work. It was read before the Graduate Philosophical Seminary of Harvard University in the winter of

Final version published in: Wolfgang Janke gives a good outlook of the consolidation of both traditions in the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th through the readings of: Fichte's Leben, Werke und Lehre. Schelling, Hegel und Fichte's ungeschriebene Lehre. Amsterdam, New York, Rodopi, p. Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, E. This paper is a kind of a topographic exploration of the conceptual landscape of the Wissenschaftslehre. In this philosophy of philosophy, many definitions of the activity of philosophizing are brought forward. The list could go on and on. But independently of those contrasts, there is an underlying similitude in all of these formulas: He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: But what exactly does it mean? And, last but not least, what does it mean to orchestrate these three activities? The word Wissen, as an important commentator of Fichte has remarked, is an etymological derivative of the Indic word Veda, which means vision. In effect, it actually touches on one of the most important conceptual displacements operated by Fichte in Kantian philosophy: A progressive replacement of the term Erkenntnis by the term Wissen in the discussions concerning knowledge is a sign of this quest for a new notion of thinking. De Gruyter, 24th ed. This alternative kind of thinking, more closely related to vision than to judgement or concept in the discursive sense of concept, could thus be called intuitive thinking anschauendes Denken inasmuch as the term Anschauung intuition derives from anschauen, which means to look. Those researches introduce thus the notion of Wissen as the concept to be attached to a peculiar kind of knowledge in action in philosophy. The transition from the question of Erkenntnis to the one of Wissen in Reinhold is thus closely related to the transition of the question of the possibility of science to the question of the possibility of philosophy as such, including critical philosophy. Die Kategorien des Aristoteles, p. From that perspective, acquiring knowledge means to discover that what appears as given is a concrete visible trace of a certain deployment of cognitive activities; knowledge thus being produced not when a connection is established between what is said and what is given, but rather when what is given is grasped as a result of a genetic process that made it come into being. In effect, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had famously affirmed that all questions of philosophy could be brought back to three: Thus, while preserving the interrogative pronoun what, Kant implements three fundamental changes: Fichte, while agreeing that knowledge is more closely related to verbs than to nouns as well as closer to the limits of the subjective actions than to the essential properties of objects, adds that it would be necessary to substitute How-questions for What-questions. And, moreover, how do I come to know them as limits? Pure Logic "determines how objects are possible. The central difference lies in the question whether Pure Logic is to be taken as self-evident or as something requiring a philosophical genesis: The plasticity of the Kantian text allows certainly more systematic and so to say more Fichtean explorations, according to which the forms of judgement would be functions of the self-determination of the understanding and they could thus be traced back to the principle of apperception cf. To see its own seeing, to know, means to mobilise all the power of attention so as to see deep in the schemes operating behind the formulation of judgements and behind the very constitution of consciousness; it is only then that we will be able to recognize the activity of our own cognitive activities as a determinant operator in the delimitation of the visual field in which objects can arise. As Asmuth puts it: This Fichtean notion of knowing implies thus a change of posture with regard to the knower. Indeed, when facing an object, what we shall do in order to know it, is not to describe its external appearance or to judge its legitimacy, but rather to look for its genetic origin that makes it appear that way. In this manner, when facing what I see as my body, or as an exterior object, or as another being like me, the question would be: The activity of knowing is thus much less interested in those things that appear to be given, than in the processes generating any given by operating what we could call declensions of seeing: This notion of knowing articulates a double tradition in philosophy: Paris, Gallimard, p. In effect, the as here captures precisely the declension operated by vision, showing, thus, that what is there can be taken as the declension of

a unity. Transforming the as Als into a key concept is a way of bringing together the epistemic problem of the subject-object relation with the ontological problem of the relation of unity- multiplicity. Knowledge Wissen would thus be this ultimate articulation of subjectivity- objectivity and unity-diversity of which we can have a visual grasp, an insight, but whose effective achievement would depend on the production of a complete consciousness comprising of all schemes that conditions the very constitution of consciousness, that is, the identification of the whole visual field of objects within the subjective field of spiritual activities "as Fichte remains realistic concerning human finitude, this indication remains an imperative whose total achievement is but inconceivable. To know is in that sense to strive in the direction of an unachievable horizon of the total identification of the activity of human spirit, its seeing, and the specific field that it generates without knowing, the field in which seen objects arise "the identification of the projection of the image and the result of the projection, of the spirit and the letter it generates. The Complete Works of Aristotle, V. Beginning with the Grundlage "which reconstructs the whole deduction of the categories from the activity of the schaffende Einbildungskraft productive imagination "erzeugen, to produce erschaffen to create , bilden to form will thereafter be explicitly identified as the operations mediating the passage from vision to language There is a natural gap between the correlates of our concepts and the genesis through which they come into being; in fact, as Fichte puts it, it is not a natural tendency of the human spirit to see objects as the result of a genesis to be unveiled "we tend rather to see what is there as a non-genetic given Now if we are to produce Wissen, to produce knowledge, it is important to use all the tools we possess in order to establish the naturally cut link between genesis and result, between spirit and letter. The introduction of the notion of Wissen "understood as an activity aimed at grasping the very activities through which what is taken as a given is unconsciously generated "poses thus a major problem for philosophical language, namely: If, once we talk, we transform what we say into objects, then what new relation to language is to be entertained by a knowledge whose aim is not to represent an object, but to grasp the very activities thanks to which the field of possible objects is first to be constituted? Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, , pp. The compilation of the notes of the lectures on theoretical and practical philosophy gave origin to the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre cf. I a new conception of practical and theoretical knowledge in which II creativity acquires a fundamental role in face of the limits of language that requires, as we would like to argue, III a pedagogical conception of philosophy. Doing philosophy as conceptual polyglot is a way of avoiding that the letter could reproduce itself without spirit, without the schaffende Einbildungskraft that animates it. In this creative experience what is important is not as much as to possess a conceptual framework capable of organizing experience according to, say, certain laws of organization of the given, but rather to push spirit towards the production of concepts capable of establishing the missing link between what appears as a given and their genesis in the human spirit. In effect, just as much as thinking is not reducible to judgment, philosophy the Wissenschaftslehre is not reducible to a piece of written work; it is related to much vaster regions of spirit, some of them remaining inaccessible to discourse. This means not only taking into account the gap between words and the production of knowing, but as well as considering the anchorage of those words in certain intellectual contexts; when conceptual production loses connection with its temporal and spatial roots, it follows a systematic reproduction of ancient schemes of knowledge with the result that one becomes unable to see the genesis of her own field of experience. In effect, he dedicates to it three sets of conferences, one in each period of his intellectual development: Here again, it would be fruitful to explore how these presentations change according to the metamorphosis of his conceptual background. However, following the path of the argument here developed, I would like to highlight a certain underlying similitude, expressed in the fact that there is a parallel in two conceptual displacements: The awakening of the eye to the seeing of its seeing depends on the development of a very specific pedagogy, in which the learning of a body of knowledge is completely secondary to the ability of exercising knowledge by oneself. Lehren teaching remains here, just as Wissen and Schaffen before it, essentially a verb; an activity that one has to exercise constantly in order to have the spirit fit and prepared to employ all its power and creativity in rendering the conceptual letter plastic so as to avoid that it blocks the access to intuition in an inert repetition of the same words. Fichte explores this issue underlying the harmful influence, in medieval and early modern western Europe, of Latin language, that,

according to him, had considerably disturbed and even prevented the development of new philosophical concepts – it is important to highlight that most of the great names of Modern Philosophy were also the first ones to write philosophy in their own languages and not in Latin, being thus responsible for establishing a philosophical vocabulary in modern languages: Hobbes, Hume, Locke in English; Wolff, Kant in German; Descartes, Montesquieu, Rousseau in French; Machiavelli in Italian. The same argument applies to space, as Fichte insists on the necessity of each linguistic community to cultivate the ability to create symbols of the super-sensible from their own vocabulary. It shows the importance of the situation of spirit in the very activity of producing concepts so as to avoid the danger of being hidden behind a conceptual structure produced elsewhere. These multiple evils caused by inertia can only be duly faced through the power of creativity boosted by a pedagogical project; in effect, when a linguistic community repeats inertly the same conceptual structures, it is doomed to formulate the same old problems, remaining thus incapable of grasping its own spatio-temporal peculiarities and the particular social and philosophical problems inherent to it. When conceptual creativity fails, the past will persist in the present and repeat itself in the future; and this past can be a local past or an elsewhere past as it is the case today in so many ancient European colonies. The scholar is then, in a word, responsible for connecting the letter of concepts with the spirit of a certain intellectual ambiance; in order to do it, he shall unleash the self from given conceptual structures in such a way that the self could for the first time contemplate what is given, not as given, but as the result of the forces of the mind anchored in a specific time and space. In this activity, spirit has to progressively develop the ability of tearing oneself away from the given structures of experience for the sake of exploring the formulation of concepts for what is not immediately perceived; for example, to surpass the concepts of door, table, t-shirt, and to go further with concepts like artefacts, work, desire, drive, self, being, image and so on – these are naturally only examples, it is not necessary and not desirable that the spirit of the student satisfy itself with those concepts; he should only use them as a tool of exercise to develop his own capacity of producing new ones, preferably those in connection with the reality and history of the student. Learning to create so as to see beyond the immediately visible, this is a notion of philosophy that emerges from the work of a philosopher that has devoted his life to formulating a philosophy of philosophy.

5: Full text of "The unity of Fichte's doctrine of knowledge"

The unity of Fichte's doctrine of knowledge Item Preview [remove-circle](#) [Share](#) or [Embed This Item](#).

Origins[edit] Fichte was born in Rammenau , Upper Lusatia. The son of a ribbon weaver, [33] he came of peasant stock which had lived in the region for many generations. The family was noted in the neighborhood for its probity and piety. It has been suggested that a certain impatience which Fichte himself displayed throughout his life was an inheritance from his mother. He showed remarkable ability from an early age, and it was owing to his reputation among the villagers that he gained the opportunity for a better education than he otherwise would have received. The story runs that the Freiherr von Militz, a country landowner, arrived too late to hear the local pastor preach. He was, however, informed that a lad in the neighborhood would be able to repeat the sermon practically verbatim. As a result, the baron took the lad into his protection, which meant that he paid his tuition. From this time onward, Fichte saw little of his parents. In October , he was attending the celebrated foundation-school at Pforta near Naumburg. Perhaps his education strengthened a tendency toward introspection and independence, characteristics which appear strongly in his doctrines and writings. He was transferred a year later to study at the Leipzig University. Fichte seems to have supported himself at this period of bitter poverty and hard struggle. There he also became in a member of the Freemasonry lodge "Modestia cum Libertate" with which Johann Wolfgang Goethe was also connected. While he was assimilating the Kantian philosophy and preparing to develop it, fate dealt him a blow: The situation, however, quickly proved disagreeable and he was released. It was thus mistakenly thought to be a new work by Kant himself. This amazing news of a third sun in the philosophical heavens has set me into such confusion". Stirred by the events and principles of the French Revolution , he wrote and anonymously published two pamphlets which led to him being seen as a devoted defender of liberty of thought and action and an advocate of political changes. In December of the same year, he received an invitation to fill the position of extraordinary professor of philosophy at the University of Jena. He accepted and began his lectures in May of the next year. With extraordinary zeal, he expounded his system of " transcendental idealism ". His success was immediate. He seems to have excelled as a lecturer because of the earnestness and force of his personality. He gave himself up to intense production, and a succession of works soon appeared. Atheism Dispute After weathering a couple of academic storms, he was finally dismissed from Jena in as a result of a charge of atheism. For Fichte, God should be conceived primarily in moral terms: There he associated himself with the Schlegels, Schleiermacher , Schelling and Tieck. At first Fichte was a warm admirer of Fessler, and was disposed to aid him in his proposed Masonic reform. Their controversy attracted much attention among Freemasons. Letters to Konstant Philosophie der Maurerei. Briefe an Konstant , where Konstant referred to a fictitious non-Mason. He became a professor of the new university at Berlin founded in By the votes of his colleagues Fichte was unanimously elected its rector in the succeeding year. But, once more, his impetuosity and reforming zeal led to friction, and he resigned in The campaign against Napoleon began, and the hospitals at Berlin were soon full of patients. Just as she was recovering, he himself was stricken down. He died of typhus at the age of Fichte saw the rigorous and systematic separation of "things in themselves" noumena and things "as they appear to us" phenomena as an invitation to skepticism. Rather than invite such skepticism, Fichte made the radical suggestion that we should throw out the notion of a noumenal world and instead accept the fact that consciousness does not have a grounding in a so-called "real world". In fact, Fichte achieved fame for originating the argument that consciousness is not grounded in anything outside of itself. The phenomenal world as such, arises from self-consciousness; the activity of the ego; and moral awareness. His student and critic , Arthur Schopenhauer , wrote: Fichte who, because the thing-in-itself had just been discredited, at once prepared a system without any thing-in-itself. Consequently, he rejected the assumption of anything that was not through and through merely our representation , and therefore let the knowing subject be all in all or at any rate produce everything from its own resources. For this purpose, he at once did away with the essential and most meritorious part of the Kantian doctrine, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori and thus that between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. For he declared everything to be a priori,

UNITY OF FICHTE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE pdf

naturally without any evidence for such a monstrous assertion; instead of these, he gave sophisms and even crazy sham demonstrations whose absurdity was concealed under the mask of profundity and of the incomprehensibility ostensibly arising therefrom. Moreover, he appealed boldly and openly to intellectual intuition, that is, really to inspiration. Our whole age is imbued with a formal striving. This is what led us to disregard congeniality and to emphasize symmetrical beauty, to prefer conventional rather than sincere social relations. I agree perfectly with this whole effort to cling to form, insofar as it continues to be the medium through which we have the idea, but it should not be forgotten that it is the idea which should determine the form, not the form which determines the idea. We should keep in mind that life is not something abstract but something extremely individual. Form is not the basis of life, but life is the basis of form. Imagine that a man long infatuated with the Greek mode of life had acquired the means to arrange for a building in the Greek style and a Grecian household establishment – whether or not he would be satisfied would be highly problematical, or would he soon prefer another form simply because he had not sufficiently tested himself and the system in which he lived.

6: The unity of Fichte's doctrine of knowledge / - CORE

The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge by Anna Boynton Thompson starting at \$ The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge has 8 available editions to buy at Alibris.

7: ON FICHTE'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE KANTIAN UNITY OF THE I | Asli Yazici - www.enganchec

The Doctrine of Degree in Knowledge, Truth, and Reality by Richard Burdon Haldane Hegel and Hegelianism by R. Mackintosh The Russian Revolution by Nicolas Berdyaev.

8: The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge : Jr Josiah Royce :

This is a reproduction of a book published before This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process.

9: The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge : Anna Boynton Thompson :

Search the history of over billion web pages on the Internet.

The art of nature coloring book Briars Book (Circle of Magic (Circle of Magic) Old Rosa Reinaldo Arenas The machine-built body Community members Topographical Survey of the Parish of Sheffield Man to Man When Your Partner Says No 9. Breaking Ranks 122. Fifty shades freed Ethical issues in family therapy The attack on religion The invisible queen. Hudson ter-centenary joint committee Overview of cosmic evolution Life of Sir Walter Raleigh: Founded on Authentic and Original Documents, Some of Them Never . Unit 1 : You and others. Gene and Protein Evolution (Genome Dynamics) Thinking differently: principles of process in living systems and the specificity of being known The Surprising years Lord of the World (Dodo Press) Is Real Love Worth My Life? I wonder why pyramids were built Brave new world worksheets Space launch initiative: A program review Understanding Hydrolats: The Specific Hydrosols for Aromatherapy Save tiger project in india XI. Sixesandsevens The calendar cookbook Proceedings of the 8th World Renewable Energy Congress (WREC VIII) Escaping the Prison of the Intellect Onkyo ht r520 manual Bipan chandra books in tamil The Little Book of Contemplative Photography (Little Books of Justice Peacebuilding) Graduates, year 2007. Conduct disorders of childhood and adolescence Proceedings of Indonesian Association of Geologists Big book of drawing animals When I Think About You, My Friend Some reflections on brain and mind, by R. Brain. The Encyclopedia of World Geography